Cap'n Piranha

He did. That’s not up for debate. What’s up for debate is if he scored more because of the bunt. When margarine consumption rates in the United States fall, so does the divorce rate in the state of Maine. Is that because eating less margarine makes people more likely to stick with their spouse? The more ice cream is consumed, the more people die from drowning. Does eating ice cream raise your risk of drowning? As MLB salaries have increased, so have house prices. Do higher MLB salaries cause higher house prices? When I wake up at 7:00 AM, the Twins win 60% of their games, as opposed to only 40% when I wake up at 6:30. Does my waking up at 7 make the Twins more likely to win? And finally, more ghost runners have scored when a bunt was attempted. But just as the 4 previous examples clearly show that two things happening at the same time does not necessitate a relationship, so attempting to bunt and scoring the ghost runner don’t either. You have confused correlation and causation, much as the authors of the study did. It is entirely possible that by controlling for more variables, the same conclusion would be reached, but until that is done, the connection the authors have made is specious, akin to Lisa selling Homer the rock to keep tigers away.

So you are therefore in support of self-imposed payroll limitations for the Twins. Whether they set appropriate ones or not is a debate for a different time and place. But we are in agreement that there is a point at which fans can not be upset that the Twins stopped spending on payroll, and that point is the level at which the team becomes unprofitable.

Yes, not my most elegant turn of phrase, haha!

Not actually my words. Go back and look at the 4 words before the quotation you selected. Those words are "THEIR CONCLUSION IS THAT". You're a smart guy--are you really trying to tell me you didn't understand that I was summarizing someone else's argument in that statement, particularly when I've made it abundantly clear that I reject and disagree with their argument (you know, the whole reason we're having this discussion)? This is pretty disingenuous unless it's an honest mistake.

You did answer a question, it just wasn't mine. You stated that you believe the Pohlads have never lost money, 2020 excepted (I'd argue possibly in 2021 as well, when in-person attendance was curtailed, at the least to begin the year). That in no way answers whether you think they should lose money. I understand you don't believe they have. Do you think they should? Having 0 access to any of the Twin's finances, I can't say for certainty whether they lost money last year. I'm inclined to believe they did not, given the owners. That said, I'm not sure why it is some scarlet letter for an owner of a thing to want to make money on it. I think with a similar payroll this year, the Twins would lose money, since their revenues are down $15Mish on the broadcast TV side. Their in-person attendance is also down about 1k a game, which at this point is probably somewhere around another $2.5M. So to more thoroughly answer your question, I don't think that after running a $150M payroll, along with perhaps another $100M-$150M on all-other expenses (on-field staff, front office, operating Target Field, travel, draft bonuses, international signings just to name a few), the Twins still had profits in excess of $17.5M in 2023. Next year, when the Twins might very well only get $10M to $15M in TV money? I absolutely believe a $150M payroll would lose money. A $120M payroll might as well.

Not at all. Their conclusion is that bunting is the best strategy, since the ghost runner scores more often when the leadoff hitter attempts to bunt (by the way, they also don't clarify what that means; if the leadoff hitter whiffs on a bunt attempt, but on the next pitch jacks one into the stands, which bucket does that go into)? The fallacy comes into play because they are directly attributing the success of the ghost runner scoring to whether or not a bunt was attempted, even though there are manifold occasions where the bunt was irrelevant. They are saying that because teams scored the ghost runner more often after attempting a bunt, that therefore bunting leads to success; this again includes scenarios where the bunt was completely irrelevant, even if it was a successful attempt. If I decide that I should never eat vegetables again because I get massive heartburn after eating them (even though I also ate a gallon of ice cream as well), am I being logical? Of course not, because there are other factors at play that might better explain my heartburn than the vegetables. By the same logic, I'm saying in the analysis the article did, there are other factors at play that might better explain the ghost runner scoring than the bunt, and without an analysis of how the ghost runner scored, the focus is on only one of a multitude of variables. That leads to PHEPH thinking, which can be accurate, but is also illogical.

You missed my point. My exact point was that the best thing the Twins could do with payroll space is sign a player like Pablo Lopez; therefore trading him for payroll space is inherently illogical.

Very nice. None of it answers my question. Do you expect the Pohlads to lose money on the Twins in any given year? I think a person who bought the Twins for $1.5B would expect to make money (unless they're Steve Cohen, and just want it for vanity purposes). As someone smart enough to have accumulated $1.5B in transferable assets, I further am sure that individual would understand that in order to turn a profit, there would have to be a SELF-IMPOSED salary cap; since the MLBPA adamantly refuses to accept one, every team's spending limits are, by definition, self-imposed. Accordingly, I ask again; do you expect the owners of the Twins, whether it be the Pohlads or some hypothetical other individual/group, to lose money by supporting a payroll beyond what the annual revenues of the team can support?

I'm honestly amazed you don't see the logical fallacy, even after I spelled it out. The article only measured bunt attempts, not successful bunts. As I said, if a player tried to bunt, but popped into an out, or rolled it foul three straight times, or sent it directly to the third baseman, preventing the runner from advancing, but then the next guy hits a homer, the article is counting that as a successful instance of bunting, even though by any definition, the but was a complete failure, and in no way contributed to success. Surely you can grasp that reality? It's like saying if a pitcher walks the bases loaded,but then strikes the next 3 guys out in one inning, but in the next gets two outs before giving up a solo homer, that loading the bases via walks to start an inning is a better run prevention strategy than getting outs to start the inning. Or if an analysis was done that showed NFL teams who run the ball for no gain on 1st and 10 pick up the first down more often than teams that try to pass on 1st and 10; if that were true, should every team attempt to run the ball for no gain on every 1st down? Absent the context of HOW the ghost runner scores, you cannot in any way say whether the bunt was actually beneficial

I love the self-imposed comment. Just for clarity's sake--do you expect the Pohlads to lose money on the team in any given year? Also, since you claim to know what they should be spending, are you saying that you either A) have a better handle on the Twins' finances than the owners, or B) that the Pohlads are now deliberately underspending in order to increase profit?

I'd say it makes sense to trade Pablo in order to open up payroll space, but what would have more impact (and be available for "only" $20Mish/year) than a starting pitcher with the ceiling of Game 1 caliber Ace? That said, if the Orioles wanted to trade us Gunnar Henderson, Grayson Rodriguez, and Jackson Holliday for Pablo, I'd drive from Seattle to Minneapolis to help Pablo pack, then give him a piggyback ride to MSP. Obviously that's a ridiculous example, but it serves the purpose of proving my point; any player, regardless of who they are, should always be on the block for the right offer.

Almost no chance the Twins get Flaherty. The Tigers can put the QO on him, meaning you have to give them something better than a high-30's draft pick next year.

If you're tied as the home team yes, otherwise no. And for what it's worth, the run expectancy for runner on second no outs is 1.068. For runner on third 1 out is 0.865. So a team that bunts with a runner on second and no outs will on average, not score that "all-important" first run. Other than that, care to expand at all on why you don't concur? I'd love to continue the discussion, and see if there's something I'm missing.

Not assuming at all, just saying that bunting actually decreases run expectancy (not as much as not advancing the runner while making an out, to be fair); the best case scenario of a bunt statistically speaking, barring the bunt becoming a base hit, is a reduced amount of run(s) scored. As for the research, I have some good news for you--you can resume unequivocally hating sac bunting, because the article you listed is riddled with issues, and nowhere near clear cut. To start, they're looking at only 138 total occurrences of bunting--that's an incredibly small sample size, and one that could skew quite quickly. Furthermore, while they're saying that in 80 out of those 138 instances the ghost runner scored (31 of 56 for road teams, 49 of 82 for home teams), they're not saying how the ghost runner scored. In their analysis, a hypothetical scenario where the leadoff man bunted foul 3 straight times, followed by the second hitter smashing a homer counts as a success for bunting, even though the bunt was not successful. Conversely, a scenario where the leadoff hitter laces a gapper, but the lead runner is thrown out at home because he stumbled and fell halfway between third and home counts as a failure for swinging away, even though the hitter had an XBH. The entire analysis falls prey to the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc (after it, therefore because of it). To actually determine if bunting is the correct strategy, an analysis would need to be done to determine how often the bunt directly contributed to the win. In my mind, that means that the only times you can definitively say bunting worked is if the ghost runner reaches third on a bunt, and then scores on a passed ball/wild pitch, a sac fly, a safety/suicide squeeze, or a shallow single. In almost every other alternative, the runner being on third v second is somewhat to completely irrelevant. Finally, the analysis completely ignores context. Even if none of the issues I described above were pertinent, perhaps the bunting works more regularly because it is only utilized when the leadoff hitter is proficient at bunting? If your leadoff hitter is a terrible bunter, it's probably not advisable to bunt, even if the stats actually suggest it is, on average, the appropriate decision. To sum up, the article linked is shot through with analytical missteps and illogical conclusions, and should not in any way be taken as a convincing argument in favor of bunting.

Fair point. Although I'm guessing the return on those 4 will be less than the return on any one of the top 4 guys I discussed. So if the Jays do want to compete in 2025, eating salary and paying the tax might be the right move, in order to get more ammo for trades in the offseason. Otherwise I agree, the Jays may as well trade all 4 of those guys, save a bunch of money, and run it back with some FA help next year

The problem here is that you're assuming not only that the attempt at small ball would have been successful if only it was attempted, but that it also makes scoring a run/runs more likely--that's an irresponsible assumption. Let's look at your two examples; When Castro flied out without advancing the runner, he cost the Twins about 0.4 expected runs (see the RE matrix in the article here). However, an XHB hit wins the game--that's immensely valuable. A single might win the game too with Martin on 2B, but with the potential cost of Martin being thrown out at home. Even if it's a single with Martin stopping at third, he's now profited the Twins about 0.8 expected runs. Alternatively, if Castro does lay down a successful bunt, or hits a grounder to the right side that is soft enough to allow Martin to get to third, assuming Castro is out at 1st, the expected runs goes from 1.068 to 0.865. Yes, you read that correctly--Castro moving he runner to third without also getting on base actually makes it less likely the Twins win. For the Margot example, it seems odd to criticize him when the Twins had an over 98% win probability entering his PA, especially because just like mentioned in the Castro example, a successful bunt again reduces the Twins expected runs. I'm not saying there's no place in the game for trying to move runners over, but it's probably a much better idea to actually try and score the run, rather than set it up for the next guy.

According to Spotrac, the Jays are almost $8.5M above the threshold, so moving Kikuchi doesn't fix that absent additional moves. Moving Guerrero and Bichette would do it, and Gausman and Bassitt would be more effective options as well. To sum up, to get out from under the tax, the Jays have to trade at least one of Guerrero/Bichette/Bassit/Gausman; if you're tradine one of the first 3, and therefore probably punting on 2025, you may as well trade all 3, which is beneficial because you can eat some salary on all of those deals to up the return. The idea here would be to commit one way or the other, and simply trading Kikuchi is not enough to get under the tax while still planning to compete in 2025. As such, if Kikuchi is the only guy they trade, may as well eat the salary and get a better prospect.

I’m curious how you reconcile the following facts about the 2024 offense. The Twins are 6th in MLB in runs, and 7th in homers. They are also 7th in batting average, and 9th in fewest strikeouts. Finally, they have gold glove caliber defenders at the two most important positions (other than catcher), and additional gold glove caliber defenders in right and at first. The only things you’re in the proximity of reality on is baserunning (inasmuch as SB count, where the Twins are 25th is a valid metric) and bunting, where the Twins are also 25th. That said, it should be noted the Royals, who lead the league in bunts, have a grand total of 18, so no one is constantly laying down bunts. I also don’t think bunting is a great philosophy for the offense described above.

This proposal does seem possible. From the Twins’ side, Kikuchi provides rotation depth through the rest of the season, and could theoretically be used as a lefty option and/or length option out of the bullpen in the playoffs. Most importantly, his salary this year is only $10M, meaning by the time the Twins trade for him, he should be owed less than $4M. Because of that, it shouldn’t take much to acquire him, and wouldn’t even be too hard to slightly up the prospect return to have the Jays eat all his salary. For the Jays, this is an obvious move in a year where they are not going to the playoffs, hence I will be shocked if Kikuchi is not moved. Good article Cody.

The you better pray that Royce Lewis decides to switch agents or keeps on getting hurt, because there's no way Scott Boras is letting him sign a Kepler/Polanco contract, and a healthy Lewis is signing a big FA deal after the 2028 season, a deal the Twins won't be likely to match. Lee won't be gone in 3-4, but he will in 5-6, with Miranda in 4-5. It also doesn't create development issues at all to have multiple MLB caliber prospects at a position, unless that position is DH/1B. If the first 2 picks this year move off short, they can go to third...or 2nd, or the OF. The odds that all of them develop at the same rate is also unlikely, so they'll probably be at multiple levels for awhile. Finally, people will inevitably get hurt, opening up playing time as well. If the Twins somehow have all 3 of these players capable of playing 3B in the majors within the next 3-4 years, that is a massive success, and a problem that 29 other organizations would love to have.

Again, having multiple MLB starter caliber prospects for a position is not a problem. You can trade them for what you do need very easily, and/or replace expensive players. You mention Lewis, Miranda, and Lee, but you should also understand that in 3-4 years Lewis is likely to be gone, with Miranda and Lee close behind. That is, unless the Twins get back to doing Kepler/Polanco style deals.

If the Twins’ first 3 picks from this draft all end up being starting caliber MLB players, this draft will be a rousing success. Too many quality prospects is a big problem said no one ever.

The only smaller problem than too many shortstops is too many pitchers. Surplus shortstops are easily tradeable for bats at any other position, and except maybe catcher.

The Twins spent 3 of their top 6 picks on pitchers last year, mere months after trading the reigning batting champ for a pitcher they subsequently extended at $20M+ per season.

The conversation here all seems to ignore one immensely pertinent fact; a trade being consummated is likely not up to Falvey, but to the Pohlads. A simple look at the Twins multi-year payroll shows they already have $117M committed for next year--only $11M below 2024. While that $117M does include options that will surely be declined ($12M on Margot, $6.25M on Farmer), that still leaves the Twins at about $99M BEFORE arb figures are determined for Jeffers, Kiriloff, Castro, Lewis, Larnach, Ober, Ryan, Topa, Okert, Stewart, Jax, and Duran. I can see the FO potentially non-tendering Kiriloff, Topa, and Okert, but that still leaves 9 players left to get raises. In 2024, those 9 players are making $10.3M; if you assume $2M raises for each of those guys, that means you're paying them $28.3M, pushing the payroll to identical to this year's number. It is clearly obvious that unless the Pohlads are willing to spend (which I doubt), Falvey will not be allowed to add payroll commitments without offloading salary. The only ways to do that currently are trading Vazquez (probably not happening without eating so much of his salary that it's not really worth it), Correa, Buxton, or Lopez; none of the latter 3 either will or should be traded. As such, the Twins only option is to acquire players in pre-arb status, and any player who moves the needle come playoff time who is also pre-arb will cost a king's ransom in prospects--the very prospects the Twins will need to remain competitive in 2025-2027, meaning any impact trade in 2024 is very likely closing the Twins window for 2026/2027, barring significant increases in spending. I for one don't think the current roster is worthy of essentially going all-in, and my guess is that come August, we will see that Falvine didn't think so either.