The Value of Prospects

[AZTwin]

I am reading a study right now that 80% of top 100 pitching prospects bust.  Only about 8% are considered "above average".  Same study says top 100 position players have a bust rate around 65%.  This needs to be considered with any trade.    If we are giving away an established star we should be getting multiple top prospects to go along with it.

[ewen21]

 

I am reading a study right now that 80% of top 100 pitching prospects bust.  Only about 8% are considered "above average".  Same study says top 100 position players have a bust rate around 65%.  This needs to be considered with any trade.    If we are giving away an established star we should be getting multiple top prospects to go along with it.

This is why I was more than open for a trade involving Buxton and Syndergaard.  I would be willing to explore a deal involving Rosario for Noah Syndergaard if the Mets are interested.  Maybe a prospect that has had success in the minors.

 

When you say 80% of the pitching prospects are a bust I assume you mean from the time they were drafted.  This is why I pay little attention to the draft process.  When you talk about prospects that already moved up the chain those numbers change.  Please clarify what you mean because I would assume it means upon being drafted, not those already knocking on the door and pitching effectively in the high minors.  Those are the kinds of guys I am interested in as well.  

 

 

[AZTwin]

This is why I was more than open for a trade involving Buxton and Syndergaard. I would be willing to explore a deal involving Rosario for Noah Syndergaard if the Mets are interested. Maybe a prospect that has had success in the minors.

 

When you say 80% of the pitching prospects are a bust I assume you mean from the time they were drafted. This is why I pay little attention to the draft process. When you talk about prospects that already moved up the chain those numbers change. Please clarify what you mean because I would assume it means upon being drafted, not those already knocking on the door and pitching effectively in the high minors. Those are the kinds of guys I am interested in as well.

No - not from when they’re drafted. From when they’re in the minors and rated as a top 100 prospect

[ewen21]

 

No - not from when they’re drafted. From when they’re in the minors and rated as a top 100 prospect

At what stage of the minors?  That is awfully hard to pinpoint, I know....but I am talking about dudes on their way up.  Not entry level guys in A.  I would need a guy under 23 and already in AA doing well and a noted guy at that.  It isn't about any old minor league scrub.

 

And I agree with what you said earlier about getting multiple propsects. I generally want to find major league ready guys or at least guys close to it.  Not interested in getting prospects for a guy like Rosario unless they are damn good and at least two of them.

 

The Mets managed to get Syndergaard and Travis d'Arnaud for RA DICKEY.  THey got Wheeler for an old Carlos Beltran.

[bird]

 

I am reading a study right now that 80% of top 100 pitching prospects bust.  Only about 8% are considered "above average".  Same study says top 100 position players have a bust rate around 65%.  This needs to be considered with any trade.    If we are giving away an established star we should be getting multiple top prospects to go along with it.

 

 

Would you be willing to share a link to this study? I don't trust those numbers at ALL, and here's why:

 

In MLB's 2014 Top 100, 46 of those prospects were pichers.

 

Of those 46 pitching prospects, only THREE (3!) did not pitch in the major leagues. The other 43 have.

 

The three who did not? Appel, a story we know. Yordani Ventura, victim of a tragic car crash in his home country, and at the bottom of that list, Trey Ball, an enigmatic two-way athlete who the talent evaluators described before the draft as high-risk/high reward.

 

That means that, even if every single one of the remaining 54 pitching prospects was a bust, we can't get close to an 80% bust rate. As a matter of fact, I can get us to well over that 20% success ratio with this collection of 46 pitchers. It's a list that includes Syndergaard, Odorizzi, Stroman, Eduardo Rodriguez, Berrios, Jon Gray, Aaron Sanchez, Giolito, Fried, Foltyniewicz, Robbie Ray, Archie Bradly, James Taillon, Taijuan Walker, Glasnow, Bundy, Osuna, Trevor Bauer...I think that's your 20% success rate right there before going to the next tier of Jimmy Nelson, Andrew Heaney...

 

I DO agree with your larger point, I think, and that's that a pitcher's value deserves to be discounted in trades due to increased uncertainty and performance volatility, most of which is the product of injury risk. I think that's often not considered here.

 

Unfortunately for us, Teams don't seem to need to discount the price for pitching, so teams shopping for it take on those risks, as we saw with Sam Dyson for example.

[AZTwin]

Would you be willing to share a link to this study? I don't trust those numbers at ALL, and here's why:

 

In MLB's 2014 Top 100, 46 of those prospects were pichers.

 

Of those 46 pitching prospects, only THREE (3!) did not pitch in the major leagues. The other 43 have.

 

The three who did not? Appel, a story we know. Yordani Ventura, victim of a tragic car crash in his home country, and at the bottom of that list, Trey Ball, an enigmatic two-way athlete who the talent evaluators described before the draft as high-risk/high reward.

 

That means that, even if every single one of the remaining 54 pitching prospects was a bust, we can't get close to an 80% bust rate. As a matter of fact, I can get us to well over that 20% success ratio with this collection of 46 pitchers. It's a list that includes Syndergaard, Odorizzi, Stroman, Eduardo Rodriguez, Berrios, Jon Gray, Aaron Sanchez, Giolito, Fried, Foltyniewicz, Robbie Ray, Archie Bradly, James Taillon, Taijuan Walker, Glasnow, Bundy, Osuna, Trevor Bauer...I think that's your 20% success rate right there before going to the next tier of Jimmy Nelson, Andrew Heaney...

 

I DO agree with your larger point, I think, and that's that a pitcher's value deserves to be discounted in trades due to increased uncertainty and performance volatility, most of which is the product of injury risk. I think that's often not considered here.

 

Unfortunately for us, Teams don't seem to need to discount the price for pitching, so teams shopping for it take on those risks, as we saw with Sam Dyson for example.

Here’s one study: https://www.royalsreview.com/2011/2/14/1992424/success-and-failure-rates-of-top-mlb-prospects

[Major League Ready]

 

Here’s one study: https://www.royalsreview.com/2011/2/14/1992424/success-and-failure-rates-of-top-mlb-prospects

 

The problem with this type of study is that the majority of people glean from it whatever supports their predisposed position. The tendency is to focus on whatever subset of the data supports a given position. In this case, 80% of prospects fail.

 

One of the first steps in any data analysis is to assess the correlation with whatever it is you are trying to conclude. I will come back to that point. First, let’s take an objective view of this data. Perhaps this high failure rate defines the key to success in a different way. Perhaps the difference between success and failure is relative success in converting (developing) prospects to MLB players. Maybe the key is producing MLB contributors from players outside the top 100 or a combination of these two factors. The data clearly shows there is a wide difference in success rates between MLB teams.

 

What are we trying to conclude here? Is it what percentage of prospects fail? I don’t think that is the end game. IMO, the question is actually what is the most effective way to construct a playoff team. The most effective way to do that is to actually look at how each form of player acquisition contributes to the construction of playoff rosters? It’s much more conclusive to look at the actual results as opposed to drawing a conclusion as to how important prospects are to building a playoff roster based on failure rate of top 100 prospects.

 

Last year, the 7 teams (not counting the Twins) who made the playoffs had a total of 88 players that contributed 1.5+ fWAR.

 

28 (32%) were drafted.
21 (24%) were traded for as prospects.
8  (9%) were Intl signings.
10 (11%) were trade for after becoming established.
21 (24%) were signed as free agents.

Drafted players combined with players traded for as prospects represent 56% of the highest contributing players. Established players acquired in trade represent only 11% of the players that contributed the most to playoff teams. Free agents had a much higher contribution. However, many of them were the type of players / contracts frowned upon here. Of the 21 free agents, only 4 had 5+ year deals. 6 were two-year deals and 11 were 1 year contracts. 

 

The two lowest budget teams are very interesting in terms of the value of trading for established players vs the value of trading for prospects. Between Oakland and Tampa, they only 23 players with a WAR of 1.5 or higher. They only drafted 5 of those players. However, they traded for 12 of their 23 highest performing players as prospects. They had 6 free agents. Four of them were 1-year deals and two were 2-year deals. The total for all six contracts was $55M, $30M to Charlie Morton. 2 players (Tommy Pham / Homer Bailey) were acquired in trade.

 

What do the actual results of these practices tell us?

[Mike Sixel]

 

The problem with this type of study is that the majority of people glean from it whatever supports their predisposed position. The tendency is to focus on whatever subset of the data supports a given position. In this case, 80% of prospects fail.

 

One of the first steps in any data analysis is to assess the correlation with whatever it is you are trying to conclude. I will come back to that point. First, let’s take an objective view of this data. Perhaps this high failure rate defines the key to success in a different way. Perhaps the difference between success and failure is relative success in converting (developing) prospects to MLB players. Maybe the key is producing MLB contributors from players outside the top 100 or a combination of these two factors. The data clearly shows there is a wide difference in success rates between MLB teams.

 

What are we trying to conclude here? Is it what percentage of prospects fail? I don’t think that is the end game. IMO, the question is actually what is the most effective way to construct a playoff team. The most effective way to do that is to actually look at how each form of player acquisition contributes to the construction of playoff rosters? It’s much more conclusive to look at the actual results as opposed to drawing a conclusion as to how important prospects are to building a playoff roster based on failure rate of top 100 prospects.

 

Last year, the 7 teams (not counting the Twins) who made the playoffs had a total of 88 players that contributed 1.5+ fWAR.

 

28 (32%) were drafted.
21 (24%) were traded for as prospects.
8  (9%) were Intl signings.
10 (11%) were trade for after becoming established.
21 (24%) were signed as free agents.

Drafted players combined with players traded for as prospects represent 56% of the highest contributing players. Established players acquired in trade represent only 11% of the players that contributed the most to playoff teams. Free agents had a much higher contribution. However, many of them were the type of players / contracts frowned upon here. Of the 21 free agents, only 4 had 5+ year deals. 6 were two-year deals and 11 were 1 year contracts. 

 

The two lowest budget teams are very interesting in terms of the value of trading for established players vs the value of trading for prospects. Between Oakland and Tampa, they only 23 players with a WAR of 1.5 or higher. They only drafted 5 of those players. However, they traded for 12 of their 23 highest performing players as prospects. They had 6 free agents. Four of them were 1-year deals and two were 2-year deals. The total for all six contracts was $55M, $30M to Charlie Morton. 2 players (Tommy Pham / Homer Bailey) were acquired in trade.

 

What do the actual results of these practices tell us?

 

It also ignores that higher ranked prospects actually succeed at a pretty good rate (according to the study), and that the kinds of players the Twins trade for are more likely to be successful than the entire population is. 

[AZTwin]

It also ignores that higher ranked prospects actually succeed at a pretty good rate (according to the study), and that the kinds of players the Twins trade for are more likely to be successful than the entire population is.

Actually according to more studies, traded prospects are much LESS likely to succeed. The thought is the home team has more information available. Established MLB stars are very valuable because they are a known quality. Many prospects need to be asked for and elite ones at that

[Major League Ready]

 

Actually according to more studies, traded prospects are much LESS likely to succeed. The thought is the home team has more information available. Established MLB stars are very valuable because they are a known quality. Many prospects need to be asked for and elite ones at that

 

Yet, among playoff teams, there were twice as many high performing players that were acquired as prospects as compared to those acquired as proven MLB players. While this leaves some room for interpretation, established players are generally traded for prospects. The fact that there were so many more players acquired as prospects does suggest that trading for prospects is more productive than trading away prospects. It would be interesting to put together the data for the last 10 years. Not so interesting that I would take on that task but interesting none the less.

[Mike Sixel]

 

Actually according to more studies, traded prospects are much LESS likely to succeed. The thought is the home team has more information available. Established MLB stars are very valuable because they are a known quality. Many prospects need to be asked for and elite ones at that

 

Which of course does not reflect what I posted....traded are less likely to succeed, compared to players in the same ranking. 

 

Your post said 80% of prospects failed.. That includes guys picked in round 40 that never do much. The Twins, no team, is trading for those. That was my point. Your point holds, but your first post included the entire population of prospects, which isn't really relevant for assessing trades.

 

I do agree, in general, that known commodities are more valuable, within context of where a team is on the competitive scale of course. 

[AZTwin]

Which of course does not reflect what I posted....traded are less likely to succeed, compared to players in the same ranking.

 

Your post said 80% of prospects failed.. That includes guys picked in round 40 that never do much. The Twins, no team, is trading for those. That was my point. Your point holds, but your first post included the entire population of prospects, which isn't really relevant for assessing trades.

 

I do agree, in general, that known commodities are more valuable, within context of where a team is on the competitive scale of course.

No my post was about prospects rated as top 100 prospects in all of baseball. The 80% figure is related to pitchers and even more so Lefties. This is not for all players in round 40. In fact I doubt there have been any round 40 players included in that statistic. It’s specifically for the best of the best minor leaguers

[ewen21]

Which of course does not reflect what I posted....traded are less likely to succeed, compared to players in the same ranking.

 

Your post said 80% of prospects failed.. That includes guys picked in round 40 that never do much. The Twins, no team, is trading for those. That was my point. Your point holds, but your first post included the entire population of prospects, which isn't really relevant for assessing trades.

 

I do agree, in general, that known commodities are more valuable, within context of where a team is on the competitive scale of course.

Excellent point in the middle paragraph. The pool of prospects getting traded for established major leaguers isn’t the entirety of the minor leagues. It would be the ones almost certain of making it to the majors.... otherwise, what’s the point?

[Mike Sixel]

 

No my post was about prospects rated as top 100 prospects in all of baseball. The 80% figure is related to pitchers and even more so Lefties. This is not for all players in round 40. In fact I doubt there have been any round 40 players included in that statistic. It’s specifically for the best of the best minor leaguers

 

clearly I didn't understand it was about left handed pitchers, or just pitchers. Apologies for the misunderstanding. I thought it was about the population of prospects. 

 

Top 100 prospects succeed, according to that study, about 36% of the time. That's why you usually see more than 1 included in a trade for a MLB player....

[bird]

Would you guys do me the favor of firing up the google machine and eyeballing the 2013 Top 100 MLB Prospects list?

 

Just glancing down that list, I'd guess we'd all agree that about 60% of these players have had successful MLB careers so far, maybe more.

 

That's a far cry from the statistics used in the study AZTwin cited, which relied on data from 1990 to 2003. 

 

I don't know how to explain the difference, but after looking at just two years-2014 and 2013- I believe it's unwise to conclude that Top 100 prospects are failing at an 80% clip, or even a 60% rate.

 

Thoughts?

[Riverbrian]

 

Would you guys do me the favor of firing up the google machine and eyeballing the 2013 Top 100 MLB Prospects list?

 

Just glancing down that list, I'd guess we'd all agree that about 60% of these players have had successful MLB careers so far, maybe more.

 

That's a far cry from the statistics used in the study AZTwin cited, which relied on data from 1990 to 2003. 

 

I don't know how to explain the difference, but after looking at just two years-2014 and 2013- I believe it's unwise to conclude that Top 100 prospects are failing at an 80% clip, or even a 60% rate.

 

Thoughts?

 

The influx of the Ivy League Front Offices. 

 

They are discovering with increased data that 600K talent is out-performing or at least nearly on par with 10M talent. 

 

This has provided more opportunity for minor league players to earn a job. 

 

The doors were simply harder to break down for for prospects from 1990 to 2003. Average performing vets were comfortable in every day starting jobs that they wouldn't lose.

 

Prospects are getting more opportunity these days to get a job and keep it because 600K talent provides the financial flexibility to sign higher dollar free agents without expanding the budget. However, they are not signing the higher dollar free agents either because the 600K guys are getting the job done cheaper.     

 

This won't explain all of it but my guess is that it will explain a good chunk of it... The old operational style was pretty hard on young players and now not so much.

 

Of course the players union is noticing this shift and starting to complain.

 

Other things like increased medical data is keeping young players healthier. Lot of the top prospects were lost due to career ending injuries. 

 

Just spit ballin.    

[bird]

 

The influx of the Ivy League Front Offices. 

 

They are discovering with increased data that 600K talent is out-performing or at least nearly on par with 10M talent. 

 

This has provided more opportunity for minor league players to earn a job. 

 

The doors were simply harder to break down for for prospects from 1990 to 2003. Average performing vets were comfortable in every day starting jobs that they wouldn't lose.

 

Prospects are getting more opportunity these days to get a job and keep it because 600K talent provides the financial flexibility to sign higher dollar free agents without expanding the budget. However, they are not signing the higher dollar free agents either because the 600K guys are getting the job done cheaper.     

 

This won't explain all of it but my guess is that it will explain a good chunk of it... The old operational style was pretty hard on young players and now not so much.

 

Of course the players union is noticing this shift and starting to complain.

 

Other things like increased medical data is keeping young players healthier. Lot of the top prospects were lost due to career ending injuries. 

 

Just spit ballin.    

 

I think these spit balls all hit the blackboard, RB. I can think of some other plausible theories, but what I guess I'd like to see is a narrowing of the divergence of opinion about how likely a top prospect is to become successful as a pro, based on current, more credible support.

 

The facts one gets from a look at the 2013 and 2014 MLB Top 100 lists doesn't just call into question a statement that 80% of the pitchers on a Top 100 list fail and 65% of position players do too. It blows that notion totally out of the water! Remember, 43 out of 46 pitchers on the 2014 list have thrown pitches in major league baseball, the exceptions being the deceased Yordani Ventura, Mark Appel, and Trey Ball, the #97 guy on the list who was known to be a high risk two-way athlete.

 

I want to see a study from 2001-2014, not one that's analyzing stuff from 1990-2003.

[Riverbrian]

 

I think these spit balls all hit the blackboard, RB. I can think of some other plausible theories, but what I guess I'd like to see is a narrowing of the divergence of opinion about how likely a top prospect is to become successful as a pro, based on current, more credible support.

 

The facts one gets from a look at the 2013 and 2014 MLB Top 100 lists doesn't just call into question a statement that 80% of the pitchers on a Top 100 list fail and 65% of position players do too. It blows that notion totally out of the water! Remember, 43 out of 46 pitchers on the 2014 list have thrown pitches in major league baseball, the exceptions being the deceased Yordani Ventura, Mark Appel, and Trey Ball, the #97 guy on the list who was known to be a high risk two-way athlete.

 

I want to see a study from 2001-2014, not one that's analyzing stuff from 1990-2003.

 

That stuff I can't provide since I've never researched it specifically myself. I can only tie it to loosely to the stuff that I have researched myself and that is where my spit ball comes from. 

 

I read a lot of articles but without knowing the author, I tend to take the information provided with grains of salt. I don't always believe everything I read but I read it anyway. 

 

I've never published anything but I've spent a lot of time researching roster construction (every team, going back many years). I won't say it's "conclusive" but I will say it's "highly plausible", that teams from that era (and decades before) worked with operational models that restricted development of prospects by restricting their opportunity. This is where my "I'm not a starting 9 guy" mantra comes from. 

 

I can't say for sure but the "cost per" analysis (it seems) wasn't very good, done at all, or ignored back in that time frame. 

 

The A's Moneyball year was 2002. Change of course, is the slow boring of hard boards, Friedman shows up around 2006 and others of that ilk starting filling the decision making positions. Now, the "cost per" analysis can no longer be denied. Prospects are getting increased opportunity to keep and hold jobs, connected, tied in lock step with the increase of clubs using data.

 

Free Agents are valued less due to not significantly producing more for the money and now they are talking to their players union because they can't figure out what happened. MLBPA P.R. is talking about more teams wanting to lose than win to spin the eggheads as cheap instead of shrewd because they collectively bargained an agreement that is based on a pre-moneyball mentality that only exists in a handful of clubs today and those dinosaur clubs are tapped out and not spending because they spent it and they are not winning either.

 

The end result. More Top 100 Prospects are showing success now because they are getting more opportunity to not only play in the major leagues... but stay in the major leagues. They are not automatic send backs to the minors when Mr. Average high salary guy returns from injury.

 

In short... The cost per is now saying... Give me more 600K talent and promoting prospects is how you get it. 

 

The Next CBA is going to be a nightmare for us fans of the game. 

 

 

[Riverbrian]

 

This makes the most sense to me along with the change in the value of being a middle of the pack team. I started following baseball in the 60s where veteran players sporting what we would now call "poor metrics" were guaranteed jobs because they were veterans. The salaries exploded and while the ballplayer middle class didn't get a huge benefit but they still ahd jobs. Why? Because it is better to keep familiar names in front of your fans to drive ticket sales and it was better to finish in the middle then on the bottom. Then analytics exploded in the early 2000s. That lead to two big realizations - the nid-priced vet wasn't worth much more, if any more,  than a lot of guys just coming up and the value of the marginal fan in the seats went down because of alternate revenue streams so winning 75 games instead of 65-70 meant less.  The result is more opportunity for younger players at the expense of job security for the larger middle class of player - the guy who can help a team but doesn't carry a team. 

 

Now, it's ok to tear your team down for better draft position instead of holding on to average veteran players to be a middle of the pack team. It's now not ok to pay a lot for a FA who isn't a LOT better than the alternative younger, cheaper player. The guy who got caught in this that comes right to mind is Brian Dozier. 20 years ago would have been a reasonably successful free agent signing a 3-4 year contract. Last year, lucky to get a job.  

 

It's like you've been reading my private research. There's a reason I am always impressed by your point of views. You've been stealing it from me. 

 

(Glass Raised) To better times.     

 

[Riverbrian]

 

I think these spit balls all hit the blackboard, RB. I can think of some other plausible theories, but what I guess I'd like to see is a narrowing of the divergence of opinion about how likely a top prospect is to become successful as a pro, based on current, more credible support.

 

The facts one gets from a look at the 2013 and 2014 MLB Top 100 lists doesn't just call into question a statement that 80% of the pitchers on a Top 100 list fail and 65% of position players do too. It blows that notion totally out of the water! Remember, 43 out of 46 pitchers on the 2014 list have thrown pitches in major league baseball, the exceptions being the deceased Yordani Ventura, Mark Appel, and Trey Ball, the #97 guy on the list who was known to be a high risk two-way athlete.

 

I want to see a study from 2001-2014, not one that's analyzing stuff from 1990-2003.

 

I don't trust other's research unless I know exactly what they are using to make determinations. 

 

In what you are looking for:

 

Step One... Define Success. Is one pitch in the major leagues success or is it some other arbitrarily defined set of data or hard line number. Does the amount of time being successful matter, Will one great year surrounded by 3 bad years be successful.  

 

Step Two... Research and Data Entry me friend... Lots of it.    You'll probably have to quit your job to find the time. 

 

Personally, I think in this day and age... Top 100 is too limiting. Because that presumes that those who rank the top 100 are somewhat flawless. In essence, this will distort what you are trying to ascertain based upon the determinations of others. The research would be tainted by the skills of the assessors.  

[Major League Ready]

 

I don't trust other's research unless I know exactly what they are using to make determinations. 

 

In what you are looking for:

 

Step One... Define Success. Is one pitch in the major leagues success or is it some other arbitrarily defined set of data or hard line number. Does the amount of time being successful matter, Will one great year surrounded by 3 bad years be successful.  

 

Step Two... Research and Data Entry me friend... Lots of it.    You'll probably have to quit your job to find the time. 

 

Personally, I think in this day and age... Top 100 is too limiting. Because that presumes that those who rank the top 100 are somewhat flawless. In essence, this will distort what you are trying to ascertain based upon the determinations of others. The research would be tainted by the skills of the assessors.  

 

Agree with everything you say but there seems to be an underlying assumption (not in your post but with some others) that they can prove that dealing prospects for proven MLB talent is the best practice because prospects are unreliable. Playoff rosters don’t support this conclusion and within this data lies a more important comparison … the gap in success rates between teams. In other words, success is not driven by a team’s willingness to trade prospects but their relative ability to draft or trade for prospects and then develop them, especially teams in the bottom half of revenue generation. I don’t support the thinking we devalue prospects because the former regime was not good at drafting and developing, I don’t want a change in tactics. Instead, let’s execute better and become the best at drafting and developing. Ironically, that change would allow them to make more trades and retain the financial ability to add through free agency.

[bird]

 

I don't trust other's research unless I know exactly what they are using to make determinations. 

 

In what you are looking for:

 

Step One... Define Success. Is one pitch in the major leagues success or is it some other arbitrarily defined set of data or hard line number. Does the amount of time being successful matter, Will one great year surrounded by 3 bad years be successful.  

 

Step Two... Research and Data Entry me friend... Lots of it.    You'll probably have to quit your job to find the time. 

 

Personally, I think in this day and age... Top 100 is too limiting. Because that presumes that those who rank the top 100 are somewhat flawless. In essence, this will distort what you are trying to ascertain based upon the determinations of others. The research would be tainted by the skills of the assessors.  

 

 

In the study cited by our pal AZTwin in this thread, the author defined a bust as a T100 prospect who either never made it to the majors or whose cumulative WAR was under 1.5 IIRC. Average was 1.5-2.5, and in that study, the author had a chart that described players who achieved Average as being a Sucess. Go figure. Since the topic was about the "success rate" of T100 prospects, I'd want a higher bar of 2.5. After all, Adrianza is already at 2WAR, Duffey has hit 1WAR, and I want a Top 100 type guy to gove me more. I think an earlier FanGraph studies have used the same measurements. 

 

We're talking about Eddie Rosario's value, and he disappointed half of us at 1.6 WAR in 2019 and has 10WAR total. The discussion evolved to our conversation about success rates for these T100 prospects. For the sake of discussion, let's raise the success bar up to 2.5 cumulative WAR from 1.5.

 

I'm willing to bet that the number of players who make the majors and then exceed a cumulative 2.5 WAR over the course of their career is better than 50%. The old study called 2.5 WAR Better Than Average and said its lower threshhold of a mere 1.5 WAR was not achieved by 80% of the pitchers on the lists during the period from 1990-2003. I mean, Ryne Harper hit 0.6 WAR in 2019 alone, and we think he stinks, but he's half wat to being defined as successful in that old study?

 

That's such a huge difference that it makes the old study unfathomable for me in light of what I see from 2013/2014.

[Riverbrian]

 

In the study cited by our pal AZTwin in this thread, the author defined a bust as a T100 prospect who either never made it to the majors or whose cumulative WAR was under 1.5 IIRC. Average was 1.5-2.5, and in that study, the author had a chart that described players who achieved Average as being a Sucess. Go figure. Since the topic was about the "success rate" of T100 prospects, I'd want a higher bar of 2.5. After all, Adrianza is already at 2WAR, Duffey has hit 1WAR, and I want a Top 100 type guy to gove me more. I think an earlier FanGraph studies have used the same measurements. 

 

We're talking about Eddie Rosario's value, and he disappointed half of us at 1.6 WAR in 2019 and has 10WAR total. The discussion evolved to our conversation about success rates for these T100 prospects. For the sake of discussion, let's raise the success bar up to 2.5 cumulative WAR from 1.5.

 

I'm willing to bet that the number of players who make the majors and then exceed a cumulative 2.5 WAR over the course of their career is better than 50%. The old study called 2.5 WAR Better Than Average and said its lower threshhold of a mere 1.5 WAR was not achieved by 80% of the pitchers on the lists during the period from 1990-2003. I mean, Ryne Harper hit 0.6 WAR in 2019 alone, and we think he stinks, but he's half wat to being defined as successful in that old study?

 

That's such a huge difference that it makes the old study unfathomable for me in light of what I see from 2013/2014.

 

How good was Baseball America Circa 1990's compared to what is published today?

 

I'd start by compiling the actual lists for the 13 years in question and looking at the names. The articles doesn't list names... just stats. I personally would need to see the names. 

 

Here's a list from 1990: http://www.thebaseballcube.com/prospects/byYear.asp?Y=1990&Src=BA

 

 

 

 

[Riverbrian]

 

Agree with everything you say but there seems to be an underlying assumption (not in your post but with some others) that they can prove that dealing prospects for proven MLB talent is the best practice because prospects are unreliable. Playoff rosters don’t support this conclusion and within this data lies a more important comparison … the gap in success rates between teams. In other words, success is not driven by a team’s willingness to trade prospects but their relative ability to draft or trade for prospects and then develop them, especially teams in the bottom half of revenue generation. I don’t support the thinking we devalue prospects because the former regime was not good at drafting and developing, I don’t want a change in tactics. Instead, let’s execute better and become the best at drafting and developing. Ironically, that change would allow them to make more trades and retain the financial ability to add through free agency.

 

I read as a bystander your previous debates on the subject.

 

I stayed clear because it seemed like the discussion was driven by extremes. I didn't believe anyone in the debate was saying you should never trade prospects or that anyone was saying you should trade all your prospects. 

 

My opinion: You need all your spigots turned on. There is a time to spend, a time to trade and a time to tend to your crops. Turn Turn Turn. You should be doing all 3 at the same time every single year. 

 

I am in 100% agreement with you. The key to long term success is in development. Developing the players you drafted and developing the players you acquired. 

 

Emptying the farm system as a strategy for winning it all has worked. It's a legit strategy but in my opinion... what those who are in favor of such strategies tend to forget... is that it hasn't worked more often than it has and the bill will come due. Dombroski is a sell the farm guy. .It worked in Boston in 2018. This can't be denied but you also have to factor in that the majority of that World Series team were home grown prospects that were augmented by cheap acquisitions like Eovaldi and Steve Pearce.

 

Now let's imagine that the Red Sox traded the farm and were bounced out in the 1st round of the playoffs in 2018 instead. Was it still a good strategy to empty the farm system? 

 

Now... Here we are, just one year later... the bill is due. The farm is drained and when John Henry comes to him and says... we had the highest payroll in baseball and we didn't make the playoffs... what's do you have planned now? Dombroski has left himself no other option but to spend even more money and he's gone like he was gone in Detroit for the same reason. I have heard some say... Well yeah but that World Series title is worth it. I won't argue that... but what if you don't win the title. is is still worth it? The Red Sox won with this strategy in 2018. They were not the only team in 2018 to try the strategy. Those other teams did not win it but winning it was the intention for selling the farm. 

 

Yes, you have to spend some money... Yes... you will have to trade some prospects but you got to balance it. The big money teams are not winning with big money. The big budget teams have the ability to absorb the mistakes of big money spent. But, every recent World Series team was built by a strong home grown core first and foremost.. Even the big money teams will die eventually when they drain the farm, the bill will come due and it won't be pretty when it does.

 

Keep a farm producing, you can trade the extra produce, you can staff your roster cheaply to spend on the occasional luxury item. You have depth, replacements. You will never go hungry. 

[bird]

 

How good was Baseball America Circa 1990's compared to what is published today?

 

I'd start by compiling the actual lists for the 13 years in question and looking at the names. The articles doesn't list names... just stats. I personally would need to see the names. 

 

Here's a list from 1990: http://www.thebaseballcube.com/prospects/byYear.asp?Y=1990&Src=BA

 

Okay, so I looked at the 1990 list. There are 40 pitchers on the list, and I count 16, I think, that indisputably (I hope) qualify as successful, accumulating WAR exceeding 5. now, that study says that if this year was representative among the 13 years included in their study, it would contain only about 9 successful pitchers, or just above 20%. Not the 35-40% number I'm looking at. I can get to the 20% success rate real fast with this list: Appier, Alvarez, Tapani, Nagy, McDonald, Kile, Avery, Stanton. Mercker...

 

So, I'm skeptical about the study cited, but mostly, I think today's success rates are so much better that clinging to these old perceptions puts us out of touch with what our FO knows to be the reality.

 

I mean, if we think about the fact that a half dozen players from our own Top 30 debuted last year and not one of them ever came close to being on BA's Top 100 list? There's just no way I can buy into a belief that those top 100 prospects aren't succeeding at better than a 50-60% clip these days, maybe better for position players.

[The Wise One]

Similar to scott's study is 

http://camdendepot.blogspot.com/2013/12/death-to-tinstaapp-updating-mckinneys.html

 

Perhaps bust for a player who did not accumulate 9 WAR in 6 years is a little harsh. Ben Revere had a car war less than 9 bwar but has career earnings of 17 million. I would happily be a bust for that.  Nick Blackburn, a top 56 rank player, made it 3 years. Success or bust? If one would turn the language around to there is a 22% chance of sustained success from a prospect I think people would have better understood the concept rather than bust. 

[Riverbrian]

 

Okay, so I looked at the 1990 list. There are 40 pitchers on the list, and I count 16, I think, that indisputably (I hope) qualify as successful, accumulating WAR exceeding 5. now, that study says that if this year was representative among the 13 years included in their study, it would contain only about 9 successful pitchers, or just above 20%. Not the 35-40% number I'm looking at. I can get to the 20% success rate real fast with this list: Appier, Alvarez, Tapani, Nagy, McDonald, Kile, Avery, Stanton. Mercker...

 

So, I'm skeptical about the study cited, but mostly, I think today's success rates are so much better that clinging to these old perceptions puts us out of touch with what our FO knows to be the reality.

 

I mean, if we think about the fact that a half dozen players from our own Top 30 debuted last year and not one of them ever came close to being on BA's Top 100 list? There's just no way I can buy into a belief that those top 100 prospects aren't succeeding at better than a 50-60% clip these days, maybe better for position players.

 

Like I said... I don't believe everything I read. I only believe the stuff that I post because I know how I came by it.  

 

 

[Riverbrian]

 

Similar to scott's study is 

http://camdendepot.blogspot.com/2013/12/death-to-tinstaapp-updating-mckinneys.html

 

Perhaps bust for a player who did not accumulate 9 WAR in 6 years is a little harsh. Ben Revere had a car war less than 9 bwar but has career earnings of 17 million. I would happily be a bust for that.  Nick Blackburn, a top 56 rank player, made it 3 years. Success or bust? If one would turn the language around to there is a 22% chance of sustained success from a prospect I think people would have better understood the concept rather than bust. 

 

Exactly

 

Definitions matter. The number of players crowded near those lines matter. 

 

 

 

 

 

[bird]

 

Similar to scott's study is 

http://camdendepot.blogspot.com/2013/12/death-to-tinstaapp-updating-mckinneys.html

 

Perhaps bust for a player who did not accumulate 9 WAR in 6 years is a little harsh. Ben Revere had a car war less than 9 bwar but has career earnings of 17 million. I would happily be a bust for that.  Nick Blackburn, a top 56 rank player, made it 3 years. Success or bust? If one would turn the language around to there is a 22% chance of sustained success from a prospect I think people would have better understood the concept rather than bust. 

 

 

Thanks for the link.

 

You are indeed a Wise One, as I think the concept of defining sustained success makes sense.

 

Maybe I'm interpreting things incorrectly, but if not, I'd suggest the 1.5 average seasonal or 9 WAR cumulative threshhold is too high. After all, since only a handful of a team's draft and IFA classes from each year ever make it, some of those prospects are logically going to both "make it" successfully and be kind of average, right? 

 

Under the success criteria established by these studies (correct me if I'm wrong please), the following Twins pitchers all produced at a rate that would relegate them to the Bust heap:

 

Duffey 1.2 WAR

May 0.9

Dobnak 0.8

Littell 0.6

Smeltzer 0.5

Stashak 0.5

 

I realize only the first two here made many appearances. But still, under the study criteria, these two would be Below Average? Taylor Rogers at 2.1 WAR is classified as Average? What am I missing?

 

And from looking back at the 1990 list, I can find a few pitchers who get the Bust tag who had as much as a 10-year career in the majors or so. Guys like Mel Rojas, Mike Harkey, and Eric Gunderson are considered busts.

 

The only pitchers on the 2019 Twins team who performed at Good or better, or who did not perform at a Bust rate? Berrios, Odorizzi, Pineda, Gibson, and Rogers. Rosario, Gonzalez, and Schoop all performed at Bust rates in 2019, if I'm seeing this right.

 

Granted, we're not talking exclusively about BA Top 100 guys here, who one could reasonably hold to higher standards.

 

I'm finding that I'm adjusting my own perception and expectations downward as I've looked at the study, despite what my eyeballs have seen from a cursory look at BA Top 100's from 2013 and 2014. Specifically, I've become more attuned to how many Magills and Drake Oliver types can pierce the Top 100 lists before they flame out as AAAA guys who don't really make that last jump. Also, guys like Delmon Young and Oswald Arcia are probably more prevalent than what I've perceived to be the case.

 

Still, the study was expanded to included years up tp 2006 and was produced in 2013. So, I am still very skeptical about looking at a 2020 BA Top 100 list and having an expectation that 75% of the pitchers on it are going to flunk out. I'm looking forward to newer information.

 

Last point, as it relates to discussions about trading top prospects for established players, whether on one side of the trade or another. According to this study, about one out of three times you trade off a Top 20 prospect, you're giving up a player who would have given you at least 3.5 WAR. So a player like Kepler, Polanco, Garver, and maybe Sano and Buxton's full season production. That's why I reject arguments that tend into the "hey, prospects never amount to squat so you're giving up nothing" realm.

 

If you're receiving the established player, you run a separate but still very real risk of uncertainty due to either injury or the inherent performance volatility you get from any player, but especially pitchers. And that's why opining with such certainty about something so unpredictable leads us to these disparate viewpoints, right? An Odorizzi for Palacios trade is the exception.

[Riverbrian]

 

Thanks for the link.

 

You are indeed a Wise One, as I think the concept of defining sustained success makes sense.

 

Maybe I'm interpreting things incorrectly, but if not, I'd suggest the 1.5 average seasonal or 9 WAR cumulative threshhold is too high. After all, since only a handful of a team's draft and IFA classes from each year ever make it, some of those prospects are logically going to both "make it" successfully and be kind of average, right? 

 

Under the success criteria established by these studies (correct me if I'm wrong please), the following Twins pitchers all produced at a rate that would relegate them to the Bust heap:

 

Duffey 1.2 WAR

May 0.9

Dobnak 0.8

Littell 0.6

Smeltzer 0.5

Stashak 0.5

 

I realize only the first two here made many appearances. But still, under the study criteria, these two would be Below Average? Taylor Rogers at 2.1 WAR is classified as Average? What am I missing?

 

And from looking back at the 1990 list, I can find a few pitchers who get the Bust tag who had as much as a 10-year career in the majors or so. Guys like Mel Rojas, Mike Harkey, and Eric Gunderson are considered busts.

 

The only pitchers on the 2019 Twins team who performed at Good or better, or who did not perform at a Bust rate? Berrios, Odorizzi, Pineda, Gibson, and Rogers. Rosario, Gonzalez, and Schoop all performed at Bust rates in 2019, if I'm seeing this right.

 

Granted, we're not talking exclusively about BA Top 100 guys here, who one could reasonably hold to higher standards.

 

I'm finding that I'm adjusting my own perception and expectations downward as I've looked at the study, despite what my eyeballs have seen from a cursory look at BA Top 100's from 2013 and 2014. Specifically, I've become more attuned to how many Magills and Drake Oliver types can pierce the Top 100 lists before they flame out as AAAA guys who don't really make that last jump. Also, guys like Delmon Young and Oswald Arcia are probably more prevalent than what I've perceived to be the case.

 

Still, the study was expanded to included years up tp 2006 and was produced in 2013. So, I am still very skeptical about looking at a 2020 BA Top 100 list and having an expectation that 75% of the pitchers on it are going to flunk out. I'm looking forward to newer information.

 

Last point, as it relates to discussions about trading top prospects for established players, whether on one side of the trade or another. According to this study, about one out of three times you trade off a Top 20 prospect, you're giving up a player who would have given you at least 3.5 WAR. So a player like Kepler, Polanco, Garver, and maybe Sano and Buxton's full season production. That's why I reject arguments that tend into the "hey, prospects never amount to squat so you're giving up nothing" realm.

 

If you're receiving the established player, you run a separate but still very real risk of uncertainty due to either injury or the inherent performance volatility you get from any player, but especially pitchers. And that's why opining with such certainty about something so unpredictable leads us to these disparate viewpoints, right? An Odorizzi for Palacios trade is the exception.

 

Length of success can't be a factor or at least it needs to minimized in the equation. 

 

You have to consider the Rental... Top 100 prospects have been traded for 2-3 month rentals. 

 

Yes, it is the vet you are renting... but if a team is willing to cough up a top 100 prospect for short time period players. Length of sustained success can't be a major part of the calculation. The rental alone proves that there is such a thing as short term value. 

 

Tyler Duffey maybe currently tagged as a bust with the methodology. However... I contend that in 2015, Tyler Duffey kept the Twins in contention almost by himself. Teams are willing to trade highly ranked prospects for that type of short term production.