bean5302

He'll be interesting to watch over the next couple of years. I suspect he's going to be a little slow developing due to how rough his arsenal is, and his inability to throw strikes. I'm a fan of getting that BB rate down to a reasonable level first, then add K's later. Too many pitchers advance on high K rates until they hit AAA and struggle or wash out of MLB quickly.

Austin Martin doesn't seem to have the defensive instincts to play at a high level. His physical tools are stretched in center and his bat is below MLB average because he doesn't barrel up balls. He's like Arraez with less pop and 4x the K rate. Can Martin become a trusted CF option with the Twins? Depends on what you consider "trusted." Trusted to technically play the game at league minimum and fill in for 100-150 PA a year? Sure. Trusted to be a starting caliber CF the Twins need because Buxton will only play 60-80 games in center? That's beyond Martin's ceiling, I'm afraid.

Baldelli's first 2 seasons were during baseball's steroid era. He hasn't played the game in a successful manner in 20 years, and he was never really a good MLB hitter. The game today is far different than it was in the pre-analytics years. Pitchers threw 5mph slower, and there were still a handful of successful starting pitchers throwing (literally) 80mph fastballs. I don't know how much Baldelli has learned since, but the team's approach has seen major shifts in hitting philosophy in consecutive years now. It's fair to question or even discount Baldelli's wisdom in applying the baseball knowledge he has. Baldelli has fielded a single team with more than 87 wins in his 5 full season career with the Twins. People complain I use 87 wins as some arbitrary figure, but I could use 88 or 89 wins as well. The bottom line is Baldelli's teams would rarely win a division in baseball. 87 wins is a 2.6% chance. 89 wins is only a 7.7% chance, and Baldelli's teams played in the worst division in the game. His teams have not gotten good results.

Prospective owners have no control over the team or how that money is spent. There is no guarantee an agreement will be reached or that whichever bidding candidate will be successful. Furthermore, there is no guarantee the additional spending benefits the product. If the deal falls through for the time being and the team performs well, the team valuation can skyrocket, pricing the bidders out of the market. Until (if ever) the deal closes, the Pohlads are on the hook for the additional spending, and if the additional spending does not improve the team, it's money they just burned. If the Pohlads thought spending more money would have improved the team's performance, they would have spent the money to increase the potential sale value of the team. There is no guaranteed reward, but guaranteed risk involved for both parties. The Pohlads want the best sale deal. The buyer wants to pay the least. A few million dollars for roster construction is not relevant.

While I welcome the Twins finally recognizing the concept of situational hitting, I still can't get behind the scapegoating of a guy like Popkins to save face for Baldelli. It's not like situational hitting is a new concept, and expecting guys to be successful while making major changes to their approach is a tall order. I have to wonder if the team has the right personnel to implement their new strategy after drafting and developing all these players to hit a different way for the past many seasons.

Alrighty! So this has been brought up a lot of times. The Dodgers are ruining baseball, teams are mortgaging their futures, these players will stop signing their contracts when the first team declares bankruptcy, etc. Unfortunately, real source material for understanding how deferrals work is in very short supply. Most stories with headlines suggesting they'll explain just say the same things, and list a bunch of historical contracts without any actual explanation at all. First, here's my source (Forbes cites the Athletic as it's source) https://www.forbes.com/sites/danfreedman/2024/12/12/a-deep-dive-into-deferred-contracts-from-the-1950s-to-today/ What the article says. MLB teams have to 100% pre-fund deferred salaries within 2 years after the deferral is earned. Ohtani deferred 2024's salary so the Dodgers have to pre-fund the liability by July, 2026. MLB lets teams discount the total amount due by an assumed 5% growth rate for however long the salary is deferred. In Ohtani's case, the deferral period is 10years. Ohtani made $2MM in direct salary in 2024 and he deferred the other $68MM for 10 years to be paid in 2034. Assuming a 5% growth rate, that means the Dodgers have to put away $41,746,101 in 2024 for it to grow and be worth $68,000,000 in 2034, but MLB gives the Dodgers a 2 year extra grace period so don't have to put that money in until 2026, which I think is a potentially major problem. This doesn't mean the Dodgers haven't already funded it or their agreement with Ohtani doesn't require the Dodgers to immediately fund. I think it's likely Ohtani did tell the Dodgers they had to immediately fund. The longer the Dodgers wait to fund, the more cash they have to spend. If the Dodgers invest the cash in the current year it equals $41,746,101 per year. If they wait a year and don't start funding to 2025 it increases to $43,833,406, and if they wait the maximum of 2 years under MLB rules, it jumps to $46,025,077. This is kind of a WORST CASE scenario if the Dodgers push funding off 2 years with the glossary: Year = Calendar Year Salary = Salary paid to Ohtani directly by the Dodgers during the year he plays. Deferred = Salary from this year which Ohtani has elected to defer into the future. Escrow Paid = This is the future salary Ohtani elected to defer getting paid out in the future year. Def. NPV @5% = This is the amount of cash, which if invested at 5% will grow to the deferred ($68MM) in 8** years. LA Escrow Cash = This is the amount of cash LA will need to invest into Ohtani's escrow account under MLB pre-funding rules. LA Cashflow = This is the amount of cash LA will have to pay directly for Ohtani's services. Ohtani Balance = This is the amount of cash due to Ohtani in the future. Escrow Required = This is the balance the escrow account needs to be at under the 5% MLB growth rule. *Actual Escrow = This is the balance of the escrow account if we assume the Dodgers can't get a 5.00% return and only get 3.00% *Shortfall = This is the extra cash the Dodgers would need to kick-in if their investments only earned 3.00% instead of 5.00% to fully fund Ohtani's escrow. *LA Total Cash = This is the total cash flow from the Dodgers into Ohtani's salary and benefits. *If the Dodgers DO get 5.00% on their investment, there would be no shortfall and the "LA Cashflow" would exactly match "LA Total Cash" column. **Even though the salary is deferred 10 years, this assumes LA doesn't even start funding for 2 years under MLB rules so they only get 8 years of growth. This is how deferrals work. This is how teams are required to fund them. This is what happens if a team isn't able to earn 5.00% or better. This is why Ohtani's contract is not reeeeallly 10 years and $700MM. Do pay attention to the LA Total Cash column at the far end of the spreadsheet. I don't expect the Dodgers won't be able to secure a bare minimum of a 2.00% investment even under dire market conditions so 3.00% is a fair bad case scenario to model. You can see the Dodgers could be on the hook for $10MM of cash more per year than they bargained for at the end of Ohtani's playing time if their investments don't pan out well, and you can see continued cash shortfalls on the escrow after Ohtani quits playing. The risk, though, isn't as much as you might expect even in a really bad case scenario. This is also why the NFL (50% max) and NBA (25% max) restrict deferrals. They have salary HARD CAPS. Hard caps could become major issues with deferrals. That $8.8MM shortfall in 2034, after Ohtani no longer plays could hypothetically become dead cap or at least I'm sure the NFL and NBA are concerned about major salary cap manipulation. Basically, it's the same as Ohtani getting $2MM salary + $41.7MM and investing the $41.7MM himself at 5%, except he doesn't have to pay the taxes on the $41.7MM yet. There is far more complexity to the issue from a tax perspective for the Dodgers, but I'm not sure how they technically fund it or report it. What if an MLB team goes bankrupt? Well, it depends on whether on the technicalities of how the deferrals are funded. Are they put into an irrevocable trust not owned by the team or are the assets held in Dodgers cash investments, etc? If a player allowed the escrow account to be co-mingled with Dodgers assets, yeah, the player could become a general creditor which would be potentially bad. I think that's improbable, though. What a mess if the Dodgers traded Ohtani to the Yankees? The Dodgers would have to potentially have to sell off hundred of millions of dollars in their investments, get killed by the taxes, and then fund the Yankee's new escrow account because the Yankees aren't going to trust the Dodgers to hold the money, know what I mean? Anyway, luckily, MLB requires certain liquidity and cash reserves for their teams so teams in dire financial circumstances (recently the Mets) or rough spots (Padres) can be forced to be sold (Mets) or cut payrolls (Padres). The risk of a true bankruptcy for an MLB team seems remote without the collapse of the entire sport.

Corey Koskie managed 22.1 career bWAR for the Twins, and that's a very good baseball career in general, even if the only stayed with the Twins. For players who wore a "Twins" jersey that puts him at 14th in batting and 23rd overall in "Twins" history. For a team which has been around for 65 years, that's pretty good. Koskie's Twins contribution is essentially identical in WAR to Morneau, and Dozier (not in). Your options to get into the Twins' HoF: 1) Be a truly an exceptional player for the Twins during your playing career (Radke, Puckett, Mauer) 2) Be a "good" or better player strongly linked with the '87 or '91 Championship team (Gagne, Gaetti) 3) Be active with the Twins post career (Cuddyer, Hunter, Gladden) 4) Be part of ownership, recognizable voice or part of the front office (Pohlad, Carneal, Stelmaszek) 5) Have nobody else qualifying for the HoF under previous rules and the team is desperate (Tovar) While Koskie was a very good player, I think he got the call because of #3. https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/minnesota-twins-corey-koskie-hall-of-fame/ If a player generates less than 30 career WAR with the Twins, they're not going to get in without help from rule 3-5.

The primary reason, under this front office, that the Twins have been unable to develop defensively valuable shortstops is because this front office does not value defense or know how to coach it. Royce Lewis is a perfect example. Lewis has both the arm and the range to cover the position, yet he has well documented throwing issues. Trevor Plouffe is on record talking about being perplexed at how the Twins have been unable to address the issues, and how the Twins have mishandled Lewis. Obviously, that's just Plouffe's opinion, but if the front office apologists are going to talk about all the knowledge Baldelli and the front office have, a guy who played SS at the MLB in the current analytics era (Plouffe) would be considered valuable. It's clear the front office doesn't value defense. They don't draft defense first players at high levels, and they certainly don't develop defensive skills well (at any position). This front office values the bat and tools. For the most part, tools = defense to the Twins. It's like a spreadsheet or AI screening tool for job qualifications. Twins Center Fielder opening. Job Requirements: Speed tool 55 grade. Arm tool 50 grade. If you meet these qualifications, apply for the opening today!

Are you arguing things like 100th in SLG or 77th in OPS is bad? Out of what? Also, Petco isn't exactly hitter friendly so why not use a park adjusted metric? The bottom line is Arraez, even with a torn thumb ligament, is an above average hitter, and he averages over 40 extra base hits a year. Vazquez managed 17 last year. Kepler managed 30. Larnach a whopping 32. Jeffers' all or nothing approached beat out Arraez's down season with 43, and team MVP Willi Castro topped his previous career best mark of 32 XBH with 48 XBH, but that went along with his .247 batting average and K rate more than 5x higher than Arraez which is why Arraez had a better wRC+ than Castro. I'm not a fan of bringing back Arraez right now for the contract, but the anti-Arraez faction around here is kind of mind-boggling to me.

I wasn't expecting Stewart to be healthy this year, but I am hopeful he'll still be effective and could maybe throw 40+ innings. Reading between the lines on Zoll's comments, Stewart isn't expected to be game ready at the opening of Spring Training, but they're hopeful he'll get in some live game action before the regular season starts to qualify for having a "full" Spring Training in terms of technically participating in all facets of the game.

Prospective owners are not casual baseball fans on Twins Daily who are hoping to watch a good team on TV. Owners want value growth potential and flexibility. No owner is changing their bid based on 1 year of Dylan Cease or the prospects it would require to get him. You could trade both Walker Jenkins and Emmanuel Rodriguez for Dylan Cease and prospective ownership wouldn't change their bid. Derek Falvey is going to be the driving force behind any roster changes at this point because Falvey is actively auditioning for a job, either with the Twins or a new team.

The Twins track record of shortstop development is really rough. The last good shortstops they've developed were probably Christian Guzman (acquired from Yankees after High-A) and Jason Bartlett (acquired from Padres from Low-A). Punto, Adrianza and Florimon were already pro before Minnesota grabbed them. Escobar was in AAA when the Twins got him. Trevor Plouffe, Danny Santana, Jorge Polanco, Brian Dozier, Nick Gordon, Austin Martin, and Royce Lewis were all viewed as poor to unplayable shortstops by the time they reached MLB.

I don't drink the gallons of Kool-Aid the TD Hype Machine stirs up. Instead, I form my own opinions based on player performance, analytics, peer comparisons, and just gut instinct (or personal biases). That's different than never having anything good to say. But hey, if you want somebody to tell you how to think, act, breathe, what to wear, when to take a leak, what color your poop should be, knock yourself out. Also, feel free to add me to your ignore list. It's not perfect, but it helps.

Jenkins could be good. I've done the analysis on how his peers have performed, and Jenkins is sandwiched in the middle of a guys who were great or washed out. Jenkins is not among the group who were all successful.

Dylan Cease = +33MM in trade value Mercedes, Martin, Morris, Paddack, Culpepper... those are all toss in guys worth nothing of note. They're sweeteners that make a tough deal palatable with lottery picks. Vazquez has negative value, and a likely reason the Padres are shopping Cease considering the Padres' biggest need might be SP is likely a payroll constraint. Trade #1 - Might get a chuckle and a "let's get serious" Keaschall probably doesn't help them, he's not good enough to bring back Cease on his own, and the rest of the package isn't worth noting. Cease makes the Twins' rotation a lot better. Trade #2 - Larnach might address some LF/DH need for the Padres, but the Twins are already in a tight spot for outfielders. Paddack might not have negative value. Morris is a nothing and he has a 20:1 chance of being an MLB caliber starter. Martin is a PTBNL caliber guy. Trade #3 - Might work, but hurts the Twins more than it helps us so I think I'll pass. The Padres need rotation pieces, and if you're putting together a multi-player package, the sum of the parts needs to be worth quite a bit more than the single premium piece you're asking for.

Not at all concerned about Buxton's swing speed. Buxton's Full NTC drops off after the a32, (2026) season. In the model above a32 lines right up with a28 with a drop off after that. Regarding launch angles vs. swing speeds, I wouldn't expect a correlation. From what I can see, the faster the swing speed, the less likely a ball is to be squared up by the batter, in general. That said, the faster the swing speed, the higher the expected exit velocity when making contact so even non-ideal contact is more likely to result in a hit. At least, that's what I'd expect. The swing path is going to be determine most of launch angle IMHO.

You know there are 30 teams in MLB. So the "average" team would have 3.3 prospects in the top 100. The Twins finished 4th in the division last year, behind Detroit (who have 6 top 100 prospects), Kansas City (who have 3), and Cleveland (who also have 3). The White Sox also have 6 top 100 prospects. I'm not excited about having 3 top 100 prospects. I'm not excited about the Twins' situation this year, either. I don't like what seems to be the front office's methodology and I really don't like Baldelli's decision making.

Keaschall's stock fell a bit after his performance showed signs of a ceiling at AA, but the TJ didn't seem to impact it at all. Keaschall is viewed as one of the top prospects at 2B as MLB ranks him at #3, but numbers 3-8 could easily be ranked in any order a scout prefers. The gap between the top 2 and Keaschall is larger than Keaschall and the next 5. 1. Campbell #7 (AAA) 2. Bazzana #10 (A+) 3. Keaschall #61 (AA) 4. Moore #68 (AA) 5. Triantos #73 (AAA) 6. Johnson #83 (AA) 7. Stewart #84 (A+) 8. Arroyo #92 (A+) ------------------- 9. Crisantes NR (A) 10. Martinez NR (MLB) Keaschall has a good bat, but his defense is a bit suspect even at 2B/3B right now. With the UCL tear and TJ, I think it's highly probable the Twins have him locked down at 2B / 1B / DH for the first few months. He'd be a major longshot to ever cover SS. He neither has the arm (even before TJ), nor the range even if he did become a smoother and more polished fielder. Defense probably isn't a big concern since the Twins don't care about teaching it anyway.

There are 9 lineup positions. 30 teams. 270 total expected players if everybody played a full season. So by "starters" on a team, here are the percentages who reached the following level of plate appearances MLB vs. the Twins. 500 PA = 130 (48%), vs. 2 (22%) 450 PA = 169 (63%), vs. 3 (33%) 400 PA = 207 (77%), vs. 5 (56%) The Twins are almost uniquely poor in terms of keeping players in the lineup or on the field due to Baldelli's proclivity, and constant player injuries.

No sensationalism here...

Potential Chris Paddack trades the Twins should consider. All of them where a team eats over 50% of Paddack's salary.

Vazquez used to be an MLB caliber player. Should we go out and bring back Michael Cuddyer? He was an 18 WAR career player!

Let me help. I read the headline and answer with "None" Replacing a AAA caliber player isn't hard. If trading a AAA caliber player has "catastrophic" consequences, something is seriously wrong with the team. Just another ridiculously over-dramatic article from some crazed Vazquez supporter. He's not an MLB caliber player. Give it up.

Wallner and Larnach are not similar hitters, but neither is likely to be good at something they're never asked to do or practice. Worth noting, LHP throw about 25% of innings in MLB. Therefore, the Twins really need to trade every single one of their right handed batters away!

FIP is considered to be more stable than ERA in smaller sample sizes. I do like using xFIP, but the batted ball data from MiLB is less reliable than MLB. Henriquez's HR's allowed were spread pretty evenly through the season in terms of 1st half vs. 2nd half, though they tended to be bunched in bursts when he allowed them. Breaking his AAA appearances down: -0.43-2.99 FIP = 15 3.00-3.99 FIP = 3 4.00-4.99 FIP = 4 5.00-42.57 FIP = 12 Basically, he's either good or gets destroyed by a home run. Henriquez is a ground ball reliever who doesn't entice hitters to chase outside the zone very well, but with good placement in the zone, he can generate a fair number of swings and misses on the changeup. None of his pitches move well, but he has good velocity. Lots of hard contact. When Henriquez makes a mistake, and all pitchers make mistakes, hitters have been able to easily capitalize. There just hasn't been a lot of wiggle room for Henriquez.