Otto von Ballpark

I don't think it is effecting him either -- although it might be affecting him. Seriously, though I don't think it is THE factor, but it's probably not helping. He was good at the plate last year, but far from perfect (elevated K%, streakiness). If his future value will be determined at the plate, let him focus on that for awhile longer until he is solid at the plate in MLB, either at DH or at the one defensive position he has played at every level since rookie ball.

Miguel Cabrera is one of baseball's all-time great hitters. To expect others, even a prospect as good as Sano, to make the same fast and successful adaptation as Cabrera, no matter what you throw at them, is not realistic. Also, Cabrera was only in his second pro season as a third baseman at the time. And by all accounts, Cabrera was much smaller/slimmer at the time (a full 3 years younger than Sano is this season). Further, Cabrera wasn't asked to be a full-time outfielder as a rookie in the field -- he split time between the outfield and third base, even into the postseason.

Actually, Dozier only had one demotion, for 20 games at the end of his rookie year. He was back as the opening day second baseman the very next spring.

Maybe, but that trip for Hunter was almost solely about adding power to his game. He was actually pretty close to a finished product in terms of K% and BB% at the MLB level by that point, but he had yet to hit for much power as a pro (which also probably manifested itself in a slightly low BABIP, as he wasn't hitting the ball with authority). Hunter turned 25 during that last AAA trip, and those numbers were compiled in the PCL too -- more important than the raw OPS was probably the power, 18 HR in 55 games. Buxton hasn't really had any problem hitting for decent power as pro, or posting great BABIPs and overall batting lines. His problem seems to purely be that transition to MLB and just laying the foundation of his approach, as evidenced by his MLB K% and BB% marks.

Standard? This is a narrative that should probably be retired. Buxton's debut month at Cedar Rapids? 1.194 OPS. Buxton's debut month at Rochester last August? .986 OPS. He's scuffled for a few weeks at some levels, and hasn't at others. It's hardly a trend, much less a statistically significant one. The bigger reason for letting him stay at AAA awhile longer is his epic struggles in MLB that were only getting worse. That's a sign of someone who wasn't really committed to or comfortable with what he was doing at the plate, and probably hasn't been "fixed" in a month. But that has very little to do with the timing of any of his minor league slumps (rather modest ones, compared to his MLB line this year).

Nobody is worried about Buxton's minor league K rate. We were worried about why his MLB K rate was so absurdly high and rising, and after that, whether we could trust his future minor league K rates. Trout's debut MLB K rate was 22.2%, perfectly in line with his minor league marks at the time.

In 2012-2013, Mauer was still a star level performer, and Morneau still had a 107 OPS+ to finish out his contract. Meanwhile, our opening day payroll dropped by about $20 mil both years. And back to the topic at hand, even if accept some financial limitations, that doesn't mean you can't grade TR on the money he has spent. And most of his spending has been uniformly poor.

Great post, Willihammer (and hopefully ties this Hughes tangent back into the thread topic -- those are a few qualities we might like to avoid in a GM).

I think they believed keeping him in the field would improve his offensive outcomes, short and/or long term, otherwise why do it? A DH only almost certainly has less risk of injury, so they must have seen enough gain elsewhere to offset that. From there, it's not much of a stretch to suggest that playing a familiar/comfortable position could also improve offensive outcomes compared to an unfamiliar/uncomfortable position. For another example, I am pretty sure the Twins cited Cuddyer's moves around the field as holding back his offense, Mauer's move to first base impacting his offense, Dozier too, etc.

I disagree that his current contract is "easily tradeable" even if Hughes didn't fall flat on his face. How many pitchers have been traded with similar commitments remaining? And for what return? Meanwhile, the list of pitchers traded with 0.5-1.5 years remaining, for solid returns, is quite long. Not that it would have been impossible to trade Hughes after his extension, but he ceased to be a valuable trade asset when we signed it. At best, we pushed the most favorable trade opportunities down the road 3+ years.

I'd still argue 50% isn't a "position change" remotely comparable to Sano. For one thing, 50% is a lot higher than 13% (Sano's innings at 3B this year). And Bryant actually had a gradual transition to the outfield, playing very little there his first ~110 games in MLB, then playing a little more there over his next ~40 games, before this year's 50% split. There was no such gradual transition for Sano in RF. The Twins seem to think defensive position can matter at the plate -- they often cited that very reason for bringing in Park, so Sano wouldn't be a full-time DH.

Sure, that's fine. I simply pointed out that your management turnover example of "rude awakenings" from 84-87 was largely not tied to performance. Our GM change certainly wasn't. Arguably Garner's dismissal wasn't either, coming with a 27-35 record that would put the 2016 Twins to shame, and Miller's dismissal was likely more about MacPhail gradually asserting control rather than Miller falling short of great expectations (how great of expectations can there possibly be on a 1.5 year contract from an interim GM of a moribund franchise?). The general point of 2015 being more of a performance blip like 1984 than an immediate trend (like, say, 2001) is certainly valid. We can only hope at this point that there will rude awakenings among ownership and management if the timeline is pushed back to 2018.

In short, the original Hughes deal offered a ton of utility. It wouldn't take much to be worth 3/24 as a starter, or even a reliever if necessary. And basically every offseason and trade deadline, we would have had the option of trading him (either as a starter or a reliever) if we weren't competitive, fetching a good return from another team looking for a short-term solution. Once we signed the extension, though, Hughes became almost impossible to trade for a good return, or send to the bullpen. His contract was no longer pure short-term solution -- it also contained a long-term liability, which would scare off a lot of trade partners, or at least lower potential returns as compared to the same player on a shorter, cheaper deal. Even if Hughes was great, if the team sucked, we couldn't really capitalize on his performance anymore.

Those "options" are at best incomplete. If Hughes had a second good season, the surplus value on his first two seasons in Minnesota would have been great, and his trade value with 1 year, $8 mil remaining could have been through the roof -- look at what Samardzija fetched in trade (twice), Cueto at the deadline, etc. If he played out his contract and was set to command $100 mil as a free agent, we would have gotten incredible value out of his original deal, had numerous opportunities to shop him in trade if we weren't competitive otherwise, and at least collected a comp pick when he left. We basically flushed away all of the potential surplus value of his original deal, just so we could control him for 5 more years (at significantly higher salaries) instead of 2 more. I liked it at the time, but looking back, it was a pretty bad decision, even without the knowledge of Hughes' performance since. It doesn't really matter if Hughes had repeated his 2014 season in 2015-2016 after signing the extension -- any benefits to our competitiveness those seasons would have been the same under the original contract. And his trade value, with 3/39 remaining on his deal, would have been notably worse than with 2/16, 1/8, or 0.5/4 remaining, if we tried to trade him under the original deal. And of course, even if Hughes repeated 2014 once or twice more, it is doubtful the Twins would have been unable to afford him, had they wanted to. I already pointed out upthread that the very month the Twins extended Hughes, they committed $97 million for 7 pitcher seasons. They absolutely could have afforded a 5 year, $100-110 million deal for a single pitcher if they wanted.

What position change for Bryant? Dude is still the Cubs starting 3B most nights. Not only that, but 111 of Bryant's first 113 MLB starts in the field came at his natural position of third base. I'm guessing he had a more comfortable base than Sano before they began spotting him elsewhere. (And since that point, Bryant has still started 50 out of 77 games at third base, definitely more spotting elsewhere rather than any kind of position change).

Milone averaged fewer IP/GS in 2016 MLB than Duffey, Santana, Nolasco, Hughes, and Gibson. He trailed all of those pitchers in the same category for 2015 too, except the hobbled Nolasco. His 2015 IP/GS mark was virtually the same as notably poor innings-eater Mike Pelfrey, and just a hair ahead of bullpen-bound Trevor May. Milone's IP/GS has dropped each year of his career since his rookie season in Oakland. His career mark is lower than even Nolasco's poor 2014 season. I'd guess there are probably other directions the Twins could go in 2016 for similar "innings eating" performance that are more useful for a club in our position. (And if they involve pitchers with options, like Dean, May, Rogers, Darnell, Wheeler, Berrios, Meyer, etc., that is even better, because those pitchers have the flexibility to be optioned out for an extra reliever as needed -- something we can't do with Milone.)

Milone's salary this year is only $4.5 mil. At the time he was waived, he had roughly ~$3.75 mil remaining. If he was really a league-average starter, I have to think multiple teams would have claimed him at that price.

Note that while his plan moves Mauer to LF, it removes Sano from RF. Should be a neutral move as far as Kepler and Buxton are concerned -- they'd still only have to beat out Arcia, Grossman, or Santana to play, same as now.

I've got nothing against Milone, but if both he and Sean Burnett get added to the roster, then someone has to get cut from the 40-man in addition to Perkins going on the 60-day DL. I imagine Nolasco would go to the pen before getting released. Might imbalance the 25-man to drop Mastro right now. And two guys would have to get dropped from the 25-man too to make room for Milone and Burnett -- if not Mastro, probably two from Gibson, Duffey, Dean, May, Pressly, and Rogers, since they are the only pitchers with options remaining. Those guys probably need the reps in a lost season more than Milone, who could be due ~$6 mil next year in arbitration again.

This is extreme cherry-picking. Yes, Milone had 3 inherited runners score in one game, but relievers also stranded 4 of his inherited runners in other starts. Also, in the game where the 3 inherited runners scored, Milone actually had a runner at first with two outs, before he walked consecutive batters to reach 102 pitches and bring up the heart of the Brewers order, of which Braun was already 2-for-2 vs Milone that day, and Lucroy had a fly ball caught at the fence in dead center, and another caught at the opposite field warning track in right. If you're past 100 pitches and not out of the 5th inning yet, it's hard to muster much sympathy for you. And what game this year did Milone not get pulled soon enough? Was it April 15th vs the Angels? He was at 68 pitches through 6 innings, his only remotely efficient start of the year. Letting him face 3 batters in the 7th inning was hardly keeping him in too long -- it wasn't Molitor's fault that Milone gave up a HR, a walk, and another HR to those 3 batters. Every other start of the year, Milone failed to complete 5 innings due to his own poor and inefficient performance.

The split looks bad this year, but it's hard to know at this point if it's just a sample size fluke. For example, in 2015, his MLB OPS was actually significantly better vs LHP (although it looks like a BABIP thing). In 2014 at AA, his OPS, K%, BB%, and ISO were all better vs LHP: http://minorleaguecentral.com/player?pid=573627&type=batter&split=2014

I was actually wondering that about Park (getting some outfield reps), although the last week suggests maybe he's not quite fully established offensively yet to go messing around with his position...

Considering no one claimed him for free on waivers a few weeks ago, I don't think he has any real trade value for the foreseeable future.

Do you understand "all intents and purposes"? Miller wasn't officially interim, but he was a midseason hire given a 1.5 year contract by what was clearly an interim GM. That's interim for all intents and purposes. Doesn't mean he's going to get fired right away by the new GM, but at best his contract probably isn't getting renewed. MacPhail was a first-time GM, youngest ever in the sport, and took over late in a season -- just because he took 12 months to find and install his permanent choice for manager doesn't mean Howard Fox giving Ray Miller a 1.5 year contract to replace Billy Garner midseason was a comparably significant move. There was only one significant "management change" for the mid-1980s Twins, and that was the new owners handing to keys to MacPhail in August 1985. The moves in the year before and after the MacPhail hire were clearly moves related to that transition to new ownership. To your original point, suggesting that the Pohlads firing TR or Molitor now would be comparable to how they replaced Griffith, Fox, Gardner, and Miller in the mid-1980s is ignoring all context of history.

I'd guess he thinks it's our people, our baseball minds, our years of experience, our "no shortcuts" philosophy, "doing it the right way"... While those aren't necessarily bad, I'd want a new GM who recognizes the limitations of relying exclusively on those qualities in modern pro sports.