Parker Hageman

It’s January so, like most of the of the young and inexperienced pitchers, Fernando Romero’s future role with the Minnesota Twins is up in the air. What we do know is that with the signing of Martin Perez, the traditional starting rotation is currently full. There is the possibility that Romero emerges as a primary pitcher -- the guy who follows the opener. There’s also a chance he lands as a late-innings power arm. It could be in Minnesota. Or it could be in Rochester.The Twins acknowledged that Romero is currently a two-pitch pitcher. Technically, he has three types of fastballs (but two movement patterns), a promising slider, and a developing change-up but, functionally, he has a fastball and a slider. Because of this, the front office believes he is better served coming out of the bullpen (or at least in a role that limits his times through the order). Foundationally, Romero’s fastballs are solid for any pitching role. The mid-90s-plus 4-seam fastball can be elevated while his 2-seam and 1-seam fastballs burrow down-and-in to right-handed hitters. From a pitch sequencing standpoint, this is something to build upon. In the most basic sense, depending on the shape of a pitcher’s breaking pitch, when you have an elevated fastball, it would be best to have a curveball that can tunnel with it before descending out of the path. Likewise, if you have a running sinker, you would like to pair it more with a slider running the other direction, similar to how Kyle Gibson tunnels his. Ideally, a pitcher would have a variety of pitches moving in different directions to keep hitters defending the entire zone but a pair of complementary pitches can carve opponents up. After all, Glen Perkins had an impressive run as the Twins’ closer with a two-pitch repertoire. So what is the shape of Romero’s slider? The greasy techie data says that it is one that has 8.2 inches of break length from release to the plate, which is average from a right-handed pitcher, and a below average break angle of -2.9. The break angle essentially means which direction and how much the pitch is running. A break angle of 0 means the pitch follows a straight path from the release point to the target with no movement in any direction. If the break angle is positive, it means it is moving toward a right-handed hitter. Negative, toward a lefty. Romero’s -2.9 break angle means it has some movement toward left-handed hitters while the average right-hander’s slider has a break angle of -8.1. (To give a better picture of what break angle means, you can compare Fernando Romero’s -2.9 break angle slider with the new Yankee Adam Ottavino’s frisbee slider with a -21.5 break angle slider who is on the opposite end of the slider movement spectrum.) So that is the essence of his best secondary pitch. It’s thrown fairly hard (the average slider is thrown at 84 mph and his clocks in at 87), moves slightly away from right-handed hitters, and has about league-average break. Before coming to the big club, Paul Molitor described Romero’s slider as “inconsistent”, which is exactly how it played for the Twins. On occasion, Romero would spin a nasty hoochie woochie but on others, it would back up and sit on a platter for a lucky batter. While Romero’s 36 percent miss rate on the slider is above average (and actually higher than that of the oft-celebrated Ottavino), opponents posted a .723 OPS and an 88 mph exit velocity (higher than the MLB slider average of 85.8 mph) off of it. It is a small sampling, to be sure, but one can look at these numbers as an affirmation of what Molitor suggested. One reason for the middling production was simply location. If you divided the zone in half across the middle, separating upper and lower quadrants, his slider landed in the upper quadrant 40.1 percent of the time (significantly higher than the 25 percent league average). The good news is that hitters did not completely decimate sliders left up - but they didn’t swing through them either (just a 5% swinging strike rate up compared to a 25% one when he kept it down). Download attachment: fernando romero.png The location cost him some strikeouts, leaving the ball spinning up in two-strike counts where an otherwise well-executed slider would have been a kill shot. Download attachment: trumedia_baseball_heatmap (7).png In terms of sequencing, Romero’s slider has actually played well off of the 4-seam fastball, enticing a miss rate of 40 percent and a 39 percent chase rate out of the zone in a fastball-slider pairing. On the other hand, opponents may be able to tell the difference between his slider and sinker as they have a 33 percent miss rate and just a 15 percent chase rate on his slider after being set up by his sinker. If Romero does nothing to tweak his slider heading into the 2019 season, at the very least he should be pairing it more frequently off his fastball. Here is where the new-look, data savvy, tech-reliant Twins organization might be able to optimize Fernando Romero’s stuff. It would seem that Romero is a prime candidate to receive the pitch design treatment — a retooling of his pitches guided by Rapsodo technology and high-speed Edgertronic cameras. Championed by Driveline Baseball, the baseball training company has found some best practices that can identify issues and improve a pitch’s performance based on certain modifications. Before pitch design technology became available, the previous best method to improve this was to have a pitching coach observe bullpens, giving the pitcher cues and provide affirmation when the ball seems to react differently. Then they hope that a player carries whatever feel they had during the pen into the game. Between the diagnostic process and communicating what the problem and solution might be, there could be a long trial-and-error period. Now, however, armed with the new tools, a pitcher and the player development team can isolate the issue, diagnose it and set forth a plan to correct it. The first issue for Romero is consistency, which seems to track back to the moment the pitch leaves his hand. When he releases the slider, it may be that he is letting go too early or with different hand tilts. As researchers at Driveline have demonstrated, even the smallest minutiae such as fingertip contact points can wildly change the spin and flight path. Admittedly, without the high-speed cameras, it is difficult to properly diagnose the issue but from the limited slow-motion release clips, we can see where Romero’s slider needs work. Here is an example of how the slider comes out of Romero’s hand. Romero’s thumb is tucked and his fingers are wrapped around the bottom of the baseball. At this juncture, the thumb is making very minimal contact while his index and middle fingertips are applying pressure. Then he snaps across. On average, he imparts 2,431 rpm worth of spin on his slider, which is about the league average spin rate for right-handed sliders (2,413). Now compare that to Justin Verlander’s slider grip and release (image courtesy of Pitching Ninja) -- the one that Verlander reportedly improved upon while using the Astros’ bevy of Edgertronic cameras to isolate his release point. Notice how his fingers wrap the side with more contact points on his fingers. His release motion also comes down diagonally through the ball. The results were two more inches of run than Romero’s slider as well as 200 more rpms of spin (2,684 average). The added rpms is important because each increase of 100 or more translates into more swing and misses. Of course, not everyone has the same release or arm path. Verlander’s 6-5 frame and over-the-top delivery might preclude Romero from copying his style. Romero’s slider release almost mimics that of Marcus Stroman, whose pitch was the basis for Trevor Bauer’s recent slider rebuild (which is now superb). This may be a template for Romero to unleash hell on an improved pitch. Like Verlander’s, Stroman’s slider grip is held deeper in the hand, which can account for more spin. Stroman’s release has his hand placement similar to Romero’s (underneath rather than like Verlander’s wrapping the side) but unlike Romero’s, Stroman has more contact with the baseball, most noticeably with his thumb (Stroman’s is flush whereas Romero’s makes contact on the side of his). The action differs slightly too as Romero pulls across while Stroman’s hand pulls down. To be fair, Romero’s slider numbers actually outperformed Stroman’s in 2018, with a higher swinging strike percentage, but Stroman’s numbers took a step back on the pitch this last season where he had previously had a swinging strike rate of 21 percent and a chase rate of 41 percent (with 17 and 33 being league average on the pitch). That said, Stroman’s metrics exceed those of Romero, with a 12-inch break and a 2,654 rpm spin rate. If Romero can emulate this pitch consistently, it will give him a significantly improved weapon and be a cornerstone swing-and-miss pitch vital for late innings relief. At the very least, tweaking his slider to give it more consistent depth and tilt could help create a monster in the bullpen. What’s more, if he reinvents his slider and maintains the more cutter-ish version, he might have the necessary three-pitch mix to be a force in the rotation. The Twins have built a player development infrastructure -- both the best tech and the best minds — to address this very issue. Now we will get to see it in action. Exciting times. Click here to view the article

The reason he threw his sinker so much last year was because all of his secondary pitches were obliterated. https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1086769996557103105 The biggest difference between comparing him to the Anibal Sanchez signing is that Sanchez came equipped with a plus-pitch (his changeup) whereas Perez does not have anything of that quality to build off of. As you can see above, he got hammered in pitchers counts and he typically went with his fastball/sinker in those situations (63%) which is typically a distribution reserved for guys with plus velocity. It seemed that Perez lost confidence in any other pitch. The changeup and sinker pair well off each other but they both are thrown in the same zone -- down/away. This means hitters can put a fastball swing on a pitch in that zone, trying to catch it deep, and also be on time for a changeup. When you look at the batted ball numbers, right-handed hitters had a very high percentage of hits to right field and center because of this. (For lefties, the effect was reversed with a high percentage of their hits going to the pull side.) His 4-seam fastball he would occasionally use to go in as well as the occasional slider but, for the most part, righties could sit on location and spit on things on the inner-half. After all, he rarely threw his slider in the zone so there was little reason to chase and hitters did not fish often. But, in theory, the slider would pair better with a 2-seamer. Being able to throw it in the zone more frequently against right-handers would give him another weapon to keep them honest. He could also potentially add a cutter as another glove-side pitch. I'm confident we're going to see some tweaks this spring. I don't know if it will make him significantly better simply because doesn't have that plus-pitch foundation, but it could push the needle in the right direction.

Just to be clear, the game is littered with pitchers who fall within this range. Corbin and Keuchel are outliers. It doesn't mean that Gonsalves can't follow suit, it just means that the odds are steeper. There are two things that seem to be the separator between Gonsalves and Corbin/Keuchel. The first is fastball location. As you can see, both Keuchel and Corbin work lower in the zone with two-seamers. Gonsalves has used just a four-seamer and locates it up and over the plate. The difference between a left-handed fastball down (9-spot) and a fastball middle-away (6-spot, where Gonsalves locates) to right handed hitter is notable. The exit velocity on the lower spot is 90.3 MPH in 2018. It was 93.5 MPH in the 6-spot. The second issue is how the pitchers pair their pitches (alliteration, ftw). Wes Johnson talked about how he starts with a pitcher's secondary stuff and crafts the fastball off of that. Pitchers with sliders should tend to throw two-seamers while pitchers with curveballs should pair it with four-seamers. Obviously breaking balls can be liquid (a slider might acts as a curveball and vice versa) so spin direction matters. Gonsalves has thrown what is classified as a slider more often than his curveball. In that regard, it is possible that he would be better served throwing a two-seamer or, maybe easier, throwing his curveball more often than his slider, which would play the four-seamer up more. Both Corbin and Keuchel throw both types of fastballs and have curveballs (or a cutter in Keuchel's case) to go with their sliders but both are predominately sinker/slider types. It will be interesting to see if Gonsalves tweaks his arsenal this year.

The Minnesota Twins’ 2018-2019 offseason had been fairly mundane as far as player acquisition goes. Sure, they said goodbye to Joe Mauer. Hired a shiny new manager. Landed a reclamation project for second base. All well and good. However the Twins had not made a maneuver to inspire the fan base, not sending any kind of signal that they cared about improving more than incrementally in 2019. On Thursday, they finally gave fans something to talk about by signing 38-year-old Nelson Cruz.Cruz’s ability to put the sweetest spot of the bat on the ripest part of the ball over the last several seasons has been near baby-making quality. According to StatCast, over the last four seasons he has ranked 8th-4th-8th-and-11th in Barrels per Plate Appearance. What’s more, when you limit the pool to players who have had 400 or more batted ball events during the season, Cruz’s rankings shift to 4th-3rd-3rd-and-4th. It is surprising to see teams forgo the opportunity to sign a player to a one-year deal (plus options) who has demonstrated this level of power consistency but somehow the Twins have coaxed Cruz into doing so. With the lumber he has been amazingly consistent, even at his advanced baseball age. Consider this: Over the last four years, the only person to barrel more pitches than Cruz’s 247 is Boston’s JD Martinez with 251. The barrel statistic is important because a vast majority of those batted ball types become extra base hits. And the MLBAM’s smart guys have conducted research that shows that barrels per plate appearances is a skill that profiles similar to a walk rate or strikeout rate year-over-year. In short, unless injuries or age foil, expect more of the same laser show from Cruz in Minnesota. That being said, 2018 was not Cruz’s best season, statistically speaking. There is no questioning his power -- 37 dingers is impressive -- yet there seems to be some signs of erosion. For instance, he posted his lowest batting average since 2007. Part of the reason may be facing the shift more. In 2018 defenses shifted him in 19.3% of his plate appearances -- a huge leap from 2017 when he saw shifts in 7.3% of the time. Whether it was the presence of the additional fielder on the left side of second base or pure coincidence, Cruz went 22-for-103 (.214) when confronted by the shift in 2018. Those kinds of results can inspire copycats. Another interesting statistic is that Cruz’s performance against the hard stuff (fastballs, sinkers and cutters) declined in 2018. Download attachment: Cruz.PNG On the surface, this drop can be worrisome. After all, reaction time vanishing with age is a real concern. It is perhaps one reason why Cruz’s market was reduced to just two teams (with the Rays reportedly never giving him a formal offer). When you look deeper however Cruz’s deteriorated performance against the fastball family appears to be less of a function of age and more of a level of luck. In 2018 Cruz hit more of his balls in the air in the left-center to right-center gaps rather than straight down the left field line. He isn’t a prototypical dead-red extreme pull hitter in the mold of say Brian Dozier or Josh Willingham who used Target Field’s inviting left field to their natural advantage. He pulled the ball in the air just 30% of the time this past season, below the league average. With balls hit in the middle of the park, it means some hard hit ones stayed in play (both Safeco and Target Field are two of the most difficult venues for right-handed hitters to hit home runs in the right-center gap). Combine that with more efficient defensive positioning and those hard hit balls became outs. Nevertheless, if you synthesize Cruz’s batted ball profile through the Statcast machine, it shows that Cruz’s actual .264 average and .542 slugging versus hard stuff could have been closer to a .302 average and a .622 slugging percentage. That’s potential upside. As we have seen, the baseball landscape has been changing, enriched with increased velocity and a newfound dedication to high spin fastballs up in the zone. Teams have changed their approach to hitters who normally would mash stuff at the bottom of the strike zone. One such low-ball masher was Nelson Cruz. From 2015 through 2017 Cruz hit 50 home runs on fastballs in the lower half of the zone while posting a monstrous .330/.406/.603 line -- 18th highest slugging percentage among qualified hitters in that time. (Miguel Sano, he wrote foreshadowingly, was 9th on that list.) In that period, the game began to shift. In 2015 the Boston Red Sox pitching staff threw their fastballs 30% of the time at the top of the zone. Baseball was paced by the Nationals’ pitching staff at 35%. In that time the FLY BALL REVOLUTION happened. Blood was shed. Balls were murdered. Families were fractured. Hitters had cultivated swings that acted like a ferris wheel, lifting balls from the bottom of the zone and launching them into orbit with total disregard for human life. Dissatisfied with being a constant punching bag, pitching analysts started to see the value in aiming higher. In time, teams started to replace fastballs with breaking balls and hitting the top of the zone with heaters. This past season, the Boston Red Sox led baseball in upper zone presence with a 45% rate. They would ride this strategy to the World Series. Cruz’s production inverted as opponents starting elevating their fastballs. After punishing the low hard stuff the previous three seasons, he posted a 238/353/390 line on fastballs down in the zone in 2018. Meanwhile he attacked fastballs up. He swung more frequently at heaters at the top of the zone and he made more and better contact. From 2015 to 2017 he connected with just 59% of fastballs in the upper third. In 2018 that number was 70%. Previously he struck out on 31% of fastballs up although he pared that down to 19% in 2018. In that three year window overall he managed to hit .210/.390/.425 with 14 home runs on fastballs up. This past year he hit .261/.455/.693 with 12 home runs. Cruz used to hit long fly balls on pitches down in the zone but that has morphed into a bit of a dead zone for him now as pitches left up in the zone are the ones he has been sending into the stratosphere. Download attachment: cruz fb.png It may be a coincidence but given Cruz's track record for preparation, it would make sense that he is parrying along with the attack. An old dog learning a new tricks. A late stage reinvention. If nothing else, Cruz is one weapon in the lineup that won’t be stymied by the growing trend of high fastballs. Beyond that, with his reputation for mentoring others, it would seem that Cruz might be the perfect acquisition to guide other teammates into making the same adjustment. Which brings us back to the Twins. The Minnesota Twins’ offense has been near the bottom of the league when facing high heat. In 2018, they held a team OPS of .673 against fastballs -- 23rd in the MLB. At the top of the list? Boston (828 OPS) and their advanced analytical approach. The Houston Astros had the second highest OPS against fastballs up (.815 OPS) which is not surprising when you consider the level of preparation their team does before the games. Elite teams address weaknesses. There is no denying that Miguel Sano was a mess last year, requiring a trip all the way down to Fort Myers to attempt to reboot. Teams know there are two surefire ways to get Sano out. The first is the slider over the left-handed batters box that he will chase until his last breath. The other is the elevated fastball. Admittedly, Sano was flummoxed by all fastballs regardless of their location in 2018 but, historically, he hasn’t figured out how to deal with the high heat. Sano’s swing is the standard ferris wheel -- down and back up -- which is very potent but can leave hitters susceptible to pitches up. To his credit, he tried to combat the issue by laying off more. Whereas Cruz swung at nearly half of those fastballs, Sano cut down to 32%. If you can’t beat ‘em, layoff ‘em is a viable short-term solution. Still, with the game trending toward more fastballs up, there is opportunity there. And Sano isn’t alone in the lineup. While Cruz led baseball with the highest exit velocity on fastballs up at 97.5, Jorge Polanco had the lowest at 76.6. Not far from him at the bottom was Cruz’s former teammate Jonathan Schoop at 79.4. Max Kepler has hit just .149 vs fastballs up. If Cruz has indeed unlocked a secret to success in the evolving game, the entire Twins lineup could stand to benefit from his knowledge. This is one element of the game that Cruz’s proficiency at could prove useful to the Twins. Additionally, his reputation as someone who puts in work away from the field could be influential to the younger players. When the Houston Astros added Carlos Beltran in 2017, his ability to help the younger roster understand the game better was lauded as one of the reasons the organization was able to win the World Series. Veteran leadership can be a very important intangible. All said, a one-year deal with options that favors the Twins is a seemingly no-lose situation. Click here to view the article

One more time for the people in the back...

Couple things: 1. "Hands adjustment" is an oversimplification of what happened; it's more of an adjustment that has led to better synchronization of upper/lower half (timing). https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1067148289936683008 He has demonstrated a better "stretch" at the launch position (front side and the back side are pulling in opposite directions before firing forward) where his weight/hands are now back instead of drifting forward at the ball at front foot strike. This was something that plagued him with the Angels over the years. In his early days, he was given limited playing time and then struggled for prolonged stretches. He'd change his stance in a variety of ways over the years in efforts to find it. In 2015 he displayed an open stance with a leg kick. In 2017, after being sent to the minors to refine his swing, he came back with this hands over his head stance. In regards to the hands adjustment, he's lowered them and kept them closer to his launch spot (rather than having to move them in sync with the pitcher). He can now just go straight back stretching instead of lowering them and then bringing them to that same spot. (This is something that helped Jorge Polanco out in 2017.) This isn't necessarily something all hitters need to do but if they are ones that get out of rhythm, it might be best to shave that distance off. In short, Cron was a bit of a mess until last year. Part of it might be the swing refinement and part of it could be consistent playing time (without the fear of being demoted in LA). 2. Barrel rates more or less explain the amount of power potential a hitter has – not necessarily the overall hitter. Additionally, if a hitter doesn’t make a ton of contact then there overall numbers are going to be different. When you look at that top list, you can see who has some of the most raw power potential when making contact. But Barrels have been found by the StatCast guys are being significantly important to future production. I was working on an article regarding Austin and Cave’s potential and had a correspondence with MLB’s Mike Petriello. He directed me to research by TangoTom which found that Barrels correlate to future wOBA figures similarly to BB or K rates. More or less, this is a skill that can be consistent year-over-year but it sounds like there needs to be 250+ batted ball events before considering it sustainable (which may be flukier for Austin and Cave). Barrels are important because over 75% of those become hits (and extra base hits) so the more BRLs/PA you have, the better your numbers (at least BABIP) should be. The rub is, the remainder of a hitter's profile, particularly in regards to making contact. 3. One of the bigger differences between Morrison and Cron is that as a right-handed hitter, Cron is not going to see the same level of defensive shifts Morrison would. Morrison saw shifts 75% of his plate appearances while Cron had a shift just 14.5% of his. As the league continues to increase the amount of shifts, Morrison's pull side open space will be squeezed out to nothing while Cron should still have ample opportunity to find vacancy. 4. I would have rather have had Josh Donaldson.

I don't know what it's going to take for Addison Reed to turn things around in 2019. Before this year, he was one of the more healthy pitchers in the game. But he's always had funky mechanics and in stop after stop, there are stories of pitching coaches cleaning this up or that up. In Arizona, the pitching coach tandem of Mike Harkey and Mel Stottlemeyer had him make two mechanical adjustments. Then when he went to New York, he supposedly had worked with the Mets' pitching coach Dan Werthen, the slider guru, and straightened more things out. Heading into 2016, his arm slot changed and he began releasing the ball at a higher point. He had one of his best seasons in 2016 and followed up with a good 2017 campaign. In addition to his velocity, his arm slot dipped as well in 2018 with the Twins. This probably should have been a red flag to someone in the organization. Take a look at Reed's mechanics from the home plate view: https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/982256551015497736 In listening to a lot of Wes Johnson's pitching presentation from Pitch-A-Palooza and reading his interviews, the thing that seems consistent is that he is big on maintaining kinetic energy going down hill and toward the plate. Reed's wrapping likely hinders some of that which may play a role in his arm ailments and the decline in velocity. Johnson has also been emphatic that pitchers have different styles of maximizing their intent (he used Greg Maddux and Bob Gibson as examples) so it's difficult to say if he will do much with that portion of his delivery. To Nick's point, I could see Johnson and Jeremy Hefner getting in Reed's ear about refining some parts of his delivery and working on getting that arm slot back up (if it is not injury related). Then again, Reed has been influenced by different pitching coaches on an almost annual basis. I'm not certain new voices, no matter how good, will be a factor. Wes Johnson says he models himself after Houston's Brent Strom and Cincinnati's (formerly Milwaukee's) Derek Johnson who are both renown communicators of the analytic side of the game so it's entirely possible that the delivery of the message will be better coming from someone like Johnson versus Werthan or Harkey or Carl Willis in Boston or Don Cooper in Chicago. What makes Johnson so much different as a pitching coach for the Twins is that he is staunch support of implementing more throwing into a pitcher's program including weighted balls and long toss. In 2017 I had a conversation with then pitching coach Neil Allen about Kyle Gibson's new weighted ball routine that he developed at the Florida Baseball Ranch. Allen was somewhat dismissive above the practice. In the recent past, there have been other coaches in the organization that discouraged weighted ball training and long toss. Johnson will be very much a voice to push the org in a different direction in regards to training. That will likely be beneficial to Reed and others.

They already did that when they hired Pete Maki away from Duke.

This was also discussed in the full story -- with quotes from Mike Radcliff on the subject. Go ahead. Download it here. It's free! https://www.e-junkie.com/ecom/gb.php?&c=cart&ejc=2&cl=76672&i=1597641&amount=10 Come back and let me know what you think.

I swear if you download the ebook, I address this.

What follows is an excerpt from a feature for the 2019 Offseason Handbook, which you can order here on a name-your-price basis and receive it right away. Contrary to popular belief, the Minnesota Twins did not create The Opener as a way to make Bert Blyleven and Jack Morris’s heads explode on the air. No, this unconventional approach was devised for one simple reason: to get 27 outs. More specifically, it was devised to get 27 outs while avoiding all those pesky runs that can happen between recorded outs.Statistically speaking, starting pitchers deteriorate over the course of a game. Perhaps due to familiarity or simply having their stuff wear down in the later innings, the advantage swings drastically to the hitter his third time facing a pitcher. From 2013 to 2017, the first time facing a pitcher, hitters posted a .249/.310/.396 (.706 OPS) batting line. That means every hitter the first time through is like Oakland’s Marcus Siemen, who posted a .706 OPS in 2018. By the third time facing a pitcher, however, hitters posted a .271/.333/.443 (.776 OPS), which means now everyone is Houston’s All-Star George Springer. Teams can combat that by swapping out the starter for a reliever, thus avoiding the dreaded third time through. After all, batters have hit .243/.317/.384 (.700 OPS) against relievers the first time facing them (hello, Cincinnati’s Tucker Barnhart). Using the opener also has the secondary purpose of protecting the primary pitcher — the pitcher who follows the opener — from a lineup’s top of the order, where most of the best hitters reside. With an opener in place, if a team does opt to allow the primary pitcher to go through a third time, chances are they're avoiding the top and middle parts of the order in that go round. In short, The Opener strategy: (1) limits a starter’s exposure to a third time through the order, (2) protects them against facing the team’s better hitters more than once, and (3) allows a manager to align a relief pitcher whose strengths better neutralize a lineup's top three hitters. “Can’t deny the logic,” Twins director of player personnel Mike Radcliff says regarding the strategy. Baseball is a boat race to 27 outs and, on paper, the opener concept could yield favorable results. While the Tampa Bay Rays were first to deploy the strategy, the Twins say they weren’t copycats. In fact, the discussion dates back to last offseason in Fort Myers. And it is likely no coincidence that one key figure in this discussion used to be employed by the Rays. Josh Kalk’s reputation for maximizing pitching results looms large within the game. In the early PitchF/X era, Kalk was a renowned data wizard, dissecting arms, arsenals and strategies, then posting his findings publicly at The Hardball Times. The forward-thinking, budget-ballin’ Rays scooped him up. Kalk’s work has become so highly respected that reportedly 10 teams were vying for his services last winter when he left the Rays organization. The Twins were geeked when they landed him. “He’s clearly an impact guy,” Falvey said of the Kalk hiring. “We had him down at our org meetings, meeting with our pitching coaches and staff. We feel like that's an area he has a certain level of expertise.” It was at those org meetings at the Fort Myers facilities — one dubbed the pitching summit — where the discussion of using a pitcher as a one-inning opener first began, according to Radcliff. At the core of the meetings, per Falvey, was answering the question: How do we get our young pitchers better. “We were wide-open to everything and anything,” Radcliff said of the organization. “We went in with the mindset that we are not afraid to try anything.” Among contributors in the room were guys like Kalk sitting next to former players like LaTroy Hawkins and Bob McClure, new major-league pitching coach Garvin Alston, and minor-league pitching guys like Pete Maki and JP Martinez. Different eras and different viewpoints were represented. The idea of the opener concept was floated, discussed, debated, argued and vetted. It seemed almost too simple — you protect your young pitchers by limiting their exposure as well as controlling the inning allotment. Minimize the risk and maximize the reward. Not all of the ideas shared were unanimously embraced and the use of the opener strategy was one. In general, the difference of opinions during the summit did not faze Falvey. In reflecting on it, he viewed what transpired as healthy. “We're never going to agree completely,” he said. “If we do, that just means we are saying yes to one idea. If we can disagree and actually, genuinely, talk about different perspectives, we've got a chance to make up ground and be better.” Ultimately the parties walked out of the room with an organizational pitching development strategy going forward, and the idea of the opener was back-pocketed. It wouldn’t take long to see the strategy in action. On May 19th the Rays started closer Sergio Romo, allowing him to get the first three outs in front of their primary pitcher, Ryan Yarbrough. Tampa would use the strategy a total of 55 times in 2018. The results were decent enough for the Rays and their young pitchers — especially Yarbrough. Tampa would win 90 games and the 26-year-old rookie would finish the year 16-6, throwing over 140 innings despite making just six traditional starts. In either capacity — starting or primarying — Yarbrough faced the same hitter thrice on a given day just 83 times, one of the lowest totals of anyone who amassed 100 innings in 2018. The Twins watched from afar as the Rays paired their young pitchers with one-inning openers. Unlike the Rays, the Twins were giving starts to veteran pitchers, such as Lance Lynn, Jake Odorizzi, Kyle Gibson, Jose Berrios and a little Phil Hughes while waiting for Ervin Santana to heal. But injuries and ineffectiveness exposed cracks in that facade. *** Want to read the rest of this story, and 70 pages of in-depth analysis of the offseason that’s about to get underway? Claim your copy of the 2019 Offseason Handbook, at a price of your choosing, and you’ll receive it right away. Click here to view the article

Yes and no. I'm saying he's capable of doing more.

While I can see your overall point but this is a bit of a flawed evaluation exercise. If we just look at 2015-2016, when Forsythe was swinging with more intent, those categories shift slightly. Months with 1.000+ OPS: 1 .900 - 1.000 OPS: 1 .800 - .900 OPS: 4 .700 - .800 OPS: 3 .600 - .700 OPS: 1 Under .600 OPS: 2 (and one of those months includes just 7 games) That's a valuable player. It's certainly bottom heavy when you factor in the last two years (this year especially) and changing his swing. This year he's had shoulder issues and hasn't played regularly -- which has to play a role. Personally, I think his current month's OPS is overrated (there's a high amount of BABIP gods smiling down on him) but, going forward, if someone can get in his ear about returning to his previous swing then you might have something. He's going to be very affordable and has potential to post 2015-2016 type numbers. Frankly, I don't think he can do it at Target Field (the right field configuration makes it difficult of opposite field home runs) but he's got rebound potential.

Logan Forsythe’s 19-game run with the Minnesota Twins has been fairly remarkable. In the time since he came over from the Dodgers in the Brian Dozier trade, Forsythe has led the team in batting average (.377) and on-base percentage (.434). Yes, a little over two weeks is the poster child for small sample size enthusiasts and having half of your hits come on ground balls isn’t exactly a roadmap for sustainability, yet Forsythe has looked good considering he was flotsam in LA. While the hits have been nice, it’s a far cry from his days with the Tampa Bay Rays where he was hitting double-digit dingers.If there is one thing you should remember from this article it is that Logan Forsythe rarely swings the bat. Over the last two seasons, Joe Mauer offered at 36 percent of pitches thrown his direction. The only person who swung less than that was Logan Forsythe. He deemed just 34 percent of pitches worthy of his lumber. So when a rare event like a Logan Forsythe swing transpired, you would want results that were worthy of the wait. He is sort of the infield version of Robbie Grossman -- likes to gamble that the pitcher can’t throw two consecutive strikes when down in the count. The Dodgers, however, were not fans of this passive approach of letting very hittable pitches scurry by. If there is a second thing you should remember from this article it is that Logan Forsythe did hit a healthy number of home runs, once upon a time. In 2015, Forsythe hit 17 home runs with the Rays. He followed that up with another 20 in 2016. His play was enticing enough that, when the Twins balked at trading Dozier in 2017, the Dodgers flipped a solid pitching prospect for Forsythe instead. However, upon his arrival to Los Angeles, he stopped hitting for power. There were various ailments cited -- a toe injury in April 2017 and a shoulder injury in April 2018 -- that zapped some of his power potential and limited his time on the field. While those are all factors for the power outage, there is also a component of his swing that changed significantly between 2016 and now. Watch the clip of his swing in 2016 (right) compared to 2018 (left): Download attachment: FSFrameGIFImage (4).GIF Both swings are against 93 MPH fastballs away from left-handed pitchers, thrown in plus-counts when a hitter should be hunting. For the most part the swings are similar but Forsythe has toned down his pre-launch bat movement since 2016. Download attachment: FSFrameGIFImage.GIF The added movement before the launch equated to more bat speed. It's simple: less bat speed, less exit velocity. For whatever reason -- a coach’s instruction, a tip from a player, his own development and feel, etc -- Forsythe has removed this element of his swing. In doing so, his average exit velocity has dropped, his average launch angle has decreased, and his ability to drive the ball to right field for power has declined as well (he hit 10 home runs to right in 2015-2016 and has zero since). There is a lot to like about Forsythe’s ability to get the barrel to the ball. He’s a barrel turner (as opposed to someone who hacks down). Watch as his hands turn the barrel rearward before rotating forward to contact. This gets the barrel on plane longer and allows for him to stay back longer instead of drifting toward the pitcher. Download attachment: FSFrameGIFImage (1).GIF The other thing to appreciate is that Forsythe actually has a two-strike approach -- something that isn’t always shared by his contemporaries. In two-strike situations Forsythe tones down, eliminating the leg kick and long distance hand load, to try to wait as long as possible and adjust on off-speed pitches: Download attachment: FSFrameGIFImage (3).GIF Forsythe rarely chases breaking balls out of the zone. According to ESPN/TruMedia’s data, since 2017 he’s reached on just 14.3 percent of breaking balls outside of the zone whereas the average hitter has done so on just over 30 percent. For comparison’s sake, Joe Mauer has even chased after 23 percent of breaking balls in that time. Forsythe will swing through some (8 percent, same as Mauer) and the results aren’t great when he does make contact (a .588 OPS vs .657 MLB average) but with baseball’s increasing reliance on nasty breaking balls, being able to wait back and keep from chasing after those pitches is rare skill set. Since coming over to the Twins, Forsythe has been some sort of bizarro Shannon Stewart and has been a spark plug for the offense. The offense, of course, isn’t going anywhere except home in October but Forsythe’s play has at least kept the team from improving its draft position. This isn’t meant to read as a sales pitch to the Twins to try to retain Logan Forsythe. A week ago, Seth Stohs asked “What To Do With Logan Forsythe” and the prevailing sentiment seemed to be “drive him to the airport”. When he was acquired, it was accepted that Forsythe was a placeholder until the end of the year. That should probably stay, but night after night he’s piled on the hits and has given the front office, at the very least, a mild case of the considerations. Truthfully, this is probably more of a sales pitch for contending teams interested in an additional bench bat or utility player. If someone is willing to surrender a prospect or project to have a high-contact right-handed bat on the bench for the playoffs (there’s got to be a team interested in a player who can put the ball in play in a pinch) the Twins should absolutely move him. What’s more, Forsythe would also come with untapped power potential if someone could convince him to rekindle his 2016 swing. If there is a third thing you should remember from this article it is that it ended. Click here to view the article

One thing that I saw was how he would hold his change-up grip versus his other pitch grips in his set position. It is probably more pronounced from the back angle than from the batter's box (the team likely has video from that angle to confirm it) but the wrist rests slightly different in his glove and may tip a hitter. Given he uses his changeup the most outside of his fastball, it could be something to consider. https://twitter.com/ParkerHageman/status/1031717881535447040

It should be noted that most pitcher's velocities tend to have a bell curve throughout the season. Unless there is a drastic decline, there will usually be some decline in the back half of the season.

I don't think it is quite as easy as ARod says. It takes some familiarity. You face a pitcher a couple times, you learn a bit of his tendencies and someone tips you off on a player's tell and you now have something to look for. If you are sitting change-up and he gives you a quick confirmation of that, that's an advantage. Not every player is going to see it and not every hit means that player saw something.

That's a good question. You'd think there could be some data that would help avoid situations like this. But if you do look at the data, it would also say you were successful with that pattern. The other interesting thing is how much better Hildenberger has been with Wilson (572 OPS in 71 PAs) over Garver (914 OPS in 120 PAs). It could all just be noise or small sample size but it would be interesting to breakdown their pitch selection.

Yeah, the rub is you have to be able to hit it. Shawn Green wrote an excellent book -- The Way of Baseball -- which details his experience uncovering some of the game's best pitchers during his era and their tells. Names like Maddux, Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling make the list. He also talks about Brad Radke's notorious glove flare on a changeup tell. Knowing what is coming might give the hitter a slight advantage, it usually takes a combination of pattern, tip-off and ability to hit that pitch.

Following the trade of Fernando Rodney, the role of closer has been undecided but Trevor Hildenberger seemed as good of a replacement as any for a team that was clearly focused on the future. There was adequate enough reason to give Hildenberger a chance to convert saves. For starters he had performed well in the first-half of the season, striking out about a batter per inning and allowing just five home runs over 43 appearances. He also had the longest name of any member of the Twins’ bullpen. That had to account for something. Even before Hildenberger was asked to save games his performance had started to get shaky. Hitters who had once flailed at fading changeups and frisbee sliders were beginning to square them up. The regularity of which his secondary offerings were pasted around the field even incited the Twins to walk out the dreaded t-word: Tipping.According to the Pioneer Press’s Mike Berardino, manager Paul Molitor said that the team’s video scouts were scouring through tape to find any signs of tipping from Hildenberger, but Molitor felt that there wasn’t any signs of tipping. If that is the case how is it that opponents have gone from hitting .120 with nine extra base hits on his changeup and slider from the beginning of the year until July 15 to hitting .454 with eight extra base hits since July 15? The first element of Hildenberger’s second-half issues is predictability. There were patterns that started to emerge from early in the season that may have influenced the results in the latter portion. In his appearances against the Rays in Tampa, Hildenberger didn’t allow a hit off his secondary stuff. In the recent series in Minnesota, the Rays were 4-for-4. Joey Wendle was one of the Rays hitters to reach against his changeup. In the first two matchups in Tampa, Hildenberger struck Wendle out but he may have left a bread crumb for the left-handed hitter: In both meetings, Hildenberger threw a 1-1 changeup to him. At Target Field, facing yet another 1-1 count Wendle sat on Hildenberger’s changeup and laced it into center field for another hit. Another example was his battles with the Royals’ Whit Merrifield. From May 28 until July 21, Hildenberger faced Merrifield four times. In each occasion, Hildenberger started Merrifield off with a slider. The fourth time around Merrifield swung at the slider and knocked a single. In two ABs since that hit, Hildenberger has started him off with sinkers. But while the Royals and Rays did a number on Hildenberger, it has been the Cleveland Indians who have inflicted the most damage. Prior to the rough stretch, Hildenberger made three appearances against the Indians. During those appearances, he held the Indians hitless against his secondary pitches (0-for-5 with 2 strikeouts). Since July 15 Hildenberger has made four additional appearances against Cleveland and has had the same lineup trash his secondary stuff (6-for-12, 2 HR) -- including Francisco Lindor’s game-winning walk-off home run on August 8. What led up to Lindor’s game-winning tank shot? Leading into that August 8th match-up, Hildenberger had faced Lindor five times in 2018. In three of those occasions he started Lindor off with a changeup. If you are Lindor, chances are you can sit on the changeup and take a Daddy Hack. Hildenberger faced Jason Kipnis twice this year. Once at the beginning of the year where he started him with a sinker then two changeups in a row. In their second meeting -- an at-bat that preceded Lindor’s home run by two hitters -- Hildenberger once again started him with a fastball and then threw two changeups -- the second of which Kipnis lifted into left field for a base hit. The second element that may be behind Hildenberger’s struggles is a combination of the predictability and, yes, some pitch-tipping. According to Berardino’s article, Molitor appeared fairly confident that Hildenberger was not doing anything explicit to tip his pitches (flaring his glove or slowing his delivery to telegraph a particular pitch). And that may be true. But before we outright dismiss it, let’s consider there does seem to be a window in which Hildenberger could be tipping his hand. When Hildenberger breaks his hands, he does so away from his body. While he contorts, twists and bends, there appears to be a momentary flash where hitters can see the ball in Hildenberger’s hand. While not every team may be wise to his, the Indians may be one ballclub that has picked up on it. With the familiarity and perhaps an extra advantage in knowing what pitch may be coming, it wouldn’t be surprising to hear this is why Cleveland has been able to batter Hildenberger around so much in July and August. Again, the latter portion of this is a theory. The Twins have multiple camera angles, such as views from behind home plate, that could confirm this. Plus, if he were tipping, one of the members of the catching crew -- either Bobby Wilson or Mitch Garver -- likely would have mentioned something to the staff. If hitters are seeing something, catchers should definitely be able to as well. That being said, the Twins have little incentive to acknowledge or broadcast the notion that Hildenberger’s tipping pitches. If his mechanics are giving something away -- and again, IF -- the Twins would most likely want to get him quietly to the offseason where they could begin to address it (hiding the ball better like the aforementioned Makita). Click here to view the article