ashbury

I always applaud an analytic approach to decision making. You seem to be aiming toward a forecast of WAR, at the time the contract is signed. I think the studies computing $6M or $8M (or whatever) per WAR are doing it in terms of value delivered, looking back after the contract is signed (so the jury is still out on recent guys). That is, they are asking the question, what do teams typically get for their FA money? I think it stands to reason that front offices' forecasts are getting better and better, so as time goes along the actual value delivered (at least insofar as WAR represents "actual" value) becomes a better and better proxy for the forecasts. But even in trying to come at the question from the forecast WAR for these players, a simple average of previous years seems awfully far from what teams probably use. I don't think you would use that kind of average for a product life-cycle study, for instance, unless at a very particular stage (probably mid-life) - you would draw dangerous conclusions if in the early years, or if at the end in maintenance mode when you're trying to wean customers off. Ballplayers, as a "product", surely aren't static enough in their "life cycles" to try that with. With the horizon you specified, I would weight the most recent year more heavily than the prior year, and much moreso than two years back - almost ancient history in some cases. But I would also factor in growth or (more usually, for these free agents) decline relative to age. Injury risk also comes into play. It may be that teams are (in the privacy of their own processes) putting a very large downward factor on their forecasts over the life of the contract they intend to offer. That would move things in the opposite direction from your conclusion, since it makes the denominator smaller. Another thing that makes the methodology difficult is that players' "accurate" forecast of value, by whatever procedure you think best, is probably in the middle range of what teams will compute for themselves; and it's highly likely that whoever computes the highest value will make the largest offer, and in turn the player is highly likely to accept an offer very near the top of the range. This of course would move things in the direction you suggest, as it makes the denominator larger. All things considered, it's hard to approximate teams' forecasts with a simple average. Beyond hard, I think - misleading, or even not useful. We'd be dividing $$/WAR using something basically unknowable. Cespedes, the first guy on your list, seems like a good example. He was a highly sought Cuban free agent in 2012, and when he became available again in the 2016-17 offseason his resume was a bit spotty. He was coming off a 2.9-WAR season (I'm using b-r.com) after a 6.2, decidedly his best, and he had missed a few games in August after putting in two full seasons the prior years, after starting off with two injury-impacted seasons. I could imagine some widely differing forecasts by competent professionals in the field. When the Mets prepared their eventual winning offer, it's not preposterous to think that another 6-WAR season could be expected. But, he was already turning 31, and for the four-year contract the team was contemplating, a decline could be expected. An injury during any of those four seasons could further harm the value delivered in that season just due to his absence, while also perhaps accelerating his declining ability for future seasons. All in all, just spitballing here, a four-year WAR of (6,5,4,3), times an 80% chance each season for not having a really serious injury, comes out to only about 14 WAR over the life of the contract, or about 3.6 a season, rather than the 4.4 you came up with. That comes out to around $7.5M per. If I did the math right. Again, I'm only spitballing. Now, given that the Mets won this sweepstakes, it's fair to assume that most other teams* came up with a lower WAR estimate and made commensurately lower offers to the player. Unless you believe the Mets are super geniuses and have a unique ability to forecast future value, it's very likely that the actual value he returns will be more in line with the crowd and thus lower than they thought they were paying for. Ergo, the cost per WAR will likely be higher than their forecast (and perhaps this guesstimate). That's the so-called Winner's Curse in any free market, right? (Not that MLB markets are all that free. ) I'm not going to invest the time with my rinky-dink eyeballing methodology, on the other players you listed, but you probably see my point, that trying to infer MLB forecasts of WAR is harder than just averaging some recent seasons. * Even if you rule out the small market teams, there are enough other deep pocketed teams to make this line of thought work.

A project leader from one of my early jobs passed along this sage rule of thumb: "It takes about 10 Attaboys to make up for 1 OhSh[oo]t". Said another way, a chess player who grinds down the opponents through a sequence of small tactical positional advantages leading to small gains in material can still lose the game in the blink of an eye due to a careless blunder. I'm encouraged by a lot of these moves, but Terry Ryan was also adept at small-ball GMing, and we have yet to see a really big move by our new guys to start to tell what will happen under their regime. They aren't likely going to win a WS doing only what we've seen from them so far.

I don't think anyone's claiming that $8M (or whatever value) is the cost for all talent. Obviously young players under team control provide value at a far, far lower cost. The $8M figure amounts to the marginal rate on the spot-market. I like to think of FA contracts as the "Stupidity Tax" when you have to admit you didn't develop a suitable player of your own at a position of need. No one wants to build a team entirely this way. People have done amusing articles on what it would cost to build an entire car from parts purchased at a parts shop. No one sane would do that. Yet we all go to NAPA or Pep Boys when the need arises. One further analogy. I presume you are in the 39.6% tax bracket (soon to change). But you don't fork over 39,6% of your total income, because of deductions and a graduated tax rate. That 39.6 number is very meaningful, but also not very illuminating if you use only that one number for your thinking. As a side note, I also kind of doubt that true 1-WAR players get X, and 2-WAR players get 2X, etc. The value of a player to a team contending for the World Series isn't linear. So any number like $8M is just for back of the envelope calculations of players at a certain fairly high level of ability and demand for their services.

Ok, but this is somewhat conflating pool limits with green dollars. In the case previously mentioned where the Cardinals voided a $3M contract due to vision issues, the kid wound up signing for $500K with Arizona. Obviously this doesn't define anything for Marte, but indicates what can happen to teams' forecasts of future value in light of a bad vision report. Pool dollars may get passed around, but when actual dollars are spent there are many things that can spoil the deal.

Assuming words match feelings. If he's getting good advice, he may understand that the $3M is gone, but high six-figures may be attainable if he doesn't burn bridges. That realization wouldn't erase a feeling of having been squeezed. I don't know either way. I just don't read much into that statement.

I'm with you on the optics of this. I am in the camp generally hoping they don't sign him; I don't want questions about "my" team putting the squeeze on players financially. The news about "no hard feelings on either side" suggests it could happen though. When the news of the contract voiding broke, the Baseball America article mentioned a similar case from about a decade ago; a different team signed him for half a million instead, and afterward his career quietly fizzled. I don't hope for bad luck like that for this player, but it's a way this could end up playing out.

Mod note: Mike, and everyone, please don't use strawman arguments like this one.

The MLB/AAA/AA logjam exists only as long as everyone stays healthy. One injury makes things less tight, and two completely eliminate the issue. What do you think the odds are that everyone reaches Opening Day ready to pitch?

I think Sam is underselling Babe as a pitcher by quite a bit. Through his age-22 season Babe was on a pace to comfortably assure eventual Hall of Fame selection with whatever he would have done by age 30, and then whatever he tacked on after that would have been gravy. Of course that's only a pace - for instance undiagnosable "sore arms" felled many a bright light in those days. But being dominant at age 21 (the only reason he wasn't the best in the Majors was a couple of more-senior guys named Johnson and Alexander) is a nice early indicator for greatness, and marked him as better than "pretty good". However, the two-way era for him in 1918-19 was a mixed success at best. Monkeying with a great pitcher in hopes of turning him into a great hitter was a gamble. So the basic point regarding a comparison to a current player trying it still stands just fine. I just gotta defend the Babe's soupbone.

Doing what, taunting fans that he won't be signing with us?

I hold no hope for him whatever. The contract extension turned a smart signing into a fiscal drag on the team.

Pitching and hitting are not mirror images of each other. Pitching is about achieving location. Hitting is about either punishing the mistakes or going with what is given to them. Batters of both kinds can succeed, and many batters adopt a blend. It's rare for a pitcher without command to get anywhere in the majors, with just his stuff. So it's no paradox for pitchers to try to strike batters out without giving them anything good to hit, while power hitters may swing for the fences when they see something they like.

They almost assuredly will get 24 of them, one by one by one - barring rain or a forfeit or other unusual and premature end to the game. The difference maker is how many balls are put in play while accomplishing that arduous task, because some of those fall in safely or leave the park as home runs. Strikeouts cut down on the chances of the first of those happening, giving no chance for good things to happen for the offense. That, plus walks+HBP, will define their success. With enough success, or with home field advantage, they may even be allowed to try for 27 outs. And that's the goal.

Let me know what different results you get from studying this question.

I ducked this part in my other reply because it's really far from my point about strikeouts in relation to other outs, but... I'm not even sure I'm willing to say one "is" better than another. Kintzler had a better *2017*, because mainly he didn't give up so many walks and (especially) HR as those other two. I spent some time explaining elsewhere my reservations about FIP for backward looking purposes, but as a predictive tool for 2018 FIP suggests it's about even-money whether Duffey or Kintzler will have the better year. Pressly... he needs to work on a few things.

The analogy of SO to dunks probably breaks down when considering that dunks are much less common. Nobody dunks often enough to make that be what defines their team's season. Likewise, I don't think I was demonstrating why strikeouts must line up precisely with ERA (they won't). And certainly not that the pitcher with the most Ks is the "best". Merely to explain a reason why a strikeout is more valuable among other outs, and not simply a paradox; you have to look further up the stream than after the out has been recorded, to notice why. As for correlation, I note if you rank major league teams by strikeouts recorded by their pitchers, you need to go down all the way to #9 (Mets) to find a team that missed the playoffs. The two teams that did make the post-season, but weren't in the top 8 in SO, both were bounced in single-game appearances. Strikeouts by batters aren't quite so dire - you can find a team at #6 (Arizona) who made the post-season. But yes, there is much in baseball that counts besides just strikeouts. Thank goodness!

It finally dawned on me that the reason I'm not a wizard with b-r.com's database in particular is that I've been too big a cheapskate to pay for their Play Index which does allow more of what I want. Perhaps Santa will hear my wish in a few weeks...

I'm taking the second half of your post separately as I see it as a separate (and interesting) issue. Baseball-reference.com has all kinds of seasonal stats that one can sort on. The stats that apply here would be SO/9, BABIP (BA on Balls In Play), and Pitches/PA. (Actually I wish they offered SO/PA, but it is what it is.) BABIP would seem to address what you are asking about. Unfortunately the site does not place these three on the same page with each other, and I am not a wizard with databases. So all I can do is sort on one stat or another, and do a bit of sampling rather than try to do something more statistical. Maybe somebody with mad skillz can help me out here. One initial observation is that BABIP is renowned for high variability. The same pitcher may have consecutive seasons of BABIP above and below average (which usually is around .300) - few pitchers are really consistent year to year, suggesting that low or high is not a repeatable skill held by the pitcher. OK, so if I sort 2017 MLB pitchers who had enough innings to qualify for the ERA title, I see at the top for pitches per PA Jake Odorizzi. Your surmise would be that his fielders are on their heels; instead, he has a very stellar BABIP of .228 this year, indicating his fielders were making the plays for him, when the batter did finally put the ball in play. I bet he doesn't repeat that feat next year, but anyway we're off to a bad start. Next on the list is Eduardo Rodriguez; his BABIP is .300, a very average figure. Third is Wade Miley, and his BABIP is .333, in keeping with your surmise. Next is Trevor Bauer, and his is .338. Next is the sainted Mike Pelfrey, and his BABIP is .276. A very mixed bag. Working next from the bottom of that list, the fewest pitches per PA belonged to Iván Nova. His BABIP was .303. Next best was Big Sexy himself, Bartolo Colon. His BABIP was not very good, .335. Next comes Clayton Richard with BABIP .354, Mike Leake with .312, and Luis Perdomo with .327. These are the guys whose fielders should be the most alert, and again it's a mixed bag or even trending the wrong way. Now, this methodology, if you can even call it that, of the 5 top and 5 bottom, is slanted toward good starting pitchers - pitchers who were trusted enough to rack up a lot of innings pitched by br-com's cutoff for rate stats. Maybe a careful study that includes relievers and/or bad starters would show a different trend. You can approach it differently, by sorting on SO/9 (since SO is the subject here), since the top Pitch/PA is not necessarily the top strikeout pitchers. Again, we'll only look at pretty good starters this way. Chris Sale was the top pitcher for strikeout rate, and his fielders allowed him to amass a BABIP of .303. Next was Robbie Ray, and he had BABIP .270. Max Scherzer, .248. Corey Kluber, .268. Chris Archer, .325. Among the pitchers with lowest strikeout rates: Ty Blach, .296. Andrew Cashner, .267. Jeremy Hellickson, .248. Martin Perez, .330. Zach Davies, .306. Every time I start to see a pattern emerge, another datapoint comes along to break it up. It reminds me of flipping coins. Interestingly, as a side note, the list of highest strikeout pitchers does not correspond to the list of pitchers with highest pitcher per plate appearance. (Edit: just as Chief expressed.) I wrote this rather stream-of-consciousness, expecting to rewrite it or at least condense it when a pattern emerged. It didn't, so for whatever it's worth, this is a very shallow but non-cherry-picked look at your question. I don't think a pattern exists, and this sampling of data doesn't motivate me to go take a course in database analysis to try to dig one out.

What you say is true, once the play is completed. But just in advance of that, a dunk is about a 95% shot to make it, versus something around 50% for various other locations around the floor. If you could work it so you had a slam dunk every time down the court, you'd win going away. And what is the On Base Percentage for strikeouts, versus walks, versus balls put in play by the batter? Those are .000, 1.000, and around .300, respectively. The strikeout is just another out, except you get about 30% more of them versus letting the batter get wood on the ball. That's what the strikeout does for your team. It is, indeed, analogous to a slam dunk by the pitcher.

Well doggies! I do believe the young fella has struck oil! (Or if you prefer, Black Gold... Texas Tea.)

... additionally, pitched well enough to record quite a number of outs in the 7th inning and beyond.

Mod note: please, let's not let a passing reference to Terry Ryan turn this thread about present prospects into yet another referendum on old topics...

FIP is mis-named. It's not fielding-independent, otherwise the formula would contain an element that distinguishes, e.g., whether you have someone like Byron Buxton playing CF behind you. It's a number constructed from plate appearances decided by not putting the ball in the reach of fielders - HR, SO, BB+HPB. That would lead to a less catchy name; I don't have a better name to propose - "What Might Have Happened If The Ball Had Never Been Put In Play". Pointing to the convergence of FIP and ERA in the long-run is circular logic - FIP is constructed as a linear regression (of the above-named factors) to actual earned runs, and contains a seasonally-adjusted additive factor to line them up more or less exactly for a given season. It seems to have some small predictive power for future ERA, versus just ERA itself. But as a method to determine pitchers' actual seasonal results with defense factored out, it's pretty far from the mark. I wouldn't use it for a HoF argument.

I see that this is your first post. Welcome!

Something I've occasionally wondered is whether the team has any choice, if the option doesn't vest. Say he pitches 165 innings but the team is happy with him and wants to pay the $14M for the next season, can they execute the option anyway, or is the option voided automatically and negotiation goes like for any free agent?