bird

Yep.

I guess I'd suggest that this would be a problem if the wonder boys adopted a Ryanesque "buy and hold" attitude. I see signs that they have an opportunistic, traderly penchant. My gut tells me this FO won't get terribly attached to either Austin or Cron if a better option surfaces. If that's the case, small incremental upgrades aren't just feasible, but a positive part of the plan.

Rooker should not enter into the calculus regarding any moves for 2019. As the 35th selection, his statistical odds of becoming a factor in MLB are way less than 50%, and he lasted until the 35th selection for a reason, probably related to risks about his contact skills. I think banking on Rooker to make it as a productive big-leaguer is ill-advised. If he does, it'll be a pleasant, mild surprise. We'll pretty much know his eventual fate by the end of 2019 though. Trading Austin or Cron to make room for a better player would be great. Important even.

Not exactly on point, but I thought it was interesting when I delved into this: Cron was the 17th selection in that notoriously shallow 2011 draft class. You know, the one where the Twins stupidly chose Levi Michael with the 30th pick, something an astute, analytics-savvy, forward-thinking organization like the Rays would never do, right? So then, I see that the Rays had 10 out of the first 60 picks in that draft. Nine out of the ten were complete flops. The exception was Blake Snell at #24. In the Ray's defense, all of those were later selections like Levi was, so... Sonny Gray was the next selection after Cron.

I get this, but I wonder how instructive it is to look at history dating back more than a decade. The 2006 results probably don't answer the silent question that criticism of the selection always asks about the competence of the current decision-makers. Can we have a statute of limitations on this? Does a particular bad result tell you something about the comparative level of prowess involved? Are the same people still earning a W-2? Is it a case of a bad decision, or is it a bad result for other reasons? If the same people who gave you Kirilloff gave you Kohl Stewart, what explains this good decision/bad decision thing? I challenge anyone to randomly pick a franchise and go back ten years with their first-round picks. Compare their results to the Twins. Factor in the value of very early selections versus late ones. Add up WAR, assign "points" or something to prospects based on Sickles grade letters if they're still in the minors. Oh, and pull out the Trout outlier if you randomly pick one of them. In other words, try to be fair and objective about it. Then get back to us to show us all how bad the Twins have done COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING. Tyler Jay appears to be a bad result. IMO, he appears to be one of the infrequent bad decisions too, not just a case of bad luck. But this doesn't suggest to me a problem with talent evaluation. Not with Lewis and Kirilloff both among about the 20 or so prospects earning a straight A grade from Sickles.

No, they're still building. Maybe a half dozen new faces designed to make measurable contributions: two RP's, MI, 1B/DH, maybe one other. All very doable without trading off MLB assets of value that are part of the future. That sounds like a lot, but it's really not. Look at some of the reasonable plans people are submitting.

Tearing something down first.

You make it sound like there's a whole slew of players from that draft starring in the majors when in fact only two players selected after Jay can be described as such. Two out of 36, mind you.

Bingo. That was part of my biggest complaint about Ryan, not actively managing the player assets.

It's hard to argue that Jay wasn't a mistake pick. It's also hard to argue that the pundits weren't too high on him, although his injury history explains some of his struggles. But people don't place his selection into context either. Right now, 28 of the first 42 selections have not played MLB. Only 5 of the 42 have generated positive WAR so far. Benintendi and Buehler were both available, so yes, drafting either of those two at #7 or #24 would have been huge. But that's the nature of the draft. All teams have their occasional misfires, every one of them. Not an excuse, just an attempt to temper the criticism a bit. All teams miss on winners, all teams have prospects who fail them through no real fault of their own, and all teams over-estimate a ceiling or take a risk that backfires every once in awhile. I seem to remember comments about the Gibson selection at #22. The pundits had his ceiling, at best, as a #2, and some thought he was too safe of a pick. An example of the inept Twins picking a high floor guy instead of going for the marbles. Many people were castigating the Twins about his selection up until about a year or so ago. Some might still, despite the fact that only 4 of the 21 players selected ahead of Gibson (9.4) have generated as much WAR and two of those guys, Mike Minor (10.4) and Mike Leake (15.6), might have lower trade value than Gibson and could conceivably be passed by him in terms of WAR before it's all over. So personally, I'm not terribly distraught that Jay has been left unprotected. At least he's still in the hunt.

Jim Pohlad is a public relations nightmare. He's so out of touch with how his answer might be perceived. To keep our sanity we should probably be mindful that when any of the Pohlad Company businesses experience fundamental changes in revenues or costs, they respond to the changes differently than all of us are thinking in terms of a simple "found money" thing with contracts coming off the books. He isn't capable of adapting the way he thinks and speaks to reflect the fans' viewpoint, so he's a smart guy who can say "stupid" things. I'll wait to see what happens myself. But I don't dismiss the possibility that he'll reverse course here and tighten the pursestrings. So frustrating.

For the sake of his own career, DJ needs to sit in the front row when this guy teaches.

I get your point, Levi, but I'd make this distinction: Florimon's talent is not comparable to Buxton's. Florimon closed the gap between his talent and his skills when he was with the Twins and that wasn't good enough. Buxton, for a very brief time narrowed the gap between his talent and his skills, but he didn't master his skills by any stretch of the imagination. For me, it comes down to the point of view one takes. Is he more likely to persist in maintaining this gap? Or is he more apt to at least partially close this gap? Because of his immense talent, and probably because the field staff believes in his make-up, they view even the prolonged struggles as correctable. Not a mirage, but correctable. So I agree, his "floor" has been established.

What struck me as I studied this list: A common narrative all this past season has been that "the next wave" of real talent is buried in the low minors. But when I look at the list, I see that a third of the players on it have either had their first taste of MLB or are champing at the bit, this despite the fact that Romero and a couple others who might otherwise make the Top 30 have graduated, and maybe more importantly, the list excludes several who are good enough to make the team or at least get auditions, guys like DeJong, Moya, Curtiss, Vasquez, Busenitz, Slegers, etc. Not good enough to make a Top 40 but good enough to earn a spot, at least temporarliy, on a 25-man roster is a fairly solid indicator of depth, I think. The third (10) who are on the cusp (yes, many won't cut the mustard): Gonsalves, Gordon, Thorpe, Rooker, Littell, Wade, Wells, Arraez, Raley, and Stewart. At it's most wildly optimistic, this group represents a third of a major league roster. Granted, not a one of these prospects is even making BA's Top 50 let alone its Top 100. In my view however, it represents a small opportunity to build surpluses that can be traded off. For example, maybe we get lucky and Odor Easy fetches something at the deadline and Thorpe is an upgrade, or Rooker kills it and makes Austin an expendable piece. If five of these guys can replace a roster placeholder and provide incremental value and thereby allow the organization to further stock the system, that could be impactful down the road. Half (15) of the prospects should be peeking up from AA at the big club roster by season's end to see where they fit. A couple could even merit a call-up in 2019. And this is a truly exciting list: Lewis, Kirilloff, Graterol, Larnach, Badoo, Enlow, Alcola, Jeffers, Miranda, Maciel, Blankenhorn, Jax, Colina, Rortvedt, and Pearson in descending order of course. If just five of these guys are legit, this roster improves a ton by 2020. So only 5 of the 30 are really "years away": Javier, Duran, Celestino, Severino, and Balezovic. And we should remember that there are probably ten prospects already under signature in the deepest minors ready to be included. Hope the wonder boys keep the enertia going. Fun list, Seth, thank you.

Nick, I think its also fair and perhaps calming to keep in mind your main point, which is that the opportunity exists to make a splash in the FA market. Going the "spend big" route, whatever that looks like, is a fun thought and not all that unrealistic. We don't know if the Pohlad boys would sign off on $125M, let alone $150M. But I'm also of the opinion that past history tells us a little less than we might think on the subject, because the context never quite remains the same. The organization is dealing with a set of conditions and factors that differ enough from the past to call for us to temper our convictions on this touchy subject. I don't need to have a perfect grasp on this past year's P&L to be confident that a solid business case could be made to spend $150M now on the 2019 MLB payroll. If the revenues lag behind forecast, something tells me the business can withstand that short-term issue. The critical things are there IMO: enough talent at MLB to think bolstering it aggressively could move the needle; adequate cash resources; more than nominal player assets with trade value, a division that's inviting the team to think opportunistically, viable difference-making FA options, even if Corbin isn't one of them. I'm just going to stay giddily optimistic for now.

Certainly not in these parts.

I'd remind you that many of us have in fact worked for or currently work for companies that "manage profitability" and lots of us have probably been involved, maybe even been responsible for those decisions. So while I see where you're coming from and agree that a call for spending can be, um, fanatical, my experience on TD is that a ton of thought goes behind all of this stuff. If someone has a good argument that it would be imprudent to invest that much, great. I can see the logic in calling for restraint in going from one extreme of payroll flexibility to the other extreme. Or for cautioning against specific contracts. For me, I guess the more cringeworthy risks are those involving desperation trades that set the baseball operation back a season or two. Say howdy to Wilson Ramos and Aaron Hicks for example.

There have been a number of years past in which the organization underspent significantly, thereby padding its retained earnings column. And even when the profit margin has been less than ideal, they reaped a return on investment in the form of "unrecognized" capital gains, i.e. an increase in franchise value. So I think it's fair for fans to hope the organization takes a longer view backwards and forwards when these investment decisions are made, and I very much believe they do. They have aggressively spent over the past two years, but on infrastructure and non-player talent. OMO, this has been both prudent and foresighted. But now it's time to invest in specific (MLB) player talent. I don't know the details, but have observed enough of the Pohlad Companies operating philosophies and strategies in their other businesses to believe that they continue to adhere to certain disciplines and business guidelines, and given the publicly-disclosed revenue numbers, it doesn't seem like a $150M number is unrealistic, ESPECIALLY because it's not merely an expense but an investment that can be expected to generate immediate revenues. And therefore, I'm birdwatcher, and I approve this message.

I have to admit this blueprint makes me kinda bluepuke a little. I want my FO to act like a World Series appearance is within range in 2018. This requires placing big bets on certain existing players, notably and almost exclusively on Buxton and Sano. If those guys stink up the joint again, the season is doomed, no matter what other aggressive but reasonable steps they take. If those guys hit stride, that in and of itself is transformative. And with a couple of additional bold but very doable moves, such as a Corbin and a Familia for example, you have the makings of a remarkable turnabout. Include a couple of hole-fillers like Lowrie and Adams, use Adrianza and Garver as your 5th OF with the likes of Wade, Reed, Granite in reserve at AAA. Keep Turtle as 3rd catcher and backup 3B. Oh, and for amusement. Move Romero to relief and take your chances on Corbin, Berrios, Gibson, Pineda, and Odor Easy. AAA of Mejia, Gonsalves, Stewart, Thorpe, and Littell. Keep guys on the shuttle like Vasquez, Curtiss, Reed, Busenitz and Anderson. Be a seller at the trade deadline regardless of the standings, based on who's ready to replace replacable roster occupants. I'd bet big on Kirilloff and Lewis, believe it or not, as 2018 call-ups, maybe even before September. They're generational talents. I'd temper my enthusiasm about Gordon and Rooker due to quiet tools for Gordon and loud flaws for Rooker. Bet on Graterol to move fast, slow the optimism about Gonsalves. The roster has too many uninspiring players, so if someone like Thorpe or Vasquez can give you more than Odor Easy or Moya, trade the lesser but surplus guys at the deadline since it enhances rather than compromises your roster. Despite the impressive improvement in talent in the minors, I wonder if they've stockpiled enough more elite talent to have the trade route become a needle mover. Assuming Graterol, Lewis and Kirilloff are untouchable, and guys like Wander Javier are likely to under-fetch for you. So again, I'd make two big FA splashes if possible for a front end starter and a high-leverage reliever, keep my prospects for now and go the FA route for your MI and 1B/DH holes, and go break-through or bust with Sano and Buxton for 2018. This leaves Falvey's "sustainable excellence" plan for beyond 2019 intact. They need a couple of prospect to emerge like Kirilloff and Graterol did (Larnach and Enlow maybe), and they need to stay focused on landing an elite international prospect every year like they have been doing. It's an area of strength IMO. Like the Yankees have been doing, stockpile talent throughout the system, and then be smart about using it or moving it. Back to 2018: Status Quo thinking is bad thinking.

Make sure you give whomever answers your social security number and date of birth and don't mind all the noise in the background.

The name Rocco engenders more confidence than Bam Bam, don't you think? And far more than Molitorsie.

I believe his preseason list last year sported 22 B- or better prospects and a like number of prospects graded at C+ or better as he has this year. The C grades may contain higher numbers in 2019 by a few. So as Steve said, the two A-graded prospects were absent from the 2018 edition. My hunch is that he probably sees more 2019 prospects who have higher ceilings and the potential to break out. He mentions in his comments that he could see guys like Jax, Wells, Ober, Urbina, and Grace eventually earn grades as high as B+.

He might be expendable NEXT off-season. But only if Cave has that breakout season and becomes proven (or someone else comes along) and only if Kirilloff or someone else steps up to solve the 1B problem. I'm not sure I wouldn't place my bet on Kepler over Cave as the more productive player in 2019. I like Kirilloff at 1B and Kepler in RF if they both make the grade offensively.

Putting a label such as "core" on players doesn't do a whole lot for me personally because the definition of core is so nebulous and player performance is so volatile. I'd rather ask this question regarding any specific player: does the team have an immediate alternative who can step in and somewhat predictably equal or exceed the production this player is projected to give you? I didn't like the Escobar and Pressly trades. Not because the returns won't be justifiable, but because I want the philosophy to be to never make a move that reduces the quality of the MLB team. Both of those trades weakened the current team. I want Falvey to wait until he has a better alternative for today's game. No more playing for 2020 by compromising 2018. I liked the Duke trade, for example, because I could see Moya equalling or bettering Duke's output immediately. Mr. Falvey, have a better immediate alternative. You can do that. You're starting from a fairly low base after all. Expend from true expected surplus. Any player, such as Escobar, who can't be replaced immediately with the same or better expectation? Well, label that player "core" for my purposes. Until he's not. Now, back to your core players, Seth. Not a single one of them, IMO is expendable by my definition. I don't see better alternatives under contract with the club. Sadly, they're all "core". If I'm thinking this way as GM, it does three good things to my thought process. First, it disciplines me to prod my evaluators to consistently and constantly have an opinion, a projection, about the players on my roster and any possible alternatives. My goal is not to develop "core" players. My goal is to build up a surplus and make every player possible expendable. Secondly, it reinforces a strategy of being open to a better alternative for every single player on the roster and to be open to every opportunity. Lastly, it forces me to define my thresholds of acceptability by the market, to have an external viewpoint. Does Grossman meet industry standards as a 4th OF? If not, go get Cave. Is Busenitz cutting it as a #7 reliever? If not, see if Magill is a better alternative. Keep the chains moving.

I'm all for meeting Escobar's agent's demands and convincing him to return, but I've been thinking of him as a back-up plan for Sano as a first priority and as a guy who plays more often than not by spelling Iglesias or whomever at SS. Polanco at 2B, and Sano on his DH days or when he (oops, IF) he gets hurt.