I disagree with the last statement. There was one analysis by Joe Sheehan a very long time ago that I believe was actually a bit lazy and anything but definitive. He set up his own definition of "pitching to the score," tailored to his premises regarding what statistics should show, used a small sample size, and came to his predetermined outcome as a result. For many years, people have been repeating that this study definitively proved that Jack Morris defenders are idiots. There's been nothing new contributed to the topic. However, if you repeat something enough as if it's true, especially if you do so as someone who's smarter than "old school" fans, it eventually becomes true. The fact is that teams actually do pitch and field to the score. For example, bringing in the infield when the score is close, or playing at double play depth when the score is not close. In one situation, the team is willing to concede a run to get an out (or two). In the other situation, the team is trying its best to prevent a run. This does not mean that over a long time and large sample size that one strategy yields more runs than the other. However, the immediate concern of the team is not statistics, but winning the game. And the analysis should be what strategy wins the games, not what yields less runs over the long term. Although it is less common today, someone like Ervin Santana shows that some pitchers are capable of pitching to complete games or at least going deep in games. That means not wasting pitches, pitching to the defense, and not worrying about strikeout totals, with the goal of saving the bullpen and shaking hands at the end of the game. It is also not proven whether pitchers who do this give up more or less runs over a long time and large sample size. However, in the context of a season, I believe it is very valuable for teams to have a Santana or Jack Morris, who goes deep into games. I would say that they are not so much "pitching to the score" as "pitching for a complete game win." However, the score can effect how much effort they have to put into run prevention as opposed to just getting enough outs to finish the game. The ultimate historical example of this, in my opinion, was in 1991, in mid-August, the Twins were 1.5 up on the Oakland A's dynasty. We won a 12-inning game 1 of the series, with both teams emptying out their bullpens. The next day, Morris gave up 4 runs and went 9 innings, saving our bullpen, which was needed to win the third game of the series the next day. Morris doesn't have a good ERA or even a quality start in the game, but it was probably the most important start of the season for the Twins, who never lost that lead in the division and buried our main competition in that series. As far as I know, there's no statistical analysis on how valuable a pitcher is who saves a bullpen by going deep into games. Maybe that's something Joe Sheehan can disprove with some "thorough" analysis. And then we can all refer to it and repeat the conclusion until it's true.