The Art of the 'Elite Send': How Ramon Borrego Has Earned the Twins Extra Runs

[Matthew Trueblood]

Image courtesy of © Jesse Johnson-Imagn Images

Derek Shelton knows what he has, and how badly it's needed. Ramon Borrego is very much a valued part of the new skipper's staff.

"He's been terrific for us," Shelton said during a pregame media availability early in the team's last homestand. "I think he's had four or five elite sends, already."

Because the Twins offense is neither especially deep nor especially powerful, Shelton has been adamant from Day One that the team needs to be aggressive on the bases. They're not loaded with exceptionally fast runners, but they want to push the envelope whenever possible—to create runs on hits and long outs, without waiting for another positive event. Shelton has called multiple runs the team has tallied "elite sends" by Borrego.

That's a strange notion, in a way. After all, players have to actually create the runs, with a blend of sheer speed, anticipation, fundamental play and physical creativity on close plays. There's no question that the third-base coach plays an important role, but the replacement level for the job is pretty high, right? And most stop/go decisions are pretty easy, right? I watched 75 plays on which the Twins scored to see just how often Borrego really influenced the play, and to what extent. It's time we get a firm handle on what an elite send is.

To begin with, I culled the initial plays I reviewed (including a few non-scoring plays, it was over 80) down to 18 that we'll call 55-grade sends or better. As a refresher, the scouting scale that is one of baseball's essential shorthands runs from 20 to 80, with 50 denoting average. In theory, the scale is meant to track with a normal distribution of skills, so a player whose ability is one standard deviation above the average would get a 60 grade. A player with a skill a full standard deviation below average would be a 40. That part is simple enough.

Slightly less intuitive or familiar, perhaps, is the mathematical implication of those numbers in terms of frequency. In a normal distribution, about 68% of the population should fall within one standard deviation of the average. About 95% should fall within two standard deviations. Therefore, only about 17% of a given sample should be better than a 60 on the scouting scale. Let's call it 20%, since the nature of that scale is to cluster people into grade buckets but the nature of a curve is continuous. I picked out just 18 sends that are even above-average, and of those, I graded seven as 55s. In other words, only about 15% of the plays I studied reached a 60 grade. Already, that's some evidence that a third-base coach might not have the same capacity to impact a play as players do (again: duh). However, I did give Borrego a 70 on five different plays—and one 80. Let's study those plays, to discuss what makes them elite and how it's possible that Borrego has had such a big impact already.

April 2: Twins at Royals - Josh Bell Scores on Sacrifice Fly

One thing should be clear to even a casual fan entering this discussion: It's hard for a third-base coach to have a major impact on a sacrifice fly. They get to advise the runner on whether to go or not, but there's usually a good bit of time to make that choice. The runner starts from a stationary position and can watch the ball and the defender while they wait to break, just as the coach can. I'm the first person I know of who has set themselves the task of grading third-base coach sends like this, but I would venture to guess that there's never been an 80-grade send on a sacrifice fly. Your job just isn't all that important on such a play.

Here, however, Borrego does coach Josh Bell very well. Before the play, he probably reminded Bell of the situation: With one out in the inning already, the default aggressiveness on a sacrifice fly should have been set pretty high. As the ball sailed toward Royals center fielder Kyle Isbel, however, Borrego had to weigh a few factors that pushed against one another. The situation says send a runner if you're unsure, but Bell is extremely slow. Isbel has a strong arm, and had time to get behind the ball and catch it with a bit of momentum toward the plate. Borrego needed to use one of the third-base coach's key tools: a keen acuity for the depth of the ball. This one ended up almost 290 feet from home plate, and with Isbel throwing it in from dead center, there was a risk of hitting the mound and creating a bad bounce if he tried to throw a low, hard, one-hop strike. 

You can see Borrego signal to Bell to go, immediately, but he also runs with him for a few steps, reading Isbel's throw. If it had been especially good, Borrego had a split-second to recall Bell to his base. Instead, he correctly sees that the throw won't get even his slow-footed charge, and lets him go. It's a great play on a tricky one to call.

GRADE: 65/70

April 3: Rays at Twins - James Outman Scores from Second Base on Single

This is the kind of play on which a coach can more often have a visible and significant effect. With only one out, James Outman has to freeze for a moment on a ball in the air, and in this instance, he doesn't get a great start once he starts heading for third base. The ball is hit very hard, which means it gets to the defender quickly.

On such plays, the third-base coach is the runner's eyes, and he has to read the defender for the runner. In this case, Cedric Mullins had to range slightly to his left, and with the ball hit so hard, that forced him to wait for it to come to him. Charging hard to pick the ball on a short hop would have required too tough an angle to risk. That was exacerbated by the way the ball slices slightly back toward dead center, so Mullins has to change direction a bit to get behind the ball as it arrives. He receives it before Outman reaches third base, but fairly flat-footed and fairly deep. That gives Borrego the leeway to send the speedy Outman. 

This was an important run, and with just one out, Borrego could plausibly have taken a more conservative tack. With two trailing runners, though, there would have been a force on the runner if he'd stayed at third, so getting him home there—avoiding the risk of an inning-ending double play or a fielder's choice that retired him at the plate from the next batter—was important. Borrego gave Outman the 'go' order right away, and it paid off.

GRADE: 70

April 7: Tigers at Twins - Luke Keaschall Scores from First Base on Double

Now we're really going to have some fun. For a third-base coach, this is as big a play as the day-to-day grind of the season offers. Yet, almost half of it is a brainless endeavor, really. Ryan Jeffers shoots the ball into right field, and right away, Borrego knows he needs to wind up the windmill for one runner. But there are two runners in his care on this one, and the trailing runner will be the one where something of note actually happens. He has to make sure his lead runner is headed home without incident, but more importantly, he has to start working out all the relevant components of the play—picking up key details in the right sequences, while seeing the big picture the whole time.

Luke Keaschall was on first base, trailing Austin Martin. He had a good secondary lead, and because the ball is hit behind him in a place far from any defender, he immediately knows it will get down and that he can take at least third base. Borrego's attention has to be on Martin for just a moment, but he can spare that, because the ball is clearly heading for the corner.

Whether Keaschall will be able to score, though, depends in some measure on how things go in that corner, so that's where Borrego's eyes need to be. He can check the progress of his runner as Zach McKinstry chops down his stride while drawing near the wall, but he has to see how cleanly McKinstry fields the ball and whether he battles the sidewall at all. That will determine how quickly he gets off a throw, and how strong it is, which will determine whether or not there's a play at the plate. 

It's time to break out a toy that has lots of fun potential future applications for enjoying and understanding the game, but relatively few salient ones right now: Gameday 3D. On the MLB.com Gameday page for any given game, you can click on a play and choose to experience it in a 3D animation. Again, this doesn't often add much, in a world where we have access to multiple video feeds of every play and a remarkable number of numbers telling us what happened, but it can occasionally help us see parts of the field that aren't picked up by the broadcasts. It can also give us an interesting perspective on the game—like that of a third-base coach watching a tricky play developing.

Here's the moment when McKinstry first reaches that ball. We can see Borrego waving Martin home, but look how far off Keaschall is. He's only halfway between second and third. Though McKinstry began the play pretty far from the line, he's covered the ground quickly, and it's not a very deep corner. Sending Keaschall here would be tough, if McKinstry were in position to make a strong throw the instant he got there.

Borrego knows something this still frame can't convey, though: McKinstry is going to need an extra second to get rid of the ball. As you might be able to see (it's a jumble out there), the animation ends up placing three of McKinstry in that corner, because he has to move in ways the tracking technology doesn't deal with well, vis-a-vis the sidewall. He doesn't slam into it or anything, and he doesn't bobble the pickup. But he has to brace himself, and then he has to turn around to make a good throw. A left-handed right fielder would have had an advantage here that was denied to McKinstry, but Borrego doesn't have to think in hypotheticals. He knows that extra half-second will be needed.

While watching and processing this, of course, he's waving his young runner on. Being a third-base coach, like hitting, requires a "Yes, yes, NO" mentality. You have to think you're sending the runner until you see something that stops you, and your runner has to think the same way. Borrego's real decision point, on this particular play, comes here:

This is the moment McKinstry actually releases his throw down the line. Closer to us, you can see Gleyber Torres streaking over to take the relay position. Until now, Borrego has the chance to throw up a late stop sign. Because he knows Keaschall is a fast and aggressive runner coming in with that score-if-you-can mentality, though, he keeps waving him on.

The Tigers' relay is virtually perfect. McKinstry has a strong arm; so does Torres. Both throws are very accurate. There's even an extra, tiny thing working against the Twins: Keaschall got his feet wrong going into third base and had to slow down slightly as he rounded it. But it doesn't quite matter. Keaschall is safe, and Borrego was right to bring him around, despite the defense's good execution.

GRADE: 65/70

April 14: Red Sox at Twins - Byron Buxton Scores from First Base on Single

Earlier in this same game, as you might remember, Byron Buxton scored on a single to center by Keaschall. That one was initially ruled an out and looks even more daring in the scorebook than this does, but if you break it down, you have to deduct points from Borrego for overaggressiveness. It was a line drive to center, played perfectly by Jarren Duran, and had Willson Contreras not leapt to ill-advisedly cut off the throw, Buxton really would have been dead meat at the plate. We're evaluating Borrego's process here, not just the results, so that play doesn't count as an elite send.

This one, perhaps counterintuitively, does. There were no outs in the inning, and the Twins already led by four. They could afford to be a bit more conservative than they had been earlier in the game. Buxton was the trail runner when Trevor Larnach laced a ball into the corner, and though it was a full count, neither Buxton nor Tristan Gray had been attempting a steal on the play. On most balls that are barely doubles, even a fast runner won't score from first base, especially with another runner in front of them.

But Borrego knew a few things. Firstly, he knew Gray would score easily, so he waved him by quickly and turned his attention to Buxton, and to right fielder Wilyer Abreu. He knew Abreu has a strong arm, but he also knew it was Buxton running, so again, he kept the wave up while he gathered data on the unfolding play. Larnach, no matter what the Twins' team-owned media sometimes says, is slow, and as Abreu raced into the corner, Borrego could see that there would be a very makeable play on Larnach if Abreu chose it. Abreu, like McKinstry, was quick to the ball, but unlike McKinstry, he does throw left-handed and would be able to get off a throw quite quickly. His second baseman was out in the same position Gleyber Torres had occupied, and was calling for the throw. Here's the moment at which Abreu committed himself to throw to second, instead of toward home.

You can do the math several different ways, but that was probably the right choice for Abreu—made for the wrong reasons. He correctly diagnosed that he had a much better chance to get an out at second than at home, but that's because he was seeing and thinking about Gray. The lead runner still wasn't home, so as Abreu released a strong throw to the infield, he wasn't considering whether the trail runner would come, too. He wanted the out, and took for granted that Buxton would stop at third.

If Borrego or Buxton had taken anything for granted at any point in the play, that would have been true. Look where Buxton is when Abreu pulls back his arm for the throw. As good as Abreu's arm is, if the throw were coming toward the plate, Borrego would have had to throw up the stop sign. In fact, if he'd even misread the play slightly and thought Abreu would come home, he might have thrown up a premature stop, and had he done that, Buxton wouldn't have been able to get going again and come home even after the throw went to the keystone.

Buxton is always running flat-out and with home plate in his sights, though, and Borrego read the play right. He knew almost before Abreu did that the throw would come to second, and once it did, Buxton was in the clear. This was a case of feeling the rhythm of the play, knowing the spatial variables and the numbers, but also of guessing what the opponent would do in a stressful situation and seizing on an advantage. It's an instance of combined brilliance by Buxton and Borrego.

GRADE: 70

April 21: Twins at Mets - Kody Clemens Scores from Second Base on Single

One difference between being a player and being a coach on the field is that, while a player can benefit from good preparation, a coach can sometimes make a play entirely based on that preparation, with almost nothing else coming into play. This is one such instance, or close to it.

Luke Keaschall hits the ball well, right over the head of Kody Clemens at second base. That's always nice, as a runner. Clemens knew this ball was going to get down right away, based on his pre-pitch check of where the outfielders were playing and on the trajectory of Keaschall's liner. Thus, even with one out, Clemens gets the kind of jump runners often get with two down.

Borrego knew where the outfielders were before the play, too. Luis Robert Jr. had shaded Keaschall fairly strongly toward right-center, which meant this ball was going to force him to come in and over quite a bit. Borrego's angle on the play was far from ideal, because the slice we can see from the camera position high and behind home is tougher to notice from the side. That's what made this play a challenging one for Borrego. He had to read Robert's body and see the way he changed his initial route toward the ball; he had to know that that meant a little extra time getting under control and getting rid of the ball. It got to Robert more quickly because of its slice, but Borrego correctly perceived that it forced the outfielder into a slightly uncomfortable position.

The rest of the play was just balancing situation with scouting report. Yes, with just one out, there would still be a chance to score Clemens from third without a hit, but the bottom of the batting order was due next. The best chance to score was to get Clemens home then and there. Clemens is good at getting around third base cleanly and taking a direct route to the plate without losing steam. Robert has average-plus arm strength, but it was pretty clear that he wasn't playing at full strength. The Twins probably had that in their advance report for the series, but either way, Borrego acted on what he saw. A good throw would have had a good chance to get Clemens, but a good throw would have been difficult for most center fielders on that play, and it proved impossible for Robert. This is what it looks like when a third-base coach smells blood and goes for the kill.

GRADE: 80

April 27: Mariners at Twins - Josh Bell Scores from First Base on Double

Once more, we return to the theme: you have to be "Yes, Yes, No" as a third-base coach. When Keaschall hit a ball down the line, Borrego's job is to see the ways he can get Josh Bell home. In the back of his mind, he has to know that the default decision will be to hold him, because it's Josh Bell, but if the window is open to score him, that has to happen. With two outs, it's especially crucial. With any ball down the line—and this is the third one we've seen—the first thing the third-base coach has to figure out is how close to the sidewall the ball will get and stay. With the play on which Keaschall scored against the Tigers, it was the way Zach McKinstry had to adjust to get a throw off that allowed Borrego to send his man. If the ball kicks off the wall and out into the playing field, instead of going to the corner, that often makes it easier for the defenses and forces a stop sign—but not always. 

In this case, that's very much the pivotal movement. because the ball pulls one of its most treacherous tricks on Rob Refsnyder. Keaschall didn't exactly blister it, and it's already rolling by the time it finds the sidewall, but because there's a small space between the ground and the padding along that wall, when the ball does get to the wall, it hits concrete. It's still moving faster than a fielder is thinking, given that the bounce has died, and it's still spinning in a slightly funky way. It hits the wall (and the rougher dirt under that padding), and it skips slightly. It barely comes off the ground at all, but that's enough to mess up Refsnyder, whose focus had been on getting parallel to the wall for what he thought would be an uncomplicated scoop. He doesn't get low enough—it's been over half a decade since he appeared as an infielder; this ball would be better for a player who still has that instinct to get down to the ball's level—and his barehand stab pushes the ball slightly behind him.

That's Borrego's opening. He had set up and begun giving Bell the wave early. When Refsnyder misplayed the ball, the "no" after the "yes, yes" was flung away. Borrego knew the situation and saw the play develop in time to ensure that his runner never slowed down. It took a review to get it right, but the Twins got their run.

GRADE: 70

---

I'll renew what I said before breaking down each play individually: Third-base coaches affect fewer plays in major ways than is implied by using the 20-80 scale. The decisions one coach would make aren't different enough from those of another coach to merit using that wide a scale. Maybe 30-70 makes more sense for them.

However, going through these this way is still instructive. A third-base coach has to be thinking along with both their own team and the opponent, including riding the emotional wave of a play. Borrego stole another run in Toronto, for instance, when he correctly guessed that a bloop single followed by a high bounce fielded with his back to home plate would leave Daulton Varsho too flustered to throw to the right base. Varsho threw to second, and an extremely aggressive send paid off for the Twins.

The coach has to be in the moment that way. They also have to have their spatial calculation machines turned on at all times. This is where being a baseball lifer is hugely valuable, and it's why you'll probably never see this particular job done by someone who hasn't played the game at a high level. Reading the ball off the bat, checking and remembering defensive positioning, and the simple pattern recognition that lets one estimate distances and read a runner's stride when they're still six steps away from third base all come from having spent a long time immersed in the game and its clock.

Layered over all of that, though, the coach also has to be an analytics maven. They have to think about who's running, which defenders are involved in the developing play, and the score, inning, and base-out state. They have to have carefully calibrated, deeply internalized risk management systems on which they can dial aggressiveness up or down based on all those variables that get discussed as cold theories in pregame meetings and show up on reports. But all of those things are just filters. The coach still has to see the play clearly and make their send/hold decision based on how the actual play before them looks and feels. 

The Twins ran into two bad outs between third base and home plate on Thursday in Washington. Neither was Borrego's fault, exactly, but his aggressive approach does seem to have started creating situations wherein runners are in peril. By Shelton's reckoning, that's ok. The Twins are getting more value from those elite sends than they're losing when one goes wrong. They intend to keep testing defenses, because they probably can't score enough runs to win games consistently without doing so. Borrego will be little celebrated for his role in that, and much maligned when things go wrong—but he's an important part of the team's offense, and he's been a positive influence so far.

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[William K Johnson]

Anyone would be an improvement over Tommy Watkins.

[Bangkok Twins Fan]

13 minutes ago, William K Johnson said:

Anyone would be an improvement over Tommy Watkins.

For sure. I lost count of the times that Watkins waved home runners only to have them tagged out easily at the plate. Borrego seems like a huge improvement. And hey, very good insightful article with some fun videos as well. Thank you!

[Linus]

Maybe more importantly I can’t recall any / many sends where the runner was DOA. He’s done a good job. 

[tony&rodney]

Good work, fun read.

[Coach Wheels]

This is the longest article I've ever read on coaching 3rd base but it might be a sign thst we are officially out of articles to write on the squad 😀

I think this an above average coaching staff but they've been dealt a hand that can't win and the best cards in the deck will be gone by the 4th of July. Being a good teacher is important as a coach and this group is a middle school science class in major league baseball. Keep teaching coaches, I appreciate your time and effort.

[tarheeltwinsfan]

Outstanding article Matthew. I nominate it for best TD article of the month. It takes a real baseball mind to have written this. The analyses of numerous variables  at play during each sequence was fascinating.. During games in high school when I wasn't pitching, our coach had me coach third base.  But our team was so bad that I had little to do as the third base coach. I mainly just used my "superior intellect" to yell what I thought were funny things at the opposing pitcher. "Stick a fork in him, he's all done", and  whenever one of the opposition fielders made an error, I might yell: "Yea, we've got your back pitcher." I even had a trick play where from the third base coach's box, I would fake a run toward home plate, hoping to distract the pitcher. I've never  seen that ridiculous play of mine done anywhere else. I wonder why? Hmmmm.

[Julian Bernick]

I read at least an article here every day and they're always pretty good (I mean, I'll give them a 55 or so at least), but this one was 70-80 range.

[Blyleven2011]

52 minutes ago, Bangkok Twins Fan said:

For sure. I lost count of the times that Watkins waved home runners only to have them tagged out easily at the plate. Borrego seems like a huge improvement. And hey, very good insightful article with some fun videos as well. Thank you!

Watkins waved home to many players that never got tag out at the plate but 12 feet from it ...

Never understood watkins would send a slow runner to his death at home but he would hold a speedy runner a third ...

So far so good for Borrego  ...

[Rod Carews Birthday]

I think it’s nice to call attention to the good things that happen in unsung places like 3rd base coach. There will inevitably be “misses” but it seems like Borrego is off to an excellent start.  

When I started reading this article, I wasn’t very excited, as it looked kind of long for the subject matter, but I have to admit that it sucked me in all the way to the end.  Nice writing!

[Western SD Fan]

I will have to agree with the tone of the commenters and the article that Borrego is definitely an improvement over Watkins.  It seems like he better understands the abilities of the runners on base.  Definitely an improvement over sending runners on all contact plays no matter how silly it may look.  I would disagree about the Clemens send yesterday.  A very short fly ball to center field with average speed just seemed like a terrible idea from the start.  Overall, his approach has seemed to be better so an aggressive error here or there is part of the job.