drivlikejehu

Only in the sense that we can't construct a rigorous counterfactual of events in the absence of that presence. The logic behind the US deployment, however, is clearly sound. Major conflicts often begin because the initiating side believes that the reaction from other parties will be limited in a way that makes the war viable in economic-political terms. Examples include: - Iraq invading Kuwait after assessing that the US would not intervene militarily, in part due to comments made by a US diplomat - North Korea invading South Korea in 1950 due in part to similarly incorrect assessment of US intentions - Germany invading Poland after Ribbentrop assured Hitler that Britain and France were bluffing with their security guarantee Uncertainty over US intentions and commitment is a destabilizing factor that increases the chances of conflict. The presence of US troops in South Korea substantially decreases that problem . . . a withdrawal would create an extremely volatile situation in which the US guarantees ROK security in theory but appears to be backing off in reality. This dynamic is so dangerous that, even if the US would have been better off without troops in South Korea, it still is completely impossible to remove them now without a dramatic increase in war risk.

The North wouldn't rush into an all-out attack, no. The problem is more with the change in the balance of power, and how that would strengthen the position of the North. That's a very bad combination with the North's economic weakness. The game theory just doesn't work out - that's why no US administration from either party has considered withdrawal from the peninsula.

Testing missiles is at least preferable to firing them at South Korea. There is no point in negotiating - North Korea has already ruled out discussing its nuclear weapons as part of peace talks. Of course they would love it if the US withdrew, thus opening up the door to blackmailing the South for economic support. Pieces of paper mean nothing to North Korea, as they proved the last time an agreement was made. Blaming the North's behavior on the U.S. is asinine and ignorant . . . American diplomats of all political stripes agree on the nature of Kim's regime and on the futility of appeasement.

This is pretty misguided. For one thing, the communists started the war. For another, there already was a path put in place to end the war and normalize relations, but the NK regime violated the agreements it made to pursue nukes instead. And for another, the North openly states its intention to unify Korea by force. NK threatens Japan, yet Japan has no troops in the South - why on Earth would the US withdrawing to Japan have any effect except to embolden the North's aggression? Nor is that aggression only rhetorical. In recent years, they have sunk a SK ship and launched a massive artillery attack against a SK island, along with numerous smaller provocations. They already commit violent acts as a matter of course - the presence of the US at least keeps them in check a bit, since the North would be somewhat nervous about killing American troops out of the blue (though they are happy to put American citizens in labor camps when they get the chance). Now, there's no question that the North appreciates the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. But that deterrent value continues to exist even following the initiation of conventional hostilities, and even after the use of nuclear weapons on a limited scale. So while the North has a growing deterrent against pre-emptive regime change, it basically already had that deterrent through its conventional artillery forces within range of Seoul (which is also the main reason they were able to get a great deal from Clinton). The main impact of nuclear weapons is that the North now has a deterrent even if they unleash a conventional attack against the South, because they can threaten nuclear retaliation for US/ROK counter-value strikes against the North. And once their invasion force is stopped through conventional means, the North can launch tactical nuclear strikes backed by the threat of targeting Japanese and US cities to prevent a severe US response. The greater the North's strategic nuclear capability, the more coercive this threat becomes. The benefit Kim gets from nukes is entirely due to the power it gives him to kill millions of people and cripple the world economy . . . there is no redeeming aspect to it at all, nor a way to mitigate the harm other than stripping that regime of nukes, or bringing about the collapse of the regime.

ESPN's problems are pretty substantial. Their costly broadcast contracts are fixed and fairly long-term. Presumably they'll do everything they can to promote the particular sports they are invested in, hence why baseball is practically being eliminated from their programming, beyond basic SC highlights and some marginal stuff. The bottom line though is that their business model is obsolete, and it's really just a matter of how fast the decline proceeds.

There's no chance that the Twins or any other club will have a starting pitcher also be a starting position player. Starters have a routine that they follow to rest their arm, etc., which would be disrupted even as a DH. A reliever could potentially be a lineup regular, and a starter could be available as a pinch-hitter sometimes, but that's pretty much the extent of it. The benefit to McKay's two-way talents is a reduction in risk without compromising upside - he has significant potential either way. Nor are the outcomes of the pitching and hitting tracks necessarily correlated; in other words, if his bat disappoints, that doesn't do much to devalue his pitching potential. Also important is the fact that, as a college player, a reassessment of McKay's position could be made within a relatively short timeframe if Plan A looks like a mistake. Greene, by contrast, would need much more time for such a determination, and he would have to start back at square one, whereas McKay at least faced SEC competition already as a hitter and pitcher.

It's not impossible that Turley has had a breakthrough in his ability, despite his relatively advanced age. Things like that do happen.

Mauer's batted ball and other data is pretty out of whack so far, but not necessarily in a way that shows he is definitely finished. Of course, he has very little remaining upside, but against RHP I'm not sure the Twins have a better option at 1B. The sample size is still too small. He definitely needs to sit against LHP though.

His swinging strike rate is well above his career norms - 10.5% instead of 8-8.5% (it dipped below that in 2014 but then came back up). On a related note, hitters so far have chased outside the zone much more often than has been the case in the past against Santiago. So, arguably his xFIP is misleading, regardless of whether he has the true ability to outperform it, because his strikeout rate is lower than would be expected based on his swinging strike %. But . . . it's 18 innings. Pitch data seems to indicate that his stuff and command are basically in line with the past. He certainly could have a decent year but there's no reason to think he's stepped up his overall game.

Grossman has a .334 BABIP in 1,180 career MLB PAs, which strikes me as very plausible going forward, considering his batted ball profile. With that BABIP, plus his plate patience and average power, an .800 OPS seems like a pretty reasonable target. Of course, a lot depends on how he is used . . . the more pertinent question is whether he makes sense as a starting DH against right-handed pitchers. The problem is that all 3 of the main DH options - Grossman, Vargas, Park - are better against LHP. So at this point the choice would seem to be more about whether one of Vargas or Park (if/when healthy) should be DH against LHP while Grossman plays a corner OF spot . . . against RHP Grossman seems like as good of an option as there is, currently.

It does kind of worry me that high schoolers manage to put the ball in play against Greene a decent percentage of the time, relatively speaking. However, his elite overall athleticism is a big factor in his favor . . . even if he is physically mature for his age, I like his chances to dramatically improve on his consistency and command with added reps. I don't think he's a real exciting 1-1 option, ideally you get an elite HS position player there, but there's no denying the upside.

I guess I'm curious what the scouts think in terms of how ready Bukauskas is, apart from his ceiling. If he's a mid-rotation guy sometime in 2018, with a little extra ceiling besides, then I'd want him. I'm not so thrilled if he's in the rotation circa 2020 (though he still wouldn't be old by any means at that point).

Pitchers do have the ability to influence quality of contact; those that are easy to square up tend not to make the Majors. The problem for Stewart, at the MLB level anyway, is that pitchers need to get some strikeouts too, otherwise even weak contact will add up to a lot of baserunners as a simple function of arithmetic. Plus, strikeouts are positively correlated with weak contact. In other words, pitchers that are harder to square up also tend to get more swings and misses. What this means for Stewart is that he has enough ability to get weak contact from minor leaguers, but a complete lack of MLB projection against higher-quality hitters. Either his stuff and/or command improves, or he doesn't succeed in MLB.

My only thought is that they are waiting for Vargas to get healthy, and that the 25th man was a placeholder regardless of position. Having Park up but sending him right back down would arguably be pointless. So this appears to be some kind of extended bullpen tryout. I'm more OK with the 13 pitchers, bizarre as it is, than I am with the roster more generally.

There's way more to being a successful GM than that. It's nice that he realized it's imperative to sign international free agents, but it doesn't mean that he was somehow a success when so many other things went poorly.

Clubs are allowed to invite prospects to work out. So measurements could be made using Target field equipment during such a work out, and analytics applied to the results. So even for high school players, more advanced means can play a role.

Huh?

Aside from the fact that standard deviations don't work that way (it's no longer "standard" once you invent arbitrary values), you first have to define what makes a projection successful. If the goal is to reduce the root mean square error, then the PECOTA result is entirely plausible. If the goal is not to minimize error, then that alternate goal needs to be defined, and it should be explained why this alternate method is preferable despite the fact it will almost always be less statistically accurate.

Splits are subject to small sample size variation. His career splits are normal. I'm fine with him in AAA or as a 5th OF if he looks decent in ST and it means no more DanSan.

Sure, college picks are risky too, or teams would never take high schoolers. The 2006 draft is a good example, it went (position added for potentially unfamiliar names): Luke Hochevar Greg Reynolds (college RHP) Evan Longoria Brad Lincoln Brandon Morrow Andrew Miller Clayton Kershaw Drew Stubbs Billy Rowell (HS 3B) Tim Lincecum Max Scherzer So, not only was the best pitcher taken 7th overall out of high school, but the college picks didn't exactly pan out in the order selected, either. So really it comes down to some combination of performing the right scouting/analysis and getting lucky. My point is just that, if Greene offers a little extra potential but one of the college guys is right there with him, plus 2-3 years closer to MLB, I want the guy that's closer and has thrown more innings in a season without breaking down. I definitely do not want Brad Lincoln. But if there's a college guy with power stuff + command . . .

There have been plenty of flame-throwing prep right-handers before. If there's a college starter that projects as a near-term, top of the rotation guy, I take him over Greene without hesitation.

No. Hicks' development was not related to any other player.

MLB teams often draft high upside high school players, in late rounds, that are committed to going to college. It's basically on the off-chance that the player has a change of heart and decides to turn pro instead . . . the Twins are no different from other clubs in that regard, and none would have signed Springer in that draft. Zero MLB organizations would fire scouts based off a single 1st round pick not becoming a star, or even a big leaguer. That's totally detached from the reality of scouting. Results over time are different, and I don't think the Twins have done very well, but it's not about any one particular player.

Park is like David Ortiz in the sense that Danny Santana is like Ty Cobb . . . I mean, both baseball players, both homo sapiens, the similarities are endless.

I think Rosario's problems are less with his approach and more with his inability to read pitch type and location quickly enough. Last year he swung and missed at a significantly higher rate than Sano. Unfortunately I see him flaming out.