MeleMouth

Hilarious! And Tristan Gray hit two bombs yesterday, so there's that.

To exhaust the comparisons of Morneau's and Jenkins' situations, here are two final facts. 1. Dougie was traded on July 31, 2004, about 7-1/2 months BEFORE Jenkins was born. 2. That's more of an amusing fact, but it's relevant because a comparison between the situations should apply data that would have been applicable to the decision-makers of each era. We shouldn't compare OPS to OPS, because decision in 2004 usually didn't consider OPS. What they did consider was slugging. And in 2004, Morneau was slugging .615 in AAA, while Dougie was slugging .363 in Minnesota. It was quite hard for Twins management at the time to rationalize keeping Morneau and his extremely rare slugging on the farm while Dougie was producing like a 1970s bat control middle infielder. Nuf said.

There may have been issues particular to Mientkiewicz, also. It sounded like he wasn't, shall we say, very "welcoming" to young Mourneau. To move him out of the locker room, the Twins accepted an OK A ball pitcher in return. To get back to the topic at hand, Dougie wasn't nearly as valuable as the players Jenkins would replace.

Among reasons not to promote Jenkins now, this is an important, less-discussed issue. The Twins have basically been snake-bit with the health of their top young players when they come up to the majors. From Joe Mauer to Byron Buxton to Alex Kirilloff to Royce Lewis, they have a bad streak of injuries. Because of the possible lockout next year, this risk is even bigger, because the last thing anyone would want is Walker Jenkins to become injured soon after coming to the majors, go into a lockout, and have to rehab on his own and not play baseball next year. Certainly, that series of facts may not come to pass, but they shouldn't be hand-waved away as not being risks for a team with the injury history of the Twins and a player with the injury history of Jenkins. I might feel differently if we thought this team was one player away from being a force in the playoffs and we were more certain that Jenkins would come up and rake right away, but even with Jenkins the odds the team will make the playoffs will still be well under 50% and the odds the team will do well in the playoffs are much lower, and Jenkins has tended to start slow and need an adjustment period each time he went to a new level.

"Much like Lackey, Tinney has been extremely selective. His swing rate is even lower than Lackey’s, at 30.9%. You could argue that’s too low, especially considering that he’s swinging at fewer than half of the pitches he’s seeing in the strike zone. It seems like both catchers could help themselves by being a little more aggressive on pitches in the zone. That’s obviously easier said than done when opposing pitchers aren’t giving them many pitches to hit, but as they continue to develop and get more professional at-bats under their belts, I’d expect that to change." Tinney's low swing rate in A ball isn't as important as his contact rate, which unfortunately is also low. As players move up in the minors, the ability to wait out bad pitches matters much less than their ability to make contact. Tinney isn't at a find-another-career contact rate in the mid-fifties like Quentin Young, but a sub-70% contact rate of 67.4% in A ball is ominous. For comparison with two rookies who have struggled with strikeouts, Colson Montgomery was at 76.8% in his first taste of A ball and Carson Williams was at 66.3%, almost the same as Tinney, but despite having exemplary defense and playing behind someone who brings very little offense, he hasn't been able to stick in the majors. The Twins have had a weakness for years of thinking they could draft poor fielding power hitters with holes in their swings and convert them into major league hitters. It can happen, as evidenced by Kyle Schwarber (63.6%) and Hunter Goodman (68.9%), but it's rare. Most other power hitters with lots of strikeouts, such as James Wood (78.5%), Spencer Torkelson (74.4% in A+), and Nick Kurtz (83.1%), had much higher contact rates in the lower minors. A couple more for the fun of it: George Lombard, Jr. - 75.4%, Matt Wallner - 66.4%, and Keoni Cavaco - 64.0% (career high).

I'm less concerned about the decision about whether or not to call up Jenkins - although I'm fine with keeping him in AAA - than I am pleased with what seems like an increased level of candor from Twins management. Tom Pohlad seems more candid than Joe, Zoll seems more candid than Falvey, and Shelton is more candid than Baldelli. Previously, it seemed like everyone spoke through cliches and generalities, and you could add Dave St. Peter as the ultimate in saying ambiguous nothings, but now it seems like we're more getting more direct answers to questions. Nobody is ever going to make decisions that are popular and that I always agree with, but if someone is straight with me I can handle it. Certainly, a capable Jenkins would improve the Twins - if and when he's ready - but I suggest to you that candor by management will be a bigger factor in long term success for the team. Further, I suggest that fans will be more likely to stick with the team through tough times if they feel like management is being honest with them.

Not right now, but how about Goryl Of My Dreams?

He thought it would be the whole shooting match.

I struggle to remember a year when the Twins picked up three players at the deadline who contributed at least a little. Most years it seemed they picked up zero players who contributed and some years they picked up players who actually made things worse or brought their own mini-crises with them. In 1987, they got Schatzeder, Baylor, Niekro, and Carlton, and Baylor, and Baylor and Schatzeder contributed in the postseason, but Niekro and Carlton were bad innings-eaters at best. I think this year's deals were wrong for the organization, but am also glad that they are working instead of not working.

This is a well-written article that makes interesting points and supports them with data. Clemens' drop-off is something to pay attention to. BUT - and it's a big but - it is based on relatively small sample size and could also be an example why we shouldn't get either too high or too low based on short-term results. That said, one thing noted by the author was his recent drop in exit velocity and hard hit rates. Again, it could be a small sample size error - his rates in July were fine - but it is also worth watching. Sometimes, players just get tired in August. As an anecdote, August was also Clemens' least powerful in 2025.

Mendez could have brought back a 40-45 pitching prospect. For Larnach, the Twins were of course aiming to get someone who is a good reliever right now, which is a much higher target.

Statements of fact, particularly verifiable ones, are unfashionable these days.

You could be right. I am still thinking (hoping?) that the change happened too late in the offseason for any changes to be material and that bigger changes will happen next year. My bigger concern - and maybe this is similar to your comment about things still being about the same - about the Gray and Jackson moves, along with the trades at the deadline, is that the team is still trying to be two things at once - competitive and rebuilding - which splits their resources in a way that makes it hard to be successful at either.

Twins should have traded Mendez at the deadline for a decent pitching prospect. Twins 40-man has 4.5 left-handed corner outfielders who are either bad or mediocre at fielding: Larnach, Wallner, Roden, and Mendez, with Clemens as a PT, plus ERod with Jenkins to follow. They should have converted at least one into pitching and Mendez was the best combo of youth, hitting well, and being expendable. Mendez was also part of a past regime. Future roster construction should prioritize fielding higher.

Jenkins has been a slow starter at every level and seems to be in the process of locking in changes to hit with more power made at or around the time of the Futures Game. He should stay at AAA instead of risking with his development on three long-shot chances all hitting: (1) his making an instant impact, (2) it mattering for a team whose playoff odds are overrated, and (3) even if they make the playoffs, their odds of doing anything better than getting swept in Round 1 are quite low. An Evan Carter type spark is much more rare than a rookie coming up and struggling.

Keaschall is really bad in the field, while Lee and Lewis are merely bad. The organization's theories over the past decade to get moldable hitters and play them in many positions so they have versatility has created a team-wide problem of not having players who are skilled at any particular defensive position. They were going down this path with Culpepper, also. It will take a few years of planning and work to fix.

Help me out here. The text says this table is for the "last 20 seasons," but between 2006 and 2025 the Rays had 1650 wins while the Twins had 1541 wins, more than 100 fewer. The Rays have more wins in 2026, also, and a separate review I did shows the Rays as having the 3rd best winning percentage in MLB between 2010 and 2026, and 2008-09 were also good years for them, so their bad years in 2006-07 couldn't have dropped them from 3rd to 24th. However, this table shows the Rays as being 24th in winning percentage over this time period and the Twins as being 15th. What am I missing? Thanks.