I also appreciate the effort that goes into such an ambitious attempt to analyze the relative skill of these organizations. As you might predict however, I find the analysis to be terribly flawed, almost to the point of complete uselessness. The primary reason has to do with the absurd connection that gets made between the success (as measured by WAR, which is its separate problem) of a given selection and an opinion that the skill of the selecting team is what is at play here. Think about it for a moment. Let's take a hypothetical 15th round selection in 2008 that generates 20 WAR in his 5 years of MLB when this study goes to press. Every team in baseball would select that player in the first round if he was available to them in a redraft. However, all 30 teams lacked the foresight to draft the player in the first round. They all lacked the skill to project success for that player 15 times!!! So, adding up a bunch of WAR numbers and declaring one team to be more skillful than the next is folly. The second reason, which is an equally fatal flaw, is the failure to adjust for draft order. The studies are too numerous to even mention regarding how favorably skewed collective WAR numbers get due to the inclusion of those premium early picks. Here's a thought: let's take the 2008 draft as our example. Now, since this was a weaker draft than maybe the next, perhaps the players selected #5 through #15 in this year are regarded as a "weak crop", and the same group a year later is regarded as stellar. Because of this important nuanced reality, it makes sense to compare teams who are faced with similar talent options, right? So, in Rd1 of 2008, I would compare the success of this group of selections, #9-#20: Aaron Crowe, Jason Castro, Justin Smoak, Jemile Weeks Brett Wallace, Aaron Hicks, Ethan Martin, Brett Lawrie, David Cooper, Ike Davis, and Andrew Cashner. This gives us a window into the selections of 11 teams in a single round. In Rd2, you'd compare Destin Hood, Robert Ross, Tyson Ross, Shane Peterson, Joseph Austin,Tyler Ladendorf, Joshua Lindblom, Thomas Adams, Kenneth Wilson, Robert Stovall, and Aaron Shafer. And on, so maybe a team looks bad compared to the teams that picked Dee Gordon and Jason Kipnis 5 picks apart in the 4th, and Chris Herrmann gets compared to Tommy Milone in the 10th. It would be a much more meaningful analysis, especially if one avoided 2010 and later at this juncture, where the WAR accumulation is close to meaningless right now. I don't know how the Twins would stack up in this methodology. My guess is better. In the example above, I'd guess that the combo of Aaron Hicks and Tyler Ladendorf would compare favorably.