TwerkTwonkTwins

I know I'm not alone in thinking that the Twins are bad at baserunning this year. It's easy to find that they are terrible at stealing bases, as they rank 30th in both total stolen bases (14) and stolen base percentage (58%). After watching Nick Gordon turn errantly around first base only to get thrown out on this play, I decided to look up the numbers to see if there was a quantifiable baserunning metric beyond stolen base percentage that would prove my eyes correct. And boy, did the numbers confirm the eye test. According to FanGraphs, the Twins rank 28th in MLB with a -9.7 BSR (baserunning metric). Only the Washington Nationals (-10.6) and the Detroit Tigers (-12.5) have a lower team BSR. The definition of BSR can be found here, but it essentially combines everything that does or doesn't happen on the base paths. These actions can include stolen bases, being caught stealing, grounding into double plays, getting thrown out, taking/not taking an extra base, and more. A BSR of zero is league average, and every ten runs is equal to one additional win. The fact that the Twins have a -9.7 BSR as a team indicates that their baserunning has nearly taken off a win from their record. That's beyond awful, according to this chart. Baseball Reference also has another stat called Runs From Baserunning (Rbaser). The Twins rank 29th with -7, matching what FanGraphs is reporting with BSR. Multiple sources have confirmed the Twins have some work to do when it comes to running the bases this year, and that it is impacting their run scoring. This raises the question: How long has baserunning been a problem, and will it hurt the Twins in the standings? The answer is that the Twins' baserunning metrics have been completely random over the last few years. Paul Molitor stressed baserunning excellence during his time as a manager, but that didn't reflect well in the standings. The Twins were also awful at baserunning in 2019, but that didn't stop them from recording 103 wins. The 2022 Twins have been absolutely frustrating on the basepaths, but it's not strongly correlated with overall winning percentage. I'm not saying you shouldn't pull your hair out when you see an out on the bases. Stolen bases are incredibly fun. But in the long grind of 162 games, there are many other factors that will contribute more heavily to the end result of a team having a successful season. Rocco and his coaching staff are going to keep rocking on instead of running on.

I agree, there's a lot of MLB pitchers who have never had a pitch clock. Older veterans will need to adjust more gradually. I think a tier-system with a plan to get to 14/18 seconds gradually over a few seasons could work.

Stashak has had a few clunkers that have destroyed his stats. Pagan has been effectively wild, but needs to reign in the control because that will bite him eventually. Coulombe is a slow pitcher who has pitched very well. It would make sense that confidence and time to home would be related, especially if there's less confidence in control.

MLB wants a pitch clock to speed up time of games, and has already implemented a pitch clock in Minor League Baseball. The current clock is set at 14 seconds for when the bases are empty, and allows up to 18 seconds when runners are on. These changes have shaved off 20 minutes from MiLB game times, and MLB has a new policy in the recent CBA that could allow them to implement a pitch clock at the major league level in 45 days, but 2023 seems more likely. Today, MLB's Baseball Savant released a "Pitch Tempo Leaderboard", which measures the median time between pitches (release to release thrown to the same batter). Maybe MLB wants to help prepare the public by making this available? It's not the most insightful data in the world, but it's fun to conceptualize and match our perceptions with reality. For example, I knew Emilo Pagán was a slower pitcher, but there are some pitchers with a surprising pitch tempo that I didn't notice. Below is a quick look at how the current Minnesota Twins pitching staff currently fares in this department compared to the league, and then we'll dive into the slowest and fastest pitchers on the staff with bases empty and runners on base scenarios. MLB Average Pitch Tempo vs. Twins Average Pitch Tempo MLB Average With Runners Empty: 18.2 seconds Twins Average With Runners Empty: 18.9 seconds MLB Average With Runners On Base: 23.6 seconds Twins Average With Runners On Base: 24.3 seconds Overall, the Twins have a slower pitch tempo than other teams. It doesn't appear to matter if the bases are empty or if the bases have traffic. We can't determine if this is a philosophy of Derek Falvey and pitching coach Wes Johnson, or if it's just the mix of pitchers on the staff. Every pitcher likely developed habits long before they were in the Twins system, especially older players who had no pitch clock prior to their MLB careers. Pitcher-Level Pitch Tempos - Bases Empty The table below is sorted by average pitch tempo when Bases are Empty. Fast Tempos with the Bases Empty: Jhoan Duran and Dylan Bundy lead the Twins pitching staff with a tempo of 15.7 seconds. Duran leads the Twins in percentage of pitches that are considered "Fast" (thrown under 15 second), at 37.1%. This appears to be very unusual for a reliever, as Duran ranks 50th across all of MLB Pitch Tempos with the bases empty. Most of the pitchers above him are starting pitchers. 8 out of 14 qualified Twins pitchers are faster than the MLB Average pitch tempo with the bases empty (18.2 seconds). Slow Tempos with the Bases Empty: Cody Stashak has the slowest pitch tempo on the team when the bases are empty, with 24.1 seconds between pitches. This ranks as the 13th slowest pitch tempo in MLB when the bases are empty. Most of the Twins bullpen outside of Duran has taken Stashak's approach. Griffin Jax, Caleb Thielbar, Emilo Pagán, and Danny Coulombe haven't thrown a single pitch under 15 seconds this year, and all average over 20 seconds with empty bases. Chris Archer has the slowest tempo of the starting pitchers with the bases empty, at 19.5 seconds between pitches. All other starters are below 17,7 seconds. Pitcher-Level Pitch Tempos - Runners On Base The table below is sorted by average tempo when runners are on base. Fast Tempos with Runners On Base: Dylan Bundy is the fastest pitcher on the staff overall with runners on bases, with an average tempo of 21.6 seconds. This is 5.9 seconds above his tempo with the bases empty. While this is the fastest tempo with runners on base across the Twins pitching staff, Bundy's 21.6 seconds between pitches ranks 77th in MLB. This indicates that the team take time with runners on base as a staff. Joe Ryan has the second fastest pitch tempo with runners on base, at 22.5 seconds. He is the only Twins pitcher to throw a single pitch under 15 seconds with traffic on the bases (only 1.1% in this scenario). While Jhoan Duran is a speed demon with the bases empty, he slows down considerably when runners are on base at 23.9 seconds between pitches. This is a difference of 8.2 seconds to his pitch tempo from when the bases are empty. Only 4 of the 14 qualified Twins pitchers are faster than the MLB Average pitch tempo with the bases empty (23.6 seconds). Slow Tempos with Runners On Base: The slowest pitches with runners are actually starters: Josh Winder (26.4 seconds) and Chris Paddack (26.2). These tempos rank 46th and 60th in MLB, respectively. Winder also has the highest percentage of pitches over 30 second with runners on base, at 22.2%. Chris Paddack has the largest difference in tempo between bases empty and runners on, with 9.1 seconds added. Cody Stashak is weird. He is the only Twins pitcher on the staff that is actually faster when runners are on base. His pitch tempo is 23.8 second with runners on, which 0.3 seconds faster than with the bases empty. This could be due to him pitching in low-leverage situations, but that's me speculating. Caleb Thielbar, Danny Coulombe, and Emilo Pagán all have nearly the exact same pitch tempo with runners on base (25.4 - 25.5 seconds). Who would be in violation of the current Minor League Pitch Clock? The current limit is 14 seconds with the bases empty, and 18 seconds with runners on base. All Twins pitchers have an average pitch tempo above 14 seconds with the bases empty and above 18 seconds with runners on base. They would all be in violation! However, only 8 MLB pitchers have a pitch tempo that would not be in violation with the bases empty, and only one (Wade Miley) wouldn't be in violation with runners on bases. Fun Chart Time I highly suggest using the "compare" tool to see how pitchers vary in pitch tempo. You can see how consistent Dylan Bundy (the speed king) is, while Cody Stashak can be all over the place. Starters: Relievers: If you got to the end of this post, congratulations. I hope you read this at a quick tempo, like Dylan Bundy.

Aaron Judge, Yordan Alvarez, Mike Trout. What do these names all have in common? They have worse expected statistics than Kyle Garlick. But...so does the entire league, so they shouldn't feel too bad. To level-set, Kyle Garlick has amassed a standard slashline of .250/.359/.625 (.984 OPS). That's amazing, and 90% above average in a year like 2022. But his underlying Statcast data is even more impressive, due to the type of contact he's been making. I do want to warn that this post will be a bit of Fun With Small Sample Sizes™, but it's a lot of fun. For much of the expected statistics I'll be looking at, the minimum amount of balls in play (BIP) needed to qualify for the official Baseball Savant leaderboard is 33. Garlick has amassed 26 BIP through 39 plate appearances due to injuries, and being sheltered from right-handed pitching -- the latter of which is certainly contributing to his eye-popping stats. Starting off with the most impressive clove of Garlick's loaded bulb of batting stats is his Expected Weighted On-Base Average (xwOBA). This stat blends a lot of Statcast data such as exit velocity, launch angel, expected batting average. It's then assigns value to each batted ball and walks like wOBA, but removes defense from the equation. When filtering to 25 Balls In Play, Kyle Garlick ranks 1st in xwOBA with .492, which is outpacing his standard wOBA (.415). Being first in this stat places him in the 100th Percentile, and it's quite the impressive list below Kyle Garlick's xwOBA is outpacing multiple former MVPs, and two Twins players in the Top 20. How is he doing this?! Garlick is outperforming his batting average of .250, by having an expected batting average (xBA) of .332. That's the 19th largest swing in batting average to expected batting average. He's been great AND unlucky, as that xBA ranks 6th among MLB players filtering to 25 balls in play. His slugging is an even greater disparity between actual and expected results. A slugging percentage of .625 is great, but Garlick has the highest expected slugging percentage (xSLG) of .804, for a nearly 18% difference in actual vs expected. Garlick is causing a stink among left-handed pitchers, because he's patient and hits the ball with extreme authority. His walk rate is 15.4%, nearly twice as the MLB average in 2022 (8.4%), and the highest of his career.. Pitchers are likely scared to come in the zone to Garlick, because when he makes contact, the ball is hit among the hardest in the league. Hard Hit Rate: 61.5% (4th) Hard Hit Swing %: 22.6% (6th) Average Exit Velocity: 94.7 MPH (7th) Barrels Per Plate Appearance: 10.3% (22nd) Barrels Per Batted Ball Event: 15.4% (27th). These are all expected statistics of a upper-echelon slugger and MVP candidate. To pour some cold water on this, I'm overanalyzing a whooping four barrels that Garlick has hit across 26 times he's put the ball into play. However, that doesn't mean that Garlick hasn't been a potent weapon in Baldelli's lineup against left-handed pitching. Just like how the Twins are in first as we enter late May, we should all savor what we are seeing. And Garlick should keep savoring those bananas. Don't change a thing.

It's true Arraez has struck out less, but Arraez is swinging and missing more often during at bats than Celestino (Whiff %). He's also swinging at pitches outside the zone more often than Celestino, which doesn't produce great outcomes of contact. That's no knock on Arraez, but more of a point to highlight Celestino's plate discipline so far. I couldn't think of a great title for this entry, and probably meant to reflect "plate discipline" over contact. Celestino's making contact far more often than the MLB average on both pitches in the zone, and outside the zone- but the huge value is that he doesn't swing at pitches outside the zone at all. As for Miranda - you are on to something. MLB averages in parentheses. Swing: 51.3% (47%) Zone Swing: 76.2% (66.8%) Zone Contact: 93.8% (82%) Chase %: 21.2% (28.3%) Chase Contact: 63.6% (58.4%) Whiff: 11.9% (24.6%) He's very comparable to Arraez and Celestino to this point, but makes contact on outside pitches a bit less than those two. All categories listed above are still above the MLB average. More to come...

Gilberto Celestino has had an interesting path to the majors, and one that reduced his initial shine for most of the fanbase. Celestino was acquired for Ryan Pressly at the 2018 trade deadline, alongside Jorge Alcala, in a very unpopular deal at the time. MLB Pipeline ranked Celestino the 15th best prospect in 2019, and 14th best in 2020. The consensus was that Celestino was a standout defensive center fielder, but questions about his bat and power limited his overall projection. When Celestino was called up out of emergency in 2021, his initial performance not only confirmed the offensive questions in the prospect rankings but the calling card of his defense was also poor with -2 Outs Above Average coming from 56 attempts. Celestino was clearly overmatched at the major league level, as he played a handful of games at AA before making the jump to the Twins. Celestino accumulated a 22 wRC+ and -0.7 fWAR in only 62 plate appearances in 2021. Needless to say, when Celestino was added to the 2022 Opening Day roster the reaction amid the fanbase was tepid. It's probable that the Twins didn't even envision Celestino making the roster, as they optioned him to Triple-A St. Paul on 3/31. Many believed that his status on the roster was to be temporary, with rumors swirling about the Twins adding Justin Upton to be a source of right-handed power in the outfield. Derek Falvey even went as far to say that Celestino could be off the major league roster in a week's time. Flashing forward to early May, Celestino has outperformed expectations, and probably any output that could have come from Justin Upton. As of 5/9, Celestino has provided some of the best offensive and defensive numbers on the team. AVG OBP SLG OPS OPS+ wRC+ wOBA fWAR bWAR Gilberto Celestino .324 .390 .405 .796 144 143 .361 0.6 0.4 FanGraphs has Celestino as the 6th most valuable offensive player on the Twins in fWAR and his wRC+ is the third highest on team behind Byron Buxton and the legendary Kyle Garlick. On the defensive side of his game, Celestino has 2 Outs Above Average (84th percentile). It's a small sample size, but how has Celestino been so valuable this early on? The answer to that question: Celestino has had amazing plate discipline. Season Pitches Zone % Zone Swing % Zone Contact % Chase % Chase Contact % Edge % 1st Pitch Swing % Swing % Whiff % Meatball % Meatball Swing % 2021 235 51.5 64.5 82.1 26.3 63.3 43.8 30.6 46 23.1 6 85.7 2022 145 52.4 65.8 96 15.9 72.7 46.2 28.6 42.1 8.2 8.3 66.7 MLB 48.5 66.8 82 28.3 58.4 42.6 29.2 47 24.6 7.2 76 The highlighted cells show that areas where Celestino has been outperforming both his 2021 self, and the MLB average. He's simply become one of the most contact-oriented players in the game, and one of the most discerning about balls and strikes. He's swinging and making contact at pitches that are meant to be swung at in the zone, and spitting at the outside pitches that usually result in outs. Among all players with at least 25 plate appearances, Celestino ranks 3rd in Whiff % (8.2%) , and 16th in Chase Rate (15.9%). To put that in further perspective, here's a look at Celestino compared to two other players with great plate discipline reputations. Pitches Zone % Zone Swing % Zone Contact % Chase % Chase Contact % Edge % 1st Pitch Swing % Swing % Whiff % Meatball % Meatball Swing % Gilberto Celestino 145 52.4 65.8 96 15.9 72.7 46.2 28.6 42.1 8.2 8.3 66.7 Luis Arraez 351 43.6 66 92.1 25.8 88.2 46.4 19.5 43.3 8.6 5.7 60 Juan Soto 549 43.4 56.7 80.7 19.3 66.7 41 20.3 35.5 23.1 5.8 78.1 MLB 48.5 66.8 82 28.3 58.4 42.6 29.2 47 24.6 7.2 76 Am I saying that Gilberto Celestino is the next Juan Soto or Luis Arráez? No, but I am saying that Celestino is a supremely disciplined hitter with extreme contact skill. That doesn't always take a large sample to determine. Soto has a chase rate of 19.3%, which ranks in the 90th percentile. Arráez has a miniscule whiff rate of 8.6%, which is in the 100th percentile of MLB players. Celestino tops both players in these areas at this point in the season. The only knock on Celestino this year can be his lack of power. Both his Barrel Rate (3.2%) and his average exit velocity (86.9 MPH) rank below the MLB average. However, the Twins have plenty of slugging across their lineup to make up for that. Luis Arráez used to be the lone bat-to-ball man in the lineup with names like Miguel Sano, Gary Sanchez, Alex Kiriloff, and Gio Urshela. It helps to have offensive diversity, and Gilberto Celestino may be filling a needed niche that nobody expected. If Celestino's current blend of strong defense and astounding swing decisions holds up, he probably ranks as a starting-caliber outfielder on most major league teams. The lack of power will always hold him back from being a true star, but his skillset fits today's game more so than the previous half-decade. The surprise addition to Opening Day roster may have been the perfect fit for the 2022 brand of baseball.

I remember being torn up by Josmil Pinto ?. Sometimes the only hope to cling on to is a player's 99th percentile outcome, especially in the rebuilding years. But if a player is exposed to waivers, the front office is usually confident that even their 80th percentile won't come back to bite them too hard.

Absolutely - a contending/playoff team probably shouldn't bank on the waiver process for meaningful results. However, I believe the order "resets" to the current year's standings after 30 days. So the Twins have definitely moved up in the process compared to April. They could (and probably will) begin to make more meaningful claims going forward.

Critique of a front office is easy to make in the midst of a deeply disappointing season. While many fans are languishing over the incoming July trade deadline, I've heard a lot of complaints about the lack of waiver claims made this season by the Minnesota Twins. Why are the Twins continuing to trot out the likes of Colomé, Happ, and (formerly) Shoemaker, when the front office can claim replacement-level players from other teams for essentially nothing? The outright waiver transaction process is a deeply complicated one. Whenever a team wants to remove a player that is already on the 40-man roster, that player must first be offered to each of the other 29 major league teams. If another team claims that player, the player goes on that new team's 40-man roster. The full definition from MLB can be found here. Because I'm insane, and this season is awful, I decided to compile a list of every player that the Falvey/Levine front office has claimed from other organizations, in addition to players they've lost via waiver claims. How have they fared in the waiver claim game? Should they pick up the pace, now that they have nothing to lose? Do these claims actually amount to anything? These questions are important... but so is the trip down memory lane, once you read some of these names. Players Acquired Via Waiver Claim Date of Claim Player Claimed Position Team Claimed From fWAR in Minnesota 2/6/2017 Ehire Adrianza UTL IF San Francisco Giants 2.1 5/10/2017 Adam Wilk LHP New York Mets -0.2 6/7/2017 Chris Heston RHP Los Angeles Dodgers 0.0 3/24/2018 Kenny Vargas 1B Cincinatti Reds - 4/26/2018 David Hale RHP New York Yankees -0.2 5/28/2018 Taylor Motter UTL Seattle Mariners -0.3 8/3/2018 Johnny Field RF Cleveland Indians 0.1 8/3/2018 Oliver Drake RHP Cleveland Indians 0.2 10/31/2018 Michael Reed CF Atlanta Braves - 11/26/2018 C.J. Cron 1B Tampa Bay Rays 0.3 10/29/2019 Matt Wisler RHP Seattle Mariners 0.6 10/30/2020 Ian Gibault RHP Texas Rangers - 10/30/2020 Brandon Waddell LHP Pittsburgh Pirates -0.3 2/5/2021 Ian Hamilton RHP Philadelphia Phillies - 2/11/2021 Kyle Garlick RF Atlanta Braves 0.3 6/22/2021 Beau Burrows RHP Detroit Tigers - Total fWAR 2.6 The Twins have claimed a total of 16 players from opposing organizations since Falvey/Levine took over after the 2016 World Series. Of these 16 claims, their most consequential claim was their very first one. Ehire Adrianza was never a star, but a very productive role player for a number of contending Twins teams. After that, the list isn't so impressive. Matt Wisler was great at slinging sliders in the bullpen during the pandemic-shortened 2020 season, but the Twins cut him last offseason in a puzzling move. C.J. Cron and the currently-injured Kyle Garlick have been the largest "successes" outside of Adrianza and Wisler, each account for 0.3 fWAR as right-handed hitters that were acquired to mash left-handed pitching. Most of these players did not remain on the 40-man roster for a long time. Quite a few were lost to waivers shortly after the Twins acquired them, which include Kenny Vargas, Johnny Field, Oliver Drake, and Brandon Waddell. Such is the life on the waiver wire for many MLB players. Players Lost Via Waiver Claim Date of Claim Player Position Team Claimed By fWAR after Minnesota 11/18/2016 Adam Brett Walker LF Milwaukee Brewers - 8/26/2017 Tim Melville RHP San Diego Padres -0.2 9/14/2017 Engelb Vielma SS San Francisco Giants -0.1 11/3/2017 Randy Rosario LHP Chicago Cubs -0.3 11/3/2017 Daniel Palka OF Chicago White Sox -0.7 11/6/2017 Nik Turley LHP Pittsburgh Pirates 0.2 1/22/2018 Buddy Boshers LHP Houston Astros 0.1 2/23/2018 JT Chargois RHP Los Angeles Dodgers 0.5 3/22/2018 Kenny Vargas 1B Cincinatti Reds - 7/9/2018 Ryan LaMarre CF Chicago White Sox 0.4 10/10/2018 Juan Graterol C Cincinatti Reds -0.2 11/1/2018 Johnny Field RF Chicago Cubs - 11/1/2018 Oliver Drake RHP Tampa Bay Rays 0.4 1/11/2019 Aaron Slegers RHP Pittsburgh Pirates 0.4 5/26/2019 Austin Adams RHP Detroit Tigers -0.1 7/20/2019 Adalberto Mejia LHP Los Angeles Angels 0.0 8/14/2019 Ryan Eades RHP Baltimore Orioles -0.2 9/16/2019 Marcos Diplan RHP Detroit Tigers - 11/4/2019 Stephen Gonsalves LHP New York Mets - 9/5/2020 Ildemaro Vargas 2B Chicago Cubs -0.5 10/1/2020 Sean Poppen RHP Pittsburgh Pirates -0.1 5/8/2021 Brandon Waddell LHP Baltimore Orioles 0 5/14/2021 Travis Blankenhorn 2B Los Angeles Dodgers -0.1 6/5/2021 Dakota Chalmers RHP Chicago Cubs - 6/18/2021 Shaun Anderson RHP Texas Rangers - Total fWAR -0.5 You'll immediately notice this list of players lost via waivers during the Falvyey/Levine regime is a lot longer than the list of players they've acquired via waivers. All together, they have lost 25 players, which is 9 more players than they've claimed from other teams. The good news for the organization, is that this cumulative list has not come back to bite them. 10 of the 25 claimed players provided negative value for their new teams, after departing Minnesota. Daniel Palka's 2017 season really sunk this group, as he posted a -1.4 fWAR in only 93 plate appearances for the White Sox (after he provided 0.7 fWAR and a 109 wRC+ in 2018). The largest losses from this group have definitely been in the relief category, highlighted by JT Chargois, Oliver Drake, and Aaron Slegers. However, most of these players have had inconsistent careers, injuries, or both, in their time after playing for Minnesota. Even when factoring in some bullpen pieces this organization might regret losing, the total fWAR from these players after departing the Twins is -0.5 fWAR. The current front office has been right far more than wrong, when deciding how to churn the 40-man roster. Yearly Trends And Overall Takeaway Year Players Claimed From Other Teams Players Claimed By Other Teams 2016/2017 3 6 2018 7 7 2019 1 6 2020 2 2 2021 3 4 Total Players 16 25 Total fWAR 2.6 -0.5 fWAR Difference 3.1 Overall, the Twins have gained 3.1 fWAR from their decisions to gain and lose players from the waiver wire. That's a pretty decent result for a type of front office transaction that is often overlooked. It averages out to about 0.69 fWAR per season, factoring in the 4.5 seasons of the Falvey/Levine regime. Most of that waiver activity came in 2017 and 2018, when the front office was still adjusting to their inherited players from the previous front office. Successful teams don't always gamble roster spots on players exposed to outright waivers, which is evident in the 2019 team. One major caveat to point out across the yearly trend is that teams were probably hesitant to claim players from other organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic, so 2020 and early 2021 should be viewed through that lens. However, that didn't stop the Twins from claiming 3 bullpen arms (Ian Gibault, Brandon Waddell, and Ian Hamilton), and Kyle Garlick this offseason. The jury is still out on these claims, but Waddell did not go well. The most interesting thing about 2021 is that the Twins lost 4 players during their early season free-fall (Brandon Waddell, Travis Blankenhorn, Dakota Chalmers, and Shaun Anderson), before claiming Beau Burrows a few weeks ago from the Detroit Tigers. Is former first-round draft pick Beau Burrows the tip of the iceberg? Now that 2021 is officially kaput, will the front office be more aggressive? I sure hope so. Moves will be made in the next few weeks, and this 40-man roster will be significantly different as we approach the trade deadline. The 40-man roster will likely be smaller, and the Twins will be in front of the line when contenders have to cut players to account for their deadline additions. Waiver claims are rarely sexy transactions, but sometimes you stumble into a Ehire Adrianza or a Matt Wisler. The Twins have proven to be more successful than not when it comes to their waiver claim game. It's time to play, because there's simply nothing to lose.

Thanks, Brock! Just tried it out, as I was used to old way of screenshotting tables. This will be nifty!

Totally agree. One move sets up a butterfly effect that channels throughout the roster. You could also say that most of that $7.5M in savings went to another guy... Alexander Colome. He signed for $5.5M with a $1.25M buyout. Maybe the Twins don't sign Colome with Semien in the mix, but we'll never know!

The day is January 26th, 2021. The Minnesota Twins had been rumored to be interested in various middle infield free agent options, but Marcus Semien was their top target, according to Darren Wolfson. The fit made some amount of sense, as the right-handed Semien would provide some pop against lefties and defensive flexibility across the infield. Semien did not sign with the Twins on January 26th. He accepted a one-year contract worth $18M to join the upstart Toronto Blue Jays, as their primary second baseman. The Twins quickly pivoted, signing Andrelton Simmons to a one-year $10.5M contract a few hours later as their fallback option. Fast forward, and today is May 27th, 2021. It's been over four months since the Twins made that pivot from Semiens to Simmons, over a difference of $7.5M. A lot has changed in that span, as the Twins quickly went from division favorites, to 8.5 games back from first place. With 30% of the season in the books, I think it's fair to look back and evaluate if the Twins made the right decision by not outbidding Toronto for Semien's services and shifting to Simmons. Before we dive in, it is important to call out that comparing Simmons and Semien across their career has been a bit like apples and oranges .The two players are both indeed starting middle infielders, but Simmons has been one of the most elite defensive shortstops in a generation, while Semien was a Top-3 MVP finalist due to his offensive performance. Semien has also been playing primarily at second base this year, but has started roughly 9% of his games at shortstop. With that out of the way, let's see how Semien and Simmons have fared so far in 2021 across overall, offensive, and defensive categories: Overall Offensive Defensive Games Played PA fWAR bWAR AVG OBP SLG HR OPS+ wRC+ Hard Hit % Barrel % WPA DRS Outs Above Average Runs Prevented Fielding % Marcus Semien 47 212 2.2 2.4 .286 .349 .536 12 143 143 44.9% 8.1% 0.6 3 3 2 .988 Andrelton Simmons 37 138 0.2 0.7 .238 .326 .320 2 92 87 27.3% 1.0% -0.6 2 8 6 .966 In one way, the overall result is what you expect. Semien is a better offensive player, and Simmons takes the edge defensively, especially when accounting for time spent at shortstop. But Semien isn't just outpacing Simmons offensively -- he's among the league leaders in offensive production. Semien not only has a higher slugging percentage and weight runs created plus (wRC+) than his 2019 season where he was a MVP finalist, but he currently leads all qualified MLB second baseman in those two categories. Toronto took a chance Semien would look more like his 2019 self, than his 2020 version. They have been right so far. The move to second base has also worked to this point, where multiple defensive metrics point toward positive contributions. All together, his 2.2 fWAR ranks 7th among all MLB hitters, On the other hand, Simmons has always been known as a player who gives the team value through his glove. His offensive skillset usually ends up slightly below average across his career, and he's been just that in 2021 (both his OPS+ and wRC+ are below 100, which is the league average). Simmons won't strike out that often, but he won't provide any power at all. Both his Hard Hit % and Barrel % are below the 5th percentile of all MLB players. Weak contact can be dangerous. The Twins have definitely received value from Simmons and his magic glove. Simmons ranks second in MLB with 8 Outs Above Average, according to Statcast, which has saved the Twins 6 runs over the course of the season. FanGraphs is not as glowing as Statcast, as Simmons ranks 11th among MLB shortstops in Defensive Runs Saved. The eye test will tell you Simmons has been amazing, but we can all point to a few plays this year where a mental lapse has resulted in a key dropped ball, or a double play that wasn't turned. That lack of clutch ability has also shown up in his -0.6 Win Probability Added (WPA), where as Semien has the reverse positive WPA of 0.6. Overall, I do think the Twins have received a positive contribution from Andrelton Simmons. He's performed in the baseline of his career, with his elite defense outweighing his offensive downfalls. But when you compare the two contracts, it's hard to justify that signing Simmons to one-year and $10.5M has been more valuable than Marcus Semien at one-year and $18M. FanGraphs claims Semien has already provided $17.7M worth of value for Toronto, while Simmons has provided $1.5M worth of value for the Twins. There were probably other factors that led Semien to Toronto, rather than Minnesota. It's not 100% up to the team in free agency, it is a dance that involves many other factors for the player aside from the dollar amount. But if the decision for a middle infield acquisition came down to a $7.5M difference between the front office's top target and their fallback option, it's clear Falvey and Levine should have ponied up a bit more. The Twins are missing out on a early dark horse for the 2021 MVP candidate.

We'll have to see about the draft pick. That could end up to hurt, it could end up to be nothing. Look at the chart above for the chances that the pick goes on to have a successful major league career. V2 essentially boils down to this: The Twins are trading more POTENTIAL Value (Graterol, Raley and the Draft Pick are all varying "ifs") for more KNOWN 2020 roster flexibility. Considering where the Twins are in the window, I take that deal. I really think the $10M will allow this team to be more aggressive at the deadline, rather than be absorbed back into the books. The Twins can do what the Dodgers just did, and throw in cash/absorb a player's contract, instead of sacrificing more prospects. Like many variables in this version, we'll have to wait for a huge amount of time to pass before we know the end result. But the writing on the wall indicates that the Twins plan to make more additions along the way, and V2 provided more flexibility to do so.

I am not necessarily calling this trade a heist by the Twins. Losing a top prospect like Graterol hurts, but I think it's fair. The likelihood is that the Dodgers end up with more future value from Graterol, Raley, and the draft pick. The Twins get more value in 2020 out of the deal. However, my argument is that this version is a better trade from the first version (Graterol for Maeda straight up). This trade was always about providing more value to the 2020 team, and receiving $10M with an open 40-man roster spot helps paint the picture that Falvine hope to add more at a later date.

I'm not a prospects expert, but I would guess he's borderline Top 50.

Great point. I have heard it's a deep draft, relative to previous years. Teams are trading up to get more picks. Then again, I will caveat that I am far from a draft expert!

The three-team mega blockbuster involving the Minnesota Twins, Boston Red Sox, and Los Angeles Dodgers is finally complete. At this point, most Twins fans are aware of what happened - a deal was in place on February 4th, sending Graterol to Boston as part of the return for offloading Mookie Betts and David Price to the Dodgers. However, that soon changed after Boston came to the conclusion that Graterol was not destined to be a starting pitcher. This was a conclusion that the Twins publicly announced well in advance of the trade. Chaos, medical speculation, and finger pointing ensued, and the entire trade between the three teams was put on ice. This was perhaps the most dramatic trade saga of my Minnesota Twins fandom, maybe ranking behind the Johan Santana rumors that dominated the entire 2008 offseason. I will spare you all the back-and-forth rumors between Boston getting cold feet and the revised agreement between the three teams, as this is a massive movement of players. Instead, the changes in the Twins aspect is highlighted below: 2/4 Twins Agreement V1 Twins trade Brusdar Graterol to Boston. Twins acquire Kenta Maeda from Los Angeles. 2/9 Twins Agreement V2 Twins trade Brusdar Graterol, 2020 Comp B Draft Pick, and Luke Raley to Los Angeles Twins acquire Kenta Maeda, $10M in cash assets, and Jair Camargo © from Los Angeles. The second version is much more complex, but paints a better picture of the Twins 2020 mindset. While the delay was agonizing, irritating, and heart-burn inducing, I think the Twins used time to their advantage and improved their haul from the first version. Let’s review what changed from the first trade to the second, and how the Twins sacrificed future unknowns for increased flexibility to improve the 2020 club at a later date. The 67th Pick In the 2020 MLB Draft Here’s a look at the Twins’ last 25 second round picks - ranging from pick number 37 to 92. There’s a lot of variability here, with 71% of the bWAR coming from the combination of Scott Baker and Jesse Crain. The Twins have failed to receive value from the second round in the last decade, but the second round picks from the Falvine regime are legitimate prospects within the system. The jury is out on anyone drafted from 2016 onward. Make no mistake - the Twins are taking an unprecedented risk for this organization by trading a draft pick this high, especially after losing the #99 pick for signing Josh Donaldson. However, there’s a very realistic chance this pick doesn’t reach the MLB level. If the player were to reach the majors, it would likely be in year outside of the Twins current competitive window. There’s plenty of second round draft talent currently in the system to supplement the current core. Another way to look at the value of this pick is by equating it to a monetary value. Fangraphs placed the value of the 67th pick in 2019 at $4.1M. That factors in a signing bonus subtracted from projected future value, based on historic WAR from players picked in that slot. That’s an interesting way to look at this part of the trade, considering the dollar amount that Los Angeles is providing. $10M in Cash Assets Cash. Don’t worry, this isn’t meant to line the pockets of the Pohlads. This is spending money for the 2020 Trade Deadline in late July/early August. This allows them to acquire an asset at the deadline using more financial capital, and less prospect capital. Judging from their pre-Donaldson free agent signings, it’s clear that Falvey and Levine crave financial flexibility. Here are several ways to look at this incoming cash, beyond use in a trade scenario: Covering the majority of Kenta Maeda’s base salary ($12.5M through 2023) Covering Maeda’s full 2020 contract, if he hits the majority of his incentives. Pays for the #67 Comp B draft pick, with roughly $5.9M in excess value. This is a huge benefit over the previous agreement, as it protects the Twins if Maeda flames out, or allows more budget room to acquire a pricier trade target in July. The $10M from Los Angeles will go to valid use in many scenarios. Luke Raley for Jair Camargo Luke Raley boomerangs back to the organization that dealt him to Minnesota for Brian Dozier in 2018. In exchange, the Twins are receiving a low-level catching prospect in Jair Camargo. Camargo is a young catcher at 20 years old, and played at Class A last year in the Great Lakes league. His offensive line was middling with a .642 OPS, but he is rumored to have a strong exit velocity from his bat (90 MPH+) with a high hard hit percentage. The Twins seem to like that offensive profile, and the fact it's coming from a catcher is extra appealing. It never hurts to add catching depth at any level. The Twins are giving up Raley, who was a fine prospect, but he suffered through an injury for the majority of 2019. He projects as a corner outfield platoon/bench piece, and that role is valuable to MLB clubs. However, the Twins outfield depth is immense, with a young starting core on the MLB team, and multiple top 100 ranked outfield prospects behind him in Trevor Larnach and Alex Kirilloff. Even with blockages in front of him, and top prospects behind him - Raley was competing alongside multiple outfielders at a similar level of development. Jake Cave, LaMonte Wade Jr, and Brent Rooker are all fellow outfielders with similar ages and projections to Raley. All of these similar corner outfielders were occupying 40-man roster spots. The major benefit in trading away Raley to Los Angeles, is that it immediately opens up a 40-man roster spot for the 2020 team. Camargo is years away from being added, and is essentially a lottery ticket at a premium position. For now, the open 40-man roster vacancy creates a large amount of flexibility. The open spot can be used for Jhoulys Chacín, an injury replacement, or a future acquisition. Brusdar Graterol Is Gone - But To A Different Opponent Fair trades are supposed to hurt, right? This aspect did not change, as pitchers who throw 100 MPH+ do not grow on trees. It still hurts to lose Graterol, but the same analysis that applied a few days ago remains the same. The Twins are betting that Graterol will remain in the bullpen, and are filling an area of need in the starting rotation, from an area of strength on the 2020 team. Unlike Boston, Los Angeles is fine with Graterol’s likely reliever projection. The Twins are hoping Graterol doesn’t turn into Aroldis Chapman. So why is the version of the trade more beneficial to the Twins, in relation to Brusdar? Simple, the Twins won’t have to face him nearly as much over the next few years if he’s pitching in the National League, compared to two guaranteed series per year against Boston. Of course, that could change with a few late October match-ups against Los Angeles, but we’d all be very pleased if that’s the case. It’ll be much easier to root for him in Dodger Blue for the next few years. The End Result The one constant between the two versions of this trade is that Kenta Maeda is still coming to the Twins, as the #3 starter to open the season. The Twins had to get a bit more creative after Boston shied away from Graterol, but Los Angeles was a flexible trade partner. While the first version of this trade was already risky with the Twins shipping away Graterol’s sky-high potential, the second version adds even more risk to the equation. The loss of the Comp B draft pick and Luke Raley could come back to sting in their own rights. However, I’m glad the Twins doubled down, as the increased roster and financial flexibility for 2020 are the only known factors in this entire deal.

Walker is definitely more intriguing, but it's hard to peg how effective he would be with the last two years lost to injury. Walker has more upside, but it's easier to see Chacin providing starts at the beginning of the season. I would not be opposed at all to signing Walker to a similar deal, and seeing how the cards are dealt.

All great points. He also only has to provide innings until Pineda returns. If he's pitched effectively to the point of staying past that, all is gravy. And if he looks like a pumpkin in Spring Training, there's no commitment to roll the dice with him. The risk is the status quo (so, none), and the upside is the return of a guy who had been an average to slightly above average major league starter just two years ago.

Jhoulys Chacín has signed to a minor league deal with the Minnesota Twins, according to Robert Murray. This move raises the floor of the starting rotation with no risk, and Chacín has a history of being a dependable mid-rotation starter. However, that history was clouded by a terrible 2019, which is why the Twins were able to sign Chacín to a minor league deal. Chacín’s major league career to this point can be summarized in four acts: ACT I: Colorado High (2009 - 2013) 608 IP, 37 W, 41 L, 3.61 ERA, 3.94 FIP, 126 ERA+, 9.6 fWAR Chacín broke into the league with Colorado in 2009 at the age of 21 for a cup of coffee. He pitched extremely well during the majority of his Rockies tenure, considering the environment that the Denver altitude brings. Chacín posted a 2+ fWAR in each of his first two full major league seasons in 2010 and 2011. Chacín was injured and ineffective in 2013 (5.14 FIP with a 0.4 fWAR), but he would go on to post a career high 4.1 fWAR in 2013. ACT II: Injuries, releases,and minor league deals (2014 - 2016) 234 IP, 9 W, 16 L, 4.81 ERA, 4.30 FIP, 86 ERA+, 2.2 fWAR The shoulder-related injuries at the end of Chacín’s Rockies tenure led to his release in March of 2015, and Chacín spent the next two years signing minor league deals. After cameos of five games each for Arizona (2015) and Atlanta (2016), Chacín was traded by Atlanta to the Los Angeles Angels where he had decent success as a swing-man (29 games, 17 starts). That season was the first sign of Chacín’s renaissance, as he would post a 1.6 fWAR with the lowest FIP of his career (4.01). ACT III: Career Renaissance (2017 - 2018) 373 IP, 28 W, 18 L, 3.69 ERA, 4.14 FIP, 112 ERA+, 5.7 fWAR Fresh off the heels from his impressive stay with the Los Angeles, the San Diego Padres gave Chacín his first major league deal for the 2017 season. Chacín rewarded San Diego with a 2.3 fWAR season in 180 IPs. He also posted the highest strikeout rate (20%) since his 2010 season, driven by the increasing use of his slider. Chacín threw his slider for roughly 20% of his pitches in his career to that point, but in 2017 it jumped to 35.3%. Chacín used his 2017 success to sign the largest contract of his career with Milwaukee prior to the 2018 season, for two years and $15.5M. Chacín had an even better season in 2018, posting a 2.4 fWAR and a 4.03 FIP. He also made the first postseason appearances of his career, going an effective 2-1 in three starts, with a 1.46 ERA against the Rockies and Dodgers. ACT IV: Rock Bottom? (2019) 103.1 IP, 3 W, 12 L, 6.01 ERA, 5.88 FIP, 67 ERA+, -0.1 fWAR This is the area I want to dissect with the most detail, because Chacín’s 2019 is the reason why that the Twins are signing him to a minor league deal on February 1st. Heading into 2019, Milwaukee was certain that Chacín was going to be a cog in the starting rotation after his strong regular season and postseason results. That was sadly not the case, as everything that could go wrong for Chacín, did. Milwaukee ended up releasing Chacín in late August after 19 starts. The Boston Red Sox picked him up on August 31st, but Chacín would post even worse numbers in five starts to end the season. Chacín’s troubles in 2019 can be explained most simply by changes in the contact, and a few unlucky trends. Chacín’s hard hit rate of 42.3% ranked among the 7th percentile for major league pitchers (MLB average was 34.5%). The hard contact was coming in a new area for Chacín - in the air. Chacín is known as a groundball pitcher, with a career groundball rate of 46.6%. In 2019, his groundball rate was the lowest of his career at 37.5%, and his linedrive and flyball rates increased accordingly. More danger came with more flyballs, as Chacín averaged 2.18 HR/9 last season, and hitters had a HR/FB rate of 21%. While increased flyballs will lead to increased home runs, home run rate can fluctuate wildly. Chacín was tied for the 8th highest HR/FB rate among pitchers with at least 100 innings last season, something that should regress a bit in future seasons. Balls contained within the fences also found holes against Chacín. His BABIP (Batting Average on Balls In Play), was also inflated last year at .307 (45h highest in MLB), compared to his career BABIP of .281. The abnormally high HR/FB and BABIP numbers from Chacín suggest that he was unlucky when the ball was in play or in the air. It's also important to point out that Chacín went on the injured list in July with an oblique strain after two rough outings, so it’s possible some of his woes were health-related. However, in any way you slice it - changing contact trends, bad luck, or injury - Chacín had a terrible 2019 season. Reasons For Optimism? The Twins signed Chacín as they are probably enamored by his slider (much like fellow offseason acquisition, Matt Wisler). Chacín’s slider use continued to rise in 2019 to 49.5%, which is extremely high for a starting pitcher. The performance of his slider did decrease a bit, as the league knew what to expect from scouting reports. However, Chacín still easily outperforms the MLB average across several Statcast metrics. The use of his slider can probably be assisted by his sinker/four-seam fastball combo becoming more effective. These pitches combined for over 44% of his pitches thrown in 2019, with dreadful results - a .652 SLG on his sinker and a 1.000 SLG (!) on his fastball. Both the sinker and the fastball have been below average for Chacín dating back to 2015, but they became borderline unfathomably terrible last season. The only signs of optimism is that he had a higher whiff rate on both of these pitches, which helped increase his strikeout rate to a career high 21.5% in 2019 (one of the only bright spot metrics for Chacín in 2019). Luckily, Wes Johnson has shown a tendency to add a few miles per hour to fastballs, or help pitchers develop a cutter or splitter (Chacín has thrown both minimally in the past), that can offset the frequently thrown slider. If Chacín can refine his repertoire of non-breaking ball/offspeed pitches, his flyball and home run rate should decrease closer to his career norms. Overall, this is a very low-risk bet for the Twins that allows starting pitching insurance for the early stages of the 2020 season. The Twins can now afford to have one rookie pitcher in the starting rotation, rather than two, until the return of Michael Pineda in mid-May. Despite all the concerns about 2019, Steamer projects Chacín to have very similar seasons to the rookie trio of Smeltzer, Thorpe and Dobnak: Chacín: 137 IP, 7.41 K/9, 3.56 BB/9, 1.54 HR/9, 5.05 ERA, 5.13 FIP, 1.2 fWAR Smeltzer: 75 IP, 7.21 K/0, 2.74 BB/9, 1.77 HR/9, 5.03 ERA, 5.20 FIP, 0.4 fWAR Thorpe: 42 IP, 9.16 K/9, 3.08 BB/9, 1.55 HR/9, 4.40 ERA, 4.54 FIP, 0.5 fWAR Dobnak: 90 IP, 5.95 K/9, 2.72 BB/9, 1.47 HR/9, 5.03 ERA, 5.05 FIP, 0.7 fWAR With the performance so closely matched, I’d rather Chacín take up one of the two open rotation spots based on his experience and string of 2+ fWAR seasons just a few years ago. If Wes Johnson and the Twins can help Chacín develop a counter to his slider, Chacín should rebound a bit to become a serviceable back-end starter. With all the starting pitching reinforcements coming later in the season, the Twins just need Chacín to be a serviceable bridge - but he has the potential to be more.

This post wasn't necessarily about his defensive aggression, but he does have to stay on the field for the offensive changes to bring an impact to the team on all sides of the game. Many of the quotes going around last season all spoke to Buxton's "instinct" to try and catch these balls. He's been told at every level how hard he works, being verbally rewarded when he sacrifices his body for defense. The new regime has tried to curb his aggression, but logic only takes you so far in the heat of the moment, especially at the speeds he travels. It's a Catch-22, because you would want Buxton to make the diving catch Aaron Hicks made in the heartbreaking loss to the Yankees. But when he makes an attempt/catch like that and gets hurt, everyone questions the decision. I think it's about picking the spots to be aggressive, but that is harder than it appears on paper.

If he's healthy for a full season and provides similar offense, it's certainly possible he could lead the team in WAR.

Byron Buxton has proven that he will provide multiple wins above replacement, if he stays healthy and hits at an acceptably average level. The bad news is that Buxton failed to stay healthy for the latter half of 2019, limiting what could have been. The great news is that he appeared to be making major swing and philosophy adjustments that may lead to above-average offensive production going forward. The first step was reducing his strikeout rate (K%), that allowed him to have a chance to put more balls in play. While Buxton may never have a strikeout rate below 20%, his 2019 K% of 23.1% decreased by a difference of 22% year-over-year. He also doubled his walk rate (BB%) from his disaster 2018 season, to significantly improve his BB/K ratio to 0.28. If Buxton can continue reducing his strikeout rate (it was over 30% in his first two seasons), and keep his walk rate steady, he will have many more chances to receive more pitches and drive the ball. Another major problem in the beginning of Buxton's career was watching too many early pitches become established in the strike zone, and he would proceed to flail at the third strike when he was in protect-mode. Pitchers threw nearly the same amount of pitches in the zone from 2018 to 2019, but Buxton continued his 4-year trend of swinging at more of these pitches (Z-Swing%). Buxton's contact of pitches in the zone (Z-Contact%) has remained constant throughout his career at roughly 82%, but that's not a bad thing. If contact is constant, but his trend of an increasing ZSwing% continues, Buxton will continue to increase his total contact events on hittable pitches. More aggression on pitches in the zone also reduces pitcher's counts, and ultimately strikeouts. He's come a long way from watching nearly 40% of pitches in the zone go on by in 2015. Increasing total contact on hittable pitches is swell, but the contact result is what matters in the end. Buxton's balls in play had encouraging results in 2019, establishing a career low in groundball rate (GB%) and a career high in flyball rate (FB%). Our new savior, Josh Donaldson previously said, "...they don't pay you for groundballs. They pay you for doubles, they pay you for homers." Well said, Josh. Buxton clearly took note of this philosophy, but how did he increase his flyball rate? Launch angle. Buxton's average launch angle of 19.5 degrees ranked 17th among all MLB players with a minimum of 250 plate appearances, and this also led the team that set the single season home run record. In addition to lifting the ball more often, he was also making stronger contact than ever before. Buxton set career highs in barrel rate, exit velocity, and hard hit percentage in 2019. He was also above the MLB averages in each of these metrics, becoming a below-the-radar Statcast darling. It was an absolute shame Buxton's season ended prematurely, but his trajectory is promising if he can stay on the field. Buxton's changes - reducing his strikeout rate, increasing aggressiveness within the zone, higher launch angle, and harder contact - resulted in a 111 wRC+ for 2019. The path to becoming an above average offensive player has been a long and winding road for Buxton, but he finally arrived after trending in the correct direction for years.

It is beyond obvious that Jorge Polanco is essential to this Minnesota Twins team. Polanco's offense at the top of the lineup provides all-star level production, despite being on the most questionable defensive shortshops in the league. You could make a convincing case that he was the MVP of the team in 2019. With that out of the way, let's play a twisted game of "What If?". What if Polanco goes down with an injury in 2020? It's not inconceivable, as he had offseason surgery for an ankle impingement, but the Twins anticipate him being ready for Spring Training. Even with that reassurance from the team, you'd rather have the starting shortstop come into Spring Training with zero questions about an ankle. If Polanco were to miss major time with an injury (ankle or otherwise), I believe that he would be the most difficult position player to replace on this team. There are limited options behind him that are clear defensive upgrades, which is concerning given that Polanco ranked last in baseball for Infield Outs Above Average (OAA). Beyond defense, there's only a few players in the league that could match his offensive output at the position. So what would would the Twins do if Polanco were to go on an extended stay on the Injured List? Below are the internal options to replace him, and they aren't inspiring. Ehire Adrianza Adrianza is the best fit on the 26-man (that number is still taking a while to get used to) to step in for an injured Polanco. However, Father Time suggests that the 30-year-old Adrianza is not as efficient at the position as he used to be. Adrianza played 152 innings at shortstop in 2019, down from 534 innings in 2018 due to Polanco playing a full year. Statcast has Adrianza at -2 OAA at shortstop, but he had a 5 OAA in 2018. FanGraphs considered him to below average at the position as well, with a -2 Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) and -14.1 UZR/150 in 2019. The Twins did not substitute Adrianza for Polanco at shortstop that often in 2019, clearly valuing him more as a utility player at other positions. This is because while Polanco major defensive deficiencies, Adrianza is not that much of a defensive upgrade as a shorstop. Adrianza did have above average offensive production in 2019, with a 102 Weight Runs Created Plus (wRC+), but Adrianza has previously never posted a wRC+ over 100 during his time at the major league level (career 84 wRC+). Even if Adrianza matches his 2019 offensive production, it would not come close to Polanco's projected 109 wRC+. Marwin Gonzalez Gonzalez has appeared at shortstop more than any other position during his MLB career (292 games), but it's clear the Twins view him more as a utility option at the corners and outfield positions going forward. Gonzalez started one game at shortstop in 2019, and a whooping two games at second base. The Twins likely took a major note from his last few years playing shortstop in Houston: 2017: -2 OAA, -3 DRS, -8.5 UZR/150 2018: -6 OAA, - 5 DRS, -30.6 UZR/150 Gonzalez would be a fine offensive shortshop, but his defensive ability to field the position no longer makes him an option to fill in for Polanco. He will be a necessary asset to mix-in at first base, where Miguel Sano will be learning a new full-time position, and across the outfield against left-handed pitchers. But he would not be first in-line to replace Polanco if a major injury were to occur, as his days as a shortstop appear to be over. Luis Arraez As I detailed in my Defensive Evaluation post on Arraez, there isn't a large sample on his time at shortstop. However, if there are major concerns with his ability to field second base ( -6 OAA, -8 DRS, -22.6 UZR/150), those worries would be amplified at a much more demanding position. The vast majority of Arraez's value also comes from his bat, but the water-level of offensive production rises from second base to shortstop. MLB SS Average in 2019: .264/.323/.439, .321 wOBA, 98 wRC+ MLB 2B Average in 2019: .259/.322/.423, .316 wOBA, 94 wRC+ Luis Arraez in 2019: .334/.399/.439, .360 wOBA, 125 wRC+ Arraez had better offensive metrics than the average at both positions, but moving him to shortstop does reduce a bit of his value as the expectation for production rises. When factoring in the negative defensive value and probable regression, Arraez would likely inch closer to average overall value at shortstop than his primary home at second base. Nick Gordon Nick Gordon is the last infielder on the 40-man roster that can handle the defensive requirements for shortstop, but he is likely a candidate to be removed from the 40-man when Josh Donaldson is formally announced. In 6 years in the minors, Gordon has failed to show signs of offensive promise outside of a few promising first halves. His collective offensive line is .276/.329/.459 is rather pedestrian for a former first round draft pick, and boosted by an improved showing in 2019 where the ball at the AAA-level was juiced. When healthy, the Twins played Gordon at shortstop slightly more at shortstop than second base in 2019, with a 40/30 game split between the two positions. The same trend also existed in 2018, with a 69/30 game split. The problem is Gordon has shown durability concerns, likely due to his slight build. This results in extreme production drop-offs in the second half when he isn't missing significant time with an injury. If Gordon remains on the roster by Opening Day, a Polanco injury might be one of his first and last shots to make an impression on the major league level. All four major league infield positions are locked in for multiple years of control, and more impressive prospects are at lower levels in the system. While a Polanco injury might be a best-case scenario for Gordon, the odds are stacked against him to provide average-level production as a temporary starting shortstop - let alone coming close to Polanco's offensive level. The impending roster crunch makes it even less likely that an opportunity will arise. Minor League Signings The Twins recently signed a few shortstops to minor league contracts, after Ronald Torreyes departed as a minor-league free agent. Wilfredo Tovar and Jack Reinhemier were signed in December, but both players have limited cameos at the major league level and should be seen as depth "break-glass-in-case-of-emergency" options. The 28-year-old Tovar has appeared in 40 games since 2013, but the majority (31) came in 2019 with the Los Angels Angels. He has produced a 28 wRC+ and a .217 wOBA in 110 plate appearances, with five extra base hits (all doubles). FanGraphs has rated his 257 career innings at shortstop favorably, with +2 DRS and a 16.2 UZR/150, so his benefit comes from his glove rather than his bat (career .676 OPS in the minors). Reinhemier is slightly younger at 27, with major league experience with Arizona in 2017 and the Mets in 2018. He collected only 40 plate appearances across these two seasons , with a 23 wRC+ and .196 wOBA. Reinheimer is more of utility player than pure shortstop, as 28 of his career 79.2 MLB innings have been played at the position. One of these players might be called up as a bench option in the event of a Polanco injury. If they are starting regularly as shortstop, something has gone horribly, horribly wrong. Why is Polanco the most difficult position player to replace? The internal options above paint a bleak picture in the scenario of a major Polanco injury. While all other starting position players are all projected to provide multiple wins above replacement, finding a replacement will be easier for all them due to the current layout of the roster. The Twins have multiple major league caliber outfielders on the bench in the likes of Jake Cave and Marwin Gonzalez. Players on the 40-man that are major league ready, or close to it, include LaMonte Wade Jr, Brent Rooker, and Luke Raley. The corner infield spots are similarly covered, with Marwin Gonzalez providing positive defensive value (unlike shortstop), and Adrianza right behind him. Even Willians Astudillo and Travis Blankenhorn could provide replacement level service if necessary. Many of these same players could easily step in for Luis Arraez at second base. The catcher position is also in decent shape, as the Twins will be protective of Mitch Garver with plenty of time given to Alex Avila. Behind Avila, Astudillo is a serviceable (but more entertaining) backup with top catching prospect Ryan Jeffers not too far behind. All of these positions have stronger backup options than shortstop, where the best replacement appears to be Ehire Adrianza. While Adrianza is a fine utility player, he has never been given a starting role. At 30 years of age, his defense will continue to drop-off, and he is no sure bet to provide above average offensive output as he did in 2019. Without Adrianza's offense making up for his defensive play, as is the case with Polanco, he might become a major liability as a starting shortstop. There's no near-term replacement for Polanco in the upper levels of the minor leagues, and the major league bench pieces aren't the best fit at his position. As I explained in my earlier defensive evaluation post, Polanco's historical metrics at the position suggest the time to find a long-term replacement is approaching in the next few years. It might be best to have the replacement in the wings, ready to step in in case this horrible game of "What If?" becomes reality.