MeleMouth

So it's just once more with feeling?

Help me out here. When Tom Pohlad says, "we intend to take the offseason and meaningfully invest,” do you think he even knows which players will be available or what they are likely to cost? It seems to me he's just sayin' stuff.

The fact of the matter is that teams like the Rays and Brewers rarely sign free agent relievers who have been OK and expect to be paid better than OK. Instead, the relievers they acquire usually are either turnaround free agents, like Fernando Rodney, or pitchers who are buried on other teams, like Trevor Megill and Bryan Baker. Usually, Tampa and Milwaukee have found one thing they think they can improve in these pitchers, such as command, and are doing more than hoping that just a change in scenery or better luck will make a difference. Suggestions along these lines would be interesting and would be a more realistic path to success for the Twins.

Are we going to get a parade of articles about how signing "affordable" Tier 3 free agents could, unlike just about every time in the past, make a difference next year? Look, Lowe isn't terrible, but he would kind of be the Trevor Larnach of first basemen: a left-handed, part-time, average hitter with poor fielding, except that it looks like he doesn't hit as well as Larnach anymore. Sure, he might be pretty affordable, but that doesn't mean he would raise the ceiling of the team. These are the kind of moves a team makes when it doesn't expect to compete, but doesn't want to try someone who's untested, so it needs a placeholder for a position.

Yes, in any one particular year, getting into the playoffs is the most important component to having a chance to win, but over time teams having a larger payroll will have both (1) more chances to make it into the playoffs, and (2) a better chance of winning the average playoff series.

How do you calibrate the pitching in the AFL? A few good pitchers are there, but if many teams are like the Twins and contribute lower-quality pitchers from the lower minors, it seems like the average pitcher would be maybe a back of rotation A+/AA pitcher. For example, Ryan Dromboski is fifth in innings so far. In 2026, he threw 81 innings in A+ and AA with a 5.38 xFIP and is organizational depth for the Phillies. The leader in innings, Marcus Johnson, was ranked #55 in Tampa's organization, threw 33.2 AA/AAA innings in 2026 before and after elbow inflammation for a 5.08 xFIP, and is available through Rule V. One interesting early stat for both DeBarge and Mercedes is their good BB/K ratios. It's 8 BB to 9 K for DeBarge, and 7 BB to 8 K for Mercedes. However, this ratio appears similar for many players. For example, perhaps the most notable player in the league is Aidan Miller of the Phillies, and he he has a 15/9 BB/K ratio, which is a very large improvement over the 82/123 ratio he had in 2025, his last full season.

Yes, this is Gambler's Ruin. The explanation is much more detailed. The numbers come from a Harvard statistics professor. You might want to look into it a little more. Gambler's Ruin is based on a fair game between players with different financial strength, not an unfair game where each player has the same amount of money. Your Musk example is an example of a fair game with different financial strength. I'm not sure where you come up with "90.1% chance of going broke," because the chances of losing all your money would depend on how many games are played. If only one game is played, the chances of going broke (losing) are small, but if thousands of games are played the chances of bankruptcy are quite high, probably much higher than 90.1%. The main point is that, in baseball, differing financial strength makes more of a difference the more games (seasons) are played, despite the real chance that in any one or few particular seasons a player with lower financial resources can win.

This is a valid grievance, but doesn't respond to the topic posed by the article, which states that Jeff Hoffman is the best option the Twins currently have to be the closer. Criticizing Hoffman does not mean that other options are better. Although the Twins and Twins media often do overhype mediocrity, the team still needs to come up with players to fill each position, and saying that Player 'X' is the best fit for a position is not the same as pumping up mediocrity. Another reason to try Hoffman at closer is that if he does well, he and his expiring contract could be traded mid-season for a decent prospect.

This article is correct; Caratini is the best defensive catcher among the options reasonably available to the Twins to start the year. There is also reason to expect his offense in 2027 to be a little better than it was in 2026. If Diaw improves his defense some, he could also get innings in the second half. Other commenters have suggested trading for Henry Davis from the Pirates, which is also a good idea, but it's unclear whether the Twins would want to trade what it may take to get Davis. Jackson would fine for a short term, if nothing better is available. Otherwise, they could try to see if they could get a AA or AAA player like Ariel Armas of the Cubs and if they would tolerate his offense; if he can match Austin Hedges, that would probably be OK.

If you don't understand why having slightly more money in a fair game would give one player an advantage over the other player or that how the advantage increases as they play more games, I recommend that you look up Gambler's Ruin, because there are much better explanations on the internet than I can give you. At a very high level, it is proof that having more money gives a sustainable advantage, despite anecdotal evidence of when a player with less money defeated a player with more money.

Sure, makes sense of the relievers coming back next year. A 2026 starter may also be a candidate. BTW, Gomez's walk rate in the second half was 17.4%. Ouchie!

To summarize, the greatest R&D team in the world won't overcome bad decision-making. The Twins make bad decisions that the Brewers, Rays, and similar teams don't make. An example of a bad decision that the Twins made that doesn't require ten more people in R&D for which the Brewers would have made the opposite decision is not trading Joe Ryan. If the Twins don't fix their bad decision-making, investing more in R&D will be futile and could have negative repercussions. -30-

Getting Ober was great, but he didn't follow the theme of finding more velocity for a pitcher with good secondaries. He was about 90-91 when he was drafted, but was over 92 only in his rookie year, and his secondaries weren't as important initially as the deception he developed by using his height and release point. For example, his change-up has been a good pitch, and he threw it more than his 4-seamer this year, but going back to 2021, for example, he threw his 4-seamer almost 60% of the time and his change-up only about 15%. Since 2021, usage has gone in opposite directions.

Seems to be the same as my statement, "Certainly, a larger analytics - or "R&D" - staff could be a great thing." Separately, though, a larger, smarter analytics staff won't overcome "go big or go home" or where the Twins fall down in decision-making in comparison to these better teams. For example, it's been stated many times on twinsdaily.com that, unlike the Twins, the Brewers would have traded Joe Ryan, like they traded Freddy Peralta and Corbin Burnes. A better and larger R&D department by itself won't make the Twins as smart as the Rays or Brewers.

A basic probability proof is based on a case where you and a friend are gambling over $100 split between you 51:49 and the game is otherwise fair. If you play 20 times, the player who starts with $51 will win the $100 60% of the time. If you play 100 times, the player who starts with $51 will win the $100 88% of the time. If you play 100 times, the player who starts with $51 will win the $100 98% of the time. Having more money improves the odds of victory, especially the more you play. Baseball isn't an otherwise fair game, because being smarter can provide advantages. The Twins, unfortunately, in addition to having less money have also consistently been less smart than several other teams. Playing in a weak division that enabled them to make the playoffs a few teams sheltered their lack of smartness. But now Detroit and even the ChiSox appear to be catching onto the strategies used by CLE/TBR/MLW and others, so the challenges facing the Twins are even greater.

It does seem that Falvey was ahead of the game on finding these less-covered pitchers and boosting their velocity, but other teams have caught on and have figured out how to add velocity. Also, starting with Falvey's first draft, where he finagled the first pick to get Landon Leach and Blayne Enlow, the strategy really wasn't that successful: very few of these pitchers have succeeded past AA with the Twins.

Yoendrys Gomez, 2026. Count 1-0: 8.06 K/9, 9.12 BB/9, 5.81 xERA. Count 0-1: 11.34 K/9, 3.51 BB/9, 4.67 xERA. You don't want to know 2-0, 2-1, or even 3-2, at least not while you're eating.

The average fastball for the Twins this year ranked 16th in MLB.

Perhaps you can start with Eno Sarris's article on October 14 about their "Moneyball-like edges." One quote: "But the thing that has perhaps separated the Brewers and Rays from other organizations that have also bought all the technology and tried to be on the forefront of the data revolution is that they’ve always had good process. The insights they gain from the data sourced from the tech they’ve bought are put into action up and down their organization. It takes great communicators to turn all that data into insights that the best coaches can use to improve their players." Please note that, as of the summer of 2025, Tampa does lead the league with 22 more people on their staff than Minnesota has, one more than Philadelphia has. You would have to say that Tampa does much better than Philly does with just one more person. Minnesota has six fewer analysts than Milwaukee, and seven fewer than Cincinnati. You would have to say that Milwaukee does much better than Cincy does despite having one fewer person. Detroit has five more than Cleveland (CLE has 9 more than Twins). You would have to say that Cleveland does much better than Detroit, despite having five fewer people. Staff size alone is less predictive than good process. Certainly, a larger analytics - or "R&D" - staff could be a great thing. But without first figuring out why other teams are more successful in their processes to gain insights from analytics and then communicate them through the organization, adding staff would just be throwing money at the problem and run the risk of making "analytics" the fall guy for the next disappointment.

Simply counting headcount is also putting pieces together about information we don't have. These teams are actually using analytics differently from other teams. Further, the world's largest and most technically brilliant analytics department won't overcome "go big or go home." Finance is full of analysts. When you're picking someone to invest your money, do you pick the company with the biggest analyst department or the one with the best track record of decisions? In fact, the answer to your request is within your response itself. Analytics is necessary, but before adding headcount, the Twins need to figure out the gaps between their processes and the processes of other teams. Critically, "processes" needs to include thought and decision processes, which are more important than algorithmic processes, which were one of Falvey's downfalls.

It all sounds good, but the subhead, "Brian Reith could revolutionize the Twins pitching staff, leading the club back to the postseason for the first time since 2023," seems excessive. The last time the Twins notably fired a coach, Popkins, his new team went to the World Series and he was named Baseball America's MLB Coach of the Year, while the Twins went to the Fire Sale and their offense went down from 12th to 17th (their fielding went down by even more, so their overall non-pitching fWAR went from 10th to 19th). There is too much to fix with the Twins and it's a destructive myth to think that one guy can make that big of a difference. It would be more fair to Reith and more mentally healthy for fans to measure him by progress in specific areas, such as improvement by Matthews and Abel, instead of overall team success.

Analytics are very important, but not the be-all, end-all. For example, the same analytics that caused the Twins to see something in Trever Megill in the first place are what caused Milwaukee to pick him up from the Twins for a PTBNL and cash. However, MLW was able to read their analytics to see what changes Megill needed to make, but which the Twins failed to do. Similar stories probably apply to other discarded relievers whom the Twins identified as talented, but who almost immediately reached a couple levels higher after they went to other teams, such as Pressly to the Astros, Cano to the Orioles, and even Henriquez to the Marlins. Similarly, it is probable that decisions based on analytics caused many mistakes by the Twins over the years, such as continually pinch hitting Margot even after he set a record for futility, prioritizing hitters who hit homers but struck out a lot and fielded poorly, pinch hitting early in the game to maintain a hand advantage, and giving at-bats to Joey Gallo long past all evidence showed he was cooked. Now, if you're arguing that advanced stats like exit velocity and launch angle are better predictors than traditional stats like RBIs for identifying future run production, I'm with you, as well as I am for many other advanced stats that are proprietary to the various teams, but all the analysts in the world will not overcome bad decision-making and strategy.

You are correct about Schrom. It is Brent Strom, who was the architect of Houston's pitching program while he was pitching coach. Thank you for pointing out that error, but please note that your finding an error in my memory of the name of the coach does not mean you have given any evidence to support your opinion that a pitching coach is just a "mechanic" and is not involved in designing an organization's pitching development system.

This year, 15 1Bs with at least 400 PAs had an OPS of at least .800. Eleven of the 15 were paid a lot less than $20M, although Contreras (.901 @ $18M) and Murakami (.825 @ $16.5M) were close. The four who made more were probably whom you would guess: Alonso, Harper, Devers, Olson. 24 had at least a .750 OPS, including Kody Clemens. Only one other - Freeman (.792 @ $27M) - made more than $20M. Jeffers is a nice player, but he's no Alonso, Harper, Devers, Olson, nor Freeman with the stick, nor even a Contreras or Murakami. It would have been great for the Twins to have serious conversations with Jeffers a year or two ago, before his price became so much higher. They could have maybe gotten him on a Yandy Diaz deal - 4 years/$36M. But they chose to wait and now he's above the price where it's reasonable for the Twins.

As someone who was reading Bill James more than 40 years ago, I'm confident he would say that decision-making is much more important than analytics, which is just utilizing data as a tool to gain insights for decisions. In that vein, all the analytics in the world wouldn't help the Twins be better than Milwaukee, if, for example, Milwaukee makes better decisions about which pitchers to trade and when, and which pitchers to acquire, or if Milwaukee makes the hard decisions about which prospects and rookies to sign to long-term contracts and gets it right when they do. Nor would more analytics help the Twins be better than Tampa, if, for example, Tampa makes better decisions about when they are not competitive and trades veterans for prospects, and acquires better prospects when they do, and acquires higher-end talent when they are competitive. You could probably find other areas where Milwaukee and Tampa, as well as Cleveland, Los Angeles, and even the White Sox and other teams, generally make better decisions than the Twins. This year, an analytics staff of only one person would have been all that was needed to tell the Twins that their offensive results in the first half were likely to regress, they had a small chance of making the wild card, and a miniscule chance of going much further. A team of just average smartness would have said it was time to fold 'em, but not the "go big or go home" Twins who, instead of trading for next year, went out and made a lot of drama about tinkering around the edges and then crashed into a 77-win year with the dubious consolation of probably drafting 10th instead of higher. That's bad decision-making, not bad analytics.