Matthew Lenz

There is a quantifiable stat for nearly everything. At catcher, we have “pop time”, as well as pitch framing and blocking metrics that try to paint a picture of their defensive value. One key part of being a catcher is the art of calling pitches and, while a site like Baseball Savant doesn't quantify the impact of this, the Minnesota Twins measure it with their backstops. Image courtesy of © David Richard-Imagn Images This very topic came up when Aaron Gleeman of The Athletic and our own John Bonnes were interviewing Ryan Jeffers at the Twins Daily Winter Meltdown. Gleeman was specifically asking Jeffers about learning new pitchers (i.e. when David Festa was promoted) and how the game plan is formed when each player is still getting to know the other. Jeffers pointed out that it's a collaborative effort between the players and coaching staff, but also revealed that the team uses a “sticking to the plan” stat. Jeffers revealed that an intern will track pitches and after the game will determine how well they stuck with the pre-game plan. While we don't know the details of how this is exactly calculated (and there's some indication that it's more of a tabulated but flexible feedback system than a true stat), it's a fascinating aspect of the game to discuss. It's one of the few things that aren't formally quantified, at least in the public sphere. Regardless, we can use some thoughtful conjecture to hypothesize what this stat may look like. When game planning, there are two sets of strengths and weaknesses to consider: your pitcher’s and the opposing hitter’s. Of course, you always prefer to lean into your pitcher's strengths, as that is where they are most comfortable, but that's not always the best plan. Not only do opposing hitters have the scouting report on that game’s pitcher, but their strengths may coincide with the pitcher’s. For example, Simeon Woods Richardson’s slider performed really well last year. At the same time, Kansas City's Salvador Perez had a solid .331 expected weighted on-base average (xwOBA) and hit six home runs on sliders from righties in 2024. When those two match up in 2025, should Woods Richardson avoid throwing his slider? That's where the next layer of the plan comes into play. Pitchers and hitters alike have tendencies and preferences that impact the game plan. Pitchers like to throw certain pitches in certain counts, and that may even vary depending on the handedness of the hitter. From Pablo López’s Brooks Baseball page, you can see his tendencies based on the count as well as hitter split. Generally speaking, left-handed hitters should look for more vertical movement, while their right-handed counterparts will look for more horizontal movement. (This is pretty typical: horizontal movement tends to deceive same-handed batters better than opposite-handed ones. Vertical movement is best leveraged when the hitter has the platoon advantage.) Specifically, in a two-strike count, right-handed hitters have four pitches to stay on, while left-handed hitters can more or less throw out the slider (that's his sweeper; Brooks Baseball just doesn't distinguish sliders from sweepers yet). On the other hand, hitters have their own swing tendencies that will be part of the game plan as well. Check out Byron Buxton’s swing tendencies and outcomes on two-strike counts. Where are you attacking him? If you said underneath the zone, I would absolutely agree. If you play around on his Brooks Baseball page, you’ll find that while he does relatively well against sinkers and sliders regardless of count, locating well with those offerings can confound him. While the numbers shared are for their careers, it’s also important to consider recent tendencies as well. Has the hitter struggled against a certain type of pitch over the last two weeks? Is the hitter dealing with a nagging injury that may impact their ability to get around on a ball or extend their hands to the outside part of the zone? While quantifiable trends are the most important thing to go into a game plan, it’s also important to have a feel for the game. “You have to constantly weigh that battle of what you see, what your eyes are telling you versus what the numbers are saying,” Jeffers said at the Meltdown. To supplement what the data is telling you, pitchers and catchers can leverage film to help identify weaknesses in a hitter’s swing. Moreover, in-game observations at the at-bat level can impact how you set hitters up later in the count or in future at-bats. That a player generally struggles with a certain pitch doesn’t necessarily mean it's wise to pummel the zone with that pitch; getting them out still requires a thoughtful approach on how you set that player up for that pitch type. While we don’t know how the Twins exactly quantify “sticking to the plan,” quantifying this internally is an important part of pitcher and catcher development and deepening the relationship there. Reflecting on the game plan can lead to invaluable discussions and learning opportunities, such as the thought process behind deviating from the plan; why a pitcher may have shaken off the catcher (something that is encouraged by Jeffers); or why the plan may or may not have worked on a particular day. Especially in the early stages of a pitcher-catcher relationship, these discussions can help the two better understand each other’s tendencies, as well as when or how the pitcher prefers to deviate from those tendencies. View full article

The Minnesota Twins have yet to establish a solid back up plan behind Jose Miranda at first base. Edouard Julie and Willi Castro are internal candidates, but who are some external candidates who could (better) fill the void? View full video

Dan Hayes is reporting that the Minnesota Twins are looking at veteran infielders Luis Urías and Paul DeJong has potential back ups to Carlos Correa. What does that mean for Brooks Lee and Willi Castro? Where is the money coming from? Should we expect more moves? View full video

If Nolan Arenado remains with the St. Louis Cardinals, it would result in a loss of at-bats for up and comer Alec Burleson. Should the Minnesota Twins swoop in for the bat first versatile defender who is controllable through 2028? View full video

Fresh off the heels of the somewhat surprising news that the Twins are looking for a veteran back up shortstop, Dan Hayes drops this little nugget in response to a fan's question. Willi Castro the first basemen? Whaaaaaat? If you're wondering, Castro has seven positions throughout his career. He's never played catcher and he's never played first base in his professional career. As in he has 0.0 (or 0 0/3 if you prefer that format) innings at first. In the last few days, the Twins have addressed their two biggest needs. A left-handed reliever and a corner outfield who can handle left-handed pitching. Lower in the priority list has been a first basemen to back up Miranda, but I'm not sure anyone would have guessed that Castro would be a viable option. In fact, Castro grades out as a negative defender at nearly every position he plays aside from third base. I don't know about you but I'm not thrilled that the contingency plan behind Miranda looks to be Castro (or Julien) as of right now. Maybe the need for a back up first basemen is bigger than we initially thought. What do you make of this news? View full rumor

The Minnesota Twins might not be done yet. Dan Hayes of The Athletic is reporting that “multiple league sources confirmed the Twins have expressed interest in adding a veteran shortstop, recently inquiring about free agents Luis Urías and Paul DeJong.” Let’s get into it. Image courtesy of Urias (left): © Steven Bisig-Imagn Images; DeJong (right): © Jay Biggerstaff-Imagn Images Let’s start by quickly getting to know Luis Urías and Paul DeJong. Urías played for the Seattle Mariners in 2024, but spent most of the season at Triple-A Tacoma Relatively speaking, he is a bat-first utility infielder, but in reality, he’s a below-average producer on both sides of the ball. In 41 games and 109 plate appearances, he carried a .697 OPS with four home runs, a high strikeout rate, and a low walk rate. If you’re not impressed by his hit tool (you shouldn’t be), you’ll be even less impressed with his glove. He's only nominally or vestigially a shortstop; he hasn’t played there since spending 200 innings as an injury replacement in Milwaukee during the 2022 season. Even then, it was ugly. While Hayes may have had this related to him as interest in a shortstop, Urías would be much more about giving the team another plausible option at second and third base. DeJong spent time with the Chicago White Sox and Kansas City Royals last year, and had a far more productive year at the plate—but he has similarly concerning strikeout and walk rates. In addition to being a better bat, he brings a better glove as well, and played both middle infield positions in 2024. I think most would agree DeJong moves the needle quite a bit more than Urías. DeJong might cost them as much as Harrison Bader did. Urías is likely to sign a minor-league deal. Regardless of whether they end up signing either player (or anyone akin to them), what can we make of this news? My first reaction to this news was to think of two guys on the roster who primarily backed up Carlos Correa in 2024: Willi Castro and Brooks Lee. Regarding Lee, this report tells me that the Twins must not like the prospect of him playing shortstop. While multiple scouting reports suggest he could be an average shortstop at the big-league level, he posted a negative rating in multiple defensive metrics during his 200-plus innings there as a rookie. Thinking about Castro, who played 465 innings at short in 2024, led me to a bigger question which was: “where is all of this money coming from!?” It’s been a weird offseason to follow, as we initially believed that the Twins wouldn’t be reducing payroll below the $130 million they carried in 2024 but that, due to arbitration and other raises (Pablo López, e.g.), they would need to cut roughly $10 million in salary to get down to that number. Then there was the announcement that the Pohlads were exploring a sale of the team, and many thought that could mean two things: The Twins aren’t going to make any expensive moves that might deter a prospective ownership group; and/or They may look to offload a bigger salary (i.e., López or Correa) to make the finances of the organization appear more attractive. We were never going to get a clear answer to those hypotheses unless they actually happened. Last week, Hayes reported that the Twins had roughly $5 million in leeway to their 2025 payroll. Now the Twins have added over $9 million in payroll, and are reportedly looking to add more? Assuming some sort of move for a backup shortstop comes to fruition, the Twins have more up their sleeve, and Jamie Cameron is asking the right questions. What it likely means for at least one of Chris Paddack, Christian Vázquez, and Willi Castro is that their days with the Twins are numbered. Each of them has been the subject of trade speculation for the entire offseason simply, because they carry salaries north of $6 million for the 2025 season. This speculation grew bigger after yesterday’s signing of Harrison Bader, and will likely only grow as we hear rumblings about their contingency plan at shortstop. Or maybe they’re thinking of zigging, when everyone else is thinking of zagging, like Nate Palmer suggests. We’ve also talked about the redundancy of Matt Wallner and Trevor Larnach on this team, as two corner outfielders who struggle against left-handed pitching. Might they view Castro as more of an outfielder, given his poor infield defense, making one of Wallner or Larnach expendable? Given their age and controllability, it’s definitely possible the Twins could be trying to tie one of those two to one of the three contracts above to try and complete a deal that is more than just a salary dump. In fact, recently, I suggested that now is the time to trade Larnach, arguing that his value will never be higher. After a quiet offseason, the last week or so has been fun. We have moves to analyze and speculation to run with. However, at the end of the day, it’s just speculation. We can read tea leaves all we want, but this front office has always kept their cards close to their vest, so we likely won’t get any answers until corresponding moves are made. What do you make of the Twins trying to add a backup shortstop? Join the conversation in the comments! View full article

The Minnesota Twins locked in their fourth outfielder role by signing Harrison Bader to a one year pact. After Michael A. Taylor exceeded expectations and Manual Margot fell short, what is fair to expect out of the Bader? Moreover, what will his exact role be on the 2025 Minnesota Twins? View full video

The Minnesota Twins and outfielder Harrison Bader have agreed to a one-year contract. Bader will take over the role as the team’s fourth outfielder. What can we expect to get out of the 2021 Gold Glove winner, entering his age-31 season? Image courtesy of © Jayne Kamin-Oncea-Imagn Images Since waiving Jake Cave following the 2022 season, the Twins have rotated their fourth outfield role, trading for Michael A. Taylor to be that guy in 2023 and Manuel Margot to do the same in 2024. Now, they're signing Harrison Bader ahead of the 2025 season. Like each of those moves, prioritizing defense over offense, Bader represents another glove-first outfielder off the bench. Taylor and Margot entered each of their respective seasons with the club with similar expectations—namely, that they would provide above-average defense and a passable bat. Despite that, their contributions to those seasons couldn’t have been more different. Taylor more than held up his side of the deal, having one of the best seasons of his career at the plate and providing solid defense across 129 games. In fact, he exceeded fans' expectations—so much so that many wanted him back in a Twins uniform (which was quickly poo-poo'ed when the Twins announced payroll cuts). For what it’s worth, the Twins made the right call in moving on, as he produced a 50 wRC+ in 2024 with the Pittsburgh Pirates. Unfortunately, their Taylor replacement didn’t perform much better. For the first time in his career, Margot wasn’t even replacement level, being a black hole at the plate while providing below-average defense. Now, the Twins take another shot at recreating Taylor by adding Bader. Should we have similar expectations for him as we did with Taylor and Margot? In short, yes. He profiles similarly, as a strong defender with a passable (albeit below-average) bat but a long history of injuries. Fortunately, Bader had the healthiest year of his career in 2024, playing in 143 games. Prior to 2024, Bader averaged 91 games a season dealing with various injuries, but most concerning are the multiple injuries to the lower half of his body (two hamstring strains, plantar fasciitis, and a groin strain). In 2023 alone, three separate strains put him on the injured list and out of the Yankees' reach when they needed him. On the positive side of things, he differs from Taylor and Margot by having produced multiple seasons as an above-average contributor at the plate. Unfortunately, it’s been three years since he’s had such a season, but his career 90 wRC+ is the highest of the three being compared. That said, he should be in a role that allows him to perform well at the plate. I would expect Bader to draw most of the at-bats against left-handed pitching at one of the corner outfield positions. Both Trevor Larnach and Matt Wallner have struggled mightily against left-handed pitching early on in their careers and, while they deserve a chance to prove otherwise, one of the two will likely give way to Bader when a southpaw starts or is brought in as a reliever. Of course, he will also relieve Byron Buxton in center field on occasion, regardless of who is on the mound. PECOTA projects Bader for 406 plate appearances and a .234/.283/.357 line, with 9 homers and 19 steals. His ZiPS-projected line is similar. While those numbers don’t jump off the page, he’s carried a .775 OPS and a 109 wRC+ against left-handed pitching over his entire career (although he struggled against lefties in 2024). He experienced better success against righties last season, but has generally been a below-average producer at the plate. More importantly, because both systems forecast Bader to be an above-average defender and runner, they still peg him for around 1.5 wins above replacement in less than a full-time role. Although their offensive production projects similarly, this signing probably points towards a reduction in at-bats (and maybe even the loss of a roster spot) for super-utility Michael Helman. Where he falls short compared to Bader is that he’s not a particularly strong defender, despite his ostensible versatility. If Helman finds a role on this team, it’s likely as the last man on the bench, left for pinch-running duties. Of the four most recent fourth outfielders (including Cave), I have to say I’m the most excited about Bader. I’m tempering expectations given his injury history and how he struggled against lefties in 2024. I think his floor is assuredly higher than what the team got from Margot, and his ceiling can be higher than they got out of Taylor. I think the biggest concern is whether he can have back-to-back healthy campaigns. What are your thoughts on this addition by the Twins? Join the conversation in the comments! View full article

The very Minnesotan outfielder has a legitimate cannon attached to his right shoulder, yet baserunners attempt to take extra bases against him at the third-highest rate (advance attempt rate) of all outfielders. One diminutive teammate, meanwhile, had the second-weakest arm at the position in 2024, yet tied for the lowest advance attempt rate. Make it make sense! Image courtesy of © Jesse Johnson-Imagn Images It would be natural to assume a strong correlation between the strength of an outfielder's arm and the advance attempt rate against that defender. That is to say, we might assume that the stronger the outfield arm, the more conservative baserunners will be. However, while that might prove mostly true, Matt Wallner and Manuel Margot are counterexamples, reminding us that there is more to throwing runners out than having a Howitzer. As Wallner looks to be the heir apparent to Max Kepler in right field, I felt it would be worthwhile to look at what might be the reason for this discrepancy. Naturally, my first thought was to consider the accuracy of his throws. Arm Accuracy This isn't quantified publicly (yet), so I put on my amateur scouting goggles, watched a few dozen plays, and found nine where Wallner was attempting to throw out an advancing base runner. Of those nine, I determined that six of those were inaccurate throws. That's not to say that the runner would have been out had the throw been better, but it is to say that Wallner made a legitimate attempt to throw out a runner and the throw was off-line. Maybe I was too harsh, but even if the throw was simply on the wrong side of the bag (like this one), I deemed it inaccurate. To be fair, I don’t have a good idea of what percentage of outfield throws are accurate, but my gut tells me that it’s better than 33.3% for some of the best arms in the game. Regardless, this subjective analysis alone wasn’t enough to make a strong conclusion on why runners are particularly aggressive against Wallner. One thing that did stand out as I was reviewing all the videos was the number of times Wallner was close to catching a ball hit over his head but just missed, like in the highlight below. This led me to another important aspect of throwing as a fielder, which is how you approach the ball. Approach While I initially noticed this when reviewing videos for arm accuracy, the way he approaches a ball is something Baseball Savant has quantified. First, I looked at his starting position relative to the rest of the league, in case he’s positioning himself differently than most of his counterparts. Alas, on average right fielders positioned themselves 295 feet away from home plate, while Wallner averaged 293. That’s pretty negligible. Then, I moved on to what happens after the ball is hit. That’s when things started to make more sense. Wallner’s Outs Above Average (OAA) was -3 in 2024, and he covered nearly four fewer feet on batted balls than did the average right fielder, which put him tied for last with Yordan Alvarez. Digging a little deeper, Baseball Savant breaks apart an outfielder's jump into three areas: reaction, burst, and route. What you find is that, while Wallner’s routes are considered a strength, his reaction and burst times are considerably below average (his data point is directly to the left of the brim of his hat in the picture below). Not only does this impact his ability to catch baseballs, but it impacts his ability to approach the ball in a way that is going to set him up for a good throw. In fact, more often than not, the most direct route to a baseball (remember, that’s his strength as a fielder) is not the best way to approach a baseball to set yourself up for a throw. Instead, you often want to take an indirect route so your momentum is bringing you toward your intended target before you field the ball. A good example of this is shown in the highlight below, where Willi Castro sets himself up (7-8 second mark) to throw out one of the fastest players in baseball. NjQxbDRfV0ZRVkV3dEdEUT09X1VsTllBVllNVmdNQVdWc0VCd0FBVkZKWEFGa0dVMVVBVmdaVFVsY0hBbFZVQXdFQQ==.mp4 While Wallner’s top-end speed is fine (55th percentile), his five-foot running splits further support what may be the underlying reason why runners are willing to test his arm. Given his size, it takes him longer to get going, which inherently impacts his reaction and burst times. This has a chain effect on his overall approach to the ball, which then mitigates his ability to consistently take advantage of the 97 mile-per-hour velocity he averages on his throws. Whether this is an area of his game Wallner can improve remains to be seen, but it at least provides us with a theory as to why runners tend to be so aggressive, despite his arm. View full article

The Minnesota Twins have brought back southpaw reliever Danny Coulombe on a one year, $2.5 million deal. After being traded to the Baltimore Orioles in 2023, Coulombe had a successful run as the Orioles primary left reliever over the past two seasons. The turnaround was in part due to his change in his pitch repertoire and mix. Will the Twins follow the Orioles lead? What are your thoughts on the signing? Join the conversation in the comments! View full video

While not as deep as the divisions hitting prospects, the American League Central boasts some of the top end pitching prospects in all of baseball. Get to know them and find out where the Minnesota Twins top pitching prospects ranks within the group. View full video

Dan Hayes of The Athletic reported that the Minnesota Twins have about $5 million in leeway left for the 2025 offseason. The Twins could use a left-handed reliever and a corner outfielder who can hit left-handed pitching. How should the Derek Falvey prioritize their $5 million? View full video

After three authors delved into the promises and pitfalls of various approaches to bridging the gaps between small- and large-market teams last week across our websites, tonight, we offer a discussion among them about what was learned. Image courtesy of © Brad Rempel-Imagn Images Matt Trueblood: So, first of all, I want to hear whether any of you changed what policy prescriptions (if any) you advocate or oppose now that you didn’t before digging into this. Did anyone see a new dynamic in the positions of big- and small-market teams or the union that they could particularly appreciate, or an unintended consequence of a change they didn’t expect? Brandon Glick: I went into this project expecting to advocate—hard—for a salary cap and floor. The NFL operates pretty strongly with it, and the NBA is probably the paradigm example of a league that has year-round player movement and strong parity sourcing from a (soft) salary cap. What I found was that not only does baseball have much stronger parity, both in terms of playoff performers and champion variety, but that it also spawns more trade and free-agent activity thanks to its existing systems that make up for not having a salary cap and floor (like the qualifying offer and prospect industry). There’s obviously a push and pull with this discussion—owners would want a hard cap with no floor, while the players would want the opposite—and that extends to the players as well, where superstar players are willing to give up the safety of a floor for the avoidance of a cap, while role players would suggest the opposite. Now, I feel pretty strongly that baseball needs tweaking, rather than a seismic overhaul to its economics. Matthew Lenz: This project required me to adopt a more objective perspective, moving away from a fan's viewpoint. Before my research, I was of the (partially educated… and that might be generous) opinion that there needed to be a complete overhaul of MLB's Competitive Balance Tax (CBT) and revenue-sharing systems. My perspective was dually flawed, as I was only thinking of the implications of any change from a fan’s point of view and, moreover, as a fan of a small- to mid-market team. Now, after my research and reading Brandon and Jake’s articles, my (more educated) opinion is that the current system just needs some tweaks, specifically related to stiffer CBT penalties and deferrals. Like Brandon, I think the parity in the league speaks for itself. That said, while deferrals aren’t new, the amount being deferred in some cases is unprecedented. We also have back-to-back seasons where there have been a record number of teams willing to pay the luxury tax, so my question back to the group would be: how long can we expect this parity to last, and will only minor tweaks maintain this level of it? BG: Look, spending money DOES help you win. Objectively speaking, buying better talent makes your team more talented. And when your team is more talented, you can start to attract guys like Roki Sasaki, who is very talented and also very cheap. I think the parity of baseball exists mostly because of the randomness of it. No matter how good a pitcher on a mound is, any hitter can run into one against him. And even the best hitters can get unlucky against the worst pitchers. Unlike the NBA, where singular stars can fundamentally alter the course of an entire franchise, and the NFL, where the “haves” and “have-nots” are separated merely by the quality of their quarterback, individual stars cannot propel teams to championships in baseball. Over a 162-game season, they absolutely do—given a large enough sample size, the cream of the crop will rise to the top. But in a seven-game series, there’s just too much randomness to ever guarantee an outcome. I think a reckoning is coming for baseball, not in terms of parity, but in terms of fan interest. There’s a palpable sense of burnout among fans this offseason as they watch the Dodgers nab every superstar on the market. If revenues start to dip, or television ratings start to decline, the league may be forced into action. MT: Let’s imagine that we do achieve a measure of financial parity, where spending power differences between teams shrink significantly. We’d still want a way to discourage players from forming super-teams and clustering up to chase rings at the expense of everyone else, right? Does anyone have an interesting idea in that vein? Jake McKibbin: One of the beautiful things about baseball is that any team can win on any given day. I have no problems with players chasing rings in free agency. This can be offset by strong drafting and development of players. Six or seven seasons of team control is a lot to work with, if you have the right talent coming through, so the main thing I’d want to see is every team have the ability to have three players locked into $20-million AAV deals and beyond. That’s not a huge sum, in this market, but I think it’s an achievable one. If players want to take reduced/deferred salaries to join one particular organization, that should be their right, but the cyclical nature of baseball powerhouses will likely result in a period in which these teams are paying heavily for aging, underperforming veterans. ML: Totally agree with Jake here. An idyllic world in sports, as unachievable as it might be, is one where nobody cares about money and everyone just cares about winning. At the end of the day, there will be some balance between players who prioritize money and those who prioritize winning. While that balance may not be even close to 50/50, I don’t think we can force players into a spot where they have to go play for poverty organizations like the Chicago White Sox because the Los Angeles Dodgers and New York City teams are too stacked. I think the other thing that will help balance is that these guys are competitors and want to play ball. Unless their skills are worsening and a smaller role is warranted, their ego and natural competitive edge aren’t going to allow them to join a super team just to sit on the bench—although the Dodgers' starting rotation may be a counterpoint to this argument. MT: To have a cap and floor, we’d have to define the baseball revenues of the game to the satisfaction of both the owners and the union. Can the owners be trusted to honestly report what they make, and how, such that players would accept their estimates? Should owners have to count money made from real estate and other investments whose value clearly derives from the baseball venture as revenue of which a percentage must go to players? Would certain teams demand that, at the expense of others who make especially gaudy amounts outside the gates of the park? How do you solve that problem? BG: Yet again, Matt throws me a curveball while I’m sitting on the heater (clearly, Matt never played for Lou Brown). I could wax poetic about this topic for a while, but the short of it is, no, you obviously cannot trust owners to properly report what they’re making, whether it’s purely team revenue or their entire portfolio. By day I’m a sportswriter, but by night I moonlight as a filmmaker, so trust me when I say this: There is no industry more corrupt than “Hollywood Accounting”. Those studio executives are the greediest people to ever walk the face of the earth. They make the biblical version of avarice look like a child who won’t share his Play-Doh. Behind them are politicians, and in a close third in the greedy column are sports team owners. As a Cubs fan, I know all too well about Tom Ricketts’s habit of claiming that all team revenue is funneled back into baseball operations. No, it isn’t. The Cubs have an annual payroll in the $200-$250 million range. Their revenue exceeded $500 million last year. Accounting for all the other expenses that go into owning a baseball team, like paying employee salaries and upkeep for the stadium,, doesn’t come close to making up that $250-300 million gap. Insofar as a salary cap and floor would require revenue reports—which they would, seeing as the figures for those parameters are percentages of the total league revenue—there just isn’t a good way to implement them into the modern age of baseball, where owners have made a business out of lying to their fans. JM: A revenue report would be fascinating. In the UK, all entities above a certain size are required to submit annual accounts to Companies House, where it can be accessed free of charge by anyone. Sports teams are held accountable, and it prevents any of the siphoning of funds that we suspect happens in baseball while giving a true cost of the operations of running an organization. This system obviously isn’t in place in the US. Brandon, can you see any way in which the owners could be tempted to air their dirty laundry in public? Or even to an independent adjudicator, perhaps, who reviews total revenue, its source, and dictates how much each team is liable for into the revenue-sharing pool? BG: Putting aside my (some would say staunch) beliefs that billionaires should be the most public people about their finances, rather than the most private, I want to believe that it’s possible that the league could coerce each owner into sharing information, at least between each other. Here’s the thing, though: I don’t actually know that a salary cap would be of benefit to baseball in the way some think. Think of what your reaction was when you saw Juan Soto’s contract with the Mets this offseason. If I were to look into my crystal ball and guess, it was probably some variation of “Holy S**t!”. If Soto was locked into signing a max contract of, for example, 10 years and $400 million, it would still boggle the mind, but it wouldn’t come as a surprise. Baseball’s current system is flawed, but I don’t think implementing a salary cap would’ve pushed Soto to the Athletics or Rays or anything, even if there was a maximum he was allowed to earn on his contract. If anything, it may have even led him back to the Yankees or even (gulp) the Dodgers. Unless a wave of benevolence washes over the ruling class of MLB, I don’t anticipate that we (or even the league) will ever have enough information to properly assess where a cap and floor should lie, and which teams should be responsible for paying what. In that case, I guess we can all just enjoy the funniness of watching people with more money than the human mind can comprehend measure which of their wallets can stretch wider. MT: Expanding revenue sharing is always easier to swallow when revenues are growing, but because of the slow deflation of the regional sports TV bubble, that hasn’t been the case—or at least, it hasn’t clearly been the case, with a robust and impressive rate of growth—over the last handful of years. Do you think a change in how money is distributed throughout the league has to wait until teams have a clearer collective picture of their future earnings from broadcasts—or should those revenues be shaped and their path forward be set based on a known arrangement with regard to revenue sharing? ML: Based on what Jake laid out in his article, I think that any changes to the revenue-sharing system need to wait until teams have a better understanding of their revenue from broadcasts. Another miscalculation of team revenue, like the one that has happened before, risks a hundreds-of-millions shortfall for teams to share. While that was in part to bail out a team facing bankruptcy, it’s baffling to me that the situation has never been fully rectified by MLB, in what will end up being a multi-billion dollar blunder. MT: A major factor in the future financial structure of the game will be the league’s efforts to expand. Now that the A’s are out of Oakland and (they hope) en route to Las Vegas, there’s a bit more certainty to that situation, but the Rays’ sticky stadium situation could create another relocation fight in the near future. Expansion would bring billions to the sport in new franchise expansion fees and increased earnings from televising an expanded postseason, but it will probably also create two new small-market teams. Should that future consideration shape decisions about whether or how to change the fundamental financial structure of the sport? JM: I think it’s a very apt point, but they should be treated as two separate issues. The challenges of a startup franchise, and the volatility they’ll face (which should ease as they develop their fan base, infrastructure, drafting, etc) are almost entirely separate from creating a balanced ecosystem in the here and now. Exceptional items will need to be made to facilitate any expansion plans, but the benefits of tweaking the revenue-sharing setup at the next CBA to create a more balanced playing field should help those newer, small-market franchises after their initial growth phase. ML: I agree with Jake. Regardless of the sport and its financial structure, start-up franchises face hurdles that they must overcome through development and time. I don’t know that the financial structure of the league, especially in baseball, has a major impact on the short-term success of a new organization. While you don’t want to make long-term success so much of an uphill battle that it deters new owners from investing, I think you need to prioritize making the best version of the game you can with the existing franchises. MT: Finally, we know that all of this conversation is happening in the shadow of the next CBA negotiations. A lockout seems likely; lost games seem possible. Which of these possible approaches reduces the friction in labor negotiations best? Would leaning into one approach make it more likely that all parties find something palatable on which to agree and spare us a long, quiet, nervous winter? And is that an overweening consideration, or is getting to the best solution worth big labor trouble? ML: Referencing my first comment in this roundtable, while the fan in me thought a major overhaul would be best, I think the more objective opinion of “minor tweaks” is the best solution to avoid or minimize a work stoppage. I don’t see how two parties with financial goals on opposite sides of the spectrum would ever be able to come to an agreement to move quickly from where we are to that grand destination, even if it’s the “best solution” for baseball. I do think change needs to happen, but I think everyone (owners, players, fans) needs to be realistic about how much change will actually happen, if the priority is to play ball on Opening Day 2027. BG: I agree wholeheartedly with Matt (Lenz) here, and I want to remind readers what happened during the last CBA lockout and the COVID-induced “lockout” in 2020. The players go into negotiations with specific goals, and the owners refuse to budge. It’s only once the threat of losing revenue starts to hit home that their side begins to negotiate in “good faith”—and, from the players’ perspective, the threat of losing salary convinces them to move the goalposts on their own wishes. Unless baseball is willing to punt on an entire season (or more), there just isn’t the time and space to completely revamp how the system works. And while that may sound defeatist to those hoping to see significant change, that’s also the reason why we won’t see baseball cancel a season or postseason again, like it did in 1994. This conversation is, ultimately, about money, and both sides want it. They may not see eye-to-eye on most things, but they do understand each other on that matter. Needling and prodding the status quo may not be in the best interests of the long-term health of the game, but in an effort to keep eyes focused on the field rather than risk ears pressed up against the closed doors of the CBA negotiations, I firmly believe both sides will continue to kick this timebomb of a can down the road. View full article