Matthew Trueblood

I do find it really odd that they've chosen right for him, especially in their home park, where the right fielder's range isn't as important as their ability to field the ball off the wall and make a quick throw, or make a strong peg from the corner. I can only surmise that they don't want to displace or displease Larnach right now. I would hazard a guess that LK will spend much of the last two months in left, instead. Or center? The old Bill James thing was, "If you can throw, but not run, you play right. If you can run, but not throw, you play left. If you can do both, you play center." I agree with Sam that Keaschall's arm will stay below-average even as an outfielder, but I could see it getting to the point where he could play center without causing a problem.

I broadly agree. I think they'll be trying to replace him pretty much for as long as he's a regular, even if that's not the way they present or even conceive of it. But it's certainly a good sign that he's been playable this year. Last year's Brooks Lee didn't belong on a major-league diamond.

Image courtesy of © Jerome Miron-Imagn Images Technically speaking, in his third big-league season, Brooks Lee is playing his third different primary position. He's wearing his third jersey number. It's third base at which he appears to be settling in for the long haul. But the key number around Lee will always be two: two swings, two plans at the plate, two tracks on which he's trying to simultaneously develop into a solid big-leaguer. This year, he's 2-for-2, which is why he's finally becoming that solid player the team expected and hoped for. As a rookie in 2024, Lee found time at three infield spots and showed flashes of a natural feel for the barrel. Overall, though, he hit an anemic .221/.265/.320. It was ugly. His approach was horrendous. He looked not so much overmatched, as confused, which isn't all that surprising. He was a 23-year-old who'd only had about 800 total professional plate appearances before he arrived in the bigs, and as a switch-hitter with two pretty different plans from the two sides of the dish, he needed more reps than that. Despite the atrocious numbers, that first exposure to the majors seemed likely to be good for him. If the seeds of success were sown in that soil of failure, though, the tree didn't bear fruit in 2025. Lee batted just .236/.285/.370 last season, playing virtually full-time in his first full season with the parent club. Technically, it was forward progress, but it felt woefully insufficient, especially as he demonstrated that his athleticism would be a lasting limitation on his value as a defender and baserunner. He was a bad player, even if he was a little less bad than he'd been the year before—and it was harder to wave away the badness on the basis of injuries or inexperience. That's what makes this year so refreshing. He's not some sudden superstar, but you don't have to squint to see the progress or hunt and plead to make the case that he's a viable regular. The move to third base is good for him, defensively. More importantly, he's batting .242/.297/.429. You'll rarely hear me praise a player with merely moderate defensive value and power whose OBP comes in on the light side of .300, but Lee has made some important strides that are much easier to see below the surface. Specifically, as is true of so many switch-hitters, you have to break him down into his two component selves to properly understand him. From the left side, Lee has made some vital improvements in the way he addresses the ball. His swing isn't massively overhauled, but it's a tick faster, and his timing is better. Here are the distributions of his swing timing on fastballs when batting left-handed for his three seasons in the majors: From left to right, these images show: the frequency with which Lee centers the ball on his barrel, horizontally; the frequency with which he's on time, as opposed to early or late; and the frequency with which he hits the ball off the center, the top or bottom side of the bat, or misses above or below it. The easiest way to see what he's changed, in this case, comes on the left, where Lee has gone from most often hitting the ball just toward the end of his bat from the sweet spot when he came up in 2024 to most often hitting the ball just toward the label or handle. Like most hitters, Lee mostly centers up fastballs well, in general, but the fact that he's more often catching the fastball toward the hands a little now tells us something important about what he's looking for and how flexible his approach is. Remember, as a switch-hitter, he's only facing righties when he bats lefty. Being on time for the fastball (as he's done more consistently this year, which you can see in the center image) but catching it slightly off the center of the barrel toward the hands means that he's extending better through the ball. That might mean slightly less hard contact on the heater, but then come the breaking balls: Breaking stuff moves in on a switch-hitter at all times, and Lee is getting them in on his label a bit more this year, but look at the righthand image. He's hitting the ball with the center of the bat, vertically, more often than last year, too. He's not swinging over the top of it as much or as often. And the story is different on offspeed stuff, but similar: Lee's hitting the top half of the ball a bit more on changeups and splitters this season, which might sound bad—but that's coming instead of whiffing altogether, which he's doing less often. Put the whole profile together, and Lee has a much better batted-ball profile from the left side this season. Here's his spray chart from the left side for last year: And here's the same image for 2026 to date: Lee hasn't hit the ball harder this year, left-handed. He's not even effecting a huge change in the frequency with which he lifts the ball. When he does hit it in the air, though, it's much more often going to the pull field, rather than to center. When he hits it well (at least 88 MPH off the bat and a launch angle of at least 10°), he's hitting it on a line more often, rather than hitting the bottom of the ball and flying out lazily. Here's the distribution of his launch angles on such batted balls in 2025: And here's 2026: This stuff is why Lee batted .220/.278/.365 last season from the left side, but is at .253/.299/.463 this season. He's tapped into more power and more overall value on contact. From the left side, he's a low-OBP guy, but the power is legitimate. Twenty of his 25 extra-base hits this year have come as a lefty. From the right side, alas, there's been no significant change to bat path, timing and contact profile. Indeed, there's been (so far) no actual improvement. He had a .677 OPS against lefties last year; he has a .642 OPS against them this year. But there's been one important change: Lee knows what he's looking for now. From the right side, he's become more selective within the zone, which has more than doubled his walk rate from last year, from 3.4% to 7.5%. He's not actually swinging less often, as a whole. He's not even chasing less often. By being willing to let some pitches his righty swing can't generate any punch on go by, though, Lee has made himself a viable hitter from the right side, with more upside. He's striking out less, in addition to walking more. The contact is pretty empty, but he's gotten slightly unlucky from that side, too. This version of Lee can be a useful player for multiple big-league seasons. He might always be the infielder you're hoping to replace with a better one, but plenty of good teams go far with players they always hoped to replace but never got around to actually shaking. Lee's two positions this year mirror his two different swings and two different approaches. He's made two different adjustments this year, based on handedness, and he's increasingly looking like a useful player—even though he's had to do two (or more) things at once almost since the moment he put on a uniform. View full article

Image courtesy of © Jesse Johnson-Imagn Images© Jesse Johnson-Imagn Images The second pitch Zebby Matthews threw Monday night in Minneapolis was a changeup. It leaped off the bat of Shohei Ohtani, and came down 414 feet away, long gone for a leadoff home run. Matthews missed his spot badly, and Ohtani made him pay with a rising line drive to the plaza beyond right field. That wasn't just a one-off, either. Matthews didn't have command of his changeup (almost) all night. He would throw another change to Freddie Freeman later in the first frame; two to Kyle Tucker and one to Tommy Edman in the second; and two to Ryan Ward in the fifth. All six of those pitches missed the zone, and none of them induced a chase. He succeeded only in falling behind with the pitch, and had to shelve it entirely in the third and fourth innings of his outing. Yet, Matthews found a way to hang around. He turned to a slightly hybridized version of his slider that had more movement than his cutter but was harder than his usual slider. he spotted his four-seamer well to all quadrants. Against a top-heavy but lethal Dodgers lineup, he got through the first five innings without giving up another run after that Ohtani shot. In the sixth, not having the change working finally caught up to him. After missing with both a four-seamer and a cutter to Freeman, he left another cutter in the middle of the zone on a 2-0 count. Freeman hammered a game-winning homer, putting the Dodgers up 2-1. All night, as it turned out, only homers by Ohtani, Freeman and Byron Buxton dented the scoreboard. But Matthews recovered nicely. After the Freeman bomb, he walked Mookie Betts, but the breaking of the tie also broke some tension for him. He and catcher Victor Caratini decided to come back to the changeup, doubling up on it to start Max Muncy's at-bat. Both pitches were called strikes. Muncy lined out. Derek Shelton let Matthews keep working, even though he'd already thrown 97 pitches at that point. Alex Call singled, but Matthews then got a flyout from Edman and struck out catcher Chuckie Robinson to escape the jam. In the end, Matthews put up six innings of two-run ball, and threw a career-high 108 pitches. More importantly, he found a way to survive without a pitch he usually throws about a quarter of the time against left-handed batters. If he successfully establishes himself as a mid-rotation starter for the Twins this year, bookmark Monday night's start. It was a huge step forward. The Twins lost, but Matthews gave them every chance to beat the two-time defending World Series champions. He did it without a pitch he'll have a better version of most of the time, through some good on-the-mound problem-solving. He rewarded his manager's faith and discovered a new capacity to pitch beyond his previous limits. View full article

Image courtesy of © Jerome Miron-Imagn Images Over the years, a somewhat facile narrative has attached itself to Josh Bell: every season, he has one good half, and one bad one. It's not quite true, of course. No player's career divides up that neatly; people just tend to generalize to save themselves time when nuance seems unduly weighty. Bell has had some years in which his first- and second-half splits stood in stark contrast to each other, but even using a generous definition of "good" (anything over an .800 OPS) and an unforgiving definition of "bad" (anything under .750), Bell has four "neutral" halves in his eight full seasons of play, to go with six of each of the other two types. In this table, I've bolded halves that count as "good" by the criteria I just described, and italicized the ones that count as "bad." Results Table Rk Split Year ▲ G PA BA OBP SLG 1 1st Half 2017 88 339 .239 .322 .472 2 2nd Half 2017 71 281 .274 .349 .460 3 1st Half 2018 96 374 .261 .342 .396 4 2nd Half 2018 52 209 .263 .383 .440 5 1st Half 2019 88 388 .302 .376 .648 6 2nd Half 2019 55 225 .233 .351 .429 7 1st Half 2021 73 274 .245 .310 .446 8 2nd Half 2021 71 294 .277 .381 .506 9 1st Half 2022 93 394 .311 .390 .504 10 2nd Half 2022 63 253 .194 .317 .289 11 1st Half 2023 82 332 .230 .319 .381 12 2nd Half 2023 68 285 .266 .332 .461 13 1st Half 2024 94 396 .228 .289 .356 14 2nd Half 2024 51 207 .292 .379 .506 15 1st Half 2025 84 326 .219 .307 .372 16 2nd Half 2025 56 207 .267 .353 .489 17 1st Half 2026 70 276 .232 .286 .366 Provided by Stathead: Found with Stathead. See Full Results. Generated 6/16/2026. As Twins fans are finding out, though, facile narratives obscure more complex realities. Bell isn't a guy who just plays at a solid, high level for three months, then slumps for three, or vice-versa. He goes through the same undulations as most hitters; he just has some things that stretch the periods of those rises and falls. For one, he's a switch-hitter. For another, he's always had good (though not elite) plate discipline. Those things set a high floor for him, but the switch-hitting (along with his swing path from each side) also sets a lowish ceiling; he can't reliably produce pulled fly balls in a way that yields lasting power and could make him an elite slugger. Thus, we've already seen Bell go through a streak and a slump in his brief tenure with the Minnesota Twins. He started the season red-hot, then went ice-cold. That's not some acceleration of his career norms for performance variance; he had multiple slumps (and neatly counterbalancing streaks) in 2024 and 2025. As yu can see, though, Bell is on the upswing again. In fact, after Monday night's 2-for-4 showing (including a three-run homer), he's now batting .218/.314/.490 over the last 30 days, with five home runs and five doubles in 102 plate appearances. He's not walking much. In fact, he's swinging quite a bit more than his norm, which is a trend we had better keep an eye on. Still, Bell has entered another productive phase of his sinusoidal batting curve, and his three-run homer Monday night against MacKenzie Gore of the Rangers was a good example of how it's happening. Gore tried to backfoot a breaking ball to Bell, but left it in the lower, inside quadrant of the strike zone. That's a costly mistake to any right-handed batter with power, but especially one who's locked in right now. In fairness to Gore and the Rangers, though, they were trying something clever. On the previous pitch (a 1-0 fastball), Bell had challenged a strike call. It was a heater down and in, but it nipped the corner, and Bell's challenge failed. In addition to leveling the count, that appeal told Texas that Bell wasn't seeing the ball especially well down in that spot. Going back to it with another fastball would be one way to take advantage of that, but they were trying the cousin of that strategy: a pitch that would look like the fastball in the same spot, but then dive under Bell's bat. They asked him, in effect, to get himself out (or at least into a 1-2 hole) by chasing a pitch for which he'd been primed by the previous pitch itself and his own frustrating failure to overturn its outcome. We'll never know what would have happened if Gore had executed better. My guess, though, is that Bell would have just spat on that offering and gotten ahead, anyway. Though the Rangers might have been right to perceive that Bell saw that fastball poorly, they were wrong to conclude that it was because of the location. Here's how we know. New Statcast metrics available at Baseball Savant show us not only by how much batters miss when they whiff, but how their swing timings are distributed within any given sample. We can see how consistently the hitter centers their swing to put the barrel of the bat in the path of the ball, horizontally; how often they line it up vertically; and how often they're on time (versus being early or late) for the pitch. Here are Bell's swing timing distributions by month, for right-handed swings only. This month (and, if I were to re-run this and show you the distribution isolating the time since the middle of May, rather than breaking it up by month for easier visual comparison, you'd see the same thing), Bell is a danger to all left-handed pitchers. See how the orange distribution curves representing June rise higher and are more centered in each of the first two images, relative to the previous months? That's Bell consistently finding the barrel and being on time, whereas he was often early or late and working out to the end of the bat in the two previous months. He's locked in, and when you're on time and the ball is on the center of the barrel, exit velocity is going to follow. Charts like this are going to help us understand and explain slumps and streaks much better than we have in the past; Bell's resurgence in power is no surprise given what we see here. When he's had any trouble at all from the right side, this month, he's found it by getting underneath the ball. Southpaws have had some luck throwing it over his bat, both inside: MTZOVlZfWGw0TUFRPT1fVWxJRFZGd0FWZ0VBQUZBSFhnQUhVZzVUQUFCUlYxWUFWd01CQlZBTUFBVmRBd01E.mp4 and outside: Uk85cm9fWGw0TUFRPT1fQXdJSEJnRlFYMUFBWGxvQlZBQUhCUU5lQUFOUVV3TUFVd01FQWdOVVUxSlJWQUpm.mp4 At this moment, if you try to get Bell out as a right-handed batter by throwing a breaking ball below the zone, you're only setting yourself up for failure. He's not chasing those, and when you miss, he's lined up to punish you ferociously for it. Gore erred as much by even attempting to throw that tricky curveball as by mislocating it. That worked out wonderfully for the Twins, though, and it illustrates another thing we can see more clearly as we get more comfortable with the new Statcast data: everyone's scouting report should be changing often. Sometimes, the back-foot breaking ball is the right pitch to Bell. Right now, he has that covered. The Twins need Bell to continue producing the way he has over the last month. Whether they end up hanging around in the woebegone AL Central or are looking to trade Bell in July or August, they need his bat to keep humming. He's not some unique case of a player tidily cutting their season in half and choosing to hit in just one of the two, but he's certainly prone to long stretches of cold or hot hitting. During the latter type of run, he can win games for you on his own—as he did, practically, in the very first inning Monday night. View full article

Hey that's right! It *IS* Culpepper's butt that is injured!

Exactly. Increasingly, this feels like a draft with a clear top 3, so being 3rd guarantees you access to the top tier. Personally, I like Emerson a lot, and HE feels like the one most likely to fall into their laps...

What I'm really trying to tell you is that Lewis might never belong in a regular big-league lineup again. He needs to be open to position changes because the team is (rightfully) no longer holding his old one open for him. Moving him around isn't about finding a way to get his bat in the lineup, from the team's perspetive. It's about him still having a career, because versatility is one way bad players can hang around a while.

Boy, I just don't see what you're seeing in what Tom wrote. It seems like a very clear-eyed, even-handed take on a player in a very real career crisis! You're sort of acting like Tom is making up the major climb that now lies before Royce, but look at this more reasonably. Lewis has been an atrocious hitter for the last 21 months now, going all the way to August 2024. Lee isn't a viable shortstop, but he's hitting enough that they need to keep giving him some chance to show whether he can stick. Third base is probably his best spot. The team sent Lewis down and installed Lee at his old position! This isn't some flight of fancy; it's what the actual big-league team just did. I think you've gotta grapple with reality a little more here. Royce doesn't have a clear path back to the majors and his most likely one is not as the everyday third baseman. He needs versatility, or a new defensive home where he fits better into someone's plans, even if it's not the Twins'. I don't think any other org is out there hoping to pounce on him for a full-time job at third, either.

I disagree with you about Kreidler, and maybe Gray, too. I believe in Keaschall's bat long-term, but he's still in a tough adjustment phase. I don't think Lee is ever going to be a consistently average-plus hitter. I think the far superior defense should be plenty of motivation for them to keep using Kreidler and Gray in all advantageous matchups (Kreidler every day, Gray against all righties) for a while, to find out what they have there. I'm fine with letting Arcia ride the bench, mostly, but if he keeps hitting like this, you might need to fit him in for OFFENSIVE purposes—and he's certainly a better defender than Keaschall at second, anyway.

Absolutely. I think the best defensive alignment they could field, by far, is Gray at third, Kreidler at short and Arcia at second. I wonder if we see that a few more times in the days ahead.

Give me good results over bad results every time, but I will say, he hasn't been right this month, either. The quality of contact isn't there. The directionality is still off. And behind the scenes, neither Keaschall nor the Twins are satisfied with the progress.

Hitting .270 without power or defensive value is a good way to end up either starting for a very bad team or riding the shuttle between the majors and AAA for a good one...

Image courtesy of © Jordan Johnson-Imagn Images The plate appearance totals don't match up perfectly, but it's as close as you could ask it to be. Heading into Memorial Day, Luke Keaschall has played exactly 49 regular-season games in 2026, which is the same number he played in 2025. This time, he knows the daily grind of the majors better. This time, he hasn't had his progress interrupted by injuries. One would hope that he would be proving himself a robust part of the Twins' future, even if he couldn't quite replicate last year's tremendous rookie showing. Instead, the comparison of his freshman and (incomplete) sophomore efforts looks like this: 2025: 207 PA, .302/.382/.445, 4 HR, 19 BB, 29 SO 2026: 201 PA, .233/.318/.307, 1 HR, 19 BB, 32 SO He remains very good at putting the ball in play, but all the sting has been sapped from Keaschall's stick. He didn't exactly obliterate the ball last year, but his average exit velocity and his hard-hit rate are notably down this year. He overachieved in terms of hitting for both power and average last season, but even at a fundamental quality-of-contact level, he's seen a real degradation this year. Over the weekend, he was benched on consecutive days, as manager Derek Shelton elected to give him the same treatment he gave Matt Wallner and Royce Lewis during their own profound offensive struggles—right before each was shuttled off to the minors. Keaschall is younger, has hit better and is more clearly a part of the team's vision for the future than either Lewis or Wallner, so he's not likely to be optioned any time soon. As Shelton commits to making playing time a question of merit and production, though, Keaschall is already losing out. Brooks Lee, Ryan Kreidler, Orlando Arcia and Tristan Gray may not be Murderer's Row, but they all have substantially better offensive numbers than Keaschall has this year—and Keaschall is, by a wide margin, the worst defensive infielder in the group. All this is fairly shocking, because Keaschall actually came to camp this year having improved in what looked like the one area that would limit him as a hitter: bat speed. Last season, his average swing speed was just 66.9 miles per hour, according to Statcast—one of the lowest marks in the league. It's not possible to be any kind of power hitter with so little bat speed, so it looked as though Keaschall would need to use his speed and good placement of the ball even to consistently generate doubles in the majors. That he ran into four homers in a third of a season's playing time felt semi-miraculous. In theory, he's made a major upgrade this spring. His average swing speed is now 69.2 MPH. That's still well below average, but batters who find the barrel often can produce power at that level. Spencer Horwitz, Michael Busch, Will Smith, Cody Bellinger, Trent Grisham and other guys who have proved themselves capable of 20-plus homers a year live in that range. Admittedly, none of those are great comps for Keaschall, in terms of body type, handedness or bat path, but the point stands. You can have a pretty high ceiling as a hitter, once you get to 69 MPH or so. In practice, this has been nothing but bad for Keaschall—at least so far. Bat speed isn't primarily about the force you impart on the baseball because of that speed; you can generate just as hard a batted ball by squaring it up well. Bat speed matters, instead, because it lets you decide later and pull the trigger on the swing later—but so far, Keaschall has had no luck in redeeming that advantage for real value. With no noticeable or measurable change in his swing path and a significant increase in his bat speed, our default expectation should be that Keaschall would make contact farther in front of his body this year than he did in 2025. Instead, his contact point is almost identical to where it was last year. That tells us that he's making proper theoretical use of the advantage he's gained by swinging faster; he's deciding later. In practice, though, that's creating more problems than it's solving. Here's Keaschall handling a fastball down the middle the way a hitter like him should, last August. ZzY4bmxfWGw0TUFRPT1fRGdsWUFnQlZBMWNBQ2xVS1VBQUhDUVlIQUZnQlZBSUFWMXdDVXdJQkJnVlNWQWRW.mp4 This is Keaschall as we all came to know him as a rookie: direct to the ball, frighteningly accurate with the barrel, and (perhaps most importantly) consistently on time. Now, here he is against another fat heater, last month. bGJ3a0JfWGw0TUFRPT1fQlZkVlhGVURVVkFBQVZFQ1V3QUhVdzVRQUFOVFYxY0FCbEJSVWdBTlZ3VldCQUlD.mp4 The temptation, when you see a batter foul a fastball off to the opposite field, is to say they were late on it. Watch closely, though. Keaschall wasn't late here. Rather, he was a hair early, in the timing and the shape of his newly accelerated swing. Set the moments at which he made contact on each pitch side-by-side, and you can see what I mean. Keaschall's arms are actually more extended in the still on the right. He misses the barrel and clips the ball with the high/outside part of his bat because he's already rotated a hair too far. This is normal, if a bit unfortunate, for a hitter who's newly added some bat speed. It's great to swing faster, but you have to learn to stay on time, too. That's a quick glimpse at the fight not to be too early, once you get faster. Now, here's how you can end up a little too late. Here are two cutters away from Keaschall, in early counts. One from last September: b0daM1hfV0ZRVkV3dEdEUT09X0J3aFdBRkVBVkFZQUQxSUxWZ0FIQTFRREFBQlRBbFlBQlFjQ0F3b0ZCbEpWQUF0Vw==.mp4 And one from April: cU93MFFfWGw0TUFRPT1fQXdZSEFsUlFVUVlBRGdNSFZRQUhWUTlmQUZrR0FBTUFBUWNHVkZCWEFRRUJCd1JU.mp4 Keaschall hit both balls pretty squarely, but as any modern hitting coach will tell you, the difference between a squarely-hit ball pulled in the air and one up the middle on the ground is the difference between payday and pain. Keaschall got around the first of these offerings; he couldn't do so on the second. He's swinging faster this year, but you can't just swing fast; you have to swing on time. Here's the moment at which Keaschall first begins the descent phase of his leg kick—when his swing really begins, as opposed to his load—on each pitch. Last year, he was starting that part of his move before the pitch left the pitcher's hand. This year, it's more often coming just after release. The difference seems tiny, until you remember that the projectile he's trying to hit (at just the right angle, mind you) is coming in on the north side of 90 miles per hour and that the space in which he can produce the better kind of batted ball runs perhaps six inches from front to back. Again, in the long run, this should still be a good thing. Being able to decide later should yield better swing decisions, and if Keaschall decides he still needs to cheat a bit more to produce the contact he wants, he can now sacrifice some contact for power that was unreachable when his swing was one of the five or six slowest in the game. There are no guarantees about getting this evolution right, of course. Plenty of players have gotten permanently broken by trying to shore up some weakness, insufficiently cognizant of the costs of that improvement or simply unable to pay them without going talent-broke. On balance, though, it's fair to stay optimistic about Keaschall as a hitter. This adjustment period has been painful, but it's part of the process of going from good to (knock on wood) great. View full article

Versatility never hurts but Royce needs such an offensive overhaul. Why complicate it by asking him to learn a new position that also puts more pressure on the bat? I already thought demoting him was a head start on sending him somewhere (anywhere?) else this summer, but moving Lee to third so soon after they did it only increases my conviction about that.

It's a bit interesting that they waited until Tristan Gray left for paternity leave to do it, though. I wonder if Lee will slide back to short (for a bit) once Gray returns, or whether it'll now be Gray and Kreidler alternating at short with Lee at third.

And, since he's not really good defensively at any spot and has no speed, not even that. He has to hit to be a big-leaguer at all.

Image courtesy of © Jordan Johnson-Imagn Images By no means have the 2026 Twins gotten lucky. In fact, they can't catch a break. Their run differential (230 runs scored, 231 allowed) implies a 25-25 record, but they're 23-27. They lost their ace to season-ending elbow surgery on the first day of full-squad workouts in the spring, and their in loco Pablosis ace, Joe Ryan, has had multiple disruptions to his preparation and performance. Their star center fielder went off to international duty and found himself benched, slowing his start to the season. They had two strong breakout candidates in their rotation for the first month, but both are currently on the injured list. Now, their primary catcher is shelved for weeks by a broken bone in his hand. Their top two prospects got hurt in Triple-A. Given all that (and especially given the aforementioned 23-27 record), though, things feel oddly hopeful. The Twins are 5.5 games behind the Guardians for first place in the AL Central, but they've already proved they can hang with that team, beating them twice in three games at Progressive Field earlier this month. They're only 1.5 games out of playoff position. According to FanGraphs, they have a 23.8% chance to make the playoffs—down from their highest point during their early-season hot streak, but right in the same range they've been in for the last four weeks or so. While neither Matt Wallner nor Royce Lewis left the team much choice but to demote them to Triple-A, this situation made that decision both easier and more urgent. Ditto for their replacement of Simeon Woods Richardson in the starting rotation. Because of what now seem to be real problems—and not just slow starts—for the Royals, Tigers, Red Sox, Orioles, Mariners, Astros and Blue Jays, the door to the playoffs remains open to this team. To give themselves a chance to push through it, the team needed to make changes. Here's a position-by-position breakdown of all 30 teams' wins above average, courtesy of Baseball Reference. The Twins' totals are highlighted. Rk Total All P SP RP Non-P C 1B 2B 3B SS LF CF RF OF (All) DH PH 1 Atlanta Braves9.5 ATL4.8 ATL3.9 SDP1.4 LAD6.3 BAL0.9 ATL1.9 STL1.7 LAD1.8 KCR2.6 SEA1.5 LAD2.2 STL2.1 BOS3.2 PHI1.0 ATL0.2 2 Los Angeles Dodgers9.3 NYY4.3 MIL3.8 PHI1.2 CHC5.8 CHC0.7 ATH1.3 MIL1.7 CHW1.2 MIA1.7 NYY1.3 CHC1.5 BOS1.8 CHC2.7 LAD1.0 LAD0.2 3 New York Yankees7.3 PHI3.4 NYY3.6 ATL0.9 ATL4.7 ATH0.7 BOS1.1 PIT1.4 CLE1.2 CIN1.4 DET0.9 LAA1.1 ARI1.8 NYY2.7 HOU0.9 CHC0.1 4 Milwaukee Brewers3.5 MIL3.4 TBR2.5 COL0.8 BOS3.6 MIN 0.6 NYY1.1 MIA1.3 ARI1.0 NYY1.3 CHC0.6 BOS1.1 NYY1.4 LAD2.6 TBR0.9 BOS0.0 5 Cleveland Guardians3.4 LAD3.0 CLE2.5 NYY0.7 NYY3.0 DET0.5 CHW1.0 CHC1.3 TEX0.7 WSN1.0 BAL0.5 MIN 0.9 WSN0.8 SEA1.9 ATL0.9 WSN0.0 6 Chicago Cubs3.0 CLE2.7 CHW2.4 LAD0.6 STL2.5 MIL0.3 HOU0.9 SEA1.3 KCR0.5 CLE0.9 TBR0.3 ATL0.8 TEX0.7 TEX1.5 CLE0.3 NYY0.0 7 Tampa Bay Rays1.7 ATH2.6 ATH2.4 ATH0.2 TEX2.2 SDP0.3 STL0.6 SFG1.1 HOU0.4 DET0.7 MIN 0.3 TOR0.7 CHC0.6 WSN1.3 CHC0.3 TBR0.0 8 Texas Rangers1.7 DET1.8 MIN 2.4 MIA0.2 ARI1.7 ATL0.3 PIT0.5 ATL1.1 SFG0.4 PIT0.7 BOS0.3 TEX0.6 LAD0.3 ARI1.1 MIL0.2 MIN -0.1 9 Athletics1.7 CHW1.6 PHI2.2 DET0.2 TBR1.1 LAD0.1 MIL0.4 CHW0.5 TBR0.3 TBR0.7 WSN0.3 SEA0.4 ATL0.2 ATL0.9 STL0.2 PIT-0.1 10 Chicago White Sox1.6 TOR1.6 LAD2.2 SEA0.2 HOU0.9 BOS0.1 SDP0.3 CLE0.3 CHC0.1 LAA0.5 TEX0.2 WSN0.2 CLE0.1 STL0.8 BOS0.1 ARI-0.1 11 Boston Red Sox1.1 SDP1.6 TOR1.8 CLE0.1 WSN0.7 TEX-0.1 TEX0.3 LAD0.3 TOR0.1 ARI0.5 LAD0.1 BAL0.1 KCR0.1 CLE-0.3 BAL0.1 HOU-0.1 12 Seattle Mariners0.7 MIN 0.8 DET1.6 SFG0.0 SEA0.7 KCR-0.1 CHC0.3 LAA0.2 DET0.0 HOU0.5 CIN0.1 PIT0.0 SEA0.0 TOR-0.3 NYY0.0 TEX-0.1 13 Philadelphia Phillies0.5 TBR0.6 PIT1.3 TEX-0.1 CLE0.7 HOU-0.2 BAL0.2 TBR0.2 SEA-0.1 CHW0.3 PHI-0.1 NYY0.0 TBR-0.1 BAL-0.4 WSN-0.1 KCR-0.2 14 Arizona Diamondbacks0.3 COL0.1 KCR0.7 TOR-0.1 PIT0.5 STL-0.2 CIN0.2 ARI0.2 PIT-0.1 CHC0.3 ATL-0.1 ARI-0.1 PIT-0.2 MIN -0.4 CIN-0.1 CIN-0.3 15 Kansas City Royals0.1 SEA0.0 CIN0.7 ARI-0.3 KCR0.4 COL-0.3 LAD0.2 TEX0.0 BOS-0.2 TEX0.2 COL-0.2 CHW-0.1 HOU-0.3 PIT-0.4 NYM-0.1 SDP-0.3 16 Pittsburgh Pirates0.1 KCR-0.3 SDP0.2 CHC-0.4 MIL0.1 PIT-0.3 PHI0.2 BAL0.0 ATL-0.2 SDP0.2 MIL-0.2 NYM-0.1 NYM-0.4 TBR-0.5 COL-0.1 MIA-0.3 17 St. Louis Cardinals-0.3 MIA-0.3 SEA-0.2 MIL-0.4 CHW0.0 MIA-0.4 MIN 0.1 ATH-0.1 LAA-0.3 STL0.2 PIT-0.2 CLE-0.1 CHW-0.4 KCR-0.6 ATH-0.2 CHW-0.3 18 Minnesota Twins -1.1 PIT-0.4 LAA-0.2 NYM-0.4 BAL-0.8 ARI-0.4 TBR0.0 WSN-0.1 COL-0.3 LAD0.1 CHW-0.2 KCR-0.1 ATH-0.4 CHW-0.7 TEX-0.3 ATH-0.3 19 Detroit Tigers-1.4 TEX-0.5 TEX-0.4 BOS-0.5 ATH-0.9 NYM-0.4 WSN-0.2 BOS-0.2 ATH-0.4 MIL0.0 NYM-0.3 HOU-0.2 TOR-0.5 NYM-0.8 DET-0.3 SEA-0.3 20 Toronto Blue Jays-1.6 NYM-0.9 STL-0.4 CHW-0.7 CIN-1.6 SFG-0.4 ARI-0.2 DET-0.2 STL-0.4 SFG-0.1 CLE-0.3 SDP-0.3 LAA-0.6 LAA-0.8 SEA-0.4 BAL-0.3 21 San Diego Padres-2.1 ARI-1.4 MIA-0.5 KCR-1.0 MIN -1.9 TOR-0.5 TOR-0.2 NYY-0.3 WSN-0.5 ATH-0.1 SDP-0.4 MIL-0.3 COL-0.7 HOU-0.9 LAA-0.4 LAA-0.3 22 Miami Marlins-2.4 CIN-1.4 NYM-0.6 WSN-1.0 LAA-1.9 SEA-0.5 COL-0.2 CIN-0.4 CIN-0.6 TOR-0.2 HOU-0.4 PHI-0.3 SFG-0.8 CIN-1.3 ARI-0.4 SFG-0.4 23 Cincinnati Reds-3.0 SFG-2.4 COL-0.7 MIN -1.6 MIA-2.1 CIN-0.5 LAA-0.3 KCR-0.4 PHI-0.6 NYM-0.3 STL-0.4 MIA-0.3 MIL-0.9 PHI-1.3 SDP-0.4 NYM-0.4 24 Washington Nationals-3.2 BOS-2.5 ARI-1.0 PIT-1.7 SFG-2.4 TBR-0.5 MIA-0.4 MIN -0.5 NYM-0.7 BAL-0.3 SFG-0.5 CIN-0.5 CIN-0.9 MIL-1.4 SFG-0.4 MIL-0.4 25 Houston Astros-3.8 CHC-2.8 HOU-1.7 TBR-1.9 PHI-2.9 LAA-0.5 NYM-0.5 TOR-0.5 MIL-0.7 PHI-0.3 ATH-0.5 COL-0.6 PHI-0.9 COL-1.5 MIN -0.5 CLE-0.4 26 New York Mets-4.8 STL-2.8 BOS-2.0 BAL-2.0 DET-3.2 WSN-0.7 SFG-0.6 HOU-0.6 MIN -0.7 ATL-0.4 TOR-0.5 SFG-0.7 BAL-1.0 DET-1.7 KCR-0.5 PHI-0.4 27 San Francisco Giants-4.8 LAA-3.3 CHC-2.4 CIN-2.0 TOR-3.2 CLE-0.7 CLE-0.6 PHI-0.7 SDP-0.8 SEA-0.4 ARI-0.6 TBR-0.7 SDP-1.2 ATH-1.8 MIA-0.6 STL-0.4 28 Colorado Rockies-5.0 WSN-3.9 SFG-2.4 STL-2.4 SDP-3.7 PHI-0.8 SEA-0.8 NYM-0.7 NYY-0.9 MIN -0.4 KCR-0.6 STL-0.9 MIA-1.2 SDP-1.9 CHW-0.9 TOR-0.6 29 Los Angeles Angels-5.2 HOU-4.7 BAL-2.8 HOU-3.0 NYM-3.9 NYY-0.9 KCR-0.9 COL-1.0 BAL-1.0 BOS-0.5 MIA-0.9 ATH-0.9 DET-1.5 SFG-2.0 TOR-1.0 COL-0.7 30 Baltimore Orioles-5.7 BAL-4.9 WSN-2.9 LAA-3.2 COL-5.1 CHW-1.1 DET-1.4 SDP-1.1 MIA-1.0 COL-1.0 LAA-1.3 DET-1.1 MIN -1.6 MIA-2.4 PIT-1.2 DET-0.8 Coming into this season, any hopes for this club to contend were anchored to their starting rotation being good. That hasn't happened in the way fans or the front office hoped and expected, in that Pablo López is out for the year and both Mick Abel and Taj Bradley have been sidelined, but lo, the unit has been a strength, after all. Bailey Ober is settling in as an obviously usable (though, just as obviously, vulnerable) keep-you-in-the-game guy. Woods Richardson was a disaster, but Zebby Matthews has looked just as good as Woods Richardson did bad. Bradley is on the cusp of returning to a rotation that now includes Connor Prielipp as a full and semi-permanent member, with fellow hard-throwing lefty Kendry Rojas as a more provisional piece. With Woods Richardson out of that picture, the team has come round to enjoying both ample upside and enviable depth in their starting corps, by however circuitous a route. Ryan, Ober, Bradley, Prielipp, Matthews, and whichever of Abel and Rojas is the right mix of available and effective can be the starting pitching depth chart of a playoff team. The (relatively) proactive fix of swapping Woods Richardson out for Matthews is echoed throughout the roster, where the team is (as expected) playing an even harder game of Whack-a-Mole. They entered the season with an utterly underpowered bullpen, and that unit still hasn't been good, so far. However, they're starting to cobble together a group that can be good, in the medium term. Already, they've churned through several external additions (Garrett Acton, Luis García, and Yoendrys Gómez), but more telling is what they've done with their internal options. Gone is Justin Topa, a roster casualty whom the team also couldn't trust anymore. Into the mix are Woods Richardson (who has a real chance to be useful in a long relief role, if deployed correctly) and Andrew Morris, who has unceremoniously claimed the mantle of relief ace. Rojas might yet spend some time in the pen, too, as the rotation gets healthier and stabilizes. No team has gotten worse performances from its right fielders than the Twins, thanks to Wallner's all-around atrociousness, but he's now out of the frame. Minnesota is 26th in wins above average from third basemen, but now, Lewis is out of the way, too. The replacements for those players won't put the team in the top echelon at either spot, but they have a real chance to be better than Lewis and Wallner. The outline of a decent team is coming into focus. That invites the question: What's next? What does the team need to do to keep improving, so they can take advantage of this unexpected opportunity to stay relevant all summer? Firstly, as the chart shows, things still aren't good at shortstop. Brooks Lee has responded better to the influence of new hitting coach Keith Beauregard than his fellow last-wave top prospects, Wallner and Lewis, but he's still only batting .248/.299/.388. He's doing a slightly better job of making contact against breaking and offspeed stuff, but that's the only notable change in his profile. Nor has he become a viable defensive shortstop. Lee almost certainly could play a solid third base, and his bat is playable. In the medium term, then, the move is obvious: call up Kaelen Culpepper, test him at short, and slide Lee over. That will be risky at any point this year, though, and Culpepper isn't quite ready for it yet. Right now, the team will stick with Lee at that position, and the first change we're likely to see will be a slow shift toward more matchup play. Tristan Gray, Orlando Arcia and Ryan Kreidler form an underwhelming but extremely intriguing collection of role players on the infield. Gray brings a left-handed bat, with enough bat speed to be dangerous. Kreidler looked like he would never hit in the big leagues, but in a tiny sample this year, he's hitting in the big leagues. Arcia brings the most experience defensively, and while he'd be no more than a minor upgrade on Lee's glove at short, he would be a big step up from Luke Keaschall's glove work at second. That brings us to Keaschall, who has belatedly pulled his OPS to the right side of .600. He's just not going to work as a defensive second baseman, though any real move to another position has to wait, right now. He can hit enough to outpace his defensive woes, though, and the team now has several guys on the roster whom Derek Shelton can use to mitigate the damage Keaschall can do in the field. It won't be easy for the team to sustain the momentum they've built by winning three of their last four series. Ryan Jeffers's absence looms large. There are guys on this roster overperforming, and guys already coming back to Earth after hot starts. (Witness Trevor Larnach's .217/.280/.326 batting line in May.) They have a 10-game road trip to survive, beginning Friday, in which they'll play the Red Sox, White Sox and Pirates. Don't forget, either, that this team is just 23-27. They haven't exactly surged. They've just maintained a decent pace longer than expected. However, the chance before them is real. By staying afloat into (at least) the final third of May, they've checked the box Tom Pohlad put on their to-do list over the winter, when he made the then-improbable claim that the team would contend this year. Pohlad said last month that he would supplement the roster via trade this summer, if new top executive Jeremy Zoll came to him with a chance to do so. Now, that feels less like a pipe dream and more like a possibility. By winning just enough to stay alive, Zoll, Shelton and the team have bought themselves enough time to fix some of their most glaring flaws. View full article

What else are you hoping for??

Feels like one of those names that shows up a lot in the Boston phonebook, so sure! I mean if you mean AROLDIS, then no.