The Value of Prospects

[Rosterman]

A team needs a place for a prospect to play. That is job one.

 

Even if they cut down the number of minor league teams, teams will still be able to field 150 prospects in their organization, with a third of them basically playing pickup ballgames at the Ft. Myers training site.

 

We can argue about why millions are paid out in the draft when so few players actually make it to three years in the system

 

Let's go back to 2014. Look at who the Twins drafted. How many are still in the organization, or in pro ball. 

https://www.baseball-reference.com/draft/?team_ID=MIN&year_ID=2014&draft_type=junreg&query_type=franch_year

 

Went back even further, Pulled up an anynymouse list of the Twins Top 20 (these are always fun, from this site, or Baseball America). The Twins Top 20 in 2010 were Hicks, Revere, Gibson, Ramos, Salcedo, Bullock, Angel Morales, Valencia, Parmalee, Sano. Hummmmmm....not a bad beginning. But look at the next 10: Carlos Gutierrez, Benson, Bromberg, Hermsen, Tootle, Slama, Bashore, Stuifbergen, Manship, Tyler Robertson.

 

Lots of recognized trade bait that the Twins didn't trade. Many just walked away from baseball.

 

In the end, how many players do you funnel thru a team during the year. You have the starting 25. Might have a couple of arms at the end of the rotation or back of the bullpen. Maybe a new name on the bench. Nice if you can add a rookie for regular play, but you can't necessarily do that every year. How many of the approx. 15 "other" names that show up during the year will play another year for the team.

[ashbury]

We can argue about why millions are paid out in the draft when so few players actually make it to three years in the system

I'm not sure of your point, but the players in group one (millions paid out) are not the players in group two (few players make it to three years), are they?

[Riverbrian]

 

A team needs a place for a prospect to play. That is job one.

 

 

 

For teams that haven't embraced depth and flexibility. Like a combination lock, it takes a specific combination of events to open a door for a prospect.

 

Not only does a player have to be performing at a level to deserve a call up, that still isn't enough for the prospect to be called up. Because if the prospect is a 2B and it's an OF who needs replacing in the majors. The old school team will call up a lesser performing OF because that is where the injury is. Every time you call up a lesser player based on specific need. The pure act of taking a lessor player lessens the odds of success and therefore overall prospect success. Depth and flexibility removes this obstacle.

 

When the OF gets hurt... you can call up your best prospect (most ready) prospect even if he plays 2B. This increases the odds of calling up your best player when you need to call someone up. This increases the odds of getting good production from your call up since the prospect was earning the call up.

 

For example, Schoop was healthy throughout 2019. If Arraez is a 2B only? If depth and flexibility isn't adopted... where does Arraez play?  

 

All of these things are golf balls in the garden hose.

 

The damage done over the years is impossible to quantify but also impossible to dismiss. It is my opinion, that a lot of players with major league talent became unidentified players through lack of sufficient opportunity. Because they are unidentified... nobody has missed them. 

 

 

 

 

[bird]

 

Length of success can't be a factor or at least it needs to minimized in the equation. 

 

You have to consider the Rental... Top 100 prospects have been traded for 2-3 month rentals. 

 

Yes, it is the vet you are renting... but if a team is willing to cough up a top 100 prospect for short time period players. Length of sustained success can't be a major part of the calculation. The rental alone proves that there is such a thing as short term value. 

 

Tyler Duffey maybe currently tagged as a bust with the methodology. However... I contend that in 2015, Tyler Duffey kept the Twins in contention almost by himself. Teams are willing to trade highly ranked prospects for that type of short term production. 

 

We're drifting away from the point of the studies here, which was to determine the predictive value of a Top 100 list (as opposed to assessing the trade value of a given player). That said, the study was brought up within the context of discussions about trades and players, so...but I'm mostly curious about the whole Success/Bust rate thing.

 

I think WIse One's suggestion to more appropriately consider a player's sustained production was more about how the WAR calculation used in the studies might be short-changing some players who are considered Busts in the study but who otherwise have in fact been Successful. 

 

It feels to me that relief pitchers get the shaft when it comes to WAR in general, but especially in a study like these, where a guy is called a bust if he averaged less than 1.5 WAR over 6 seasons, and is thought of as Average with a 2.0 WAR.

 

The WS teams this year? WSN had 9 players with 2.0 WAR or better. None of them was a relief pitcher. HOU had 12 such players (league high), and the final two guys, their two "best relievers", Will Harris and Roberto Osuna, sported 2.1 and 2.0 numbers respectively. Oh, and they had another Average guy named Pressly at 1.8.

 

Back to my skepticism: I doubt these old studies are valid references regarding today's bust rates of guys making BA's Top 100, and I question the validity of the criteria used because it calls a lot of pitchers Busts who in fact are not, and doesn't give a Bust like Mel Rojas any credit for lasting 8-10 years in the majors.

[Shaitan]

While these stats are interesting and should influence any trade talks, probability isn't the only thing to consider. Salary and control are huge influences, which inflate the value of prospects a little more.

[Riverbrian]

 

We're drifting away from the point of the studies here, which was to determine the predictive value of a Top 100 list (as opposed to assessing the trade value of a given player). That said, the study was brought up within the context of discussions about trades and players, so...but I'm mostly curious about the whole Success/Bust rate thing.

 

I think WIse One's suggestion to more appropriately consider a player's sustained production was more about how the WAR calculation used in the studies might be short-changing some players who are considered Busts in the study but who otherwise have in fact been Successful. 

 

It feels to me that relief pitchers get the shaft when it comes to WAR in general, but especially in a study like these, where a guy is called a bust if he averaged less than 1.5 WAR over 6 seasons, and is thought of as Average with a 2.0 WAR.

 

The WS teams this year? WSN had 9 players with 2.0 WAR or better. None of them was a relief pitcher. HOU had 12 such players (league high), and the final two guys, their two "best relievers", Will Harris and Roberto Osuna, sported 2.1 and 2.0 numbers respectively. Oh, and they had another Average guy named Pressly at 1.8.

 

Back to my skepticism: I doubt these old studies are valid references regarding today's bust rates of guys making BA's Top 100, and I question the validity of the criteria used because it calls a lot of pitchers Busts who in fact are not, and doesn't give a Bust like Mel Rojas any credit for lasting 8-10 years in the majors.

 

The topic itself is EXTREMELY important in my opinion and it is much much broader than the narrow scope you are trying to contain it to. The topic has many different paths to take in different directions. You are focused on end result and I am focused on roadblocks that change the end result. 

 

You want to determine the predictive value of the top 100 lists. I'm saying OK I understand this but the predictive value is directly influenced by the operational style of the day. You want to know if BA gets it right... I'm saying that BA doesn't control how Andy LaRoche is handled. Maybe BA was right... the club was wrong or vice versa. I'm saying... I believe that there are busts that are self inflicted by the organization and more than we realize. And I believe that the the operational style has been changing to the point where it is becoming apples and oranges. 

 

I brought up short term value specifically because you had Duffey in the bust pile. You were questioning the line... I agree with you. It's a bad line if Duffey is in the bust pile and I used short term value as a reason for agreeing with you. 

 

As for using WAR... I'll let you use that for your determinations. I won't use it for mine... I'm not a WAR guy but I still see where you are going and am muddying the waters in an effort to help. 

 

Bottom Line... There are a lot of ingredients that go into this cake you are baking. I think the cake needs to be baked but the things I'm mentioning are factors that have extreme influence over the cake you seek. 

[bird]

 

For teams that haven't embraced depth and flexibility. Like a combination lock, it takes a specific combination of events to open a door for a prospect.

 

Not only does a player have to be performing at a level to deserve a call up, that still isn't enough for the prospect to be called up. Because if the prospect is a 2B and it's an OF who needs replacing in the majors. The old school team will call up a lesser performing OF because that is where the injury is. Every time you call up a lesser player based on specific need. The pure act of taking a lessor player lessens the odds of success and therefore overall prospect success. Depth and flexibility removes this obstacle.

 

When the OF gets hurt... you can call up your best prospect (most ready) prospect even if he plays 2B. This increases the odds of calling up your best player when you need to call someone up. This increases the odds of getting good production from your call up since the prospect was earning the call up.

 

For example, Schoop was healthy throughout 2019. If Arraez is a 2B only? If depth and flexibility isn't adopted... where does Arraez play?  

 

All of these things are golf balls in the garden hose.

 

The damage done over the years is impossible to quantify but also impossible to dismiss. It is my opinion, that a lot of players with major league talent became unidentified players through lack of sufficient opportunity. Because they are unidentified... nobody has missed them. 

 

 

Some really good points. And we should expect that because these trends and other factors, that a 2013 study that showed (with arguably flawed criteria) a 78% bust rate through 2006, might be outdated.

[bird]

 

The topic itself is EXTREMELY important in my opinion and it is much much broader than the narrow scope you are trying to contain it to. The topic has many different paths to take in different directions. You are focused on end result and I am focused on roadblocks that change the end result. 

 

You want to determine the predictive value of the top 100 lists. I'm saying OK I understand this but the predictive value is directly influenced by the operational style of the day. You want to know if BA gets it right... I'm saying that BA doesn't control how Andy LaRoche is handled. Maybe BA was right... the club was wrong or vice versa. I'm saying... I believe that there are busts that are self inflicted by the organization and more than we realize. And I believe that the the operational style has been changing to the point where it is becoming apples and oranges. 

 

I brought up short term value specifically because you had Duffey in the bust pile. You were questioning the line... I agree with you. It's a bad line if Duffey is in the bust pile and I used short term value as a reason for agreeing with you. 

 

As for using WAR... I'll let you use that for your determinations. I won't use it for mine... I'm not a WAR guy but I still see where you are going and am muddying the waters in an effort to help. 

 

Bottom Line... There are a lot of ingredients that go into this cake you are baking. I think the cake needs to be baked but the things I'm mentioning are factors that have extreme influence over the cake you seek. 

  I don't contest anything you're saying. In fact I agree with your take completely and with your premise that it's all important. 

 

The focus of the original thread, and therefore my own original focus, was derived from a discussion. It was the kind of discussion that highlights why this one particular ingredient in the cake, if measured wrong, can foul up a discussion: "Well, 80% of all those Top 100 pitchers bust anyway, so..."

 

We all get that the trade value of prospects, especially pitching prospects, deserves to be greatly discounted. Trouble is, if you believe a pitcher ranked in BA's 2020 Top 20 has an 80% chance of busting when the new reality is that it's more like a 50% chance (arbitrary # here), then I don't wan't you anywhere near MY team's FO. I just want to know what the new number is so I can more clearly understand the decisions we're seeing from GM's out there. And yes, I do recognize that there are other valid considerations, including tradeoffs with respect to short term and long term benefits and costs.

[Riverbrian]

 

Some really good points. And we should expect that because these trends and other factors, that a 2013 study that showed (with arguably flawed criteria) a 78% bust rate through 2006, might be outdated.

 

When I read that article... I didn't dismiss it completely because I'm sure it was saying something. 

 

But, there were two immediate points in my mind that needed to be factored in for relevance. 

 

The Value of a Prospect has escalated a ton since then. If the Value goes up.. the opportunity goes up accordingly and it changes today's relevance in the discussion significantly. Should we trade Royce Lewis for a Yu Darvish? If you are thinking with a 1990-2003 mentality. The Answer is Yes. If you are thinking with a 2020 mentality. The Answer might be no. 

 

Where was the line between Bust and Success arbitrarily placed. This is huge and I believe this is what you are trying to currently determine. 

[Riverbrian]

 

  I don't contest anything you're saying. In fact I agree with your take completely and with your premise that it's all important. 

 

The focus of the original thread, and therefore my own original focus, was derived from a discussion. It was the kind of discussion that highlights why this one particular ingredient in the cake, if measured wrong, can foul up a discussion: "Well, 80% of all those Top 100 pitchers bust anyway, so..."

 

We all get that the trade value of prospects, especially pitching prospects, deserves to be greatly discounted. Trouble is, if you believe a pitcher ranked in BA's 2020 Top 20 has an 80% chance of busting when the new reality is that it's more like a 50% chance (arbitrary # here), then I don't wan't you anywhere near MY team's FO. I just want to know what the new number is so I can more clearly understand the decisions we're seeing from GM's out there. And yes, I do recognize that there are other valid considerations, including tradeoffs with respect to short term and long term benefits and costs.

 

I'll just cut and paste from above. 

 

The Value of a Prospect has escalated a ton since then. If the Value goes up.. the opportunity goes up accordingly and it changes today's relevance in the discussion significantly. Should we trade Royce Lewis for a Yu Darvish? If you are thinking with a 1990-2003 mentality. The Answer is Yes. If you are thinking with a 2020 mentality. The Answer might be no.

 

Where was the line between Bust and Success arbitrarily placed. This is huge and I believe this is what you are trying to currently determine.

 

I believe that short term success can't be dismissed out of hand. 

[Riverbrian]

 

 

 

Where was the line between Bust and Success arbitrarily placed. This is huge and I believe this is what you are trying to currently determine.

 

 

 

Oh and how many players are bunched up close to the hard line matters. 

 

When I was in Rock Radio Programming. According to the consultants. China Grove tested a 75 so I could play it. Jesus is Just Alright tested a 74 so I couldn't play it. It was a hard arbitrary line that produced a Classic Rock library of 200 songs and the same methodology was applied across the entire industry. 

 

 

[bird]

 

If you are thinking with a 1990-2003 mentality. The Answer is Yes. If you are thinking with a 2020 mentality. The Answer might be no.

 

This is at the crux of my dismissal of an opinion backed up by a study from 2013 using data from 1990 to 2006 and using b-ref's WAR and nothing else as the measurement of success and failure.

 

That's thinking with a 1990-2003 mentality.

 

Trouble is, someone needs to help me with what 2020 fact-supported mentality looks like.

[Riverbrian]

 

This is at the crux of my dismissal of an opinion backed up by a study from 2013 using data from 1990 to 2006 and using b-ref's WAR and nothing else as the measurement of success and failure.

 

That's thinking with a 1990-2003 mentality.

 

Trouble is, someone needs to help me with what 2020 fact-supported mentality looks like.

 

I totally understand the complexity of your quest. It should make you tear your hair out if you are doing it right. 

 

My tendency is to believe that there isn't a simple right answer that will remove the complexity of the question. 

 

Let me put this way... If you took Andrew Friedman and Dave Dombrowski, locked them in a room and then forced them to honestly (without decorum) debate roster construction, the value of prospects, overall operational style, long term planning, things like that. Let's say that you tied them to chairs and only the winner of the debate would be untied at the end of the debate to make sure they won't mince words with freedom on the line.   

 

It is my opinion, that Andrew and Dave will argue, shout and roll their eyes at each other. The difference between them would be extreme, it probably wouldn't be pretty and the value of prospects would be at the heart of the debate. 

 

Andrew Friedman isn't going to drain the farm to acquire talent, he won't do it. He values prospects higher. Dombrowski will drain the farm, he has done it, he values veteran talent higher. 

 

Neither camp is wrong... The Red Sox have won a recent world series so the drain the farm strategy is legit and can't be dismissed. 

 

Personally, I'm in the Friedman camp. You have to keep the farm productive at all times. However, we have some posters on Twinsdaily who think that prospects typically don't pan out so we might as well cash them in... and those posters are in the Dombrowski camp. When they believe that 80% of prospects don't pan out. This is Dombrowski speak. 

 

But, here's the deal... The Dombrowski's are disappearing fast. New hires are almost exclusively coming from the Friedman style camp now. And as the Friedman's take over... the value of prospects goes up accordingly.

 

From 1990 to 2003... they were all Dombrowski's. This renders research from 1990 to 2003 concerning prospects panning out... basically not relevant to today's discussion. 

[biggentleben]

 

Andrew Friedman isn't going to drain the farm to acquire talent, he won't do it. He values prospects higher. Dombrowski will drain the farm, he has done it, he values veteran talent higher. 

 

Or both have been in roles that required that mindset. With Friedman, he's been with a team that had minimal money to spend overall and then a team with significant long-term money spent that needed to maximize on the edges to stay under luxury tax, so prospects would always have high value.

 

Dombrowski has, in fact, built a winner from within. He cleared off an older roster in the early 1990s in Montreal to give playing time to guys like DeShields, Walker, and Grissom while drafting guys like Cliff Floyd, Mark Grudzielanek, and Rondell White before heading to take over the Marlins in 1992. There, he made Charles Johnson his first draft pick and in the organization's first season traded for 24 y/o Gary Sheffield. He plugged in Robb Nen and acquired guys like Quilvio Veras for the lineup. Heck, a look at the expansion draft for the Marlins, orchestrated by Dombrowski is a sign of just how in tune he is to roster construction via young players - Bret Barberie, Trevor Hoffman, Chuck Carr, Bryan Harvey, Jeff Conine, Carl Everett, David Weathers, and Robert Person, along with another 3-4 guys who were decent middle relievers were all in that expansion draft. The 1997 team is infamous for having a ton of big-time players, but Kevin Brown, Al Leiter, Alex Fernandez, Devon White, Moises Alou, and Bobby Bonilla were all free agent signings, none of them costing prospects, and that '97 team famously played rookies Luis Castillo and Edgar Renteria up the middle and even with three FA starters, rookie Livan Hernandez was their playoff hero on the mound (along with Eric Gregg). Ownership forced the tear-down after the 1997 season, but the team that won in 2003 was built largely on the back of Dombrowski as well, with guys like Beckett, Adrian Gonzalez, and Josh Willingham coming from his drafts between 1998-2001, and 2003 cornerstones like Derrek Lee, A.J. Burnett, Juan Pierre (via Preston Wilson), Braden Looper, Mike Lowell, Brad Penny, and Dontrelle Willis (via Matt Clement) were all part of trades between the end of that World Series and his departure after the 2001 season. Add in that he signed Miguel Cabrera in that time, and he built a pretty incredible team that eventually won in 2003 again.

[Riverbrian]

 

Or both have been in roles that required that mindset. With Friedman, he's been with a team that had minimal money to spend overall and then a team with significant long-term money spent that needed to maximize on the edges to stay under luxury tax, so prospects would always have high value.

 

Dombrowski has, in fact, built a winner from within. He cleared off an older roster in the early 1990s in Montreal to give playing time to guys like DeShields, Walker, and Grissom while drafting guys like Cliff Floyd, Mark Grudzielanek, and Rondell White before heading to take over the Marlins in 1992. There, he made Charles Johnson his first draft pick and in the organization's first season traded for 24 y/o Gary Sheffield. He plugged in Robb Nen and acquired guys like Quilvio Veras for the lineup. Heck, a look at the expansion draft for the Marlins, orchestrated by Dombrowski is a sign of just how in tune he is to roster construction via young players - Bret Barberie, Trevor Hoffman, Chuck Carr, Bryan Harvey, Jeff Conine, Carl Everett, David Weathers, and Robert Person, along with another 3-4 guys who were decent middle relievers were all in that expansion draft. The 1997 team is infamous for having a ton of big-time players, but Kevin Brown, Al Leiter, Alex Fernandez, Devon White, Moises Alou, and Bobby Bonilla were all free agent signings, none of them costing prospects, and that '97 team famously played rookies Luis Castillo and Edgar Renteria up the middle and even with three FA starters, rookie Livan Hernandez was their playoff hero on the mound (along with Eric Gregg). Ownership forced the tear-down after the 1997 season, but the team that won in 2003 was built largely on the back of Dombrowski as well, with guys like Beckett, Adrian Gonzalez, and Josh Willingham coming from his drafts between 1998-2001, and 2003 cornerstones like Derrek Lee, A.J. Burnett, Juan Pierre (via Preston Wilson), Braden Looper, Mike Lowell, Brad Penny, and Dontrelle Willis (via Matt Clement) were all part of trades between the end of that World Series and his departure after the 2001 season. Add in that he signed Miguel Cabrera in that time, and he built a pretty incredible team that eventually won in 2003 again.

 

Agreed and I want to be clear... I'm knocking Dombrowski at all.

 

You can also add Theo to what you describe. There is a time to spend, a time to sell and Theo did it nicely. 

 

He built the Cubs via the Farm and then drained it. I have no criticism for this strategy because it has produced championships but the bill will come due and when the bill comes due... they may not survive. 

 

In the end... I could be wrong but I don't believe Friedman will ever drain the farm and while it remains to be seen... I believe that Bloom will eventually build the Dodgers East. A team with money to spend at the top and prospects coming from the bottom. Money combined with the Tampa sensibility will be a hard combination to beat. 

 

Friedman has the resources to spend and he will spend carefully, he has the resources to trade and he will trade carefully but I don't believe Friedman will ever be in the position that the Cubs and Red Sox currently are and I believe he will be in contention every year and that perpetual contention will produce a title eventually.

 

 

[bird]

I enjoyed Ben's little history lesson. Interesting.

 

My personal take is that all these leaders assign pretty similar values to their prospects. I believe they put a putative dollar number by every name on their spreadsheet. They know what the statistics show in terms of historical rates of success. This information is updated from the studies we've discussed. They know the bust rate for top prospects is no longer 77%, if it ever was.

 

And they know a lot about what factors contribute to success AND to failure. They also have a good idea of the things they can't predict about these human beings, and are aware of how volatile these "assets" can be.

 

Where guys like Friedman and Dombrowski have differed is in philosophy and strategy, not so much player value, and the options have narrowed recently, IMO. I believe we'll see fewer "bet the farm" strategies. We'll see fewer teams flirt with the luxury tax penalties.

 

But hey, what do I know? I don't even know what the bust rate is for a BA Top 100 prospect. Might be 75%. Might be 35%. I don't know.

[Riverbrian]

 

 

My personal take is that all these leaders assign pretty similar values to their prospects. I believe they put a putative dollar number by every name on their spreadsheet. They know what the statistics show in terms of historical rates of success. This information is updated from the studies we've discussed. They know the bust rate for top prospects is no longer 77%, if it ever was.

 

 

 

If the Red Sox wanted to straight cash buy Royce Lewis. 

 

Everything has it's price... How Much?

 

When you can answer the question, you'll have a starting point. 

[bird]

 

If the Red Sox wanted to straight cash buy Royce Lewis. 

 

Everything has it's price... How Much?

 

When you can answer the question, you'll have a starting point. 

 

We'll never know, but it's a hella lot more than slot.

 

We might get a better read on his monetized value by looking at a similarly talent but perhaps riskier prospect out of Havana, Luis Robert. He was signed to a contract after his season in 2016 that included a $26M upfront bonus. A year later, he shoots up the Top 100 lists, all the way to #22 with MLB. Last I looked, he was #3 with MLB and #18 with FanGraphs and pretty much ready for the show.

 

My guess is that Falvey would turn down $26M and give Boston his routing number at twice that?? But I feel certain he knows the number.

[Riverbrian]

We'll never know, but it's a hella lot more than slot.

 

We might get a better read on his monetized value by looking at a similarly talent but perhaps riskier prospect out of Havana, Luis Robert. He was signed to a contract after his season in 2016 that included a $26M upfront bonus. A year later, he shoots up the Top 100 lists, all the way to #22 with MLB. Last I looked, he was #3 with MLB and #18 with FanGraphs and pretty much ready for the show.

 

My guess is that Falvey would turn down $26M and give Boston his routing number at twice that?? But I feel certain he knows the number.

Yeah I don’t know either but I think you are right. The front offices have a number in mind and that number plays a role in if they trade Royce Lewis and what they get in return.

 

Ponder that and then consider what the Cubs gave up for a rental of Chapman. It means the Cubs Valued the Chapman rental at a similar price of Royce Lewis or they said screw the value. I don’t think we will see anything like that again from a majority of clubs but that was Dombrowski style move and there are less Dombrowski style GM’s today because the bill comes due.

[Rosterman]

But prospects come and go. You have 3-5 yeras to really make a decision. You draft according to perceived weaknesses on your team in that time period, but then you go and sign someone, or someone rises in the system, and suddenly you have a slew of outfielders or starting pitchers that looked to be blocked, no matter how they rise in your system, but decisions have to made on how they could possibly fit on your roster this season or next, or who are they blocking further back in the system that needs the sesoning and will probably help you more in the future than these guys now.

 

Who saw Arraez pushing forward. He won't be the Real Deal until the Twins see the need to pull a Polanco and longterm him. But Gordon was definitely ahead of him as a middle infielder, and Lewis and Javier were considered more in the mix. But he managed to change the overall picture, and suddenly you are sitting with a top prospect (Gordon) and no where to put him. What was Gordon worth at the end of the 2017 season comapred to 2018 or now. Today you ahd to make a decision on Javier or risk losing him. 

 

If Polanco is your curent longerterm shortstop, does Lewis become expendable because you signed an equally intriguing Cavaco who might step into the fray in 4-5 uyears. Or is Polanco a palce holder and tradebait with Lewis the Real Deal, which means a good long career (you hope) and thus Cavaco will become an asset if he proves his prospect status the next 2-3 years.

 

[Riverbrian]

But prospects come and go. You have 3-5 yeras to really make a decision. You draft according to perceived weaknesses on your team in that time period, but then you go and sign someone, or someone rises in the system, and suddenly you have a slew of outfielders or starting pitchers that looked to be blocked, no matter how they rise in your system, but decisions have to made on how they could possibly fit on your roster this season or next, or who are they blocking further back in the system that needs the sesoning and will probably help you more in the future than these guys now.

 

Who saw Arraez pushing forward. He won't be the Real Deal until the Twins see the need to pull a Polanco and longterm him. But Gordon was definitely ahead of him as a middle infielder, and Lewis and Javier were considered more in the mix. But he managed to change the overall picture, and suddenly you are sitting with a top prospect (Gordon) and no where to put him. What was Gordon worth at the end of the 2017 season comapred to 2018 or now. Today you ahd to make a decision on Javier or risk losing him.

 

If Polanco is your curent longerterm shortstop, does Lewis become expendable because you signed an equally intriguing Cavaco who might step into the fray in 4-5 uyears. Or is Polanco a palce holder and tradebait with Lewis the Real Deal, which means a good long career (you hope) and thus Cavaco will become an asset if he proves his prospect status the next 2-3 years.

That's bring us back to what I call the Friedman style. Talent used to get blocked like you describe all the time. I said it earlier in this thread. It used to take a specific combination of events for a prospect to break through the wall.

 

In the scenario you describe, Friedman won't (in my opinion) look at Gordon as blocked. If Gordon is ready, he will find a spot for him and he will have Arraez and Gordon on the same 25 man roster leaving it to Dave Roberts to make it work, Arraez would probably be a super utility guy and Gordon might take on a similiar role. Or... if the 25 man is plump full, he will exhaust Gordon's options in AAA for injury replacement. I don't think Friedman looks at it the same "we have 4 2B so we can trade 2 of them" way. Value is Value... positional need factors matter much much less and this creates an overall depth instead of position specific depth. This makes the Dodgers bulletproof in my opinion. They will call up the best prospect, regardless of position when they need to backfill from the minors. They can fill from above with money and below with prospects... Injuries or Bad Contracts won't take them down.

 

Dombrowski on the other hand, Might (In my opinion, I don't know) look at Moncada and have no problem trading him for Sale because he perceives he has specific depth at 2B and 3B with Pedroia and Devers and Nunez and Holt and he can address 2B later. In a sense, he may devalue Moncada in that scenerio because he isn't usable to the Red Sox at the moment. This is fine... it worked in 2018 but in 2020, they now need a 2B and the owner says he wants them to get below the luxury tax. The bill is due.

 

This is why I'm a Friedman style guy. The way I see it, teams need 600K talent because everybody has a budget cap. If want to keep payroll around 130,000,000. Just using 25 for the 25 man roster instead of the 40 man roster. This is around 5.2M per player. Each 600K talent you have, allows you to change that number from 5.2M to 9.8M for one player. Another 600K talent on the roster and you can afford a 14.4M talent.

 

If 600K talent is blocked (self inflicted). Teams become their own worst enemy.

[Mike Sixel]

Fangraphs has a literal dollar value assigned, it might be an article. If you are curious, Google is your friend