Danchat

A team barely alive
 
Some are saying the Twins should abandon the effort to seriously compete in 2019 and aim to reload for 2020 and 2021, when prospects like Alex Kiriloff and Royce Lewis will be ready to contribute. That's a mistake to me--with a payroll commitment of only about $60 Million, they almost can't afford not to spend some serious cash. I'll lay out what we can learn from 2018 and what the Twins can do not only to compete but to put themselves in position to win the American League Central in 2019, ending this post with my offseason blueprint. First, let's look at the year now past--not quite a debacle, but quite disappointing:
2016 2017 2018 changeActual Wins 59 85 78 -7
They fell off by seven games, which isn't much considering a 26-game improvement came about the year before. Still, everyone was hoping for better. Their Pythagorean wins (the number of wins expected given their runs scored and allowed) were at 79, so there's not much bad luck involved in that number.
 
Where did the Twins' actual decline come from? Let's compare this year's decline to last year's improvement:
2016 2017 2018 changeLuck -7 +2 +1 -1Hitters WAR 17.0 28.7 15.2 -13.5Pitchers WAR 1.8 7.0 12.3 +5.3
So here's the bright side: Twins pitching in two years went from the worst around to now above average. This is an incredible achievement by Falvey and Levine, the coaches, and the players. The Twins have released pitching coach Garvin Alston after one year to enable new manager Rocco Baldelli to hire the person he wants, but judging from the results, one would have to give a hearty thanks to Alston for moving the needle significantly in the right direction for whatever degree of influence he had. Their challenge now is to keep up this level of quality and boost it on the margins.
 
To say that hitting was a disappointment is an understatement. While the lineup didn't totally fall apart, they certainly fell two big steps backwards. Getting just a little better from here isn't going to cut it in the minds of Twins fans or for the front office. More importantly, knowing the specific players who should take the blame leaves me both concerned and hopeful--quite literally, the Twins supposed five best hitters (Sano, Buxton, Morrison, Mauer, and Dozier) all dramatically underperformed. In no universe did fans, writers, pundits, projection systems, Paul Molitor, Thad Lavine, or Derek Falvey think there was any reasonable chance that the five of them would combine to post a cumulative WAR under 1. When you would have been just as well simply benching your five best hitters for all 162 games, there's literally no possible way to overcome that. And yet, the Twins still ended three wins under .500 for the year, a mark far more respectable than what could have happened.
 
So the bad news is that Twins's best players now all have big question marks surrounding them. The good news though: 2018 was certainly a black swan event, the likes of which the Twins offense has never seen nor imagined. No one could have predicted it, and the probability of it happening again is exceedingly small. These players are all better than this, and we should expect this year to be expunged from their memories after they achieve more success going forward.
 
I'll break down the hitters by WAR (technically fWAR, or FanGraph's WAR), focusing on the players that mattered most. I'll list last year's players who have been replaced for comparison's sake, as well.
WAR 2017 2018 change15 Hitters 24.9 14.6 -10.5LF Rosario 1.7 3.4 +1.7RF Kepler 2.4 2.6 +0.23B Escobar 1.3 2.4 +1.1SS Polanco 2.1 1.3 -0.82B Dozier 4.4 1.0 -3.41B Mauer 3.4 1.0 -2.4CF Buxton 5.1 -0.4 -5.5C Castro 2.5 -0.2 -2.7DH Vargas=>Morrison 0.3 -0.7 -1.0 3B Sano 2.5 0.0 -2.54O Granite=>Cave 0.3 1.3 +1.0BC Gimenez=>Garver 0.7 1.3 +0.55O Grossman 0.8 0.7 -0.1MI Adrianza 0.9 0.5 -0.4MI Santana=>Forsythe 0.1 0.4 -0.3
Moves that worked
 
Sticking with Rosario in 2017: Rosario had a successful year in 2017, but many were worried that it was more of a fluke--that Rosario would return to a below-league-average hitter, as he was in 2015-2016. Instead, Rosario kept hitting at a high level and simultaneously improved his baserunning and fielding into also above-average territory. If he can maintain these tools, expect an all-star team appearance for Rosario, perhaps even in 2019. Under team control through 2021, the case can also be made that Rosario's trade value will never be higher--what kind of pitching riches could the Twins acquire if they offer Rosario and move Jake Cave into left? Still, the most likely scenario is that the Twins keep playing Rosario every night for a few years, and perhaps they should keep offering him long-term contract extensions till he signs one.
 
Trading Luis Gil for Jake Cave: The Yankees were never going to play Cave in the outfield, so trading him for a low-level hard-throwing prospect was perhaps a good move for them, but it was a great move for the Twins, as Cave contributed more to the team winning than Miguel Sano, Byron Buxton, and Joe Mauer combined in 2018. It seems that Cave can legitimately hit and field, and so the Twins plan on keeping him around. He is perfect as the fourth outfielder for years to come. Before the trade, Zach Granite was struggling and Ryan LaMarre jumped over him to begin the year in the big leagues, but Cave's success led the Twins to trade away LaMarre without fear.
 
Relying on Mitch Garver more than Bobby Wilson or Chris Gimenez: Last year, the Twins were reluctant to trust Garver behind the plate, trying him out as a pinch hitter, DH, and outfielder. That's a problem, because Garver isn't a good enough hitter to be highly valuable at any of those positions--but at catcher, he's a great hitter. This year, Garver caught in over 650 innings, and while his catching metrics are overall slight negative, his strong hitting makes up for it. Good-hitting catchers are hard to find, and the Twins should live with little shortcomings in Garver if he can be a above-average hitter--that is, above-average for a hitter, way above average for a catcher.
 
Moves that bombed
Playing through lower-body pain: How many times do the Twins have to get bitten by this to change their emphasis? Logan Morrison (hip), Brian Dozier (knee), Miguel Sano (leg, hamstring) and of course Byron Buxton (toe) all tried to play either through an injury or come back too soon from recovery. The evidence is abundant that hitting suffers immensely when any part of the legs can't be trusted. Playing hurt often means playing to hurt your team, and it should no longer be tolerated, let alone encouraged.
 
Managing Byron Buxton's injuries and swing: Buxton is too good for this to be the result. By the butterfly effect, migraine headaches led to a broken toe, the already-mentioned foolish attempt to return too early, and lots of confusion over his swing mechanics. The new trainers, new manager, and yet-to-be-named new hitting coach will have Buxton's success as perhaps their top individual priority.
 
Failing to trade Dozier before the beginning of the year: The rumor was that, for Dozier to escape to the the Dodgers before the season, the Twins were demanding Jose De Leon and Cody Bellinger in return. The Dodgers, even without the benefit of hindsight, were never going to do that trade. The Twins should have accepted DeLeon and another lesser player as the best deal they could have gotten. It looks especially bad now, as the Twins' "best hitter" was not at all their best hitter anymore--Dozier inexplicably (was it a lingering knee injury?) went from being 25% above average to 10% below average in one year. Needless to say, Dozier was hoping for a hundred-million-dollar or more contract in his first free-agent try, but might now have to settle for a one-year deal and try again next year.
 
On to the starting pitchers:
2017 2018 change6 Starters 7.2 9.7 +2.5Berrios 1.7 3.3 +1.6Gibson 0.2 2.8 +2.6Colon=>Odorizzi 0.1 2.6 +2.5Mejia=>Lynn 0.8 0.8 0.0Santiago=>Romero -0.2 0.7 +0.9Santana 4.6 -0.5 -5.1
Moves that worked
 
Sticking with Berrios and Gibson: It took Berrios a few additional years after his debut to find his footing, but the patience with him is paying off. When you have a pitching prospect like Berrios, it may take some years of struggle before becoming a reliable contributor--Berrios was such all year, without giving the coaches reason to worry or doubt. La Maquina is under team control through 2022, so the Twins will pencil him in as often as possible for the next four years.
 
Gibson's struggle was ongoing for years, but this was the year he put all that behind him and had confidence on the mound for the entire year. I was among those who were ready for the Twins to cut ties with him two years ago, but he has proved me wrong by being the rare pitcher whose age-30 season is better than any year prior. We shouldn't expect Gibson to exceed his 2018 success, but he has certainly earned a rotation spot next year.
 
Trading for Jake Odorizzi: The Twins spent the offseason trying to get Chris Archer. When they couldn't meet the Rays' asking price, they went down a notch and acquired Odorizzi from them in exchange for Jermaine Palacios, who went on to have a poor season in A and AA and seems a long way from ever contributing in the majors. Odorizzi wasn't the near-ace the Twins were hoping for, but at a notch below, he was a much better contributor than Bartolo Colon last year. The Twins should not hesitate to make such a routine move to plug a hole again, as adding two or three wins in exchange for a marginal prospect is a bargain no matter which way you look at it. By the way, Archer struggled on the year and was traded mid-season for a lesser return to the Pirates, so perhaps it all worked out well for the Twins.
 
Moves that bombed
 
Signing Lance Lynn and thus blocking Adalberto Mejia:
I hesitate to call this a big mistake--Lance Lynn's contract was limited and the Twins recognized early enough that he wasn't the pitcher they thought they were getting, skipping occasional starts and pulling him early. Still, the Twins would have been better off trusting Meijia, Romero, or Gonsalves to take Lynn's 20 starts. The results would likely have been no worse, and furthermore perhaps one of those three would be a clear asset for the major league team in 2018. Instead, the Twins and Twins fans alike still are unsure of these three not-so-young-anymore pitchers and their role going forward. We can't second-guess the Lynn signing too much, as it was cheap and easy, and this was likely just a down year for Lynn, who should be effective for the Yankees or some other team for years to come.
 
And the bullpen:
2017 2018 change11 Relievers 2.4 2.4 0.0Rogers 0.4 1.9 +0.8Pressly -0.2 0.8 +1.0 Gee=>Duke 0.6 0.8 +0.2Kintzler=>Rodney 1.1 0.5 -0.6Breslow=>Moya -0.1 0.1 +0.2Hildenberger 0.8 0.0 -0.8Belisle 0.0 -0.2 -0.2Duffey -0.4 -0.2 +0.2 Boshers=>Reed -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 Tonkin=>Magill -0.2 -0.3 -0.1Busenitz 0.1 -0.8 -0.9
Moves that worked
 
Making Taylor Rogers more than a LOOGY: Being left-handed is certainly a blessing for most pitchers, but sometimes they get trapped into a specialty role. Instead, Molitor used Rogers often against lefties and righties alike, and he shined in the process, boasting more than a strikeout per inning and nearly five for every walk, and giving up the bare minimum of home runs you could ever expect. I doubt Rogers will ever be this good again, but you can hope he'll come close. He's definitely the kind of pitcher the Twins are happy to have for at least four more years in his prime.
 
Signing Zach Duke and Fernando Rodney: Duke didn't make himself into a top-notch reliever, but his 52 innings pitched were solidly above-average for a team that struggled to find strength in their bullpen. Rodney contributed just as well, too. Again, signing players like these (and then trading them away if the season becomes lost) should be routine moves that happen every year alongside any bigger moves. These players are often available each year, and the Twins' scouts will prove themselves if this kind of signing usually works out as it did with Duke and Rodney.
 
Building up Pressly and trading him for value: Ryan Pressly got some press after the Twins traded him for Jorge Alcala and Gilberto Celestino, saying that the Astros recognized that he needed to change his mix of pitches simply to throw his superior breaking ball more often. It should not be overlooked that the Twins helped Pressly develop very well, and any tweaks the Astros have done are because they stand on the proverbial shoulders of giants.
 
Not signing a top-quality reliever: The Twins could have convinced themselves that Wade Davis or Greg Holland were worth big contracts. If they had done so, we'd probably now be lamenting how much we are on the hook. This isn't to say that the Twins shouldn't sign a more expensive reliever now, but only that in 2018 the options were poor and they were wise to avoid making a high-risk, low-reward mistake.
 
Moves that bombed
 
Leaning on Trevor Hildenberger: One of the biggest disappointments of the year was the failure of Hildenberger to step up as the Twins' next elite reliever. Did Molitor call on him too often--having him pitch in nearly half of the Twins' games? Did he wear down early and never recover? Was he thrust into a high-leverage role too soon in his career? Or is he just an average pitcher, and the Twins should not have given so much credence to his late 2017 performance? Hildenberger might be an area of focus for the new pitching staff. They have a lot of plates to spin in order to improve this bullpen, and Hildenberger might be the biggest and wobbliest.
 
Bringing back Belisle: This one's a puzzler to me: Matt Belisle was not a good pitcher in 2017 and got worse in 2018; why did the Twins sign him mid-season? The only thing I can think of is that the Twins wanted his leadership and cameraderie in the bullpen--to have him more as a player-coach and a mop-up pitcher rather than a true bullpen building block. Still, they must have realized that in August, as the end of July featured two bad Belisle outings that led to one-run losses. Maybe his playing days aren't done, but I surely hope they are done in Minnesota, although I'm open to the idea of hiring him as a minor-league pitching coach.
 
Duffing around the course: Tyler Duffey is just hanging around, not bad enough to be cut but not good enough to help the team win. I suppose he's better than relievers behind him on the depth chart, but I'm hoping the Twins bullpen improves to the point where it will be more obvious that the Twins can move on from Duffey.
 
Mind your own Busenitz: Alan Busenitz has been disappointing to be sure, and part of the problem was in keeping him away from the majors for two months, but he failed to make the most of his 23 appearances in the majors, showing that perhaps he did deserve to be in AAA after all. He'll be in the doghouse again to start 2019, and I have no problem making him earn his way back to the majors again as he's done three times already.
 
Subtraction by Addison: Reed was thought to be one of the top relievers on the free-agent market, and the Twins were able to snag him for only a two-year deal. He turned in very inconsistent performances in the second half, but I don't think this is too big a disappointment, and I'm glad he'll be in Minneapolis next year to bounce back and earn his next big contract.
 
We have the capability...
 
Well, the label "big spenders" is something of an exaggeration, but the Twins have the opportunity to spend more than ever before in longer-term contracts and set themselves up for success in 2019 and in their future. The Twins major-league payroll sits at around $60 million, leaving them $60-80 million to add for 2019 alone to reach even league average, and there's nothing stopping them from spending even more. The same wide-open salary continues in the future. It will be up to Falvey and Levine to spend it wisely, but they can't revert to Terry Ryan-style frugality.
 
Rocco Baldelli will lead that team
 
Their first task is to build out Rocco Baldelli's coaching staff. He should choose a pitching coach that he can trust, but also someone who can usher Twins pitchers into modernity. It seems currently that pitching strategy is changing faster than ever before, and the new pitching coach will need to manage openers, starters, quick hooks, and firemen--and nuture pitchers to throw more breaking balls, keep their velocities up as they age, avoid tipping pitches, prevent injuries, and manage fatigue better than any Twins pitching coach in years past. I have no idea who Baldelli, Falvey, and Levine should choose, but the choice is perhaps more important than ever before.
 
Better than they were before
 
The Twins' hitters have a few holes, and the opportunities for improvement are more obvious than last year. Here's how they should approach this team renovation.
 
Trust the supposed three best hitters: It would be far too hasty and foolish to give up on Sano or Buxton. Eddie Rosario has surpassed them and inspires more confidence for sure, but Sano and Buxton's trade value will never be lower than right now. Don't forget that they are 25 and 24 years old, 3-4 years before their statistically-likely prime. They still have growing and developing to do, and they were too good in the minors and in long stretches in the majors before for 2018's performances to be representative. Grant them a fresh start in the new year and I'm betting that Twins fans will be rewarded.
 
Trust Sano at third base: Good fielding has returned as a emphasis for the Twins, with Kepler, Buxton, and now Rosario helping out in the field, but to those names you can lighly pencil in Miguel Sano, who is just fine at third base, and far more valuable there than at DH. The Twins should keep Sano at third till it is utterly obvious that he shouldn't be playing there, and we seem to be a long way from that. Presuming that the Twins infield will be shifting much more than in 2018, the coaches will have to work out how best to play him--he can't be roaming in short right field like we saw Travis Shaw or Justin Turner do in the playoffs--but there is flexibility here and the coaches can make it work.
 
Sign a good-hitting second baseman: No, don't re-sign Logan Forsythe. The Twins need a very good hitter at second base more than they need a good-fielding shortstop. I'm not sure that Manny Machado is even a good fit nor nearly worth the money. I'd go with Jed Lowrie or Asdrubal Cabrera as free agent signings, but also look for someone arguably better on the trade market, like a one year rental of Scooter Gennett. The Twins have several in-house options for 2020 and beyond, so a one- or two-year commitment here makes a lot of sense.
 
Trade for a real slugging first baseman: There are a few disappointing options at first base on the free agent market, but there's a obvious name that might be gettable in a trade: One year of Paul Goldschmidt. I'd beware a bidding war, but trades for no-doubt mashers are not often regretted. If that doesn't work, a trade for Justin Smoak or Carlos Santana could be arranged, but the Twins should also look at taking on longer contracts if a good deal can be had for Wil Myers or Brandon Belt. But plan A should be Goldschmidt.
 
Sign a designated hitter: Picking up Logan Morrison didn't work out, but it was the right idea. Matt Adams or Lucas Duda could be a relatively inexpensive boost to a lineup that has been missing a go-to DH for years, though I still expect that Willians Astudillo and Tyler Austin will get starts at DH as well as corner infield positions throughout the year.
 
Plan on using Jake Cave often to keep Kepler, Buxton, and Rosario fresh. If any starting outfielder gets a nagging injury, put him on the disabled list without hesitation and keep him there till all are confident he is recovered.
 
Say goodbye to the hall-of-famer, has-beens, and almost-weres: Joe Mauer seems all but retired, and the Twins shouldn't entice him back unless it is for a true bargain on a one-year deal. Grossman, Gimenez, and Belisle should also retire and the Twins shouldn't feel forced to bring them back. Sadly, Danny Duffey doesn't seem to have a way back. I have no problem keeping him in Rochester in case he truly earns it back, but I wouldn't plan on it happening.
 
Better, stronger, faster
 
Improvements to the pitching staff need to emphasize faster fastballs, sharper curve balls, and above all, clear-cut quality. Lance Lynn or others like him should not be an option for this team unless they come even cheaper than last year. Also, the bullpen can't continue to limp along--the Twins are way behind in getting an advantage out of their relievers and it is time to end that.
 
Sign an almost-ace: I can't quite use the term "ace", as a pitcher in the top echelon is nearly impossible to get, but the the Twins need a clear-cut top-notch pitcher, and there's several to choose from. My pick is Nathan Eovaldi. With a 100 mph fastball and a tendency to avoid walks, he will give Twins fans both excitement and winning immediately. Trevor Cahill is another good option, or Patrick Corbin if you want to aim a little higher
 
Stick with what works: Trevor May might become great, we know Rogers and Moya are capable, and I mentioned staying faithful to Addison Reed. This gives the Twins four pitchers they can rely on--maybe not to be the top of the bullpen, but to at least stick around for the year.
 
Bring in expensive talent: I figure the Twins need two new top relievers in 2019, as well as one depth acquisition. Trading for any of these may be an option, but I think the bullpen is the best area to spend the deep pockets the Twins have starting this year. I'd target Jeurys Familia and Kelvin Herrera, and pick up a lefty like Jerry Blevins for good measure.
 
Manage the rest carefully: Hildenberger, Magill, and Busenitz haven't inspired confidence yet, so keeping them in Rochester till needed isn't a bad idea. Make sure they are trusted as true contributors in the majors before trusting them with a roster spot. Of course, we all hope that Hildenberger is very close to earning that trust, but there was much to cause doubt in him in 2018.
 
So here's my 2018 season-long roster, comprised of the 30 most important players, along with somewhat optimistic hoped-for WAR numbers for each. These numbers add up to a bit over 100 wins for the 2019 Twins. Most of these players will not hit these "hope" numbers, but some will, and others will come close, and a few will exceed them enough to make the Twins a contender in 2019. Join me in my optimism; a AL Central title and thus a World Series is within reach.
WAR 2017 2018 2019 hope CF Buxton 5.1 -0.4 5.01B Goldschmidt 5.2 5.1 4.53B Sano 2.5 0.0 3.7 LF Rosario 1.7 3.4 3.5 2B Lowrie 3.6 4.9 3.1RF Kepler 2.4 2.6 2.6SS Polanco 2.1 1.3 2.0C Castro 2.5 -0.2 1.5DH Adams 1.2 0.8 1.2 4O Cave 0.3 1.3 1.5CI Astudillo 0.7 1.4BC Garver 0.7 1.3 1.3MI Adrianza 0.9 0.5 1.0CI Austin 0.1 0.4 0.7SP Berrios 1.7 3.3 3.5SP Eovaldi 2.2 3.0 SP Gibson 0.2 2.8 2.6SP Odorizzi 0.1 2.6 2.1SP Pineda 1.1 1.7SP Romero 0.7 0.5RP Rogers 0.4 1.9 1.5RP Familia 0.3 1.8 1.0RP May 0.5 0.8RP Herrera 0.1 0.4 0.5RP Hildenberger 0.8 0.0 0.5RP Reed 0.9 -0.2 0.5RP Moya -0.1 0.1 0.3RP Busenitz 0.1 -0.8 0.3RP Magill -0.3 0.2 TEAM WAR 36.8 28.8 52.0Wins 85 78 100

The one sport that stands to benefit most from advances in technology is America’s Pastime. My colleague Ben Beecken shares that sentiment and understands baseball’s big problem and how to solve it. But as a semi-traditionalist baseball fan, I’m not ready to take the umpires off the field in favor of robots.
 
This was originally published at Grandstand Central.
 
Something must be done, obviously, and Major League Baseball owners are apparently pushing Commissioner Rob Manfred to make “bold” changes to address what they believe to be a pace-of-play problem caused by the increased employment of defensive shifts. But baseball doesn’t have a pace-of-play problem; it has a lack-of-action problem that an electronic strike zone can solve without taking umpires’ jobs.
 
Increased Action Makes Pace of Play Irrelevant
“Time flies when you’re having fun” they say, and that goes for a three-plus-hour-long baseball game, too. Shortening the game or speeding it up isn’t going to make the game more appealing to young people. You need action to appeal to the all-time low attention spans of young people, or they’ll just find their entertainment on that computer in their pocket. MLB isn’t providing that action and hasn’t for a decade or so.
 
Thus far this season, MLB’s collective batting average is .248 — the 21st-worst league batting average since 1871, according to Baseball Reference. Runs are down to 1956 levels, but on-base percentages, upon which run production depends, have remained steady, according to ESPN’s Buster Olney. But there’s never been more strikeouts in the bigs.
 
The league is on pace to break the strikeout record set last year, and the year before that, and in each of the eight years prior. That’s a decade’s worth of record-setting strikeout totals, so no one should be surprised by how often professional hitters are failing to hit. And you can’t blame defensive shifts for strikeouts.
 
This idea that the increased employment of defensive shifts has forced hitters to alter their approach at the plate to increase their “launch angle” and “exit velocity” to hit over the shift is ridiculous. Defensive shifts don’t force hitters to do anything except exactly what hitters have been expected to do since the game’s inception: hit it where they ain’t. If any professional ballplayer could bunt these days, and every one of them should be capable, or if managers valued baserunners over extra-base-hit potential, defensive shifts would all but disappear except for pull-happy, power hitters who aren’t paid to bunt — ever. The defense is the one taking a risk by shifting; most hitters risk nothing except their batting averages trying to hit over the shift and into the stands. We shouldn’t want more hitters bunting, however. We should want more action occurring from hitters hitting — or better yet, driving the ball.
 
Some of those hitters, like the Cubs’ Daniel Murphy, have explained why they don’t bunt against the shift despite having a gimme single if they can get it in play past the pitcher on the vacated half of the infield. Murphy’s reasoning is that he’s more valuable to his team pursuing extra-base hits rather than occupying first base and waiting for another two teammates to hit singles to score him given his lack of speed. “It’s really difficult to get three hits in one inning,” he told ESPN’s Jerry Crasnick, citing “how good pitchers are now” as a reason.
 
The Evolution of Pitching is to Blame for Baseball’s Problem
Young fans are avoiding baseball because it’s boring. Hitters can’t hit because pitching is too good. Many hitters, like former MVP and batting champion Justin Morneau, say a hitter can expect one hittable pitch per plate appearance, and hittable pitches are fewer and farther between in today’s MLB than ever before.
Batters aren’t looking to get the ball in the air more often to avoid hitting into defensive shifts. Batters are looking to get the ball in the air more often because there are fewer pitches thrown they are physically capable of hitting hard in the air. There are fewer pitches thrown that have extra-base-hit potential.Since 2002, swings on pitches outside the strike zone have increased 12.7 percent, resulting in an all-time low contact rate and all-time high swing-and-miss rate.
In 2010, 50.2 percent of all pitches thrown in MLB were in the strike zone, according to FanGraphs. This season it’s down to 47.9 percent, and despite the percentage of swings at pitches in the zone at an all-time high over the 11-year history of this research, the contact percentage on those strikes is at an all-time low. Contact on pitches outside the strike zone is also at an all-time low, but why?
 
Reliance on Relief Pitchers Contributes to Baseball’s Problem
Before defensive shifts became the norm and launch angle was ever uttered, the approach to pitching had already evolved immensely in MLB. John McGraw had a dedicated relief pitcher on his New York Giants roster as early as 1905, according to the research of Bryan Soderholm-Difatte for “America’s Game.” That tactic became more popular in the 1920s after Mordecai “Three Finger” Brown’s career was shortened considerably having served as the Cubs’ ace starter and ace reliever from 1908 to 1911.
 
Even though the lengths of MLB pitchers’ careers were shortened by the now-incomprehensible number of innings pitched over a hundred years ago, there are still pitchers calling for starters to go longer in games and ignore pitch counts.
 
Hall of Fame pitcher Bert Blyleven reminding MLB’s aging audience that starters were expected to finish games as recent as the 1980s should consider how effective he and his peers were the third and fourth time through a lineup instead of calling it evidence that throwing more pitches leads to fewer injuries.
 
Real research conducted by real physicians found that throwing fastballs, not curveballs, is linked to Tommy John surgery, according to Sports Illustrated’s Ian McMahan. Blyleven made his living with his curveball, which is why he’s a terrible spokesperson for getting rid of the pitch count and treating today’s starting pitchers like it’s 1971.
 
Over his career, Blyleven allowed an OPS of .679 when pitching to opponents for a third time and a .711 OPS when seeing hitters a fourth time in a game. That’s respectable, but according to Total OPS+, or tOPS+, Blyleven’s teams, on average, would have been better off had Blyleven never pitched to a hitter a third or fourth time. That is, of course, if there was a relief pitcher on the team with a better tOPS+ when facing hitters for the first time in relief than Blyleven’s tOPS+ when facing hitters a third or fourth time in a game.
 
In 1971, at age 20, Blyleven’s tOPS+ against batters in their third plate appearance of a game was a fantastic 77 (the further below 100 the better a pitcher was in that particular instance). Only Minnesota closer Tom Hall was more effective in his first time facing batters as a reliever than Blyleven was facing batters a third time as a starter. And while Blyleven struggled a bit when facing batters a second time (107 tOPS+), he certainly had a good feel for his curveball when they stepped to the plate a third time.
 
Blyleven’s struggles the second time through lineups persisted throughout his career, but he actually got better as the game went on because he was throwing mostly curveballs, not fastballs. In 1986, Blyleven allowed an .853 OPS to hitters in their second plate appearance. But in their third plate appearance, opponents’ OPS was down to .733 and back up to .828 in their fourth look at Bert. So Blyleven, besides a knuckleballer, is the last person who should be calling for today’s pitchers to go longer in games because he was spending the early innings “finding” his curveball so he could throw it more often and more effectively late in games while pitchers today are throwing far more fastballs and fast breaking balls than he or anyone else in his era was throwing.
 
Reliance on Velocity Contributes to Baseball’s Problem
Since the 1980s, when the curveball gave way to the slider as the breaking ball of choice, pitchers have been throwing more fastballs and are understandably less effective against hitters a third and fourth time given that approach, losing their velocity and, in turn, movement. A curveball is difficult to track regardless of inning, but a fastball can be timed in a single plate appearance and exploited in the next. Sliders and cutters slide and cut less with less velocity, which is lost by pitchers faster in games these days due to the volume of fastballs and fast breaking balls thrown.
 
Since pitchers have been relying on fastballs more so than breaking balls, and rather effectively given the aforementioned statistics, pitchers ought not throw as many pitches as a curveball specialist given the medical research previously cited. Hence the advent of the pitch count.
 
Managers want to keep their starting pitchers healthy and able to start every five days, and the pitch count provides them with a guide for attempting to do so. But managers’ number one priority is winning ballgames, and throwing four or five electric arms at a lineup instead of one or two increases their chances to win games and preserve the health of their pitchers. But it doesn’t matter how fresh the arm or how electric the stuff if pitches thrown in the strike zone aren’t called strikes. Reliance on Humans Contributes to Baseball’s Problem
Baseball purists like my attorney and Blyleven think it’s the human element home plate umpires provide that makes the game of baseball great. Each home plate umpire having his (and “his” sadly is the proper pronoun, at least in MLB) own unique, strike zone does make the game great. It sparks dugout chatter and builds camaraderie as teammates badmouth that day’s enemy behind the plate while trying to figure out the one 60 feet, six inches in front of it.
 
Then questionable calls lead to looks of “whoa” directed at the home plate umpire, culminating in confrontation and eventual ejections followed by the truly inspired, laid-bare performances in response, as if these men, like all great thespians, forget they have an audience. Now that’s drama.
 
There’s nothing more entertaining in baseball than a player or manager getting their money’s worth after being tossed from a game. Maybe a three-homer game or a straight steal of home could rival Ron Gardenhire’s red-faced rants or the legend of Lou Piniella’s interpretive, dirt dances, but hitting for the cycle pales in comparison. An ejection can invigorate both a team and crowd for the entirety of the game like winning a fight in hockey. The cycle climaxes with a curtain call lasting a few minutes, while the ejected entertainers, also deserving of a curtain call, make for a lonely locker room to find some semblance of solace in a cold shower and comfort food.
 
Frankly, I think the decline in ejections has been detrimental to baseball and contributed to baseball’s problem attracting young fans, who have gravitated toward the soap operatic drama of soccer instead. Bad actors with no respect for the theatre of sport are taking advantage of baseball’s dwindling drama thanks to a surplus of soccer drama performed by characters like The Zlatan — too unreal for even MTV’s Real World.
 
The advent of replay has scrubbed the sport of baseball relatively clean when it comes to disputing plays on the bases, and that’s an unfortunate but necessary sacrifice to get the calls right. An electronic strike zone will have a similar effect, removing some of the drama that makes a baseball game both joyous and enraging for all involved.
I like when an incorrect call goes my team’s way as much as the next fan, and I scream at the television when an umpire or official misses one. Officiating-hating is part of the fun for fans of all sports. There’s a problem, though, when pitches outside the strike zone are called strikes in a game where even the best players fail seven out of 10 times. It makes a game ESPN’s Tim Kurkjian calls “the hardest game in the world to play” even harder for hitters.
 
Reliance on Spin Rate Contributes to Baseball’s Problem
Pitches these days are harder to hit than they’ve ever been. On average, they’re being thrown harder than they’ve ever been. Fastballs, split-finger fastballs, sinkers, sliders and even change-ups are being thrown harder in 2018 than they have since 2007, which is where FanGraphs’ dataset starts. Pitches are moving more, too. Sliders, on average, have more horizontal movement than ever, with a focus on spin rate making pitches move more and making it harder for hitters to recognize pitches.Not only has fastball velocity increased almost annually in MLB, but almost every pitch is being thrown faster than ever before.
So not only are we expecting MLB hitters to hit the nastiest pitches ever pitched, but we’re expecting them to hit the highest volume of nasty pitches despite an inconsistent strike zone that changes everyday, or twice daily for doubleheaders. The players are quite literally playing by different rules every game, and while Babe Ruth and Ted Williams dealt with similarly subjective strike zones in their eras, neither they nor the umpires of the day had to track an exploding slider or sinking and cutting fastballs thrown in the mid-90s all game, every game. Williams was subjected to defensive shifts, though, and they didn’t ruin the game back in the 1940s and won’t now.
 
The Solution to Baseball’s Problem
Baseball is a contact sport in that it requires contact between bat and ball to provide audiences action. “Strikeouts are boring. Besides that they’re Fascist,” as Crash Davis correctly claimed in Bull Durham. “Throw some ground balls. It’s more democratic.” Contact equals action, and a lack of contact is a lack of action.
 
Baseball’s problem attracting young fans is a result of that lack of action, not pace of play. You could shorten games to a two-hour time limit and without contact, the game would still be boring to young people. But the game wasn’t boring when Barry Bonds and Mark McGwire were launching steroid-fueled bombs into the stratosphere back in the 1990s because we had contact — epic contact.
 
Since ending MLB’s performance-enhancing drug policy is unlikely, using technology already available and already being used to train umpires to provide players with a consistent strike zone will lower chase and swing-and-miss rates, increase contact rates and, in turn, increase action. If baseball wants to attract young fans, instead of Commissioner Manfred altering the rules to limit defensive shifts or defensive positioning, he should consider implementing an electronic strike zone that’s consistent from game to game, umpire to umpire.
 
The most fun I have watching the lowly Twins is when Logan Forsythe runs out to left field from second base to serve as a fourth outfielder and then running back to the infield. Players are probably getting more exercise than they ever have in the history of the game, and movement is action.
 
Defensive shifts are the most interesting thing baseball’s had to offer since the Steroid Era. That is until Tampa Bay’s use of relief pitchers to start games becomes the norm so starters can relieve the “openers” and face hitters during their higher-leverage plate appearances the second, third and fourth time through the lineup. But instead of hitters figuring out a starting pitcher in their second or third at-bat, they’re figuring out a new pitcher in their second at-bat. If you thought strikeouts were out of control now, just wait until flamethrowing relievers are facing hitters at their most vulnerable — their first plate appearance — and then starting pitchers come in and make hitters relive the horror of their first plate appearance all over again.
 
Not only do both hitters and pitchers have to figure each other out throughout the course of a game, but they have to figure out the home plate umpire as well. Pitchers test the edges of the plate to see how wide the umpire’s strike zone is that day, resulting in plenty of pitches thrown out of the strike zone slowing play to a halt. A ball off the plate that doesn’t entice a swing is a complete lack of action, and a ball off the plate that does entice a swing tends to result in poor contact and little action. Until pitchers are forced to throw strikes, why would they? Greg Maddux carved out a Hall of Fame career pitching out of the strike zone, and he didn’t have the velocity or wicked movement pitchers feature today.
 
So what’s the answer to baseball’s problem? No, not robots, but technologically enhanced umpires. I’m not talking about creating special headgear that projects the strike zone on a see-through visor like Google Glasses and makes blue look like RoboUmp, although that’s a cool option. That way home plate umpires still feel useful and in control of the game, with technology assisting the umpire in calling a consistent strike zone instead of dictating balls and strikes. Technology is a tool humans should use to do work better; it should not be a means to do away with work altogether.
 
A less cool but effective option would be to put a microphone in the ear or a buzzer in the pocket of home plate umpires that indicates when a pitch is thrown in the electronic strike zone, and the technology is close to doing so accurately. That way hitters come to the plate every game knowing exactly what a strike is and is not, so they swing at more strikes instead of chasing balls incorrectly called strikes, which will result in more contact, better contact and fewer strikeouts despite defensive shifts. It will also give managers one less reason to argue with umpires, which, unfortunately, might be one of the last reasons left. But the electronic strike zone will make a three-plus-hour game more appealing to the short attention spans of young fans.

The Minnesota Twins employed the best catcher in baseball up until 2013, and over his tenure behind the plate, Joe Mauer proved to be one of the five or ten best to ever play the position. Since then however, the role has become somewhat of a black hole for the organization. With Jason Castro shelved in 2018 more question marks have surfaced. The biggest unknown going forward is what do Derek Falvey and Thad Levine do now?
 
Castro will return in 2019 on the final year of a three-year, $24.5 million deal. He'll be coming off a knee surgery that allowed him to play in just 19 games this season. At 32 years old he'll have spent 699 games behind the dish, and the likelihood that his best days are behind him remains real.
 
Initially billed as a framing wizard behind the dish, Castro ranked just 15th in baseball per Baseball Prospectus' Framing Runs metric for 2017. While not awful, that's hardly what the Twins had hoped given the hype around that being his best asset. Castro's .720 OPS last season was 29th among major league catchers with at least 130 plate appearances. To summarize, there was plenty to be desired on both sides of the game even before the injury.
 
Fast forward to 2018, and the Twins catchers have combined to post a .607 OPS. That number comes in 6th worst in all of baseball. Bobby Wilson, who has been the main starter behind the plate in Castro's absence, owns the 6th worst OPS among 55 catchers with at least 100 plate appearances (.507). Mitch Garver has been a significantly better bat, and Willians Astudillo profiles as such also, but neither have been trusted with the gear on.
The lack of belief behind the plate really points to the crux of the Twins issues.
 
Regardless of what form Castro is in when he returns, Minnesota has virtually no one else they're willing to turn to. Astudillo has posted strong framing numbers at Triple-A, and held his own throwing out 35% of would be base stealers. In seven games with the Twins (and nearly a month on the roster), he never once drew time behind the plate. Garver has been on the 25 man for the balance of the season, yet has been called upon to start at catcher just 45 times.
 
There's plenty of reason to believe that the Twins should compete immediately in 2019. Projecting another year of virtually everything going wrong seems like a poor bet, and the division should remain plenty open with the only other talented team being the Cleveland Indians. Before they get there however, the Minnesota front office needs to figure out a better blueprint at catcher.
 
Down the stretch, Garver should be prioritized over Wilson. Whether or not he's deemed an acceptable catcher shouldn't matter in a lost season. Figuring out to what degree he can be counted upon is a must. Astudillo seems like a career minor leaguer, and probably isn't the answer either. Should the results point towards a different direction than Garver, the Twins will need to get creative over the winter.
 
Castro could be presumed the starter out of the gate again, but a free agent could be brought in to take away those duties. Potential names on the open market include Yasmani Grandal, Wilson Ramos, and Devin Mesoraco. Should the Twins decide not to supplant Castro, another Chris Gimenez type might make sense in place of Garver.
 
Stepping further away from the situation, the reality is there's a ton of moving pieces and very few certainties for Minnesota. Catcher isn't a position rich in value across the big leagues right now, and while the Twins have two intriguing prospects in Ben Rortvedt and Ryan Jeffers, neither are close enough to make a difference any time soon. The role can't continue to be a revolving door for a team with postseason aspirations however, and driving towards a real answer needs to be a goal sooner rather than later.
 
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(Entry photo by Gregory Shamus/Getty Images)
 
Fogo de Chão, a Brazilian steakhouse with all-you-can-eat tableside-carved meats, was attributed by Eduardo Escobar before this season as a big reason for his success in 2017, according to an interview by the Star Tribune.
 
Reportedly, Eduardo Escobar is unwilling to be traded to any team whose home ballpark is not located near a Fogo de Chão. Namely, of the teams still in playoff contention this year, this will entirely rule out St. Louis (Cardinals), Cleveland (Indians), and Milwaukee (Brewers). It will likely also rule out the Los Angeles Angels, whose stadium is in Anaheim, 2 hours away from the nearest Fogo de Chão.
 
We reached out to Escobar, and he stated “Hey man, I really like Fogo de Chão. No Fogo de Chão would be no bueno. Big meat equals big hits.”
 
Of all the divisions in baseball, only the NL West has Fogo de Chão locations in every city, meaning likely suitors for Escobar could be the Dodgers, Diamondbacks, or Giants (who have a 90%, 45%, and 12% chance of reaching the playoffs in 2018, respectively, according to Fangraphs as of July 5th).
 
On the year, Escobar, a utility infielder who has mostly played third base this year, is hitting .277 (.867 OPS) with 13 homeruns and 50 RBI. Eduardo Escobar will be a Free Agent at the end of the 2018 season, after earning $4.85M this season with the struggling Minnesota Twins.

During the final game of the last homestand against the Rangers, after the Twins dropped the first three games of the series to the Rangers, many fans noticed a change to the familiar Minnie and Paul celebration sign in center field.
 
As an apparent gesture of the Twins performance this year, likely in particular that of the offense lately, Minnie and Paul had paper bags placed over their heads. Minnie and Paul are well-known for their friendly handshake over the Mississippi River.
 
Minnesota Twins Senior Director of Ballpark Development and Planning Dan Starkey said, “We felt this was the correct gesture to ensure that Twins fans have the right mentality when coming to Target Field to cheer on the Twins this year.” He added, “We are considering making additional changes to the famous Minnie and Paul sign. For example, after Joe Mauer leaves the Twins or retires, we’re considering changing the handshake to some kind of fist bump to appeal to current players and millennial fans.”
 
We asked Starkey if they had any additional plans around Target Field, other than with Minnie and Paul, to commemorate the failing Twins season. “Well if the Twins are truly going to continue being a bad team this year, why not embrace that and find ways to enjoy it? When the Twins are officially eliminated from playoff contention, we are planning on hosting a paper bag giveaway sponsored by Cub Foods so every fan can watch the game from the comfort and security of a paper bag over their head with some eye holes poked into it. We’ll even have mini paper bags for the kids,” Starkey said.

Prior to the news of the Minnesota Twins re-signing veteran reliever Matt Belisle, I had every intention of writing a piece on the curious usage of Matt Magill. Paul Molitor has routinely been lackluster when it comes to bullpen managment during his time as Twins skipper, but things got even more confusing today. After revamping the relief corps going into the season, Thad Levine, Derek Falvey, and Paul Molitor have found a way to make a relative strength into a revolving door.
 
Needing a fresh arm at the tail end of April, the Twins turned to Matt Magill. Prior to that point, Magill last pitched in the big leagues during the 2016 season. He had just 32 innings under his belt, and at 28 years old, he was a relative flier. Now having been on the 25 man roster for 40 games, he's been used just 13 times in that stretch. Without knowing his numbers, it may not seem egregious given the lack of history to build off of. The numbers though, well they're very good. In 20.2 IP with Minnesota, Magill has posted a 1.31 ERA with a 7.4 K/9 and 1.3 BB/9.
 
It wouldn't be a terrible thing to Magill to be largely unused if the Twins found themselves avoiding a need to go to their bullpen. However, in that 40 games timeframe he's been with the club, Ryan Pressly has been ran out to the mound 21 times, while Addison Reed has been called upon on 19 occasions. In the 21 games Pressly has appeared in, he has a 6.11 ERA and is allowing an .886 OPS to opposing hitters. Reed's 19 appearances have equaled out to a 3.38 ERA (compared to a 2.57 mark prior), and an .895 OPS against. To say they are running on fumes is an understatement. It being only June makes matters worse.
 
Then comes the news of Matt Belisle.
 
Not only is Paul Molitor not using his full relief corps currently, but he's now been given a veteran arm that the worst bullpen in the big leagues (Cleveland) decided to give up on even at Triple-A. Belisle filled in admirably as the Twins closer down the stretch last season, but his fastball velocity has declined to a career worst 90.9 mph. He's also ceded runs in three of eight appearances at the highest level this season. Molitor hasn't given Magill the opportunity to spell his horses despite Matt proving worthy of a chance, now he'll have an arm that should be utilized in a similar vein to Tyler Kinley or Phil Hughes before him.
 
Sure, there's a value to clubhouse presence, and that will be a notion disseminated freely when referencing Belisle's signing. That's more a cop out than anything however. Addison Reed, Zach Duke, and Fernando Rodney were intended to be the veteran presence brought in over the offseason. All solid clubhouse guys, they effect Belisle has in the matter should be well represented in the doldrums of Target Field. By spinning an odd fit with the clubhouse tag, Minnesota should and does likely alienate more deserving players toiling away at Triple-A.
 
Tyler Duffey noted frustration when he was recently optioned back to Triple-A. While he's had poor stints with the Twins this year, he was perfect in his recent opportunity and likely deserved better. Most egregious in all of this is none other than Alan Busenitz. Across 24 Triple-A innings thus far, Busenitz owns a 0.38 ERA, 10.5 K/9, and 1.9 BB/9. There's no other way to put it except that it's a massive mistake to have him be wasting bullets in Rochester. No longer a prospect at nearly 28 years old, Busenitz has proven he's well above the Triple-A level, and he should be working his way into a back-end role with the Twins.
 
The signing of Matt Belisle on its own isn't some terrible decision. Given the factors at play however, it's one that Thad Levine, Derek Falvey, and Paul Molitor should all be questioned for. The bullpen is currently mismanaged, internal options likely provide a higher impact, and a negative message is sent throughout the organization. While the front office deserves to be commended for how they handled the offseason, the roster moves since the games began are puzzling at best.
 
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Ehire Adrianza has no business playing shortstop everyday, and Gregorio Petit has no business on an MLB roster. Ryan LaMarre should be nothing more than a fourth outfielder and pinch runner. And it’s way past time for the Minnesota Twins to call up Nick Gordon.
 
This was originally published at FoulPlaybyPlay.com.
 
The Ehire Adrianza Problem
On Wednesday night in Minneapolis, Ehire Adrianza started at shortstop because Logan Morrison’s back was still a bit stiff, moving Miguel Sano to first base and Eduardo Escobar to third. Miguel playing first makes a lot of sense, but Adrianza being in the lineup with Gordon hitting .357 at AAA Rochester just doesn’t compute.
 
Adrianza even had two doubles and drove in a run before booting a ball that led to a four-run sixth inning. Adrianza wasn’t given an error on the play. How I don’t know, but it was the play that forced the Twins to go to its bullpen, specifically, the overused Ryan Pressly. Pressly has appeared in 31 of the Twins’ 58 games, and he’s starting to show signs of fatigue. In his last three appearances, he’s allowed three earned runs over two innings, allowing four hits and a walk.
 
The Pressly problem I’ll save for another rant. This rant is about never seeing Gregorio Petit and Ehire Adrianza in Twins uniforms again. Even if Gordon struggles to hit in the bigs, which hasn’t been a problem for him at any level, he’s better defensively and on the bases than Petit and Adrianza right now.
 
Gordon is an Upgrade Defensively at Shortstop
Adrianza is three runs below average over 1,200 innings at shortstop. Petit is 48 runs below average over 1,200 innings. And while I don’t have access to the same stat for Gordon, Baseball Reference does tell me his range factor per game (3.46) is higher than Adrianza’s (3.28) and Petit’s (2.67).
 
Gordon is an Upgrade on the Bases
It’s also safe to assume Gordon to be a better base runner than both Adrianza and Petit. I can’t tell you how many runs Gordon is worth on the bases, but I can tell you he’s faster than Adrianza and Petit. Baseball Prospectus’ editor Aaron Gleeman indicates as much with regards to Adrianza on Twitter.
 
Adrianza and Petit have each cost the Twins a run on the bases this season and have combined for three stolen bases on four attempts. Gordon is seven of 11 on stolen base attempts this year.
 
Gordon is an Upgrade at the Plate
I know what you’re thinking: “It doesn’t matter how good Gordon is on the bases if he’s not on base.” Well, his batting average at AAA is higher than Adrianza’s on-base percentage and Petit’s batting average. Gordon is hitting .357 with an on-base percentage of .379. Adrianza’s on-base percentage sat at .281 at the time of this writing, and Petit’s average is .308 in 30 plate appearances.
 
The Lineup with Gordon
Assuming Morrison and Joe Mauer become available soon, which seems to be the case, you might think Adrianza’s playing time will diminish, and that’s true. But until Byron Buxton is healthy, which could take considerable time, LaMarre will still play center field, where Max Kepler is 35 runs above average over 1,200 innings to LaMarre’s -56. That’s a difference of 91 runs over 135 games.
 
I don’t know about you, but I’d also rather have Nick Gordon’s bat in the lineup instead of LaMarre’s. LaMarre might be hitting a respectable .288 with a .681 OPS, but just three of his 18 hits have gone for extra bases. Consider this:
Joe Mauer, 1B
Brian Dozier, 2B
Eddie Rosario, RF
Miguel Sano, 3B
Eduardo Escobar, LF
Max Kepler, CF
Logan Morrison, DH
Mitch Garver, C
Nick Gordon, SS

I think this lineup is better defensively, better on the bases and better at the plate than Paul Molitor’s, but I’m not the reigning American League Manager of the Year. Molitor might not be able to convince president of baseball operations Derek Falvey and general manager Thad Levine to call up Gordon, and I don't know what they're doing claiming Taylor Motter, but Molitor should be in their ear every day, because it’s way past time for the Minnesota Twins to call up Nick Gordon.

We are close to the beginning of the baseball season, so it is time to release my top 10 prospects for the Minnesota Twins. There are so many prospects who could make a huge jump and knock on the door of the top 10. After losing 2016 first round pick Alex Kirilloff for the whole 2017 season, he will be back. This is a deep prospect list and many could eventually make the big leagues.
 
10) Akil Baddoo, OF (2017 teams: GCL, Elizabethton)
 
Before Terry Ryan was fired, Baddoo was in his last draft class. He is one of two on this list from this class (Kirilloff). After being ranked outside the top 20 Twins prospects, Baddoo had a huge 2017 campaign. After having a batting average of .267 with the GCL Twins, he was promoted to Elizabethton, and he took off. While in Tennessee, he hit .357 and had an OPS of an incredible 1.057. He had 45 hits with Elizabethton in 126 at-bats, and nearly half of his hits (20) were of the extra base variety. In addition to those stats, he had 27 walks and 19 strikeouts with Elizabethton. All that while being more than two years younger than his competition. If he can replicate his play from 2017, he could knock on the door of the top five. The sky is the limit for the 19-year-old.
 
9) Blayne Enlow, SP (2017 team: GCL Twins)
 
After being talked about as a possible first round pick last year, Enlow fell to the third round due to signability, where the Twins grabbed him. There was plenty of buzz surrounding him heading into his debut last summer, and he did not disappoint. In 20.1 innings, Enlow had an ERA of 1.33 and held opponents to a .141 batting average and an OPS of just .433. He also struck out 8.4 per nine, and had a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 4.75. Enlow gave up just 4.4 hits per nine and had a WHIP of 0.69. Enlow has a curveball that is the best in the organization and if he can add a bit of velocity, he will sky rocket up prospect lists. The 19-year-old will likely start in Elizabethton, but will be in Cedar Rapids by the end of the year.
 
8. Brusdar Graterol, SP (2017 teams: GCL, Elizabethton)
 
Graterol missed the 2016 season due to Tommy John surgery, but when he came back in 2017, he picked up right where he left off. In five games with the GCL Twins, he was 2-0 with an ERA of 1.40 and a WHIP of just 0.72 in 19.1 innings. When he was promoted to Elizabethton, he struggled a bit (especially compared to his showing in the GCL). In his 20.2 innings in Tennessee, he had an ERA of 3.92 and a WHIP of 1.21, but did have a strikeout ratio of 10.5 strikeouts per nine innings. With the tougher competition in the Appy League, his control took a dip. After walking just four in 19.1 innings for the GCL Twins, he walked nine in 20.2 innings for Elizabethton. After throwing 85-87 when he signed out of Venezuela, he reaches triple digits now. If he can improve his off-speed pitches to complement his heater, he can be an ace with the Twins.
 
7. Alex Kirilloff (2017: missed season)
 
Kirilloff had a very solid 2016, hitting .306 with seven homers and 33 RBI in 55 games. Not bad for being thrown to Elizabethton after being drafted out of high school. He will likely be a corner outfielder with the big club, but can play center when needed. The reason he was drafted so high is his power. The 20-year-old has a chance to hit 25-30 homers when he develops and ends up in Minneapolis. After playing in Tennessee in 2016, Kirilloff will start in Cedar Rapids on what will most likely be a loaded Kernels lineup.
 
6. Brent Rooker, OF/1B (2017 teams: Elizabethton, Fort Myers)
 
Rooker was selected in the first round by the Twins, and started in Elizabethton and mashed. He started out a bit slow, but finished hitting .282 and an OPS of .952. Of his 24 hits with the E’Town Twins, Rooker crushed seven homers and exactly half of his hits were extra bases. After he was promoted to high-A Fort Myers, he kept smashing. With the Miracle, he hit .280 with 11 more bombs. He had close to the same stats in Florida as he had in Tennessee. The only major dip was in slugging, where he slugged .552 after slugging .588 in Elizabethton. But still, .552 is extremely good. He still strikes out too much, but that is fine when he hits homers at the rate he does. Rooker has the potential to hit 40 homers in the big leagues. The former Mississippi State standout will start in Chattanooga, and if dominates there, I would not be surprised if he ends up in Minneapolis by the end of the season.

With just a handful of days left until pitchers and catchers officially report to Fort Myers for Spring Training, Minnesota is nearing the end of its offseason. The main focus when it comes to additions was starting pitching, and due to the market, that remains the one area left unattended at this point. Whether before or after spring training officially kicks off I expect that to be dealt with. What remains to be seen is whether or not Derek Falvey and Thad Levine have interest in adding a bat to supplement their bench.
 
As things stand right now, the Twins appear to be alright opening the season with a bench of Robbie Grossman, Eduardo Escobar, Ehire Adrianza, Mitch Garver, and Kennys Vargas. Considering the possible (see: likely) suspension for Miguel Sano, Zack Granite could also find his way into this group out of the gate. Of the names above, it's Vargas that is more than likely the most on the bubble. Out of options, and having bounced between Triple-A and the big leagues a season ago, he's probably the first to go if space is needed.
 
Operating under the assumption that Vargas is the quintessential 25th man, the question revolves around whether or not he can be improved upon. From a construction standpoint, Vargas almost certainly needs to be replaced by a bat first player. Grossman figures to see regular time as the designated hitter, while Adrianza and Escobar have similar skillsets despite Eduardo toting the more capable bat. Garver is entrenched as the backup catcher, and should serve as a platoon option for starter Jason Castro. Bringing in another utility man means Minnesota relies solely on Grossman as the outfield option (which is currently the case), and the lack of a true bat could expose Robbie being heavily reliant on his on-base prowess.
 
In an ideal world the Twins greatest addition to the bench would be in the form of a right-handed hitting outfielder. Offering the potential to pair with Max Kepler (should his facing left-handed pitching continue to be a detriment) as well as play in rotation across the corner spots makes a lot of sense. Between Adrianza, Escobar, and Garver, each of the infield positions has a true and capable backup. After posting a -21 DRS in 630+ innings in the outfield during 2016, Grossman shored things up somewhat totaling a -3 DRS mark across 350+ innings a year ago. There's still plenty to be desired with the glove there, but he showed that he can be less of a liability if need be.
 
Among the options, former Twins center fielder Carlos Gomez has an intriguing profile. He would give the club positional flexibility across all three positions, and posted a .340 OBP in 2017 with some pop. At 32 the hope would be that he could be had on a short-term deal, and that could be of intrigue to Minnesota. Another more elder option comes in the form of Jose Bautista. This would be a relative leap of faith given his age (37) and 2017 season. Posting a .674 OPS there's reason to believe that he's simply cooked. Bautista is just one year removed from an .800+ OPS however, and if you could get him on a minor-league deal or something incentive-laden there would be a level of intrigue.
 
If you want to go more of an unconventional route, a versatile super-utility type could be a fit. Noted as a possible fit by Zone Coverage's Brandon Warne on Twitter, former Minnesota shortstop Eduardo Nunez has some appeal. Nunez played 20 games in the outfield a season ago for San Francisco, and he got some time out there for the Twins in his first stint with the club. His career -3 DRS across 322 OF innings slots in line with 2017 Grossman, and I'm not a big fan of non-traditional outfielders playing the position. That said, Nunez's .801 OPS from 2017 is more than enticing. He's posted a .778 OPS over the last two seasons while playing in at least 110 games during each. It seems given semi-regular playing time, he can be an offensive asset as well.
 
At the end of the day Kennys Vargas should probably be given a final shot. His career .748 is far from abysmal, and the .833 OPS in 47 games during the 2016 season was exciting. Vargas hasn't proven to be much of an OBP guy (just .311 for his career), and the 251/65 K/BB ratio is more than concerning. All of his eggs remain in the power basket, and if he's not taking free bases then he needs to be accumulating them in bunches. At 27 he's no longer a prospect, and the Twins likely have a significant amount of information to feel comfortable with their evaluation of him.
 
This seems like a no lose scenario, with a slight opportunity for a win. Vargas is hardly a red flag on the 25 man, and you could do much worse. What Minnesota could also do is look for some competition or even to supplant him completely, and in turn, raise the water level as a whole. There's a few more weeks for us to see how this all plays out, but it'll be a storyline worth watching this spring.
 
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Read this story in full on Zone Coverage here.
 
It’s a play as old as the game itself, and maybe that’s because the DH didn’t always exist. It’s the bunt, a time-honored tradition that is being phased out of the game more and more every year.
 
Fangraphs has sacrifice bunt totals dating back to 1895, and according to their database, the 925 sacrifice bunts laid down by teams in 2017 was the second-lowest figure in MLB history. Only the 1900 season (806 bunts) featured fewer, and there were only eight teams back then.
 
So yeah, the bunt is dying a slow death.
 
At a glance, the Twins were in the middle of the pack as far as bunts were concerned, checking in 17th among 30 MLB teams with 26 sacrifices in 2017. That’s a deceptive number, though; flip the dial to only AL teams, and only two teams -- the White Sox and Rangers -- bunted more often than the Twins.
 
That’s more problematic. Subtracting NL teams -- yay, pitchers hitting! -- from that figure shows how much more the Twins were devoted to bunting than their junior circuit contemporaries.
 
To frame up how different the game is bunts-wise, consider this:
 
Twins bunts as a percentage of MLB on the whole: 2.8 percent (one team = 3.3 percent of MLB)
Twins bunts as a percentage of AL on the whole: 9.6 percent (one team = 6.7 percent of AL)
 
As you can see, bunting is severely shifted toward the NL, and the Twins are well above the average mark of their AL contemporaries.
 
The White Sox offense was absolutely dreadful in 2017, scoring 109 fewer runs than the Twins while the team lost more games than every team in the AL but the Detroit Tigers. The Rangers were in the thick of the race for much of the season despite Adrian Beltre missing time due to injury and a patchwork rotation, and scored just 16 fewer runs than the Twins while winning 78 games to Minnesota’s 85.
 
So maybe everything said in this space will also apply to the Rangers -- we’ll see.
 
Here’s one thing that stands out, and it is glaring: no team bunted more than the Twins did with their No. 3 hitters. In fact, according to Baseball Reference, the Twins bunted five times with their third hitter. The rest of the league combined bunted six times with their No. 3 guy -- and no team did so more than once.
 
And according to Parker Hageman of Twins Daily, none of those bunts led to runs. Blech.
 
So what’s the big deal? It’s just giving up an out to move up a base. Doesn’t it make it more likely the team scores a run? Doesn’t it lead to more scoring? Aren’t those basically asking the same question?

Now into the final third of the 2017 Major League Baseball season, the Minnesota Twins have somewhat mapped out their destiny. Selling off short term assets, they will be positioning themselves to make a playoff run in 2018. In the first year under Derek Falvey and Thad Levine, the club was in somewhat of a feeling out period. Over the offseason, the biggest change could come in who heads up the dugout.
 
Paul Molitor was given a one-year grace period by owner Jim Pohlad. Despite mixed results his first two seasons, Molitor was saved as Pohlad mandated that whoever take over for Terry Ryan, keep the current manager in place. Now in the last of a three-year deal, Molitor has nothing to fall back on, and management could go a different direction.
 
When hired, Molitor was up against a group that included names such as Doug Mientkiewicz and Torey Lovullo. The other names in consideration were significantly younger than he was, and had a bit more going for them in terms of managerial experience. Molitor was a guy I backed, and thought made sense, but as we've seen, it's been a bumpy road. It's hard to go backwards and consider what could've been at this point, but the past three years lay a blueprint for Minnesota to avoid.
 
Chief among the issues that plague Molitor are in game decision making, and his relatability to younger players, which is currently the lifeblood of the Twins future. Regarding in game decisions, Minnesota's skipper has done everything from pinch running in odd situations, to making head scratching bullpen moves. In relief, Molitor has latched onto a few guys each year, and ridden them into the ground. For 2017, that name has definitely been Taylor Rogers. Despite running an overflowing bullpen for the bulk of 2017, the same select arms have been used.
 
There's been select games that one could point to in illustrating bad in game managing or bullpen usage, and there's also been a concerning trend of the same mistakes being made. For Molitor, it seems to boil down to a lack of experience, or an inability to best position the Twins for success. Being paired with help like Jeff Pickler this year, it's probably not something that has gone unnoticed by the men in charge.
 
Outside of the in game decision making, there's been a confusing inability to develop youth. While not in the clubhouse or involved in any conversations, it appears from the outside that Molitor struggles with relating to the backbone of Minnesota's core. Whether it be Jorge Polanco, Miguel Sano, Byron Buxton, or some other name, Molitor has dropped the ball at times over the past three seasons. Young players have either gone underutilized or put in odd situations at times, and knowing they represent the organization's future, that's more than a little concerning.
 
In reality, managers in baseball come in somewhere along the middle of the spectrum as far as coaches go. They maybe don't make as many impactful decisions as coaches of other sports do, but the few opportunities they get each night, can have a big influence. Employing an average or mediocre manager may not matter in the standings, but an above average or good choice can absolutely steal you a game or two. Conversely, someone below average as I would argue Molitor has been, can cost a few games over the course of a season. That hasn't mattered in recent memory for Minnesota, but a team with playoff aspirations as soon as next year should want more.
 
As things stand right now, I'm not sure where Derek Falvey and Thad Levine may turn. I do believe they'll go elsewhere to manage the 2018 Twins, and I don't think they can be faulted for that practice. Molitor is finishing out his contract, and I can't see a scenario in which Minnesota or another organization is lined up to give him more run. Paul Molitor the player was a great one, but as a manager, the Twins will need something more a year from now.
 
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Thursday, the Twins officially announced what many had suspected all along: "Engelb Vielma," supposedly a light-hitting middle-infielder from Venezuela, is actually a fictional creation, a la Sidd Finch.
 
"Frankly, we were surprised that our joke went on so long," said Twins spokesman Dustin Morse. "It seemed obvious that it was a prank, especially when we put it out that his middle name was 'Stalin,' but in the internet age, people just assumed that he was a prospect and didn't question it."
 
Vielma, whose name was created by scrambling the letters in "Level Beaming," the title of a feature on Rob Antony's new car, supposedly batted a combined .265 across High-A and AA last season. With the Twins' dearth of shortstop options, some wondered if Vielma could potentially provide some much-needed depth.
 
"I think people just wanted to believe," said Antony. "After things with Levi Michael went south, people just needed something to grab onto."
 
When asked about the status of Ehire Adrianza, whose name is an anagram for "Zanier Airhead," or Wander Javier ("A Redrawn Jive"), Antony only grinned cryptically and said, "Hope is definitely around the corner for Twins fans."

Jose Berrios made his major league debut on April 27, 2016. He now has made nine starts for the Twins, the latest of which came today against the Detroit Tigers. As has been the case more often than not, he wasn't good. This time though, it resulted in Jose Berrios being demoted to Triple-A Rochester.
 
This is the second time Berrios has been demoted by the Twins this season. The latest occurrence though highlights a culture of ineptitude at the big league level. Everyone from Paul Molitor on down seems absolutely clueless when it comes to not only Berrios, but the majority of the young prospects supposedly tasked with revitalizing the organization.
 
On the season, Berrios owns a 9.24 ERA and is 2-4 across his nine big league starts. He owns a poor 35/23 K/BB ratio, and his pitches have been all over the strike zone. In hoping to fix that, Minnesota has recently gone with a committee approach. Molitor, pitching coach Neil Allen, pen coach Eddie Guardado, starter Ervin Santana, and even Hall of Famer Bert Blyleven have taken to observing the young Puerto Rican. The collective brain trust has failed, and done so miserably.
 
The issue I have with how things went down following Berrios' latest poor start is that the Twins come out looking clueless in the whole mess. A young 22 year old top pitching prospect just got shelled. It's not the first time, and his struggles haven't been consistently getting better either. Instead of letting him continue to work through it under the best coaches the organization should have, the big league club (and staff) simply washes their hands of him.
 
While with the Twins in his latest stint, Berrios was given direction by seemingly everyone with a mouth and the ability to walk to the Target Field pen. No doubt reeling with the amount of information and tweaks he was trying to make to his game, the process was absolutely experiencing more negativity than anything else. Rather than realize that this club is destined for 100 losses though, and Berrios continuing to work through things against the only competition he hasn't mastered, Minnesota gave up.
 
Earlier this season, Jorge Polanco was sent back and forth between Triple-A and the big leagues despite no reason for Minnesota to do so. Paul Molitor was clueless when it came to intitially utilizing Max Kepler. Heck, Byron Buxton is so wrecked that prominent national analyst Keith Law has suggested Buxton stay at Triple-A until he's traded to an organization that "knows how to develop him as a hitter" or Molitor and his staff is gone. The collective coaching staff at the highest level for the Twins is arguably a larger laughing stock than that of the clubs 48-79 record.
 
Don't worry though, Jim Pohlad has suggested that Paul Molitor will be the first thing inherited by his newly hired General Manager.
 
At this point, you can't help but to feel for the likes of Jose Berrios and Byron Buxton before him. Berrios doesn't have a good outing or two to spare him. Thankfully Kepler has 15 home runs, and Polanco has a solid average, otherwise the likelihood of Molitor continuing to mismanage them would remain high as well.
 
Going into 2017, there's nothing more important than Jose Berrios and Byron Buxton getting right at the major league level. The problem is, the Minnesota Twins don't have organization pieces in place to allow that to happen. Unfortunately, we got to see that on full display yet again.
 
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In 2016, very few things have gone right for any extended period of time for the Twins. Whether it be losing, injuries, or mismanagement, the group has not had a good showing coming off of a near playoff year (flukey as it may have been). There's one guy, and his situation, that may embody most of the shortcomings for Minnesota this season, Jorge Polanco.
 
Now, before you go leaping off the deep end, Jorge Polanco has been arguably one of the best players from the Twins in 2016. He's absolutely nowhere near their list of problems. However, the handling, utilization, and understanding of Jorge Polanco may almost perfectly describe a host of the Twins shortcomings this season.
 
Starting the year off down at Triple-A, Polanco was looking up at a roster that didn't seem to have much room for him. Brian Dozier was entrenched at second base, and at some point, the plan was for Miguel Sano to take over at third. Really, the only thing left up in the air was whether or not Minnesota had a real shortstop. For the better part of the first half, Eduardo Nunez played out of his gourd, earned an All Star trip, and held down the role. When he was flipped to San Franscisco though, it finally became time for Polanco to play.
 
By this time, Polanco had already been shuffled between Triple-A Rochester and the big leagues three different times. Each time he was called up, manager Paul Molitor seemingly didn't know how to use him. He didn't find time in the lineup, and he was passed over for lesser options. Molitor's public comments were of the vein that as a young player, there may not be much of a role for him one the big league club at the current juncture.
 
Here's the problem with that train of though, Jorge Polanco is 23 years old, and already out of options a season from now. He's one of Minnesota's best prospects, and there's very little track record of him being given any considerable run to showcase his talents at the highest level. On a team with a record among the worst in baseball, there's no excuse to continue to exclude him.
 
Finally, the training wheels come off. Since his most recent promotion he's played in 18 games for the Twins. Polanco has hits in 16 of those games, and has gone from hitting at the bottom of the order, to being among the top three. He owns a .347/.355/.440 slash line, and has been a catalyst for the Minnesota offense. If there was one thing known about Polanco, it's that his bat would play, and it has.
 
Then there's the other side of the equation, defense. Molitor shuffled Polanco around between third, second, and short to start. Despite knowing that two-thirds of those positions were supposedly spoken for, Polanco still being utilized as a utility type. It wasn't until his eighth game with the club, following his recall, that he finally played shortstop. Then, Molitor played him there three games in a row, and eight of the last 11 contests. The decision is only concerning because of the way in which we've gotten here.
 
Despite playing nearly 3,000 minor league innings at short in his career, Polanco played a whopping zero there this season for Triple-A Rochester. Although it appeared that was his best bet for consistent playing time, Minnesota operated using the idea that Polanco's arm wasn't strong enough for the role, as absolute truth and didn't manage their roster accordingly. Since, and with the understanding that it's a small sample size (just 72 innings), Polanco has been worth 3 defensive runs saved and posted a 1.8 UZR. Those marks make him easily the only productive defensive shortstop the Twins have had this season. Having had 40 chances now across his post-recall time at short, Polanco has committed just one error, and it was of the fielding variety.
 
At this point, Jorge Polanco is no more than long term answer at shortstop for the Twins than he may have been entering the season. What he has been however, is a tale of youth that has been underutilized, an organization that was ill-prepared, and a management style that doesn't suggest awareness of the positioning in the standings relative to the long term goals of the club. If Minnesota is actually going to rely upon their developed talent as they should be, knowing when to get the acclimated, comfortable, and productive is something that can't continue to be overlooked.
 
For now, Polanco may have given the Twins enough leash to save themselves, but this is a trend that can't continue to happen.
 
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Back on June 11, the Minnesota Twins were defeated by the Boston Red Sox 15-4, giving up 10 runs over the final two innings to let an otherwise close game get out of reach.
 
It wasn’t just another loss in another losing season. It was noteworthy because it gave fans their first look at J. T. Chargois, a highly-touted, hard-throwing pitching prospect from the 2012 draft. Chargois is one of many collegiate relief pitchers the Twins have been stockpiling with high picks in the amateur draft over the past several years, and became the first of these picks to make his major league debut.
 
Twins manager Paul Molitor said before the game that he would look for a low-pressure situation in which to ease Chargois into his role. It made sense. Chargois was coming off of two lost seasons to elbow surgery and had pitched on back to back days only once in 2016 to that point. The late innings of a lopsided game seemed like a good spot to give him his first appearance. Any runs Chargois might surrender would have little impact on the final result. And surrender them he did—he faced eight batters, six reached base, and he was charged with 5 runs in 2/3 of an inning.
 
And just as quickly as he had been called up to the majors, Chargois was immediately optioned back to AAA after the game.
 
Introduction
 
Chargois was drafted in 2012 out of Rice University with the 72nd overall pick, one of five college relievers selected among the Twins’ first eight picks that year. The Twins then drafted heavily again in this way in 2014. Obtaining more college relievers with high velocity and expectations of much quicker promotions was welcome news for many Twins fans, who were enduring a string of losing seasons in which their team would finish near the bottom in many pitching categories. The 2014 season was one in which division rival Kansas City was building a pennant winner around its overpowering, upper-90s-throwing bullpen arms. Twins used the 42nd overall pick in June 2014 on Nick Burdi, a relief pitcher from Louisville who could reach 100 mph on the radar gun.
 
But the 2014 draft was two years ago, and the 2012 draft was four years ago already. The Twins bullpen in 2016 is still relying on softer-throwing minor league signings made during the offseason. Where have all the college relievers gone?
 
From reading the discussion boards at Twins Daily this season, I noticed others asking this same question. TwinsDaily writer Seth Stohs had an article back in December on the long list of college relief pitchers the Twins have drafted over the past decade. Other than that, references were scarce; I couldn’t find much (or didn't conduct the right searches) about how college relief pitchers became major league relief pitchers. Are the Twins promoting their relief prospects too slowly? That was my main question, but I had some other questions too. I decided to frame the questions as an academic type of study. I wanted answers with Chargois and Burdi in mind, two guys who were selected with second round picks and have been indisputably developed for the purpose of becoming major league relief pitchers.
 
The natural response to the question of whether the Twins are promoting these pitchers too slowly is: They are promoted when they are promoted. Hard to argue with that explanation, but for many people, it’s not good enough.
 
I wanted to compare how other organizations promote pitchers with profiles similar to Chargois and Burdi through their minor league systems. My intent was not to perform any sophisticated statistical analyses or conclusively answer any big philosophical questions, nor do I consider roster issues, or a pitcher’s velocity or pitch repertoire, or any qualitative information that might affect a player’s progress or a team’s evaluation of it. I just wanted to dig up some data, present it, and see if it was saying anything.
 
I settled on three hypotheses or questions I wanted to test. First, that the Twins have drafted more of these types of pitchers than most other organizations; second, that the Twins promote these pitchers more slowly than other organizations; and third, that it makes no difference to their careers when these pitchers make their first major league appearance, whether it be a critical situation or low leverage.
 
Also, I believed that there are more efficient ways to obtain strong bullpen arms than targeting them in the amateur draft, but I chose not to address this last question. A good rundown of the best relievers the Twins have developed over the years is here, and they are not primarily relief pitchers drafted from college.
 
On the initial three hypotheses, I found the answers mixed. But I did discover a couple of things that surprised me.
 
Methods
 
In order to arrive objectively at a set of pitchers to examine, I established some rules. First, I would define what a college relief pitcher is. Then I would set some conditions for which pitchers from the draft were eligible for inclusion into the sample, and finally, I would need to decide on how to measure the promotions of these pitchers once they were in a team's minor league system.
 
Above all, I was interested in success stories. Again, I was targeting players who were drafted as college relievers, who pitched in relief in the minors, and who eventually reached the major leagues as relievers for the team that drafted them. I wanted to know what characteristics these ballplayers had in common, and if Chargois, Burdi and other Twins relief pitchers shared those characteristics.
 
Defining a college relief pitcher. I didn’t want starting pitchers in the group. During his college career, J.T. Chargois appeared in 47 games as a pitcher and started only 2 of them. (Note: I would use the Baseball Cube for retrieving college stats, and then verify these stats against other sources when possible.) I was comfortable calling Chargois a college relief pitcher. Other times it was less clear. Logan Darnell appeared in 43 games—strictly in relief—in his first two seasons at Kentucky. In his third and final season, he made 11 starts. Was Darnell a college reliever? Did the Twins consider him one? I wasn’t sure.
 
After browsing through the records of many former college pitchers who were selected in the draft, I settled on the following rules. A college relief pitcher would be someone who:
pitched in relief in a majority of games his final college season; or, pitched in relief in a majority of all college pitching appearances; and
pitched fewer than 200 innings total as a college pitcher.
There is nothing special about these rules; I thought they simply made sense for what I wanted to look at. Unfortunately those rules created a couple of odd exclusions, including Chance Ruffin, who was the closer for the Texas Longhorns during the 2010 NCAA season but who made 28 starts in his two prior seasons at Texas, exceeding the innings limit. Also disqualified as a relief pitcher here was Madison Boer, who the Twins drafted at the end of the 2nd round in 2011 but who also barely exceeded the innings limit (according to Baseball Cube). It's also not impossible that a pitcher or two in this study might have been unintentionally mis-categorized, but if so, it was without bias.
 
Eligibility for sample. Having defined a college reliever, I then decided I would only look at picks in the first and second rounds, including compensation picks. This would include Chargois and Burdi in my set (but not Darnell, who in 2010 was a sixth round pick).
 
I settled on the drafts from the years 2004-2012, however. This meant I would have Chargois, but not Burdi, who was drafted in 2014. I decided that for any players drafted 2013 or later, their teams wouldn’t have the benefit of development time. Though this endpoint excludes Burdi, I will bring him into the discussion later. I had also supposed that Chargois, a mid-second round pick in 2012, might be the final pitcher in the set chronologically, but my first surprise was that there was a college relief pitcher drafted later than Chargois in the second round who has been in the major leagues for several seasons now.
 
The 2004 draft was my other endpoint, or beginning point, because in my initial browsing, I discovered that Huston Street was part of that draft, and he is an example of the successful type of college pitcher I imagine the Twins are hoping to develop with these picks. I also liked the 2004 draft for the irrational reasons that it was the first draft held following the publication of Michael Lewis's Moneyball, it was the draft of Glen Perkins, and also the draft of Matt Bush, the first overall pick that year, selected as a shortstop but now pitching effectively in relief with the Texas Rangers. (Perkins and Bush are not otherwise part of this study.)
 
As I was finishing this project, I became aware that in 2002 the Twins drafted Jesse Crain in the 2nd round with the 61st overall pick. Crain then debuted for the Twins two seasons later. Crain would have qualified for this list had I broadened the year range back to 2002. But by that time, I did not want to expand the set of pitchers based on this selected piece of information. However, like Burdi, I will bring Crain into the discussion at various points of interest.
 
How to measure the speed of promotions? I thought it would be reasonable and convenient to use innings pitched to measure a pitcher’s time spent at each minor league level. Innings pitched has the advantage of familiarity over other measures like batters faced, game appearances, or even calendar days spent at a level. I would track the number of innings pitched up until the pitcher's major league debut.
 
I also began with the intention of tracking minor league performance, such as strikeout and walk rates, but as I went on, I felt less of a need for this. Sample sizes are too small for this exercise, and my own judgment about performance would be too uninformed and subjective. Here is an example. An argument could be made that Nick Burdi, compared with his stats in college, struggled with control (a higher BB/9) at his first minor league assignment in A ball at Cedar Rapids. Indeed, I believe the Twins even stated this. However, Huston Street, with the Oakland organization, also struggled with control in this same way (with a higher BB/9) at his first minor league assignment. I began the study wanting to measure performance, but when I considered things like park bias, and sample size, I decided it was not significant. Huston Street pitched only 2 innings in AAA, after all. Whatever his walk or strikeout rate in AAA, it wouldn't be as significant to me as the number of innings he pitched. I reasoned that Oakland would not have promoted Street after a mere 2 innings in AAA if they did not feel he was ready.
 
In the end, I was comfortable bypassing statistics altogether and using the promotion itself as the main indicator for satisfactory performance.
 
I did not account for innings pitched in exhibitions, minor league postseasons, or independent leagues. Only innings pitched in the affiliated minor leagues were part of this study; in other words, the innings pitched total you would see if you checked MiLB.com.
 
Likewise, other than Chargois, I had very little information on injuries for these pitchers, and I simply used their presence in games as an indicator of health.
 
The College Reliever Search
 
Using the criteria above, I found a total of 50 college relief pitchers drafted in the first or second round from the years 2004 to 2012.
 
Have the Twins drafted more college relief pitchers than other organizations? This was my first hypothesis, and from this pool of relievers, I would conclude yes. From this set of 50, the Twins drafted five college relief pitchers within the first two rounds between 2004 and 2012. The Dodgers also drafted five. The Diamondbacks and the Cardinals each drafted four, and no other team accounts for more than three such pitchers.
 
However, I determined that 27 of these 50 relief pitchers were converted to starters early in their minor league careers, or were given enough starts to cast doubt on whether they were drafted with the strict intent of becoming major league relief pitchers. For example, Mason Melotakis, drafted in the 2nd round of 2012, met the conditions of a college relief pitcher, but he made 18 starts in A ball to begin the 2013 season. Carlos Gutierrez, drafted in 2008, had a similar profile as a potential starter. Starting games in the minor leagues made Melotakis, Gutierrez and the others distinct enough from Chargois and Burdi that I excluded them from my set.
 
Removing those 27 converted starters from the original set of 50, and removing four others who did not sign a contract (including Josh Fields, who is actually counted twice in the set of 50 as he was drafted in consecutive years), I arrived at a set of 19 college relievers who were drafted in the first two rounds and then used almost exclusively as relief pitchers in the minors.
 
The Twins drafted 3 of these 19 players to become relievers exclusively, while no other team drafted more than two. Setting aside Melotakis and Gutierrez, here are the three Twins pitchers who would make up part of this group of 19 (Table 1):
 
Table 1: College relief pitchers drafted by the Twins between 2004-2012 in the first or second round, who were developed exclusively as relief pitchers in the minor leagues


 
Because I was only interested in college relievers who have reached the majors with their original teams, I sorted these 19 relief pitchers into even smaller sets: three who were traded to another organization while still in the minors, including Bullock (and also Josh Fields again, who I will mention later); three who retired or were released by their original clubs before making it to the majors; and two who are still in the minors with their original clubs, including Luke Bard. That left 11 left over. The remaining 11 pitchers were the ones I was looking for—college relief pitchers who made it to the major leagues as relievers with the club that originally drafted them.
 
These were the guys who again, like Chargois and Burdi, were selected with high draft picks, developed through the minors almost exclusively as relief pitchers, and made their debuts with the teams that drafted them.
 
Table 2 introduces these 11 pitchers, listed chronologically by year drafted and draft position: Bill Bray (drafted as a Montreal Expo), Huston Street, Craig Hansen, Joey Devine, Chris Perez, Eddie Kunz, Ryan Perry, Daniel Schlereth, Drew Storen, J. T. Chargois, and Paco Rodriguez.
 
Table 2: College relief pitchers drafted between 2004-2012 in the first or second round, who were developed exclusively as relief pitchers in the minor leagues, and who debuted in the major leagues as relief pitchers for the teams that drafted them


 
By collecting data from this set of 11 relief pitchers, I could now look at innings pitched to test my second and main hypothesis, about whether the Twins are promoting college relief prospects more slowly than other organizations. I got my answer, but found that the question was a little more complicated than that.
 
Before collecting this data, however, I wanted to get a sense of how well these pitchers have performed in MLB. A couple of these pitchers are well known, while a few of them I had not heard of or had forgotten about. Table 3 lists these same pitchers, tracking the pitcher by age and the fWAR accumulated in the majors at that age, through the end of the 2015 season:
 
Table 3: Age of relief pitchers per season, and accumulated fWAR for that season


 
There are some problems with using fWAR and dividing by seasons played to put a value on a player, but I was only looking for approximations. Additionally, when evaluated this way, I found these pitchers could be put into three natural groupings: a very good group, an above average group, and a below average group.
 
The following data re-sorted and displayed in a bar graph (Figure 1) will illustrate these three groupings better. The top and bottom of each grey bar represent the highest and lowest season fWAR for each pitcher. The black line near the middle of each bar represents the pitcher’s career average fWAR. The league average fWAR for a relief pitcher is 0.16, indicated by a dashed line.
 
Figure 1: Relief pitcher high and low season fWAR, represented as a bar graph, relievers sorted by general effectiveness


 
The first three bars in order are Huston Street, Drew Storen, and Chris Perez. These three make up what I considered the very good group. The next three bars are the above average group of Paco Rodriguez, Joey Devine, and Bill Bray. The last group of bars includes Ryan Perry, Daniel Schlereth, Eddie Kunz, Craig Hansen, and J. T. Chargois.
 
The pitchers will be sorted in this order in all of the bar graphs to follow.
 
I put Chris Perez with the first group based on his career saves total, and because Perez’s fWAR was hurt by his final two seasons. bWAR treats Perez much better than fWAR. Perhaps Perez would fit better in the middle group, but I chose to include him in the top group. Perez also was named to two All Star games.
 
You can also see Jesse Crain’s performance in this graph. The first bar represents his seasons with the Twins, which would fit neatly with the above average group of relievers. Crain’s second, taller bar represents his full career, including his final three seasons with the White Sox.
 
Results and Discussion
 
My second hypothesis was that college relief pitchers in the Twins system were promoted more slowly, as measured by innings pitched, than the pitchers in the other organizations. Note that this innings pitched data is not intended to differentiate across seasons, only minor league levels.
 
For each of the 11 relief pitchers in the final set, Table 4 lists the number of innings each pitched at each minor league level prior to their major league debuts:
 
Table 4: Relief pitchers, innings pitched per minor league level


 
Below is the same information presented in bar graph format (Figure 2). Already, one or two things start to stand out.
 
Figure 2: Relief pitchers, innings pitched per minor league level, represented as bar graphs


 
The first thing that stood out to me is the tallness of the bar representing Chargois. Chargois pitched more minor league innings prior to his debut than all but Perez.
 
Another clear bit of data that stood out is the number of innings Chargois pitched in rookie league, which I generally thought to be for players coming out of high school. All six of the very good and above average relief pitchers skipped the rookie level. At first, I thought that the Twins not having a short season A- team might have narrowed a choice of assignment to either rookie level or A level, but each of the top three relievers pitched in organizations with a short season A- level team, yet were assigned directly to A level.
 
However, looking at Chargois and the top three relievers, what also stands out is a pattern of promotions those pitchers were given through the minors. Each of the top three of Street, Storen and Perez began their careers at A ball, pitched at AA, and then at AAA. Storen also made a stop at the high A+ level. Each of the top three spent their longest minor league assignment, measured by innings pitched, at AA. On its face, it looks significant to me that this progression of promotions is shared among the top three relievers, and I find it encouraging that Chargois also followed this progression. What’s more, none of the other seven relievers in the set shows this progression in just this way. On the contrary, the promotion patterns of the others seem haphazard in comparison.
 
The most common characteristic shared among all the pitchers is pitching at the AA level. Ten of the eleven pitchers in this set pitched in AA prior to their major league debuts. The top three were then promoted to AAA and promoted to the majors from there. However, six of the other seven were promoted to the majors from AA.
 
Nine of the 11 pitchers prior to their debuts, including Chargois, pitched their highest number of innings in AA. Perhaps these organizations see AA as the most important level for these pitching prospects.
 
But for how long did these other pitchers stay in MLB after their debuts? Here is a chart with an additional bar to represent major league innings pitched following each pitcher’s debut:
 
Figure 3: Relief pitchers, length of first stay in major leagues, represented as a bar graph


 
Again, Chargois stands apart from this group in a few respects. His initial stay in the majors was very brief and fits more with the bottom of the group or relievers than the top group.
 
The table below shows the number of major league game appearances and innings pitched for each pitcher following their initial call up (Table 5):
 
Table 5: Relief pitchers, number of game appearances and innings pitched following MLB debut


 
The best three pitchers had three of the four longest stints in the major leagues. Street was with the team from Opening Day, and Storen and Perez were each called up in the middle of May. Bill Bray was called up in June and then traded in July. Paco Rodriguez was a September call up, then broke camp with the Dodgers the following spring. Only Joey Devine was demoted shortly after his first call up.
 
Leverage of First Appearances
 
Does the leverage index of a debut appearance make a difference?
 
I decided to look at the leverage index of the first three major league appearances of each reliever (Table 6). Approximately, low leverage is a number under 0.85, medium leverage is between 0.85 and 2.00, and high leverage is anything higher than 2.00:
 
Table 6: Relief pitchers, leverage index (LI) of first three major league appearances following first call up


 
Most of the relievers did indeed debut in low leverage situations, if not quite blowout losses as Chargois did. In fact, Huston Street’s first three appearances were also fairly late in blowout games (one win, two losses).
 
The big difference between Street and Chargois is that Street eventually took over the closer role later in his rookie season, something Chargois seems unlikely to do.
 
The highest leverage debut appearance came from Joey Devine, who entered a game in the top of the 12th inning for the Braves. Devine’s appearance was rated a leverage of 2.31. Devine was one of Bobby Cox’s last options from a bullpen that appears to have been depleted from the previous couple of games. Devine pitched a scoreless top of the 12th, struck out trying to lay down a bunt with two strikes in the bottom of the 12th, then got into trouble in the top of the 13th before surrendering a grand slam and taking the loss.
 
Meanwhile, Bill Bray was credited with a win in his debut appearance—without facing a batter. Pitching for the Nationals and manager Frank Robinson, Bray entered a game in Milwaukee in the bottom of the 8th inning with a runner on first and two outs, his team trailing by a run. He was brought in to face the rookie Prince Fielder, but the baserunner was caught stealing after the first pitch, ending the inning. The Nationals scored two runs in the top of the 9th and another pitcher replaced Bray to record a save. Bray got the win. The baserunner who was thrown out? Corey Koskie, in his final major league season.
 
Jesse Crain's MLB debut in August 2004 was in a 0.51 leverage situation, trailing by five runs in the 4th inning versus the Angels. Gardy pulled no punches with Crain’s next two appearances, however, with leverage indexes of 2.85 and 3.41 each, one of those being an extra-inning appearance.
 
As far as leverage is concerned, I am not sure there is enough information—here or anywhere, perhaps—to determine whether a debut appearance in a high leverage situation will impact a career negatively. Introducing a relief pitcher into a low leverage situation wouldn’t seem to hurt, however.
 
Other Pitchers
 
In the following bar graph are the innings pitched of some additional pitchers, including Twins, who were not part of the original set of 11. Each of these pitchers were also relief pitchers in college and developed as relief pitchers in the minors:
 
Figure 4: Relief pitchers, innings pitched in minor leagues, represented as a bar graph


 
The first three remain Street, Storen, and Perez. The next two pitchers, separated by extra space in the middle, are Chargois and Nick Burdi. Chargois’s stats are through his debut in June, while Burdi’s stats are through the end of 2015, before his 2016 season began.
 
The next group of six pitchers is made up of Twins. In order, from left: Billy Bullock, Luke Bard, Zack Jones, Jake Reed, Trevor Hildenberger, and Jesse Crain. The stats for Crain are up through his major league debut in 2004. The stats for the other five Twins pitchers run through the end of the 2015 season and do not include 2016.
 
The final bar at the far right is Josh Fields, who was just traded from Houston to the Los Angeles Dodgers, which is now his fourth professional organization. Briefly on Josh Fields: Fields was among the 19 relievers in the sample above who were college relievers and pitched almost exclusively in relief in the minors. Seattle drafted Fields with the 20th overall pick in 2008, and notice how they assigned him directly to AA, skipping the lower levels completely. After seeing the progression of promotions from the top three relievers, it’s not hard to imagine how Fields might have struggled in that first long minor league assignment, facing a quality of competition he was not yet suited for, and then having trouble catching up and meeting expectations from that point forward.
 
The second tallest bar, next to Fields, is Jesse Crain. You can see how the Twins promoted Crain comparatively slowly, but also according to the progression of minor league levels, without skipping a level. Crain spent the longest time in AAA, rather than AA.
 
Notes on other Twins college relief pitchers here include:
Billy Bullock, drafted in 2009, in the 2nd round with the 70th pick. Bullock was traded to Atlanta during spring training of 2011 after 107.2 minor league innings with the Twins. Bullock pitched in AAA for a couple of seasons and then was suspended in December 2012, effectively ending his career;
Luke Bard (2012), 1st round with the 42nd pick. Bard has been hit with significant injuries which perhaps prolonged his stay in A ball, but is currently healthy and pitching in high A;
Zack Jones (2012), 4th round, 130th overall. Looking at his stat line, Jones seemed to pitch well and even improve on his college numbers in 3 ½ seasons in the Twins system. Jones was then taken in the Rule 5 draft by Milwaukee in December 2015, but returned to the Twins in June. He is pitching in AA;
Jake Reed (2014), 5th round, 140th overall. Reed would not have made my original set, for pitching too many innings in college. Reed sputtered when promoted to AA in 2015, but is performing very close to his college numbers in AA now in 2016;
Trevor Hildenberger, 2014 draft, 22nd round, 650th overall. Successful late round picks are fun stories, and Hildenberger is finally getting some attention this season. Like the others in this study, he was a college reliever who was developed as a reliever in the minors. Like the other Twins, he has progressed through every level, and was promoted comparatively slowly to Street, Storen and Perez, which I attribute partly to his low draft selection and lower expectations. Hildenberger has dominated at AA this season;
Mason Melotakis. I did not include Melotakis in the bar graph above, because the games he pitched as a starter in 2013 would distort his innings compared with the others. He was drafted in 2012, 2nd round, 63rd overall. He has been promoted on the same schedule as the others, with stops at every minor league level, including rookie. Melotakis is also currently pitching in AA;
Pat Light. Light was drafted 37th overall in the 2012 draft. He was a starter in college and in the low minors, but has pitched exclusively as a reliever since being assigned to AA to begin 2015. At AA he has pitched 29.2 innings in 21 appearances, and at AAA he has pitched 64 innings in 51 appearances. He debuted with Boston on April 26 of this season and had two appearances before being demoted back to AAA;
Alan Busenitz. Busenitz was college relief pitcher drafted in the 25th round of the 2013 draft. He has pitched 254 innings in the minor leagues, mostly in relief.
All of which leads us to Nick Burdi.
 
On the surface, it looks as though Burdi and Chargois are being promoted on the same schedule as the other Twins college relief prospects. Here is the comparison of Burdi’s minor league innings through 2015 with the innings pitched by Street, Storen, Perez, Chargois, and Crain prior to their major league debuts:
 
Figure 5: Relief pitchers, comparison


 
Again, Street and Storen were promoted fairly quickly, while Perez and the three Twins were promoted less quickly, or even slowly, in comparison. Chargois and Crain pitched 75.2 and 85.2 innings apiece through the AA level prior to their debuts. Similarly, Burdi reached 84 innings through AA through the end of 2015 (not counting Burdi’s innings during Chattanooga’s 2015 postseason run).
 
Notice how Burdi skipped rookie ball and was assigned directly to A ball in 2014. As we’ve seen, for the Twins this is unusual. Remember too that Burdi struggled in the first half of 2015. After 30.1 innings in AA he was demoted back to A+ for a short time. Burdi then pitched 20 more innings in A+ before his promotion back to AA.
 
Now suppose that Burdi, instead of struggling in those first AA appearances, had pitched very well. Suppose he pitched well enough that instead of being demoted at the end of June, the Twins instead promoted him to AAA, and he pitched in AAA until the end of the Rochester season. Here’s how the graph might look under these new innings totals (FIG 6):
 
Figure 6: Relief pitchers, comparison alternative


 
This alternative promotion schedule is similar to Storen’s, especially through the end of AA. If the 33.1 innings pitched by Burdi after his demotion had all been credited to AAA instead of the lower levels, the AA to AAA innings ratio would have resembled Crain’s prior to Crain’s debut. It is not a stretch of the imagination to think that Burdi would have been considered for a September call-up last season had his season gone differently.
 
Wrapping up
 
Looking only at this small set of 11 pitchers, one can conclude that what is most important to the major league success of these pitchers is not the speed of their promotions, but instead is the logical progression of promotions the pitcher takes through the minor leagues. The pitching prospect is drafted and assigned to a minor league team, after which point the pitcher advances level by level, without skipping more than one level at a time, until AA is reached. A college relief pitcher on a successful development plan can skip the rookie level, but will not skip the AA level. At AA, the pitcher may be asked to pitch more innings than at any previous level. AA is then followed by a stop in AAA, which is followed by the pitcher’s MLB debut. The soundness of this progression is even more evident when looking at the major league careers of the college relief pitchers in this study who did not follow the progression (Figure 2). It’s true that better data and a larger sample of pitchers might alter how this conclusion currently looks, but for now I am standing behind it.
 
Unfortunately for this study, the relative slowness with which the Twins promote their relief prospects means that their success will not be apparent for a while. The quick promotion of Paco Rodriguez, selected 10 picks later than Chargois in 2012, does suggest that a late second round pick would not need to be promoted slowly out of fear of hurting the pitcher’s career. The Dodgers had already gotten more than three seasons and 1.2 fWAR from Rodriguez before trading him away during his age 24 season. With the slower timelines the Twins prefer, the Twins figure to miss out on the early value a college relief pitcher might present.
 
Only after I finished with the above data did I hunt for pitchers with similar profiles who fell outside of my set. This is when I discovered Jesse Crain, drafted in 2002. There are pitchers such as Jake Barrett in Arizona (2012, 3rd round) and Tony Zych in Seattle (2011, 4th round) who were taken a bit later in the draft and spent a great deal more time in the minors than Chargois, but there are also pitchers like Joe Smith (2006, 3rd round), who was promoted rapidly by the Mets and debuted in MLB with only 32.2 minor league innings behind him.
 
A similar, better study of minor league promotions would widen the sample of pitchers, and would also improve on the definition of college reliever as used here.
 
For now, it's reasonable to think that the Twins still expect a few of these relievers in their system to become valuable major league contributors. I would also conclude that most of these relievers have been promoted responsibly, if a little slowly. But again, too slowly? It's hard to know for sure. Chargois could probably have been called up by now. Once Burdi becomes healthy, the Twins will probably ask him to pitch more minor league innings than he really needs. And aside from Chargois and Burdi, there is still an abundance of young pitching prospects in the Twins system waiting for their chance. Perhaps half of the AA Chattanooga bullpen is made up of former college relief pitchers who could stand to use a promotion, but not to the majors yet—to AAA.

There's not much hiding from the fact that the 2016 Minnesota Twins aren't good. Currently just 24-51 through their first 75 games, Paul Molitor and Terry Ryan have put a stinker on the field night after night. While there's plenty of blame to be handed to the players under-performing, there's a true scapegoat in all of this.
 
At the end of the day, the criticism for Terry Ryan hasn't been loud enough.
 
Sure, it's maybe not fair to pile on a 62 year old that's in well over his head. That being said, he's currently the General Manager of a Major League Baseball team, and his ineptitude suggests we probably haven't dissected just how bad it is, often enough. Forget the fact he asked his best young player to play out of position, or the reality that he's made countless of boneheaded roster moves in 2016 alone. Honestly, you can forget that fact that the debacle known as 2016 has even happened, none of it matters, and none of it absolves Ryan from what he's done.
 
What is it that he has done you ask? Now in his 20th season as the General Manager of the Minnesota Twins, Ryan has compiled losing records in 13 of those seasons (including 2016). He's orchestrated two separate four-year stretches of 90 plus losses, and his teams have won just 47% of the 3,083 games he's presided over.
 
After handpicking his replacement in Bill Smith following the 2017 season, he's come back to be even worse. Since his return in 2011, the Twins have won only 42% of their games, and have had just one winning season. Ryan has never sniffed anything close to a World Series berth, and the playoffs have been made just four times.
 
In short, no sane franchise gives any comparable run to a General Manager that has failed at the level Ryan has for the Twins.
 
Not only has Minnesota given Terry Ryan 20 years of employment, but they have also entrusted him with one of the most critical situations in recent Twins history. Following the second four-year 90 loss stretch under his watch, Ryan was tasked to rebuild. He had a talented farm system that was supposed to be the biggest piece of the puzzle, and in turn, make Minnesota relevant at the highest level.
 
Instead, Ryan has decided to put bandaids on a bullet wound, and turned his nose at a rebuild. He's committed significant money or years of employment to players like Phil Hughes, Ricky Nolasco, and Kurt Suzuki, He moved his star third basemen to right field and got him injured. He's failed to make trades when they appeared obvious, and instead has sold at a player's lowest possible value, or cut bait all together (see Arcia, Oswaldo). Seemingly lacking understanding of player options, he's misused his young talent (see Tonkin, Michael or Polanco, Jorge), and he's committed to veteran retreads.
 
Ryan most recently can be pitted against franchise gurus such as Theo Epstein or Jeff Lunhow. With both the Cubs and Astros finding themselves in similar positions to the Twins during recent memory, both have turned their respective franchises around and are in significantly better places than that of the hapless Twins. While both Chicago and Houston were looking to turn things around and sustain a high level of play into the future, Ryan was worried about toeing the line of mediocrity for the here and now.
 
To summarize, nothing the Twins do in 2016 matters. Poor trades, poor roster management, poor decisions, all of it together doesn't matter. Sure, the more decisions that Terry Ryan has a hand in, the further the franchise will be set back for the long run. Really though, the only thing that matters is that the Twins realize and do something about their 20 year long mistake.
 
Terry Ryan is not a good General Manager, and he's never been a good General Manager. A brief period of relevance is a distant memory, and far from worthy to hang the franchise's hat on still today. It's not an enviable situation to make a change at the top, but until the Minnesota Twins rid themselves of the man who has brought them 20 seasons of losing, nothing matters.
 
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The Twins bullpen has been a problem area in the early going this season, and despite being left largely unaddressed this offseason, I expected the minor moves to make some difference. In short, some aspects have played out as expected. Fernando Abad has been about as good as I assumed, and Casey Fien has struggled along the lines I pictured. A guy I worried about though, was Kevin Jepsen, and that's been a bigger issue.
 
Jepsen appeared a very large regression candidate coming into the 2016 season. After being acquired from the Tampa Bay Rays, Jepsen posted a 1.61 ERA for the Twins along with a 2.56 FIP. His 8.0 K/9 was right near his career average, and his 2.3 BB/9 were the best result of his career. Having never seen significant time as a closer previously, he grabbed 10 saves for Minnesota as a replacement for the injured Glen Perkins.
It all added up to a situation that just seemed too good to play out again.
 
Now around 20 games into the 2016 Major League Baseball season, the wheels have essentially fallen off for Jepsen. He owns a 4.15 ERA which probably doesn't highlight how poor he's been. His 7.3 K/9 is fine, but he's striking out just 17% of opposing hitters, the worst mark of his career. He's blown three saves, and has converted just two on the season. Now matter how you break it down, he's far from anything certain in a closer role.
 
There's a couple of things Jepsen seems to be doing differently early on for the Twins. He's relied on his fastball nearly 75% of the time this season (nearly a 10% bump from 2015), and has all but abandoned his changeup (using it just 2.7% of the time). Combining the usage with the fact that his 94 mph velocity on his fastball is the lowest of his career, it's resulted in less than ideal output.
 
On top of that, the effectiveness of Jepsen's pitches seems to have waned as well. In 2016, he's gotten batters to chase ptiches out of the zone just 24.1% of the time (lowest mark of his career) and well as generating swinging strikes just 8.7% of the time (lowest mark since 2013). When he throws a ball in the strike zone, opposing hitters are making contact a ridiculous 92.2% of the time (also the worst mark of his career).
 
Right now, Jepsen's problems are a perfect storm. He's not executing his pitches, and when he is, they simply aren't very good. He's not fooling hitters, and he's generally dancing around trouble rather than attacking and avoiding it. The sum of all parts suggests the regression I expect to set in, but I really didn't see it coming this quickly.
 
It's more than fair to attribute some of Jepsen's problems to the role he is being forced to play. Thanks to Glen Perkins binding the Twins with a week one DL stay, the former Rays reliever is pitching in a high leverage closer role he has no business occupying. In a pinch, as was the case in 2015, the situation may work for a brief period of time. As a shut down late inning reliever, you'd expect a ballclub to do better than Jepsen however.
 
For now, it sounds like manager Paul Molitor has issued a vote of confidence to his 9th inning arm. I'd hope the leash isn't too much longer, as the Twins can't continue to cough up leads and are already scarping for every W tally they can get. At some point, it might make sense to give Trevor May a shot, or even call on one of either J.T. Chargois or Nick Burdi to assume the role. The latter two are more drastic measures, while the former is worth a try.
 
Regardless of what eventually takes place, the path and process Kevin Jepsen is currently travelling down and executing upon can't continue to happen.
 
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On Tuesday, I checked the 25-man rosters of all 30 MLB teams, checking not for quality, but quantity - of players by positions. While this may not be the opening day roster, it was probably close.
Of the 30 teams:
• Most had 12 pitchers. Two teams - the Athletics and the Mets had 11 pitchers. the Mets actually only had 24 players on the 25-man roster. The Cubs, Giants and Indians had 13 pitchers. All others had 12.
• Four of the AL teams – Athletics, Red Sox, Royals and Tigers had a player named as a designated hitter. The other 11 teams did not.
• The three-man catcher appears to be a thing of the past. Only the Cubs carried three catchers. All other teams had two designated as catcher.
• Teams had between four and seven infielders and between four and seven outfielders designated. One should keep in mind that some players can play both infield and outfield positions (such as Danny Santana, Miguel Sano, Eduardo Escobar and Eduardo Nunez). Eight teams designated seven infielders, but only Oakland designated seven outfielders. The Athletics were also the only one to have only four infielders.
A lot of teams had four, five or six infielders and outfielders. But only the Royals had equal numbers of each (five).
• Half of the teams (15) had exactly six infielders. Fourteen teams had 4 outfielders; 11 teams had five outfielders. Five teams had either six or seven outfielders.
• The most common roster was 12 pitchers, two catchers, 6 infielders and 5 outfielders (9 teams had that).
• The Cubs, Mets, Athletics and Royals had unusual combinations of pitchers, catchers, infielders, outfielders and/or designated hitters that no other team had. Oakland's was most unusual - with 11 pitchers, 7 outfielders, only 4 infielders, 2 catchers and a DH. It's one of only 2 teams with 11 pitchers (all others had 12 or 13); only team with 4 infielders; only team with 7 outfielders, and one of four teams with 4 DHs.
P IF OF CA DH
Mets – 11 6 5 2
A's – 11 4 7 2 1
Cubs – 13 5 4 3
Royals – 12 5 5 2 1
Twins – 12 6 5 2 (most common)
 
I'm not sure of the significance of all of this. But if the Athletics, Mets, Cubs and Royals succeed with their unusual combinations of players, will other teams copy them?
Probably not.

Today marks the Minnesota Twins home opener. A game that represents the first sellout of Target Field in quite some time, may be more a letdown than originally expected. With no Ervin Santana, and a team that owns a 1-5 record on the season, expectations have already plummeted. In the early going however, the Twins have seen less innovation and more of the same from Paul Molitor, and it hasn't been a good thing.
 
When hired, Molitor was regarded as an elite baseball mind, and someone that embraced what the game had transitioned into. While not a full blown sabermetrics guy, he appeared to be someone that would be up to date on any new way to win. Hired from within, Molitor seemed to buck the trend of the Terry Ryan cloth and bring a fresh bit of insight to the bench. Thus far, the Twins have seen anything but, and their record struggles to deter from more of the same as well.
 
Down in Fort Myers, Molitor mentioned being open to the idea of batting Joe Mauer (a high on base percentage hitter) second, while moving Brian Dozier (a power guy) into the third spot. This happened once during spring training, and has yet to take shape since. With Torii Hunter batting in the cleanup spot, the Twins have struggled to get much going from the bulk of their order, and the run production hasn't been there.
 
Over the weekend, the Twins decided to place starting pitcher Ricky Nolasco on the disabled list. The move cleared up a spot on the active roster. It was announced that Trevor May would be called up to pitch the home opener on Monday, but as a starter, he didn't need to be added back until the end of the series with the White Sox. Instead of calling up a bullpen arm that could have helped the club in Chicago, the Twins added Trevor May immediately on Saturday. Instead of having a fresh bullpen arm (because no doubt the pen had been taxed in Detroit with starters only going just over 12 innings in three games) Minnesota had May on the bench sitting in a windbreaker.
 
On top of that move, Eduardo Escobar headed to Minnesota and missed a game due to the birth of his child. The Twins failed to call up a bench bat in his place for the day, and Jordan Schafer was forced to look overmatched against David Robertson to end the game on Saturday (while Josmil Pinto hit a 2 run walk-off home run for Rochester).
 
Really what it all adds up to is just a curious set of circumstances. While the Twins touted a changing of the guard for much of the offseason, Molitor has more often than not deferred. Whether Ron Gardenhire or Molitor is on the bench, it would seem hard to differentiate at this point. It's probably still to early to be grabbing pitchforks, but there's no doubt that a change of thinking needs to be implemented. For the Twins to accomplish heights they have not in recent years, a shift in the thought process needs to take place. It may start above Molitor at the Terry Ryan level, but there's no doubt on field execution needs some fine tuning.
 
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Our Minnesota Twins enter today with a record of 54-65, tied for 12th in the AL with Boston, and bringing up the rear in the AL Central. The Forums and Blogs could fill volumes about what has transpired, what should have happened, and where we can go from here. However, I'd like to take a more quantitative approach and look at the team versus the rest of the league to see what we can deduce about the team and where they are losing the most ground. Based on this data, I'll comment a bit on what this means going forward.
Here's the your 2014 Minnesota Twins in a nutshell (through 8.13.2014):
 
Win-Loss Record: 54-65
Pythagorean Win-Loss Record: 56-65
W/L Rank in AL: T-12/15
Payroll: $84,912,500 (11th/15 in AL)
 
Hitters and Fielding
AL Runs Scored Rank: 8th/15
 
Weighted Runs Created (wRC+) by Position (100 = league average, definition):
Position: Twins, AL, and Diff.
C: 108, 94, +14
1B: 90, 107, -17
2B: 115, 91, +24
SS: 97, 85, +12
3B: 94, 99, -5
LF: 91, 102, -11
CF: 114, 103, +11
RF: 86, 98, -12
DH: 88, 102, -14
All Pos: 97, 99, -2
Runs/G: 4.20, 4.23, -0.03
Fielding%: 0.985, 0.984, +0.001
 
Pitching
 
AL Runs Against Rank: 12th/15
 
Starters: Twins, AL, and Diff.
Starters ERA: 4.97, 3.99, +0.98
QS Ratio: 44%, 51%, -7%
xFIP: 4.20, 3.91, +0.29
K/9 & BB/9: 6.0 & 2.5, 7.3 & 2.8, -1.3 & -0.3
BABIP: 0.319, 0.299, +0.020
 
Bullpen: Twins, AL, and Diff.
Bullpen ERA: 3.28, 3.63, -0.35
xFIP: 4.04, 3.75, +0.29
K/9 & BB/9: 6.9 & 2.7, 8.3 & 3.3, -1.4 & -0.6
BABIP: 0.291, 0.292, -0.001
W/L in Relief: 17-13, 18-17, -
 
Total ERA: 4.35, 3.86, +0.49
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
So what can we say about these numbers? The starting pitching has largely failed this team. Currently the starters' ERA is nearly a full run above the league average. The offense has been excellent from "up-the-middle" positions but production from the corner positions (and DH) lags far behind the rest of the league.
 
Let's dig a bit further, starting with the hitters. The most obvious thing is that Joe Mauer has really hurt this team since moving to 1B. It's hard to overstate this enough. He accounts for 27% of the payroll and the team is trailing the league average 1B by 17 wRC+. Hopefully this will change, and he's been hot recently since returning from the DL but these numbers look back, not forward. We could look at a variety of hitting metrics here, but wRC+ is a good one that incorporates overall hitting contribution. If not for Kurt Suzuki's unexpected, above-average play it would look even worse. What else? Traditionally, offensive production comes from the corners and the DH. We are significantly lacking at four of these five positions (but still below average at all five). Injuries to Willingham have hurt. Arcia has been banged up but has largely been a bust this year (injuries haven't helped). Still I'm glad he's getting a chance to play despite his struggles. Rather than use the DH as a position to stash a defensively-limited, stud hitter, they have again used it as a position to plug in whomever Gardy wanted in the lineup that day that he didn't have room for. A DH by committee usually isn't a good sign, certainly not if you're "saving" it to rest the legs of a below average 1B or feature below average hitters at every corner position. The Twins have been pleasantly surprising up the middle, getting above average production from Suzuki, Santana, Dozier, and Escobar (and Fuld, essentially). These guys have largely offset poor production from "power" positions allowing us to rank in the middle of the pack in runs scored overall.
Which brings us to the pitchers. This is where the Twins are losing the most ground to their competition. More specifically, it's the starting pitching. Despite good seasons from Phil Hughes and Kyle Gibson, the rest of the rotation has been way below average. Our starters have been a little unlucky as evidenced by their xFIP and BABIP, but still, they strike out less batters, get taken out sooner, and provide fewer QS (quality starts) than other staffs. The bullpen has actually been better than the league average. However, further analysis suggests they may be getting somewhat lucky. Like the starters they strike out fewer hitters, but have a much lower BABIP and their ERA is well below what would be expected from their FIP. They've also managed a better record that the rest of the league; however, this is more likely a by-product of poor starting pitching performances (i.e. less opportunity to blow leads and more opportunity to vulture come-from-behind wins).
What does this mean going forward?
The first order of business is to decide what 2015 will be about. Will they attempt to win the division or use it as a "transition" year? In any case, the rest of 2014 must allow the team to assess what pieces can contribute at SP and the "power" positions. Finally, I think it would be wise to consider the bullpen. There's a good chance they'll regress. It falls off tremendously after Perkins. If they are to compete for the division, let alone in the postseason, they really need two or three above average arms in the pen. Right now there aren't any complementary bullpen arms who are (well) above average.
 
Personally, we should have relatively low expectations for 2015. The Twins will likely be trying to assess the same issues next year. In my opinion, the best we can hope for is to find one to three players who can be fixtures at power positions (Sano, Vargas, Arcia). Unfortunately, they don't have any power prospects in the upper levels beyond the aforementioned guys. On the staff, Nolasco has to improve, obviously, but they also need to fill in two other positions (assuming nobody gets hurt, which never happens with pitchers right?). Maybe Meyer and May can do that, but it's asking a lot to go 2-for-2 with top pitching prospects out of the gate (health issues aside). And the bullpen... they need to find two or three upgrades there as well. Maybe Stephen Pryor, the art school phenom or Nick Burdi? Do all that, stay health... and we can win the division next year. But as you can see, the odds do not look good by expecting minimal injuries and getting production upgrades from all those positions.
As good as the farm system is, they are still a few years away. The best thing this team can do would be to deposit the money it saves from shedding contracts in the bank and wait until 2016 (or the trade deadline in 2015 if things are going better than expected). In the meantime, try out the rookies (Vargas, Sano, Buxton, Pinto) and take flyers on some AAAA players. Remember, Jose Bautista, Chris Davis, Nelson Cruz, Brandon Moss, Chris Davis, Dallas Keuchel, Colin McHugh, and Tyson Ross were all picked up for next to nothing. If they can find one or two of these guys it could set us up for 2016 to sign a few vets and compete. The Twins can offer playing time at several positions after this year if we don't lock ourselves into expensive veterans with limited upside in 2015, which will probably be another rebuilding year.
 
*All stats come from Baseball Reference and FanGraphs.
Note: I apologize for the lack of formatting in the data, I realize it makes the data much harder to read. I made several attempts to align the data to make it easier to read but it would always get reset by the blog editor prior to publishing. If anybody knows how to construct/import tables in TD's blogging application, feel free to PM me.