Cap'n Piranha

I'd love to have Esco back on the team, but he's fairly redundant given what we have with Gonzalez, Adrianza, and Arraez. If you can get him for an unexpectedly cheap price without taking up a lot of time to do it, great, otherwise I'm good with our lineup. Save your ammo (prospects and time) for pitching.

Maybe his hitting will improve? Crazy assertion, I know, but if Mitch Garver can go from an OPS of .679 as a 22 year old in Elizabethton to the best offensive catcher in baseball in 6 years, maybe Lewis can get better too. That being said, if the right player/package came along I'd be all for it, but it would have to be a hell of a deal.

As all organizations should do with the elite talent in their organizations. All GM's know that every player is available for a price (for example, if the Twins offered the Angels Lewis, Kiriloff, Graterol, Berrios, Polanco, Kepler, and Garver, the Angels would be only too happy to give us Trout, Pujols, and Upton). Good GM's go into trade negotiations with the ability to credibly walk away without making a deal. It's harder to do that if you've broadcast your eagerness to trade a specific player.

Why stop at Castillo, deGrom, or Syndergaard? You know what player I would easily deal Lewis for? Mike Trout. Falvine should go do that.

This season is going to come down to 3 more stretches; From now through July 28, the Twins play 13 games against both NY squads, Oakland, and the White Sox; combined winning percentage of .538 (87 win pace). From July 30 through August 18, the Twins play 19 games against Miami, KC, Atlanta, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Texas; combined winning percentage of .492 (80 win pace). From August 19 through September 15, the Twins play 25 games against the White Sox, Detroit, Boston, Cleveland, and Washington; combined winning percentage of .469 (76 win pace). During these same periods, here's how the Indian's schedule looks; In period 1, 14 games against Detroit, KC, Toronto; combined winning percentage of .344 (56 win pace) In period 2, 20 games against Houston, LA Angels, Texas, Minnesota, Boston, and the Yankees (of note--these 20 games are in 20 days); combined winning percentage of .587 (95 win pace) In period 3, 25 games against Mets, KC, Detroit, Tampa, White Sox, Minnesota, and LA Angels; combined winning percentage .492 (80 win pace) At that point, the Twins get their final 13 games of the season against the dregs of the central, combined winning percentage of .368 (60 win pace). If the Indians are more than 3-4 games out after the game on September 15, it will be almost impossible for them to catch us. Therefore, expect the following to happen; Indians close to 3 or 4 games before the end of the month. The Twins make it all up in the next 20 games to push the lead back to the 7-9 game range, where it stays for the next month. The Twins enter their last 4 series with the Central all but locked down, and clinch at home against KC on September 22.

Marwin Gonzalez is essentially Miguel Sano, except he has more defensive versatility, he doesn't strike out as much, and he has a lot less power. In high leverage situations, Marwin has a .648 OPS and 80 wRC+; Sano is at .728 and 83. Also, has anyone checked in the offshore magnetic boot prison lately? It would seem that one Rocco Baldelli might have had his visage stolen.

The one issue here when using run expectancy to say bunting is a bad idea is that you're not weighting the likelihood of outcomes for not bunting. Let's use Jonathan Schoop as an example. Assuming that a single only advances the runners one base, below are the percentage for each scenario. 123, 0 runs in, 0 outs; 20.2% 2, 2 runs in, 0 outs; 5.6% 3, 2 runs in, 0 outs; 0.0% -, 3 runs in, 0 outs; 4.9% 12, 0 runs in, 1 out; 53.5% 3, 0 runs in, 2 outs; 5.9% 23, 0 runs in, 1 out; 10.0% Some of these are simplified, as the multiple ways different states could come about are too legion to calculate, but I feel confident that for every situation I don't give him credit for (no errors, no chance for a triple, for example), there are probably more situations I do give him credit for (DP's always ending with a runner on third, non K/DP outs never erasing a lead runner, a 25% non K/DP productive out rate). This results in the below weighted run expectancies and probabilities. 123, 0 runs in, 0 outs; .464 and .174 2, 2 runs in, 0 outs; .174 and .056 3, 2 runs in, 0 outs; 0 and 0 -, 3 runs in, 0 outs; .169 and .049 12, 0 runs in, 1 out; .473 and .217 3, 0 runs in, 2 outs; .021 and .015 23, 0 runs in, 1 out; .137 and .067 Sum those up, and the expected run outcome after Schoop's PA last night is 1.437, with a 57.8% chance of a run scoring. Given that the baseline for the runners on 1st and 2nd, not outs situation is 1.437 runs with a 61% chance of a run scoring, Schoop batting neither increases nor decreases the expected runs, although it does lower the chance of scoring a run. That being said, if you decrease his non K/DP productive out rate to 10%, the numbers dip to 1.408 and 56.2% Now with bunting--let's assume 10% of the time he gets a hit, 50% of the time he successfully moves the runners to 2nd and 3rd, 35% of the time he fails to get the bunt down, and 5% of the time he actually bunts into a DP. With those numbers, the expected runs come to 1.24, with a 57.9% chance of a run scoring. In essence, since Schoop is unlikely to actually improve the expected runs for the inning, bunting, while lowering the chances of a big inning, increases the chances of a tie game. In the 7th inning, against a team whose bullpen is 2nd in ERA, 1st in FIP, 3rd in xFIP, and 1st in HR/9, increasing the odds of taking advantage of a good opportunity is not a bad play.

Yeah, that was a typo, it was supposed to be top 100. My inclusion of his relatively low SLG was meant to demonstrate that despite not a lot of power, Arraez maintains a healthy walk rate, which you wouldn't expect for a guy that's seen nearly 80% of his MiLB hits go for singles (this year the MLB rate is 62%, IL is 62%, Southern League is 70%). Arraez thus far has displayed elite contact ability (best among all players with 40+ PA's at 95.7%, 2nd at Zone contact at 98%, and 1st at Out-of-zone contact at 90.5%). He also has the 21st lowest out of zone swing rate, 40th lowest in-zone swing rate, and 20th overall swing rate, which means he's actualyl allowing his contact skill to play. Compare that to Astudillo (4th in contact, 6th in zone contact, 7th in non-zone contact; 6th HIGHEST non-zone swing, 2nd zone swing, 2nd overall). This is why Luis Arraez has a .521 OBP and 198 wRC+, and Astudillo is at .276 and 67.

For his minor league career, Arraez took 122 bb, compared to 129 k, in 1,585 PA's. That's a 7.7% bb rate, which is right around a top-11 rate in all of MLB. This despite a career minors SLG of .414. Arraez is a professional hitter who will be 22 the rest of this season--I'd be shocked if he's not the starting 2nd baseman next year.

I just want Ricky De La Torre and Ernie De La Trinidad on the same team so we can have some DLT's in the lineup.

Sure it can. Seldom deals with frequency, regular deals with intervals. Halley's comet appears at regular intervals, but based on the human lifespan, that regular interval is seldom. In the context of batters reaching on strikeouts, while it happens seldomly, it is also a regular occurrence; there have been 92 4-strikeout innings alone in MLB history, so there have obviously been quite a few more instances of players reaching on a strikeout. I would bet it happens anywhere from 4-6 times every season, making it a regular, but infrequent, occurrence.

You did claim that not putting the ball in play can't be positive. From your post at 9:01 AM, 4th to last sentence in your first paragraph: "Failing to put the ball in play can never result in a positive." I agree that a batter reaching on a WP/PB reaches because of the WP/PB, not the strikeout; however, that also means a batter that reaches on an error on a ball put in play reaches on the error, not the ball put in play. Insofar as reaching on a WP/PB or an error is dependent on a strikeout or ball in play, respectively, you can't dismiss either case without also dismissing the other. A stolen base is also dependent on the ball not being put in play. Therefore, if stealing a base is a positive, not putting the ball in play is imperative.

The HR scenario was not a wasted inning. Re-produce that inning every inning, of every game, and that team will have far and away the greatest offense of all time. That team will in all likelihood win something like 140 games, shattering the all-time win record. I also don't understand why you would rather have a double play than a strikeout. There are 14 states in which a double play can occur; runner at first, runner at second, runner at third, runners at first and second, runners at first and third, runners at second and third, bases loaded (either with 0 outs or 1 out). Based on run expectancy, the only times a double play is less damaging than a strikeout is if there are multiple runners on base, one of whom is at third, and that runner manages to score before the second out of the double play is recorded. The best-case scenario for a double play is on average .2 runs worse of an outcome than a strikeout, whereas the worst-case scenario is .6 runs worse of an outcome.

Except that a strikeout allows for the possibility of a wild pitch/passed ball, or for that matter, a stolen base. A ball in play means none of those things can happen. If you're going to say putting a ball in play is positive because it can result in an error, than you have to say not putting a ball in play can be positive because it can result in a WP/PB. Using your logic, a batter reaching/runner advancing due to an error, is the result of the error, not the ball put in play. Also, batters seldomly, but regularly reach base on strikeouts when the third strike gets away. Runners often advance on those as well. And while those instances are less frequent than runners advancing on balls-in-play, it is plainly false to say no good can possible come from a strikeout.

Striking out in 24 of 56 PA in June is an issue in the sense that his OPS is only .724 in June. He's not doing enough in his non-k PA's to justify his k rate. If that continues, I'll be all in favor of sending him down to clean it up. However, if he hits like he did in May, when he struck out in 18 of 50 PA's, but put up a .936 OPS, I'm perfectly happy with penciling him into the 6/7 slot every day. After all, in May, Sano was 41% better than the average hitter.

Strikeouts aren't a problem in and of themselves. Consider this thought experiment; Imagine a player who gets 600 PA's in a season, and strikes out 70% of the time (420 strikeouts, almost 200 more than the all-time record). However, in the other 180 PA's, the player hits a homerun every time. That players line would be .300/.300/1.200/1.500. That would be, by OPS, the greatest offensive season in baseball history. In fact, the slugging percentage alone would be the 21st greatest OPS season in baseball history. It would be a wOBA of .630, which is almost 100 points higher than Barry Bonds 2004 season. The problem is not the strikeouts (after all, every hitter's out rate will be somewhere in the 55% to 60% range). The problem is what happens in all the plate appearances that aren't strikeouts.

Putting the ball in play also has a marginal chance of becoming negative. Double plays, lead runners being thrown out, guys getting cut down at the plate; none of which can happen on a strikeout. On the whole, I agree that strikeouts are worse than ball-in-play outs, but the difference is not quite so large as a number of posters on this site want to believe. Additionally, if strikeouts are the price you pay for higher home run rates, than you can argue strikeouts are a good thing. After all, which inning would you rather have; a lead-off single, and three straight ball-in-play outs, or a leadoff homer and three straight strikeouts?

This is inaccurate. You're assuming that his BABIP stays the same if he changes his approach; it's quite possible it would change, and change drastically. Willians Astudillo is an elite contact hitter, and owns a career .290 BABIP. Eddie Rosario is another very good contact hitter--his career BABIP is .313. It's most likely that if Sano works to cut down his strikeouts, the trade off will be making less hard contact, and probably a lower BABIP. I'm not super interested in trading strikeouts for weak contact.

He has a better OPS on the year than Rosario, Adrianza, Schoop, Gonzalez, and Astudillo. By the way, if chasing pitches is bad, then Astudillo is a far bigger issue, with his 46.6% chase rate.

Agree with this. Strip out Gibson's first two starts, when he was still trying to gain weight/strength, and here's what you get; 11 starts, 3.38 FIP, 3.18 xFIP, 9.4 k/9, 1.6 bb/9, completely reasonable .287 babip and 74.4% lob. That FIP puts him at 20th in the league, just behind Greinke, while the xFIP puts him 7th, just behind Strasburg, and ahead of deGrom. Not too shabby for a 3rd starter. Even if you don't strip out those first two starts, Gibson is 11th in xFIP; Berrios is 38th and Odorizzi is 44th.

Larnach is a 22 year old in the most pitcher-friendly professional league there is. He's 4th in SLG, He's 1st in doubles, tied for 20th in homers (and it should be noted, only 3 guys have more than 8 homers; one big series and he pops up to top 10 easily). He's leading the league in average (one of only 4 guys above .300), and is third in OBP. This might be heretical, but I'm increasingly open to the idea that Larnach is on a par with Kiriloff. Kiriloff's OPS+ of 168 as a 20 year old in A+ is definitely better than Larnach's 150 as a 22 year old in the same league, but if Kiriloff will get you a much better return, I'm ok with trading Kiriloff to keep Larnach.

So with these numbers, it's an 8.2% chance for a DP, which means its slightly more likely of an occurrence than a walk (8.1%). Which suggests Chief feels Twins hitters should not take pitches, as it's a statistically insignificant chance that they would be able to work a walk.

Cruz in High Leverage Situations--.984 OPS, .423 wOBA, 168 wRC+, 28.6% hard hit rate, 28.6% soft hit rate. Sano in High Leverage Situations--1.262 OPS, .503 wOBA, 222 wRC+, 66.7% hard hit rate, 0.0% soft hit rate. You were saying about not trusting Sano in high leverage?

Strikeouts are good for pitchers, and bad for hitters, but its by degrees. A hitter is going to make outs at least 60% of the time. While balls in play can move runners up, or get them in, they can also erase lead runners via double plays or baserunning gaffes. A strikeout is always one out, unless the ball gets away from the catcher, and a runner tries to advance. So in the sense that a certain number of outs are guaranteed, the upside of balls in play is at least somewhat cancelled by the downside of balls in play, whereas strikeouts are neutral.

Sano has almost 1700 career PA. Austin has less than 500 career PA. That's 3 times the sample that puts Sano at a HR rate that would place him 100th all time if he had 3,000 PA's. It would also put him at 14th among active players. Given his HR rate is accelerating (1 every 13.2 PA this year), that seems likely to hold up.