Paul D

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

The majority of Twins fans are treating the ownership as the bogeyman for the team’s demise, I’m here to pass the blame to the person who is most deserving of that title.
The Twins signed Carlos Correa to a “pillow” contract in March 2022 for $105,300,00 over 3 years which paid him $35,100,000 for 2022. In the 4 years prior to free agency Correa had a 2.9 WAR in 110 games, 3.8 WAR for 75 games, 1.6 WAR for 58 games and 7.3 WAR for 148 games. No question that he had a career year at the perfect time for reaching free agency both for on-field performance and player health.
The Twins had never been a player in free agency, but when Correa became available for short-term money the Twins decided that here was their opportunity for relevance. As happened in 2021, Correa had another career year with a 5.3 WAR for 136 games. Because of opt outs Correa decided to re-enter the free agency market where he found 2 teams willing to give huge contracts for crazy years. The problem for Correa became his medicals. Both the Giants and Mets rescinded their offer when their team physicians had found issues with his feet that they felt would cause the contract not to age well. Re-enter the Twins with a shorter term contract for similar annual salary. Their medical people gave their blessing to the term of the guaranteed years and the Twins resigned him thinking that had pulled off a heist of epic proportion. Well I don’t have to remind you of the results after this signing; in 2023 he had a 1.3 WAR in 135 games, in 2024 a 3.7 WAR but in 87 games and in 2025 a 0.1 WAR in 93 games before being traded. It looks like he is a better player in his contract year.
Now onto the blame game. For the initial signing, Derek Falvey was able to convince Twins ownership that this was a deal that would give credibility to the franchise and was worth the 1 year investment. With the promise of a surge in attendance and playoff money, ownership agreed. The business had started accumulating debt and a successful season on the field was the most painless way of addressing their growing liabilities on the balance sheet.
After a 7.3 WAR Correa was certainly worth $35M per year and with the opt outs, he was obviously going to re-enter the free agent market if he had a decent year. Well he had a 5.3 WAR year and filed for free agency after the 2022 season. When the market dried up and the news of medical issues became public and with many big market teams already having an elite player at shortstop, the Twins had another opportunity to resign an elite player for about the same pay but with fewer years than others offered. Somehow ownership again agreed to take on the financial burden.
In 2023 the Twins had their greatest success in recent memory. They finished 1st in the Central Division with a 87–75 record and swept the Blue Jays in the Wild Card round, before finally losing 3-1 in the ALDS. At this time the farm system was ready to produce and there were some attractive players who had reached free agency. Instead of: 1) signing a player to fill-in gaps through free agency, or 2) trading prospects for established major leaguers, ownership on a $30M cut from the salary budget.
Apparently at this time the Pohlad’s re-examined their finances and, in spite of logic telling them they needed to further invest, they had to revert back to pre-Correa payroll.
I don’t think that it was a coincidence that the $30M of decrease in budget was just about Correa’s salary. While we may blame ownership for reducing the payroll, I’m placing the blame totally with Derek Falvey for making the signing in the first place. A team without Correa at shortstop could have fared very well, especially if they were able to invest $10M of that $30M on player acquisitions. Instead he bet on Correa being at his prime.
My feeling is that Derek Falvey should have faced the guillotine rather than Rocco (which even he admitted) or Joe Pohlad.
Falvey has a monopoly of control and whether it is controlling the business side of the organization, or through pre-game meetings with his manager to give his opinion on decisions that should be made by his manager, he has authority well beyond his capabilities. Until the business model is redefined where the ownership gives Falvey the money for groceries, he does the shopping and the manager decides what to cook, the franchise will continue resting near the bottom of the standings.
The best solution is to get rid of Falvey.

Card Collecting in the Early 1900’s
Card collecting in the early 1900’s was before my time and my dad’s, but not my grandfather’s. He arrived in Ellis Island in 1907 but did not acquire a taste for baseball or card collecting in his lifetime. If he had it would have been great because the T206 cards (1909-1911) common cards are worth at least $50 each in the 520 card set.
Unlike later baseball cards the T206 cards came in packs of cigarettes, issued by the American Tobacco Company. And because of that, the most sought after card ever is the Honus Wagner card that was card number 500 in the set. For those unfamiliar, the card was part of the original issue but Wagner refused to allow production of his card. Most publications list his objections to the cards because it encouraged people, especially youngsters, to buy cigarettes to obtain cards. I have also seen where he objected because he had not received adequate compensation to appear on the cards. The American Tobacco Company halted production of the card when it received notification of Wagner’s objections, but there had already been a few of his cards printed and inserted into packs. The number of Wagner cards that escaped is impossible to verify, but the estimates range from 50 to 200.
In August of 2021 a Wagner was sold at auction for $6.6 million and was rated a SGC 3 (an independent appraiser rating where a perfect card is a SGC 10). In August 2022 a SGC 2 (lesser condition) sold for $7.25 million.
Being a long time collector myself, I bought a T206 a number of years ago, it was a Frank “Home Run” Baker card. Not sure how much I paid for it, but currently it is valued by Beckett from $250 to $400 depending on condition. I certainly didn’t pay that much at purchase time, but I would guess a card that is over 115 years old of a Hall of Famer should have decent value.
In addition to the T206 set, there was also a T205 set from 1911, also by the American Tobacco Company, a 1914 and 1915 issue by Cracker Jack and 1916 by The Sporting News.
Card Collecting in the 1930’s
Card collecting in the 1930’s was before my time, but not my dads. The main focus on cards in the 1930’s was the Goudey set. The cards were the first to contain gum and many of the cards had a Big League Gum banner on the front of the card. The card was square in shape and smaller than today’s cards. Rather than a photo of the player, it seemed like more of a painting. The 1933 Goudey set was the first issue since the 1916 Sporting News set.
Fortunately for me, my dad loved baseball and collected baseball cards, and unlike most kids, he or my grandmother never threw his cards away.
The highlight of the set were multiple versions of some of the greats. There were 4 different Babe Ruth card. One of the cards had a double run (had twice as many printed as the normal card), but still is a very valuable card. Two of the other three cards, however, are worth more. There were also multiple cards of players like Lou Gehrig, Jimmy Foxx, Mel Ott, Goose Goslin, Rogers Hornsby, Lefty O’Doul, Bill Terry, Carl Hubbell and 3 of Joe Cronin.
There was one card issued in 1934. It was card number 106. There was no #106 in the original set and to handle complaints from collectors they issued a card of a retired superstar, Napolean “Nap” Lajoie and sent this card numbered 106 to those that complained and offered the card through a mail in offer. Even though the Lajoie is more scarce, one of the Ruth’s is of equal value. Beckett places a value of $25,000 to $60,000 for both the Lajoie and the #53 Ruth, $20,000 to $50,000 for the Ruth #181, and $15,000 to $40,000 for Ruth #144 and #149. A Jimmy Foxx (2) is valued at $1,000 to $2,500 and Lou Gehrig # 160 at $800 to $2,000 and #92 from $6,000 to $15,000.
There is one card of high value for a player who had an average career. That player was Morris (Moe) Berg. Moe Berg would be a spy for the US during World War II and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his contributions during the war. Moe’s card #158 is valued from $400 to $1,000.
In all, there were 240 cards in the set and it was full of Hall of Famers. Included were: Dazzy Vance, Ted Lyons, Bill Dickey, Pie Traynor, Kiki Cuyler, Paul Waner, Jimmy Foxx (2), Tony Lazzeri, Al Simmons, Heinie Manush (4), Frankie Frisch, Babe Ruth (4), Red Ruffing, Waite Hoyt, Joe Cronin (3), Burleigh Grimes, Eppa Rixey, Mickey Cochrane, Red Faber, Tris Speaker, Lou Gehrig (2), Travis Jackson, Earle Combs, Nap Lajoie, Goose Goslin (2), Rabbitt Maranville, Rogers Hornsby (2), Bill Terry, Mel Ott (2), Chuck Klein, Sam Rice, Herb Pennock, Leo Durocher, Joe Sewell, Lloyd Waner, Earl Averill, Rick Ferrell, Gabby Hartnett, Hack Wilson, Lefty Grove, Charlie Gehringer, Dizzy Dean, Billy Herman, and Carl Hubbell (2). That’s 58 Hall of Famer cards in the set, almost 25% of the cards. And to add value to this series, it would be their rookie card also.
There would be other card sets from the 1930’s such as 1934 Goudey, 1935 Goudey (4 in 1), 1936 Goudey, 1933 Tattoo Orbit, 1934-36 Diamond Stars, 1935 Schutter-Johnson Candy, 1936 National Chicle and 1939 Play Ball, but none that would have the value of the 1933 Goudey set.
Card Collecting in the 1950’s
Growing up in the 50’s and 60’s was so different than growing up in later years, especially when it came to baseball card collecting.
If I could find a Delorian and go back in time, my first trip would be back to 1952 so I could spend my money hoping to open a pack or two or three to get the Mantle rookie. Next I would wait a couple of year and take all of my 1955 and 1956 Topps cards and store them in a hard case rather than “pitching” them at school with my friends or putting them into the spokes of the front wheel of my bike to get that awesome sound.
The 1955 and 1956 Topps were iconic sets. Both were set in landscape (horizontal) view rather than the more common portrait view. The 1955 set had some awesome rookie cards, namely Roberto Clemente, Sandy Koufax, and future Twin, Harmon Killebrew. Clemente is valued from $3,000 to $8,000, Koufax $2,000 to $5,000 and Killebrew $300 to $800. Non-rookies Mays and Robinson are $1,000 to $2,500, Aaron $750 to $2,000 and Williams is $500 to $1,200.
The 1956 set had no major rookie. However the 1956 had more cards in the set (340 vs. 206) and some major stars, especially Mickey Mantle, who was not in the 1956 set ($2,000-$5,000), Jackie Robinson ($600-$1,500)(his last card), Ted Williams ($300-$500), and Roberto Clemente ($750-$2,000).
But cards were not investments back then, they were sports toys. It was my first exposure to gambling where it was me against him in trying to win as many of his baseball cards as possible by pitching them.
It was called pitching and there was little regard for which card you chose to pitch at that moment. You would pitch your doubles because the collecting part of the hobby was getting the entire set of cards, not the stars or rookies. Maybe you would put your favorite player or team’s cards at the bottom of the stack, but for the most part you played with little regard for the players you may lose to your opponent.
Being from Rhode Island, I was a huge Red Sox fan, and naturally that would almost certainly mean that I was a Yankee-hater. Possibly the Yankee players were the first to be “pitched” since I had no issues with losing any of them in the competition. God knows how many Mantle, Ford and Berra’s I may have had in my stack and ended up losing.
But really what it boiled down to was that no card was handled with kid gloves, and every card was eligible to be altered by “pitching” them in a contest. To have a card with ideal corners was close to impossible since a corner was the most vulnerable part of a card when being tossed. Then the gloss on the top was next to take the brunt of damage because we played many games in the school yard and the cards would be sliding along on cement or asphalt.
The cards were also subject to the dreaded elastic band. There were no see-through cases back then. Cards were kept in shoe boxes, but kept together with elastic bands. And organizing cards was done by sorting in numerical order so you could quickly see whether you already had a player when opening up a pack of cards. Number 1 was always on the top and that is why when you go to a price guide and look up cards in the 1950’s, card number 1 was always worth more than many other cards even if that card was not a superstar. The top and bottom card would always have indentations that detracted from their value.
The first set I remember collection was the 1954 Topps set. I was 5 years old at the time, so it would have been my dad who bought the cards for me. Number 1 in 1954 was Ted Williams, a superstar. His card is only outvalued by the Hank Aaron and Ernie Banks rookie cards. Ted would have been in that select company even if he were not card #1. In 1955 the Topps set had Dusty Rhodes as #1. Hardly a superstar, and surely a common if he had any other number. His card is 5 times the value of any other common card because of its card number. Two other examples would be the 1956 Topps with American League President Will Harridge as #1. That was the last card you wanted to see in your pack. A league president?, seriously! Card #2 was Warren Giles, the National League President. Currently the Harridge card is 20 times the value of a common, while Giles is 4 times the value. Practically the same card, the number 1 card was valued 5 times higher because it would be exposed to abuse by being in the front of the number sorted stack.
Finding places that sold baseball cards was never a problem. On my way to school (there was no such this as a school bus for us) we would walk past 2 variety stores that sold penny candy and baseball cards. My easiest way of buying cards, especially with no school during the summer, was a traveling store that came through my neighborhood every weekday. This was the size of a self-contained RV and had shelves built into the vehicle that contained canned goods and other grocery items. God knows what would have happened if there were “sell by” dates back then. He was my main source of cards and would usually have cards on the truck except when he would sell out that day. Cards were usually 5 cents for a pack of 6 cards, but some places would sell a pack for 1 cent, but it only contained 1 card. There would be a rectangle piece of gum in each pack and the gum would normally stain the back of the last card in the pack. But the gum was great for sticking multiple pieces in your mouth and looking like you were chewing tobacco.
When it came to pitching cards, there were 3 different games you could choose from. If you played at someone’s house, that kid would pick the game. You could change games, so if you were not having luck with one of the options, you could pick another to try and change the outcome.
The most common games were “farzees”, “topzees” and “standeez”. Farzees would be one card pitched by every player (you could have an unlimited number of players competing against each other). You would toss against a wall (indoors or outdoors), and the person whose card came to rest closest to the wall would win all the cards. Topzees had an unlimited number of rounds and space. The winner would be the person who was able to get his (I use his because my experience with pitching cards never included a girl who participated) card on top of one of the cards already tossed. The winner just needed a very small overlap on the cards to win. The player who “topped” would win all the cards and if you were not confined to an area, you could win quite a stash. Standeez was the other contest and this was the game that caused the most abuse to the card. The first “pitcher” would place a card against a wall standing up at an angle of about 30 degrees. The game was won when you “pitched” a card that knocked the standing card from upright to flat on the ground (floor). The winner would collect all the cards already tossed. Because you were throwing against a wall and you would toss with greater speed than the other games, no card was unscathed from corner damage.
So, when you look at baseball cards from the 1950’s and see the value for premium condition, you’ll know that the likelihood of having a card in great condition was extremely unlikely. It was truly a game and not an investment.
I am eternally grateful that while I was away in the Army my mom never got the boxes of my cards and got rid of them just as my grandmother never did with my dad’s.
Many days and nights were spent reading and digesting the back of a card. Statistics were always part of the card, but other features would vary from year to year.
I can’t imagine growing up without the thrill of opening up a pack of cards or pitching them in a game with friends or classmates.

Card Collecting in the Early 1900’s
Card collecting in the early 1900’s was before my time and my dad’s, but not my grandfather’s. He arrived in Ellis Island in 1907 but did not acquire a taste for baseball or card collecting in his lifetime. If he had it would have been great because the T206 cards (1909-1911) common cards are worth at least $50 each in the 520 card set.
Unlike later baseball cards the T206 cards came in packs of cigarettes, issued by the American Tobacco Company. And because of that, the most sought after card ever is the Honus Wagner card that was card number 500 in the set. For those unfamiliar, the card was part of the original issue but Wagner refused to allow production of his card. Most publications list his objections to the cards because it encouraged people, especially youngsters, to buy cigarettes to obtain cards. I have also seen where he objected because he had not received adequate compensation to appear on the cards. The American Tobacco Company halted production of the card when it received notification of Wagner’s objections, but there had already been a few of his cards printed and inserted into packs. The number of Wagner cards that escaped is impossible to verify, but the estimates range from 50 to 200.
In August of 2021 a Wagner was sold at auction for $6.6 million and was rated a SGC 3 (an independent appraiser rating where a perfect card is a SGC 10). In August 2022 a SGC 2 (lesser condition) sold for $7.25 million.
Being a long time collector myself, I bought a T206 a number of years ago, it was a Frank “Home Run” Baker card. Not sure how much I paid for it, but currently it is valued by Beckett from $250 to $400 depending on condition. I certainly didn’t pay that much at purchase time, but I would guess a card that is over 115 years old of a Hall of Famer should have decent value.
In addition to the T206 set, there was also a T205 set from 1911, also by the American Tobacco Company, a 1914 and 1915 issue by Cracker Jack and 1916 by The Sporting News.
Card Collecting in the 1930’s
Card collecting in the 1930’s was before my time, but not my dads. The main focus on cards in the 1930’s was the Goudey set. The cards were the first to contain gum and many of the cards had a Big League Gum banner on the front of the card. The card was square in shape and smaller than today’s cards. Rather than a photo of the player, it seemed like more of a painting. The 1933 Goudey set was the first issue since the 1916 Sporting News set.
Fortunately for me, my dad loved baseball and collected baseball cards, and unlike most kids, he or my grandmother never threw his cards away.
The highlight of the set were multiple versions of some of the greats. There were 4 different Babe Ruth card. One of the cards had a double run (had twice as many printed as the normal card), but still is a very valuable card. Two of the other three cards, however, are worth more. There were also multiple cards of players like Lou Gehrig, Jimmy Foxx, Mel Ott, Goose Goslin, Rogers Hornsby, Lefty O’Doul, Bill Terry, Carl Hubbell and 3 of Joe Cronin.
There was one card issued in 1934. It was card number 106. There was no #106 in the original set and to handle complaints from collectors they issued a card of a retired superstar, Napolean “Nap” Lajoie and sent this card numbered 106 to those that complained and offered the card through a mail in offer. Even though the Lajoie is more scarce, one of the Ruth’s is of equal value. Beckett places a value of $25,000 to $60,000 for both the Lajoie and the #53 Ruth, $20,000 to $50,000 for the Ruth #181, and $15,000 to $40,000 for Ruth #144 and #149. A Jimmy Foxx (2) is valued at $1,000 to $2,500 and Lou Gehrig # 160 at $800 to $2,000 and #92 from $6,000 to $15,000.
There is one card of high value for a player who had an average career. That player was Morris (Moe) Berg. Moe Berg would be a spy for the US during World War II and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his contributions during the war. Moe’s card #158 is valued from $400 to $1,000.
In all, there were 240 cards in the set and it was full of Hall of Famers. Included were: Dazzy Vance, Ted Lyons, Bill Dickey, Pie Traynor, Kiki Cuyler, Paul Waner, Jimmy Foxx (2), Tony Lazzeri, Al Simmons, Heinie Manush (4), Frankie Frisch, Babe Ruth (4), Red Ruffing, Waite Hoyt, Joe Cronin (3), Burleigh Grimes, Eppa Rixey, Mickey Cochrane, Red Faber, Tris Speaker, Lou Gehrig (2), Travis Jackson, Earle Combs, Nap Lajoie, Goose Goslin (2), Rabbitt Maranville, Rogers Hornsby (2), Bill Terry, Mel Ott (2), Chuck Klein, Sam Rice, Herb Pennock, Leo Durocher, Joe Sewell, Lloyd Waner, Earl Averill, Rick Ferrell, Gabby Hartnett, Hack Wilson, Lefty Grove, Charlie Gehringer, Dizzy Dean, Billy Herman, and Carl Hubbell (2). That’s 58 Hall of Famer cards in the set, almost 25% of the cards. And to add value to this series, it would be their rookie card also.
There would be other card sets from the 1930’s such as 1934 Goudey, 1935 Goudey (4 in 1), 1936 Goudey, 1933 Tattoo Orbit, 1934-36 Diamond Stars, 1935 Schutter-Johnson Candy, 1936 National Chicle and 1939 Play Ball, but none that would have the value of the 1933 Goudey set.
Card Collecting in the 1950’s
Growing up in the 50’s and 60’s was so different than growing up in later years, especially when it came to baseball card collecting.
If I could find a Delorian and go back in time, my first trip would be back to 1952 so I could spend my money hoping to open a pack or two or three to get the Mantle rookie. Next I would wait a couple of year and take all of my 1955 and 1956 Topps cards and store them in a hard case rather than “pitching” them at school with my friends or putting them into the spokes of the front wheel of my bike to get that awesome sound.
The 1955 and 1956 Topps were iconic sets. Both were set in landscape (horizontal) view rather than the more common portrait view. The 1955 set had some awesome rookie cards, namely Roberto Clemente, Sandy Koufax, and future Twin, Harmon Killebrew. Clemente is valued from $3,000 to $8,000, Koufax $2,000 to $5,000 and Killebrew $300 to $800. Non-rookies Mays and Robinson are $1,000 to $2,500, Aaron $750 to $2,000 and Williams is $500 to $1,200.
The 1956 set had no major rookie. However the 1956 had more cards in the set (340 vs. 206) and some major stars, especially Mickey Mantle, who was not in the 1956 set ($2,000-$5,000), Jackie Robinson ($600-$1,500)(his last card), Ted Williams ($300-$500), and Roberto Clemente ($750-$2,000).
But cards were not investments back then, they were sports toys. It was my first exposure to gambling where it was me against him in trying to win as many of his baseball cards as possible by pitching them.
It was called pitching and there was little regard for which card you chose to pitch at that moment. You would pitch your doubles because the collecting part of the hobby was getting the entire set of cards, not the stars or rookies. Maybe you would put your favorite player or team’s cards at the bottom of the stack, but for the most part you played with little regard for the players you may lose to your opponent.
Being from Rhode Island, I was a huge Red Sox fan, and naturally that would almost certainly mean that I was a Yankee-hater. Possibly the Yankee players were the first to be “pitched” since I had no issues with losing any of them in the competition. God knows how many Mantle, Ford and Berra’s I may have had in my stack and ended up losing.
But really what it boiled down to was that no card was handled with kid gloves, and every card was eligible to be altered by “pitching” them in a contest. To have a card with ideal corners was close to impossible since a corner was the most vulnerable part of a card when being tossed. Then the gloss on the top was next to take the brunt of damage because we played many games in the school yard and the cards would be sliding along on cement or asphalt.
The cards were also subject to the dreaded elastic band. There were no see-through cases back then. Cards were kept in shoe boxes, but kept together with elastic bands. And organizing cards was done by sorting in numerical order so you could quickly see whether you already had a player when opening up a pack of cards. Number 1 was always on the top and that is why when you go to a price guide and look up cards in the 1950’s, card number 1 was always worth more than many other cards even if that card was not a superstar. The top and bottom card would always have indentations that detracted from their value.
The first set I remember collection was the 1954 Topps set. I was 5 years old at the time, so it would have been my dad who bought the cards for me. Number 1 in 1954 was Ted Williams, a superstar. His card is only outvalued by the Hank Aaron and Ernie Banks rookie cards. Ted would have been in that select company even if he were not card #1. In 1955 the Topps set had Dusty Rhodes as #1. Hardly a superstar, and surely a common if he had any other number. His card is 5 times the value of any other common card because of its card number. Two other examples would be the 1956 Topps with American League President Will Harridge as #1. That was the last card you wanted to see in your pack. A league president?, seriously! Card #2 was Warren Giles, the National League President. Currently the Harridge card is 20 times the value of a common, while Giles is 4 times the value. Practically the same card, the number 1 card was valued 5 times higher because it would be exposed to abuse by being in the front of the number sorted stack.
Finding places that sold baseball cards was never a problem. On my way to school (there was no such this as a school bus for us) we would walk past 2 variety stores that sold penny candy and baseball cards. My easiest way of buying cards, especially with no school during the summer, was a traveling store that came through my neighborhood every weekday. This was the size of a self-contained RV and had shelves built into the vehicle that contained canned goods and other grocery items. God knows what would have happened if there were “sell by” dates back then. He was my main source of cards and would usually have cards on the truck except when he would sell out that day. Cards were usually 5 cents for a pack of 6 cards, but some places would sell a pack for 1 cent, but it only contained 1 card. There would be a rectangle piece of gum in each pack and the gum would normally stain the back of the last card in the pack. But the gum was great for sticking multiple pieces in your mouth and looking like you were chewing tobacco.
When it came to pitching cards, there were 3 different games you could choose from. If you played at someone’s house, that kid would pick the game. You could change games, so if you were not having luck with one of the options, you could pick another to try and change the outcome.
The most common games were “farzees”, “topzees” and “standeez”. Farzees would be one card pitched by every player (you could have an unlimited number of players competing against each other). You would toss against a wall (indoors or outdoors), and the person whose card came to rest closest to the wall would win all the cards. Topzees had an unlimited number of rounds and space. The winner would be the person who was able to get his (I use his because my experience with pitching cards never included a girl who participated) card on top of one of the cards already tossed. The winner just needed a very small overlap on the cards to win. The player who “topped” would win all the cards and if you were not confined to an area, you could win quite a stash. Standeez was the other contest and this was the game that caused the most abuse to the card. The first “pitcher” would place a card against a wall standing up at an angle of about 30 degrees. The game was won when you “pitched” a card that knocked the standing card from upright to flat on the ground (floor). The winner would collect all the cards already tossed. Because you were throwing against a wall and you would toss with greater speed than the other games, no card was unscathed from corner damage.
So, when you look at baseball cards from the 1950’s and see the value for premium condition, you’ll know that the likelihood of having a card in great condition was extremely unlikely. It was truly a game and not an investment.
I am eternally grateful that while I was away in the Army my mom never got the boxes of my cards and got rid of them just as my grandmother never did with my dad’s.
Many days and nights were spent reading and digesting the back of a card. Statistics were always part of the card, but other features would vary from year to year.
I can’t imagine growing up without the thrill of opening up a pack of cards or pitching them in a game with friends or classmates.

First let me preface this by saying that I realize that Spring Training results and stats are practically meaningless. But with this in mind here are some raw data from the spring along with a ranking of the 30 organizations.
 
OPS – Twins 20th with a .739 OBP
OBP – Twins 19th with a .336 OBP
SLG – Twins 18th with a .403 SLG
Batg. Avg. – Twins 20th with .250
HR’s – Twins 12th with 19
2B’s – Twins 24th with 20
3B’s – Twins 29th with 0
SB – Twins 9th with 15
CS – Twins 12th with 4
BB – Twins 24th with 55
 
All of these are not surprising. They are not showing a dominating offense at this time. A few of their players are struggling. But here is the eye opener.
K’s – Twins 30th (best) with 111 in 501 AB over 15 games
 
What great news for a team that at times has not been able to put the bat on the ball, especially when it was really needed.
 
I’m hoping that this continues into the regular season.

First let me preface this by saying that I realize that Spring Training results and stats are practically meaningless. But with this in mind here are some raw data from the spring along with a ranking of the 30 organizations.
 
OPS – Twins 20th with a .739 OBP
OBP – Twins 19th with a .336 OBP
SLG – Twins 18th with a .403 SLG
Batg. Avg. – Twins 20th with .250
HR’s – Twins 12th with 19
2B’s – Twins 24th with 20
3B’s – Twins 29th with 0
SB – Twins 9th with 15
CS – Twins 12th with 4
BB – Twins 24th with 55
 
All of these are not surprising. They are not showing a dominating offense at this time. A few of their players are struggling. But here is the eye opener.
K’s – Twins 30th (best) with 111 in 501 AB over 15 games
 
What great news for a team that at times has not been able to put the bat on the ball, especially when it was really needed.
 
I’m hoping that this continues into the regular season.

Those of us who are baby boomers vividly remember Popeye’s friend and lover of hamburgers, J. Wellington Wimpy, commonly referred to as Wimpy saying “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”. It has been reported that Wimpy would never come around on Tuesdays.
The LA Dodgers, in this offseason, have started negotiating with available free agents by offering larger contracts with a decent amount of the money deferred. By deferred we mean that when a player's career is over, large payments will become due.
For Shohei Ohtani it makes perfect sense. The money he is currently making in doing promotional work, endorsements and commercials is substantial. Forbes has estimated that he made about $40 million in 2024. It’s easy to see how he would allow the Dodgers to defer about $680 of his $700 million contract to 2034 through 2044.
While it looks like his 10 year $700 million contract would require the Dodgers to make a $70 million dollar payment in 2025, they will, in fact pay him about $2 million.
This allows the Dodgers to spend that $68 million on other players and still experience the same cash flow. This off-season in addition to Ohtani they signed Blake Snell (5 yrs./$182 million), Teoscar Hernandez (3 yrs./$66 million), Blake Treinan (2 yrs./$22 million), Michael Conforto (1 yr./$17 million), Hyeseong Kim (3 yrs./12.5 million), Tanner Scott (4 yrs./$72 million) and extended Tommy Edman (4 yrs./$64.5 million). In total that comes out to 32 years of contract for $1.136 billion, an average of $35.5 million a year for these 8 players. But instead of paying $284 million for these players in 2025, they will “only” have to pay out $216 million because of Ohtani’s deferral. It’s possible that number could be lowered further if there are other players with deferrals in their contracts.
From a player’s perspective, it makes complete sense for tax purposes to spread their payments over additional years. However, $68 million today will have far greater value than $68 million in 2044. 
However, in spite of all this information, my concern is the Wimpy impact. What will the Dodgers be like in 2034? Will the $68 million they are paying Ohtani (and maybe others), have an impact on the team’s ability to compete against teams in the 2034 season without continuing with deferrals?
Unless Major League Baseball requires teams to place the deferred money in escrow or in an annuity, there should be concern about the financial stability of teams who defer such large sums of money.
Many of us knew about the Bobby Bonilla's contract with the Mets and its deferrals, but how many other deferrals are already in progress?
To remind those of the Bonilla deferral, here is the background. In 2000 the Mets agreed to buy out the remainder of his $5.9 million contract. At that time the Mets were investing with Bernie Medoff with the promise of a double-digit return (how’d that work out?). So instead of making a one-time payment in 2000 they negotiated a payment schedule of nearly $1.2 million a year for 25 years starting in 2011 with a negotiated 8% interest rate. Bonilla will be paid $1.2 million until 2035 when he is 72 years old.
For those without a calculator handy, Bonilla will receive a total of approximately $30 million for that $5.9 million deferral.
There are other deferrals known but they are nowhere near the size and magnitude of the Ohtani deal. We know that Bret Saberhagen receives $250,000 a year from the Mets from 2004 to 2029 (this was the inspiration for the Bonilla deal!). Max Scherzer will receive $105 million from the Nationals that will be paid out through 2028. Manny Ramirez is collecting $26.2 million from the Red Sox through 2026. Ken Griffey is receiving $3.59 million from the Reds every year through 2024 as the deferral from his 9 year $116 million deal signed in 2000. And Todd Helton received $1.3 million annually from the Rockies through 2023 as the result of a $13 million deferral when he signed a two-year extension in 2010. – Thank you to ESPN Stats & Information’s Ryan Milowicki for the information.
 
What do you think? Is this a compensation method that you are comfortable with for MLB? Would you be okay with the Twins using this payment option to sign current players?

Twins Amateur Draft Choices – The Griffith Years – Part II (1975 to 1984)
 
A month ago I posted an article on the results of the first 10 years of the amateur draft which would have been lead by team owner Clark Griffith.
 
I did an analysis of the first 5 rounds from 1965 to 1974 and found that:
11 of the 51 total picks played at least one game for the Twins
6 of the 51 picks never signed a contract with the Twins and were available in later drafts
34 of the 51 players drafted never played a Major League baseball game
The best players drafted and signed by the Twins were: Graig Nettles, Dave Goltz, Bert Blyleven, Eddie Bane, and Butch Wynegar.
During this 10 year period the Twins finished 2nd (1), 3rd (2), 4th (4), 5th (1), and 7th (2)
 
The 2nd 10 year period of the Griffith era (1975-1984) produced the following results:
 
1975
Of the 1st 5 rounds only one player made it to the major leagues and with the Twins, it was 1st round pick Rick Sofield.
The best player drafted by the Twins in that draft was Paul Mirabella, who did not sign with the Twins.
1976
10th overall pick in the draft, Jamie Allen, never signed with the Twins
2nd and 3rd round picks, Terry Felton and John Castino played multiple seasons in Minnesota.
4th and 5th round picks never made it to MLB
The best player drafted by the Twins in 1976 was John Castino
In the Secondary Phase of that draft the Twins drafted and signed Pete Redfern, who had a lengthy career with the Twins
1977
In rounds 1 through 5 only 1 player made the majors with the Twins and the other 4 never played an MLB game including 1st round choice Paul Croft
The player who had a career with the Twins was Roger Erickson who played 4 ½ years with the Twins and was traded along with Butch Wynegar to the NY Yankees for Pete Filson, Larry Milbourne, John Pacella and Cash in 1982
Roger Erickson was the best player the Twins drafted in 1977
1978
First round pick (16th overall pick) was Lenny Faedo, who played SS for 5 seasons with the Twins.
3rd round pick, Dave Leeper, never signed with Minnesota
The other 3 picks never made it to the majors.
Best players drafted were 9th round pick, Tony Fossas, who did not sign and 17th round pick, Kent Hrbek, who had a 14 year career with the Twins and hit a career total of 293 home runs. Kent was drafted out of high school from Kennedy High School in Bloominton.
1979
2 of the 5 picks in the 1st 5 rounds made it to Minnesota. They were 2nd round pick, Randy Bush, and 3rd round pick, Tim Laudner. Both had lengthy careers entirely with the Twins
1st round pick, Kevin Brandt (11th overall) was one of the 3 players to never play a major league game
Best player drafted was Tim Laudner
1980
The 1980 draft saw 3 players never making it to the majors
First round pick, Jeff Reed and 3rd round pick, Tim Teufel, both played for the Twins during their careers. Reed was traded with Al Cardwood, Neal Heaton and Yorkis Perez to the Montreal Expos for Tom Nieto and Jeff Reardon. Reed played an addition 14 years after the trade. Reardon had a 3 year career with the Twins racking up 104 saves.
Best players drafted were Tim Teufel (2nd round) and 16th round pick, Jim Eisenreich
1981
The Twins had 7 picks in the draft
Mike Sodders (11th overall pick) and two other choices never made it to MLB
3rd round pick, John Marzano, never signed with the Twins
Frank Viola was drafted in the 2nd round and had an 8 year career with the Twins and a 15 year career overall, where he was a 3 time All-Star, World Series MVP and Cy Young Award winner. Viola was traded to the New York Mets in July 1989 and the Twins received Rick Aguilera, Tim Drummond, Kevin Tapani, David West and Jack Savage.
Curt Wardle was drafted in the 3rd round and played 1 ½ seasons with the Twins before being traded to the Cleveland Indians with Rich Yett, Jay Bell and Jim Weaver for Bert Blyleven. Blyleven was drafted by the Twins in the 3rd round of the 1969 draft and would play with them for 6th years before being traded to the Texas Rangers in 1976. He returned to play 3 ½ more years with the Twins in his Hall of Fame career
5th round choice, Dave Meier, had a short 2 year career with the Twins and even shorter history with the Rangers and Cubs.
Best Players drafter were Frank Viola and 9th round pick, Steve Lombardozzi
1982
The 3rd through 5th choices in the draft never played in the majors.
1st choice (4th overall pick) Bryan Oelkers had a short, one year (10 games pitched) career with the Twins before being traded to the Cleveland Indians along with Ken Schrom for Ramon Romero and Roy Smith. He would play one season with the Indians.
2nd round pick Allan Anderson would have a 6 year career with the Twins where he won the ERA title in 1988 (2.45).
The best pick in the draft would be 2nd round pick, Allan Anderson.
1983
3rd, 4th and 5th round picks never played a major league game.
1st round pick, Tim Belcher, had a 14 year major league career, but none were with the Twins because he did not sign with them.
2nd round pick, Bill Swift, had a 13 year major league career, but none were with the Twins because he, also, did not sign with them.
Belcher and Swift were the best picks in the 1983 draft.
1984
2nd, 4th and 5th round picks never made it to the majors.
3rd round pick, John Verducci never signed.
1st round pick, Jay Bell signed with the Twins and had an 18 year major league career, but none with the Twins. The Twins traded Bell in August 1985 along with Curt Wardle (1981 3rd round pick), and Jim Weaver to the Cleveland Indians for Hall of Famer, Burt Blyleven.
Jay Bell would be the best player drafted in 1984.
 
Recap - This summarizes the 11th through 20th year of Calvin Griffith’s amateur draft history.
1984 would be his last year as General Manager. 1985 would see Howard Fox as the team president and Andy McPhail as the General Manager.
1975-1984 -
15 of the 52 players drafted would appear in a major league game
6 players would never sign with the Twins
31 players would never appear in a major league game
Best Players Drafted who signed
Kent Hrbek, Roger Erickson, Tim Laudner, Randy Bush, Tim Teufel, Jim Eisenreich, Frank Viola, Steve Lombardozzi, Allan Anderson and Jay Bell
Best Players drafted who did not sign
Tim Belcher and Bill Swift
1st Round Picks
Rick Sofield, Jamie Allen, Paul Croft, Lenny Faedo, Kevin Brandt, Jeff Reed, Mike Sodders, Brian Oelkers, Tim Belcher and Jay Bell
 
Recap 1965 to 1974 (Griffith’s 1st 10 years)
51 players drafted in rounds 1 – 5
11 played in the majors
6 did not sign
34 never made a major league appearance
 
Conclusion – Neither of these decades produced a vast number of major league players. With the Amateur Draft providing most of the incoming talent for an organization the Twins never finished better than 2nd place. Their best 1 – 5 draft pick was Frank Viola. They did draft Kent Hrbek in the 17th round and traded Jay Bell and Curt Wardle for Bert Blyleven . Jeff Reed was included in a trade that brought Jeff Reardon to the Twins.

With the implementation of the MLB Amateur Draft in 1965, a team's ability to build a farm system and stock a major league team is largely affected by it success in drafting future talent.
In analyzing the results of the Calvin Griffith years of the draft (1965 - 1984), I looked at players drafted in rounds 1-5.
For the first 10 years, 51 players were drafted 1 through 5. Of those 51 players 6 did not sign with the Twins. This group included Eddie Leon (Round 1, 1965 draft), Del Unser (Round 2, 1965 draft), Steve Garvey (Round 3, 1966 draft), and Dick Ruthven (Round 1, 1972 draft).
Of the 45 players who did sign with the Twins my research shows that 34 never played a game in the majors.
Here’s some interesting information about each of the 10 drafts:
1965 -
1st and 2nd picks did not sign (Eddie Leon and Del Unser)
Picks 3 and 5 never made it to MLB.
Best Player Drafted – Graig Nettles (4th round) had a 22 year career but only 3 with the Twins. He was traded to the Indians with Dean Chance, Bob Miller and Ted Uhlander for Luis Tiant and Stan Williams.
1966 -
3rd and 4th picks did not sign (Steve Garvey and Rob Desjardins)
1st, 2nd and 5th picks never played a game in MLB.
Best Player Drafted – Steve Garvey, who did not sign and 10th round selection Steve Braun
Not a good draft
1967 -
1st and 5th picks played in the majors (Steve Brye and Dave Goltz) the other 3 picks did not.
Best Players Drafted – Dave Goltz (5th), Al Hrabosky (11th but did not sign) and Rick Dempsey (15th)
1968 -
Pick 1, 2, 3 and 5 never played a major league game.
Best Player Drafted – Jim Nettles (4th round) played 3 years with Twins in a 6 year career. Career WAR of 1.1
Secondary Phase – January Draft - 1st pick, 1st round Eric Soderholm. Career WAR of 21.5
Not a very successful draft until the secondary phase
1969 -
2nd, 4th and 5th picks never played a MLB game while 1st round pick (overall pick #7) Paul Powell had 42 AB over 3 seasons in the majors.
Best Players Drafted - 3rd round pick, Hall of Famer Bert Blyleven, and 8th round pick Rick Burleson who never signed with the Twins.
1970 -
1st round pick Bob Gorinski had one season in the majors (118 Abs) and 2nd rounder, Mark Wiley, pitched in 21 games over 3 seasons (1 season with the Twins). The 3rd, 4th and 5th picks never played in a MLB game.
Best Player Drafted - 14th round pick Steve Staggs who had 2 seasons in MLB with a total WAR of 0.6.
Secondary Phase – 8th round, 125th pick Jim Barr. Did Not Sign. 30.7 lifetime WAR.
Another unsuccessful draft
1971
The Twins were able to sign all of their 1 – 5 picks this draft. Unfortunately this would have been the year to have none of them sign. They selected Dale Soderholm (Brother of Eric), Michael Uremovich, Scott Marchael, Robert Gallagher, and Steve Marquard with their 5 picks. None of them ever made it in MLB.
Best Player Drafted - 13th round, Rob Wilfong who had 11 seasons in MLB with 6 of them with the Twins. He had a lifetime WAR of 7.5
Another unsuccessful drafting
1972
1st round pick, 8th overall pick was Dick Ruthven who would pitch in the majors for 14 years but none with the Twins, because he did not sign with them. 3rd round pick Willie Norwood would play 4 seasons in MLB, all with the Twins. 5th rounder Doug Clary would play one season in MLB but not with the Twins. 2nd round and 4th round picks would never make it to MLB.
Best Player Drafter – Dick Ruthven (see above) and Lyman Bostock (26th round) who had a 4 year MLB career, with 3 with the Twins. He was tragically murdered in 1978. He had a lifetime WAR of 13.1
1973
1st round pick, Eddie Bane, was the 11th pick in the draft. Looking to duplicate the success of the Rangers in letting their overall 1st pick (David Clyde) make his professional debut in the major leagues, the Twins also let Bane pitch without any time in the minors. His first game was on July 4, 1973 against the Kansas City Royals. Bane pitched 7 innings and gave up 1 run (earned) on 3 hits, with 3 walks and 3 strikeouts. He would leave the game trailing 1-0. Twins scored 3 runs in the 8th, but Ray Corbin would give up 4 runs in the top of the 9th for a Twins 5-4 loss. While that start was very encouraging and it looked like the Twins had a keeper in Bane, he ended the 1973 season with a 0-5 record and a 4.92 ERA pitching in a total of 23 games. Bane would spend the 1974 season and much of 1975 pitching in Tacoma in the Pacific Coast League. He did return to the Twins for parts of the 1975 and 1976 seasons but 1976 would be his last season in the majors. His career stats were 7 wins 13 losses with a 4.66 ERA. In 168 total innings he would strike out 80 batters and walk 83. With the 182 hits allowed he would end up with a career WHIP of 1.583. None of the other top 5 picks would ever see a MLB game.
Best Player Drafted – Jerry Reed (11th round). He did not sign with the Twins and had a 5 year major league career with a WAR of 5.0
Once again, an unsuccessful draft.
1974
The 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th round selections never made it to the majors. However, 2nd round pick, Butch Wynegar would be the best draft pick since Bert Blyleven in 1969.
Best Player Drafted – Butch Wynegar – 26.5 WAR playing 7 of his 13 years with the Twins. He was an All-Star in his 1st two seasons and finished 2nd in Rookie of the Year voting to Mark Fidrych. The 2nd best player selected was Eric Show, drafted in the 36th round. He did not sign with the Twins.
Recap -
This article summarizes the 1st 10 years of Calvin Griffith’s 20 years of drafting.
A total of 11 players in the 1st 5 rounds of these drafts (51 players) would play at least one major league game with the Twins
Graig Nettles, Steve Brye, Dave Goltz, Jim Nettles, Paul Powell, Bert Blyleven, Bob Goronski, Mark Wiley, Willie Norwood, Eddie Bane, and Butch Wynegar.
Six of the 51 picks never signed with the Twins.
Thirty four of the players never played a major league game.
Obviously, the results from the first 10 drafts were not very good. Next week we will look at years 1975-1984.

In baseball there is a chance for something special to happen in every game. One of the rarer events is for a player to make his major league debut and never had spent any time in the minors.
Since the advent of the American and National League in the early 1900’s, only 102 players can make this claim.
There are 4 subsets of players who have achieved this rarity.
1) Prior to World War II – Thirteen players are in this group. Almost half of these players have been inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. They include Eppa Rixey (1912 Phillies), George Sisler (1915 Browns), Frankie Frisch (1919 Giants), Ted Lyons (1923 White Sox), Mel Ott (1926 Giants) and Bob Feller (1936 Indians). There are also two all-star caliber players in Cy Williams (1912 Cubs) and “Jumpin’” Joe Dugan (1917 Athletics). On the other hand there are others like Charlie Faust (1911 Giants – 2 games), Walter Ancker (1915 Athletics – 4 games) and Johnson Fry (1923 Indians – 1 game) who barely had enough time to get a cup of coffee.
2) World War II – With so many players enlisting to serve their country, there was a need to find able bodied players who could play the game. These seven players all made their debut in 1943 or 1944. Among the better players were Gil Hodges (Dodgers - 19 in 1943), Cal McLish (Dodgers – 19 in 1944), Joe Nuxhall (Reds – 15 years, 316 days when he made his debut in 1944 – youngest player to ever play a major league game), and Eddie Yost (Senators – 18 in 1944).
3) Bonus Baby Era – The next 71 players appeared from 1947 to 1965. Sixty nine of these players went directly to the major leagues because of the “bonus baby” rule. Between these years if you signed a player and gave them a bonus of $4,000 or greater they had to be carried on the team’s roster for the entire season. This stifled the development of many players, but some may have never made the majors or played in a major league game without this rule. Among this large group were Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente (Dodgers $10,000), Catfish Hunter (Athletics $75,000), Al Kaline (Tigers $35,000), Harmon Killebrew (Senators $30,000) and Sandy Koufax (Dodgers $14,000). It also included Eddie and Johnny O’Brien, twin brothers who signed with the Pirates for $40,000 each. The largest signing bonuses during this era went to Hawk Taylor ($199,000 Braves), Bob Bailey ($175,000 Pirates), Bob Garibaldi ($150,000 Giants), Willie Crawford ($100,000 Dodgers), John DeMerit ($100,000 Braves) and Paul Pettit ($100,000 Pirates). Only 2 of these 71 players were not “Bonus Babies”. They were Claude Osteen (Reds) and Eddie Gaedel (the 3’7” player sent up to bat by Bill Veeck, who drew a walk on 4 pitches in his only time at bat - he wore the number 1/8).
4) Current Era – Of the final 23 players who went directly to the major leagues 14 happened in the 1970’s. Included in this group were: Burt Hooten (Cubs), Eddie Bane (Twins), David Clyde (Rangers), Dave Winfield (Padres), pinch runner Herb Washington (Athletics), and Bob Horner (Braves). From 1979 to the present only 9 players have made this jump, they are: Pete Incaviglia (Rangers), Jim Abbott (Angels), John Olerud (Blue Jays), Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park (Dodgers), Ariel Prieto (Athletics), Xavier Nady (Padres), Mike Leake (Reds), and in 2020 Garrett Crochet (White Sox). All of these players would eventually spend time in the minors.
 
Just because you started in the majors doesn’t mean that you never played a game in the minors. A paper published by SABR (Society for American Baseball Research) published in 1980 listed 21 players who played at least 10 years and never played a game in the minors. So of all the players who went directly to the majors only 21 played 10 years and were never sent down. Many of these players played prior to World War II (8), but here are the 13 who played from 1940 until 1980: Mel Ott (HoF), Al Kaline (HoF), Ted Lyons (HoF), Ernie Banks (HoF), Bob Feller (HoF), Eddie Yost, Danny McFayden, Catfish Hunter (HoF), Dick Groat, Billy O’Dell, Johnny Antonelli, Sandy Koufax (HoF), and Carl Scheib. Since the 1980 article Dave Winfield and Bob Horner (played one season in Japan) exceeded 10 years and should be added to the list, making 23 players who played 10 years or more that never played in the minors.

“Bonus Baby” Rule Eliminated, Amateur Draft Implemented in 1965
 
If you read my recent blog article “Players Who Went Right To The Major Leagues” you will know that from 1947 to 1965 any player who signed with an organization for $4,000 or more was considered a “Bonus Baby” and had to spend their first year of professional baseball on a major league roster. This meant little playing time and very little opportunity to develop into a better player. There were 71 players in this category that went straight to the majors of the total of about 120 players who accomplished this feat over the last 120 years.
 
Knowing that this rule was not in the best interest of the player or the organization, Major League Baseball decided to implement an amateur draft in 1965. The premise was simple, the team with the worst record from the previous season would get the first pick and the rest of the picks would be in order of a team's previous year's record.
 
The very first pick in 1965 was Rick Monday, a player from Arizona State, who was selected by the Kansas City Athletics. Monday would end up with a 19 year major league career, would play in 2 All-Star games, and would play in 5 championship series, including 3 World Series (winning one). If that was the type of player that you could draft if you had the first pick, I think you would be satisfied with your selection. There were other first picks in the 60 years of the draft that would never appear in a major league game.
 
Of the 20 players selected in the 1st round of the 1st amateur draft 7 never made it to the major leagues. This includes players taken 4th (Alex Barrett-Astros), 8th (John Wyatt-Dodgers-Not the Relief Pitcher), 10th (Doug Dickerson-Pirates), 12th (Dick Grant-Braves), 15th (Scott McDonald-Orioles), 17th (Ken Plesha-Wihte Sox) and 20th (Joe DiFabio-Cardinals). Notable names chosen in addition to Monday were Joe Coleman (3rd-Senators), Billy Conigliaro (5th-Red Sox), Ray Fosse (7th-Indians), Jim Spencer (11th-Angels), Gene Lamont (13th-Tigers), and Bernie Carbo (16th-Reds). With the 9th pick the Twins selected Eddie Leon a shortstop from the University of Arizona who was one of two players who decided not to sign. Interestingly, Leon would be drafted by the Cubs in the secondary phase of the 1st round in 1966 and again did not sign. Finally, he was taken in the 2nd round of the 1967 draft by the Indians and did sign. Eddie would play 8 seasons in the majors and had a .236 lifetime batting average with 24 HR’s and 159 RBI’s.
 
Over the next 19 years the following players would be taken with the 1st pick in the draft:
1966 – Steve Chilcutt – Mets – One of 3 #1 picks in the 60 years of the draft who never played in the Major Leagues
1967 – Ron Bloomberg – Yankees
1968 – Tim Foli – Mets
1969 – Jeff Burroughs – Senators
1970 – Mike Ivie – Padres
1971 – Danny Goodwin – White Sox
1972 – Dave Roberts – Padres
1973 – David Clyde – Rangers
1974 – Bill Almon – Padres
1975 – Danny Goodwin – Angels (See 1971)
1976 – Floyd Bannister – Astros
1977 – Harold Baines – White Sox
1978 – Bob Horner – Braves
1979 – Al Chambers – Mariners
1980 – Darryl Strawberry – Mets
1981 – Mike Moore – Mariners
1982 – Shawon Dunston – Cubs
1983 – Tim Belcher – Twins – Did Not Sign
1984 – Shawn Abner – Mets
 
In future blog postings I will list all of the Twins first round picks from 1965 to present in 20 year increments, with some statistical information on their career.

In baseball there is a chance for something special to happen in every game. One of the rarer events is for a player to make his major league debut and never had spent any time in the minors.
Since the advent of the American and National League in the early 1900’s, only 102 players can make this claim.
There are 4 subsets of players who have achieved this rarity.
1) Prior to World War II – Thirteen players are in this group. Almost half of these players have been inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. They include Eppa Rixey (1912 Phillies), George Sisler (1915 Browns), Frankie Frisch (1919 Giants), Ted Lyons (1923 White Sox), Mel Ott (1926 Giants) and Bob Feller (1936 Indians). There are also two all-star caliber players in Cy Williams (1912 Cubs) and “Jumpin’” Joe Dugan (1917 Athletics). On the other hand there are others like Charlie Faust (1911 Giants – 2 games), Walter Ancker (1915 Athletics – 4 games) and Johnson Fry (1923 Indians – 1 game) who barely had enough time to get a cup of coffee.
2) World War II – With so many players enlisting to serve their country, there was a need to find able bodied players who could play the game. These seven players all made their debut in 1943 or 1944. Among the better players were Gil Hodges (Dodgers - 19 in 1943), Cal McLish (Dodgers – 19 in 1944), Joe Nuxhall (Reds – 15 years, 316 days when he made his debut in 1944 – youngest player to ever play a major league game), and Eddie Yost (Senators – 18 in 1944).
3) Bonus Baby Era – The next 71 players appeared from 1947 to 1965. Sixty nine of these players went directly to the major leagues because of the “bonus baby” rule. Between these years if you signed a player and gave them a bonus of $4,000 or greater they had to be carried on the team’s roster for the entire season. This stifled the development of many players, but some may have never made the majors or played in a major league game without this rule. Among this large group were Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente (Dodgers $10,000), Catfish Hunter (Athletics $75,000), Al Kaline (Tigers $35,000), Harmon Killebrew (Senators $30,000) and Sandy Koufax (Dodgers $14,000). It also included Eddie and Johnny O’Brien, twin brothers who signed with the Pirates for $40,000 each. The largest signing bonuses during this era went to Hawk Taylor ($199,000 Braves), Bob Bailey ($175,000 Pirates), Bob Garibaldi ($150,000 Giants), Willie Crawford ($100,000 Dodgers), John DeMerit ($100,000 Braves) and Paul Pettit ($100,000 Pirates). Only 2 of these 71 players were not “Bonus Babies”. They were Claude Osteen (Reds) and Eddie Gaedel (the 3’7” player sent up to bat by Bill Veeck, who drew a walk on 4 pitches in his only time at bat - he wore the number 1/8).
4) Current Era – Of the final 23 players who went directly to the major leagues 14 happened in the 1970’s. Included in this group were: Burt Hooten (Cubs), Eddie Bane (Twins), David Clyde (Rangers), Dave Winfield (Padres), pinch runner Herb Washington (Athletics), and Bob Horner (Braves). From 1979 to the present only 9 players have made this jump, they are: Pete Incaviglia (Rangers), Jim Abbott (Angels), John Olerud (Blue Jays), Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park (Dodgers), Ariel Prieto (Athletics), Xavier Nady (Padres), Mike Leake (Reds), and in 2020 Garrett Crochet (White Sox). All of these players would eventually spend time in the minors.
 
Just because you started in the majors doesn’t mean that you never played a game in the minors. A paper published by SABR (Society for American Baseball Research) published in 1980 listed 21 players who played at least 10 years and never played a game in the minors. So of all the players who went directly to the majors only 21 played 10 years and were never sent down. Many of these players played prior to World War II (8), but here are the 13 who played from 1940 until 1980: Mel Ott (HoF), Al Kaline (HoF), Ted Lyons (HoF), Ernie Banks (HoF), Bob Feller (HoF), Eddie Yost, Danny McFayden, Catfish Hunter (HoF), Dick Groat, Billy O’Dell, Johnny Antonelli, Sandy Koufax (HoF), and Carl Scheib. Since the 1980 article Dave Winfield and Bob Horner (played one season in Japan) exceeded 10 years and should be added to the list, making 23 players who played 10 years or more that never played in the minors.

In baseball there is a chance for something special to happen in every game. One of the rarer events is for a player to make his major league debut and never had spent any time in the minors.
Since the advent of the American and National League in the early 1900’s, only 102 players can make this claim.
There are 4 subsets of players who have achieved this rarity.
1) Prior to World War II – Thirteen players are in this group. Almost half of these players have been inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. They include Eppa Rixey (1912 Phillies), George Sisler (1915 Browns), Frankie Frisch (1919 Giants), Ted Lyons (1923 White Sox), Mel Ott (1926 Giants) and Bob Feller (1936 Indians). There are also two all-star caliber players in Cy Williams (1912 Cubs) and “Jumpin’” Joe Dugan (1917 Athletics). On the other hand there are others like Charlie Faust (1911 Giants – 2 games), Walter Ancker (1915 Athletics – 4 games) and Johnson Fry (1923 Indians – 1 game) who barely had enough time to get a cup of coffee.
2) World War II – With so many players enlisting to serve their country, there was a need to find able bodied players who could play the game. These seven players all made their debut in 1943 or 1944. Among the better players were Gil Hodges (Dodgers - 19 in 1943), Cal McLish (Dodgers – 19 in 1944), Joe Nuxhall (Reds – 15 years, 316 days when he made his debut in 1944 – youngest player to ever play a major league game), and Eddie Yost (Senators – 18 in 1944).
3) Bonus Baby Era – The next 71 players appeared from 1947 to 1965. Sixty nine of these players went directly to the major leagues because of the “bonus baby” rule. Between these years if you signed a player and gave them a bonus of $4,000 or greater they had to be carried on the team’s roster for the entire season. This stifled the development of many players, but some may have never made the majors or played in a major league game without this rule. Among this large group were Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente (Dodgers $10,000), Catfish Hunter (Athletics $75,000), Al Kaline (Tigers $35,000), Harmon Killebrew (Senators $30,000) and Sandy Koufax (Dodgers $14,000). It also included Eddie and Johnny O’Brien, twin brothers who signed with the Pirates for $40,000 each. The largest signing bonuses during this era went to Hawk Taylor ($199,000 Braves), Bob Bailey ($175,000 Pirates), Bob Garibaldi ($150,000 Giants), Willie Crawford ($100,000 Dodgers), John DeMerit ($100,000 Braves) and Paul Pettit ($100,000 Pirates). Only 2 of these 71 players were not “Bonus Babies”. They were Claude Osteen (Reds) and Eddie Gaedel (the 3’7” player sent up to bat by Bill Veeck, who drew a walk on 4 pitches in his only time at bat - he wore the number 1/8).
4) Current Era – Of the final 23 players who went directly to the major leagues 14 happened in the 1970’s. Included in this group were: Burt Hooten (Cubs), Eddie Bane (Twins), David Clyde (Rangers), Dave Winfield (Padres), pinch runner Herb Washington (Athletics), and Bob Horner (Braves). From 1979 to the present only 9 players have made this jump, they are: Pete Incaviglia (Rangers), Jim Abbott (Angels), John Olerud (Blue Jays), Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park (Dodgers), Ariel Prieto (Athletics), Xavier Nady (Padres), Mike Leake (Reds), and in 2020 Garrett Crochet (White Sox). All of these players would eventually spend time in the minors.
 
Just because you started in the majors doesn’t mean that you never played a game in the minors. A paper published by SABR (Society for American Baseball Research) published in 1980 listed 21 players who played at least 10 years and never played a game in the minors. So of all the players who went directly to the majors only 21 played 10 years and were never sent down. Many of these players played prior to World War II (8), but here are the 13 who played from 1940 until 1980: Mel Ott (HoF), Al Kaline (HoF), Ted Lyons (HoF), Ernie Banks (HoF), Bob Feller (HoF), Eddie Yost, Danny McFayden, Catfish Hunter (HoF), Dick Groat, Billy O’Dell, Johnny Antonelli, Sandy Koufax (HoF), and Carl Scheib. Since the 1980 article Dave Winfield and Bob Horner (played one season in Japan) exceeded 10 years and should be added to the list, making 23 players who played 10 years or more that never played in the minors.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

When Pohlad dropped a bomb saying paraphrased "We aren't going after any $30MM/ yr. FA" & " We'll live where we're at". Many fans went berserk, I'm not taking sides if the Pohlads can afford to pay the money or not because I have no idea. But I do know we live in a much lower market than NY, LA & CHI. & can't compete with those teams in spending. But is spending big in FA the answer to being successful? NYY & NYM went big in FA last offseason, how did they do? Is FA the solution to all our problems? I think not. IMO FA is an inefficient way to take care of our needs with FA salaries skyrocketing every year. I'd like to look at 3 different teams that do not go big in FA yet are very productive.
1st is Baltimore, They won the highly competitive AL East Division & are positioned to be a powerhouse for years to come. How did they do it? Much like HOU they tanked for many years & were able to get high draft picks & started to accumulate great prospects. 2nd is Tampa Bay. It's been a while since TB has had a really bad season so how have they done it? By accumulating prospects by trading off hyped players (especially SP) getting near to FA for promising young players & prospects. Another successful team that doesn't rely on FA is Atlanta. Like TB they like to trade but they trade to fortify a need & when they get a player they like to be around for a while they extend them. Can we emulate them?
With the new anti-tanking lottery this is no longer a sure bet to build a great team, plus teams like PIT & CO have tanked for years & still are floundering. Maybe build a pitching pipeline like TB & CLE, which we have tried since Favey became GM. Many of our high-ceiling prospects never panned out & Ober (started out as mid-ceiling) is the highest of any of our prospects that have risen but we haven't been able to produce a rotation full of in-house high-level  SPs every year so we can trade them to fill weak spots in the team. Maybe we can be more proactive in trading to fill our needs and extend players like ATL? It should definitely help. 
BAL, TB & ATL are all different but there are a couple of things that they do that are the same. They are great at player & team evaluation & development which separates them from their peers and make them successful year after year. These are areas that the Twins need to improve. CO has tanked for years & they like to throw money at their players but that doesn't do any good if they don't have good player & team evaluation & development. IMO stats like WAR favor sluggers, & any high-focus analytical team tends to focus on HRs & defense & baserunning are minimized. Drafting, developing, team & player evaluations are prioritized on HRs, the rest is ignored. Analytics are very important but we can't be lost in it.
We been blessed with 3 high 1st round picks that were no brainers Lewis, Lee & Jenkins. Whenever we get a low 1st round draft pick we often select a big bat cOF/1B/DH (Rooker, Sabato, Larnach, & Caveco #13 was drafted as a SS but most likely will end up at 1B). I'm frustrated with the development of Wallner who has a lot of potential but it seems that all they focus on is for him to hit HRs. I'm frustrated with the development of our catchers. This priority affects us as far as our evaluation of our team needs & players' importance to the team where we hang onto players we could let go & let go of who we should keep.
Team & player evaluation & development are very important but where ATL separates itself is that they use that evaluations to find holes in their team & then they go out & make trades that fills or upgrade in that area. We have also been fortunate with trades that fell into our laps like Lopez, Ryan, & Maeda. But once we improve our team & players evaluations of not only our team but also those teams that hold our missing pieces, I'd love to see us to be more proactive in making trades. There are so many opportunities out there once our eyes are open. The opportunities that were open early this season are pretty much closed but there'll be new opportunities & we need to be ready for them.
I heard someone praise our FO that if Pohlad allocates X amount of dollars they will spend X amount of dollars. I can see what they are saying but I also see it as something very wasteful because if the Twins had an extra $11MM they could take another unrealistic risk on a Gallo-type that had no real need just because they had the money. Dreaming about picking up this high price FA or that high price FA isn't very feasible even before this Balley mess.
The Chinese look at crises as an opportunity, these 2 words have the same root word. We have 2 choices stay the same & fall behind or change our priorities to be more realistic & to become more like ATL & become independent from free agency,  & become a better & more competitive team.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.

Let’s Talk Salaries
The Padres traded their “once in a lifetime” superstar to the Yankees for payroll relief. This in spite of drawing over 3.2M fans in 2023 (2nd in NL). The Padres 2023 payroll was $259M (per sportrac.com) and they didn’t make the playoffs. In looking forward, the Padres are currently paying Manny Machado $17M per year until 2025 and then it becomes $25M in 2026 and then $39M for the next 7 years. Fernando Tatis will make $11.7M in 2024, $20.7M in 2025 and 2026, $25.7M in 2027 and 2028, then $36.7M until 2034. Xander Bogaerts will earn $25.45M from 2024 until 2033. It is interesting to add to this horror show the fact that both Tatis and Bogaerts were signed to play shortstop and at this moment they are playing right field and 2nd base respectively. This financial model can best be explained by the saying used by Whimpy in Popeye cartoons when he said, “I’ll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today”.
In the same boat are the Dodgers who this year signed Shohei Ohtani for 10 years at a total contract price of $700M. He will receive $2M in payroll each year until 2032 and then will be paid $68M for the next 10 years. They then signed Yoshinobu Yamamoto for 12 years and $325M (an average of $27M), but paying him $9.2M in 2024. And of course they traded for Tyler Glasnow and his $25M salary and quickly signed him to a lucrative contract extension. At some point, 10 years from now the Dodgers may have an extremely serious payroll problem.
To the credit of the NY Mets, last year under Steve Cohen’s ownership they bought every toy they could find in the toy department. Half way through the year they figured out that buying the best players does not guarantee positive results. At the trade deadline they traded many of their big off season signings for prospects and this off season they decided to sit out the dance and work on improving their farm system. Sanity has visited the Mets.
All of this brings me to the Twins. This past week Joe Pohlad made comments on local radio that seemed to hit the hometown fans the wrong way. He basically declared that the Twins would not be spending money to bringing in one of the high priced Boras Band of Five (now four). He did, however, leave some wiggle room for signing one of the lesser unsigned players who may come at a bargain rate and a short contract because of spring training already being underway.
Being from southern New England and new to the Twins, I’m now reading many fans questioning the ownership’s commitment to putting together a team that can compete for a World Series ring. The term “Cheap Pohlad” is appearing often in comments on X (not going to say, formerly twitter), The Athletic and Twins Daily. The majority of fans believe that the team has a strong and youthful nucleus and that with the addition of a piece or two can compete for the championship. The inability of the front office to add the missing pieces is being blamed on team ownership and their frugal ways.
To fill in my gaps in Twins history I thought that I should take a look at the team’s recent payroll and attendance figures so I can formulate my own opinion.
The Correa Effect
 
Year
Payroll
Prior Yr Attendance
Attend. Yr
2023
$160M
1,801,000
2022
2022
$150M
1,310,000
2021
2021
$123M
0
2020
2020
$135M
2,303,000
2019
2019
$114M
1,959,000
2018
2018
$110M
2,051,000
2017
2017
$104M
1,964,000
2016
 
2017 to 2019 was largely status quo. The attendance fluctuated by no more than 100,000 each year and the payroll showed inflationary increases. No huge surprises to their overall payroll plans.
2020 showed an 18.4% increase based on a 17.6% increase in attendance. Unfortunately 2020 was the Covid season where spectators were not allowed in the ball park, but players still needed to be paid according to their contract terms. I don’t know if ownership was covered by business interruption insurance or if they were stuck with a year of normal expenses (less many game day expenses) with no attendance revenue.
2021 - Probably as a reaction to the Covid season the payroll dropped by $12M for the 2021 season.
2022 – I will call this the Correa Factor. The Twins had a unique opportunity to sign one of baseball’s elites to a 3 year/$105M contract. The contract contained opt outs after each year, so unless Correa was to experience a major injury (which should have been covered by insurance), it was a 1 year/$35M contract. This transaction was probably unforeseen, but the budget was increased by $27M to make it happen. Chances are that the payroll budget may have been reduced because the attendance for the 2021 season only reached 1,310,000, far lower than previous seasons.
2023 – I will call this the Correa Factor II. There was probably little likelihood of Correa having a 2nd season with the Twins, but a funny thing happened, he fell back into their laps when the Giants and Mets were spooked by his physical. The Twins had an opportunity to take him back at a slightly lower rate and a reasonable 6 year term (with team options after that). They couldn’t reduce the budget after this signing so they ended up increasing the payroll from $150M to $160M. Attendance increased by 491,000, but still fell below the 2017-2019 norm.
2024 – They have been operating with a payroll bloated by the Correa double signings, were losing $7-$8M in TV Revenue, attendance had not bounced back to earlier amounts, and they needed to “right size” the budget.
I’ve used the term “right size” frequently in my career as a CFO. The term simply means to have the right number of employees (or payroll) for the amount of sales you are realizing. If your sales decrease from one year to the next you are probably going to look at a layoff or not replacing employees who leave. You match your loss of revenue with a reduction in expenses to keep your bottom line stable.
After all of this background, the Twins are basically saying that after a payroll that has increased by opportunity, not additional revenues, that they need to bring it back to an amount that is consistent with the attendance (and TV revenue) they are generating. That largely brings them back to the 2017-2019 days.
I think that their approach is fiscally reasonable and responsible. Let’s admit it, we were warned early in the off-season that this was going to be a reality. Last week it became cast in stone. However, let’s look at the bright side. There is still wiggle room for a spring training signing to round out the roster, just not one of the big boys.
Cost Per Attendee
To further evaluate the Twins position I decided to compare Payroll to Attendance. I did an analysis of the 2023 attendance for each team compared to their 2023 payroll. The team with the highest payroll for 2023 was the NY Mets and they were ranked 14th in total attendance. They ended up paying their players $137 for each person who attended a game. Second was the White Sox who had the 15th highest payroll but the 24th highest attendance. They ended up paying $108 for each person. The rest of the top 10 were the Yankees at $85, the Angels at $80, the Phillies at $80, the Marlins at $79, the Twins at $78, the Rangers at $77, the Padres at $76 and the Tigers at $76. The Twins ended up in 7th place among the 30 teams. The overall average was $68 for each fan attending. The team that spend the least on payroll compared to attendance were the Orioles at $31.
Some teams can alleviate some of this high cost per attendee because of the ticket prices they charge. A cost to the Mets of $137 per person or the Yankees at $85 can be offset by having higher ticket prices than a team like the Twins or Marlins. It is possible that when this payroll cost per attendee is adjusted by average ticket price, that the Twins may climb up the ladder and be closer to the top ranking.
My Summary or Conclusion (Finally)
My hope for the Twins is that as the trade deadline approaches that we will be able to pickup a premium pitcher to round out our playoff roster. I have complete confidence in ownership that this will happen if the right player and the right deal comes along. They have already opened up for purse strings for Carlos Correa. Strong attendance will be very helpful.
As far as how they handle financial management, I believe paring back payroll and not taking on another $30M per year plunge is perfectly understandable. Their 2023 attendance of 1,974,000 puts them right back to the 2017-2019 years when the team payroll was around $110M. With a $126M payroll for 2024 and a loss of $7M in broadcast fees, it seems like a reasonable budget. Hopefully attendance will increase and there will be a willingness to spend at the trade deadline for any missing pieces.
I am not a Pohlad Family “fan boy”, but I feel that their approach is fiscally sound. While there are teams spending money like drunken sailors, the majority are still living within their means and looking at their front office to make personnel moves that will make a difference. Their standing as 7th when comparing payroll to attendance tells me that they are providing adequate funding to support the team. I can’t justify joining “Cheap Pohlad Club”.