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Parker Hageman

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  1. Parker Hageman
  2. Parker Hageman
  3. Parker Hageman
    The six-foot-two Aaron Nola might not fire the fastest bullets among this year’s draft class but the right-handed junior out of LSU might be the most major league ready arm. But is a pitcher the organization's highest priority? Who is this guy? Nola, a graduate of Catholic High School in Baton Rouge, LA (that’s French for “Red Stick”), was an intriguing enough a prospect after his senior year of high school that the Toronto Blue Jays selected him with their 22nd round pick in 2011. At that time, the six-foot-two fungo bat was wheeling 92 mile an hour fastballs in Perfect Game events. Several rounds later, the Blue Jays took Aaron’s older brother Austin, a shortstop from LSU, in hopes of getting the family discount. Both Nolas delayed their professional careers at that time to play together in the storied baseball program in Louisiana. The younger Nola had a terrific freshman year among the elite competition with the likes of Mike Zunino, terrorizing pitchers with aluminum bats. For his part, Aaron Nola finished the year 7-4 in 19 games and 89 strikeouts in 89.2 innings pitched. Leading the Tigers staff that season was Kevin Gausman, who would be drafted fourth overall by the Baltimore Orioles (one slot behind the ball-killing Zunino). In his sophomore season, Nola combined with a future Twins prospect Ryan Eades to be the one-two punch for the Tigers that made it to the College World Series and finished with a 12-1 record, 1.57 ERA, and a 122-to-18 strikeouts-to-walks ratio in 17 starts. After the CWS run, LSU’s coach, Paul Mainieri, noted that 22 professional scouts were on-hand to watch one of Nola’s intrasquad fall practice starts heading into 2014. So far this season he has not wasted anyone’s scouting budget -- maybe except if your organization is drafting outside the Top 10 however. Nola has racked up a 9-1 record with a 1.42 ERA and the best strikeout rate of his career (10.62 K/9). Why the Twins will pick him Nola possesses the kind of command that makes the Twins front office swoon. Yes, I know. Twins fans read that a pitcher has above-average command and immediately assume he pitches to contact. That’s not the case with Nola. Unlike the more recent pitching draft picks, Nola doesn’t have the power arm that Eades or Jose Berrios have but there is little question that his fastball is a significant weapon. With a slinging three-quarter arm slot, Nola is able to put on a lot of sink and generate plenty of missed bats while hovering at 90-92 miles an hour. The radar gun readings do not do his fastball justice however, as the sound is what makes hitters take notice. “It sounds like a loud whistle,” Sean McMullen, LSU’s designated hitter and outfielder, told the local media. “It’s as loud as anybody I’ve ever faced.” Beyond the fastball, Nola has an above-average changeup that is considered his best secondary pitch but he also has a developing breaking ball. His stuff isn’t overpowering but his deceptive delivery (there’s some good extension at release) and pitch movement show a polished pitcher who could be MLB ready real soon, as one anonymous cross-checker told MLB.com. Why the Twins won’t pick him There does not seem to be a real reason to not draft Nola at five if they want to target a pitcher unless one of the higher-upside arms like Brady Aiken, Carlos Rodon or Tyler Kolak somehow falls to them. And the Twins went pitcher/catcher in 2013 so there may be some gravitation towards position players like Nick Gordon or Alex Jackson (a catcher who may not remain a catcher). Nola has the stuff to rise quickly through the system but that might not be the Twins biggest need in 2014. ------------------------------------------------------------- With another Twins win over San Diego on Wednesday night, you can get half-price large or extra-large pizza at PapaJohn’s.com with the promo code “TWINSWIN.”
  4. Parker Hageman
  5. Parker Hageman
  6. Parker Hageman
    [ATTACH=CONFIG]7492[/ATTACH]On this week’s podcast episode, Dan Anderson and Parker Hageman take a field trip: The No Juice Podcast heads to Target Field to experience the Twins’ Deckstravaganza event. There, the guys talk about the recent happenings with the Minnesota Twins, take your Burning Twitter Questions™, assign blame to the response of a high school prank, and chat with Keith Beise, the team’s social media coordinator. They also shot a handy video for you that demonstrates how to get kicked out of a Twins social media event. **If you listen to the entire show and are able to follow directions, there is an opportunity to win a free Game Six t-shirt** Topics: 0:00-1:25: Introduction 1:26-7:40: Chris Parmelee, swing changes, video scouting and gifs 7:41-13:03: Calling out Aaron Hicks’ preparation and the media’s reaction 13:04-30:20: Burning Twitter Questions™ including Twins at .500, Target Field Mascot Races, best happy hour spots, softball leagues that outlaw drinking and Baseball Stars vs RBI Baseball 30:21-36:12: Who Do We Blame? High school pranks 36:13-End: Talking social media and MLB with Keith Beise
  7. Parker Hageman
  8. Parker Hageman
    With just a few days remaining before the Twins were to travel to Chicago to begin the 2014 season, Chris Parmelee got the sickening news that his services would not be needed at the major league level. Out of options, the Twins were willing to expose him to waivers and risk losing him to another organization. As an additional gut punch, all of the other organizations in baseball said “eh, no thanks”. Shortly after receiving the news at Hammond Stadium, Parmelee had the appearance of someone who had just died, the exact person whom Jake Taylor was referring to in the movie Major League. In the clubhouse that morning, he was walking in a daze, slowly packing items from his locker and trying to process what had just happened. Occasionally a player or coach would walk by and offer some platitudes. In front of a handful of media members in the offices at the stadium, Twins assistant GM Rob Antony remarked that Chris Colabello out-performed him and then mentioned a few adjustments that the team was hoping Parmelee would make if he made the decision to stay with the organization. “[Parmelee] needs to regroup. He hasn’t gotten the job done,” Antony explained. “He’s had opportunities. We need him to be a run-producer. He needs to be a profile guy who can play first base, play the corner outfield positions and drive in runs. And to me, he’s become way too passive at the plate, taking pitches, taking strikes, taking first-pitch fastballs down the middle. He needs to go up there with the mentality that he’s going to do some damage trying to be aggressive.” Ultimately, with $242,200 of salary on the line to stay with the Twins, Parmelee accepted his reassignment to Rochester and went to work improving his offense. In regards to Antony's and the Twins’ assessment of Parmelee being too passive, the numbers do not necessarily reflect that notion. In most circumstances -- taking first-pitch fastballs in the zone or taking pitches in general -- Parmelee is right around league average. In fact, last year Parmelee held an above-average swing rate in hitter's counts (48% vs the 44% league-average rate according to ESPN/TruMedia). More than likely, the Twins just wanted him to swing aggressively -- not so much in which circumstance. Parmelee’s 2014 season, his third tour of the International League, started off with a bang. He compiled seven home runs in 32 games, putting himself near the top of the leaderboard. Naturally, the reaction from the fan base was that this performance was nothing new -- after all, those who remember his 2012 season in Rochester will recall that he dropped 17 dingers in 64 games before posting yawn-inducing numbers in 2013. How was this output any different than the circumstances in 2012? Was Parmelee simply a AAAA player, one destined to wax AAA pitching but never make the jump in the major leagues? The biggest reason why this season is likely more comparable to the 2012 year (and provides the hope that this is finally his breakthrough) has to do with him regaining the aggression in his swing. In 2013 and during spring training, Parmelee had changed his swing from the previous year. What Parmelee demonstrated last year was a more contact-oriented approach in his swing, specifically his lower-half. Parmelee implemented a toe-tap in his stride that may have reduced his ability to drive the ball: http://i.imgur.com/EBGa5nD.gif This approach followed him into spring training this year, which the Twins evaluators took note of: http://i.imgur.com/pSqCaij.gif Perhaps the realization that he could be jobless encouraged Parmelee to make changes. Whatever the reason, wherever the encouragement came from, Parmelee began to swing with more vigor. It was during this stretch that we see his transition from the toe-tap to the full leg-lift which led to seven home runs in 32 games: http://i.imgur.com/4fPXBre.gif That method has continued upon his call up to Minnesota: http://i.imgur.com/HuPgetr.gif With this swing, Parmelee is able to engage his hips better and generate more power, as we have seen with his prodigious home runs. The Twins challenged Chris Parmelee to become more aggressive at the plate. He did. Will this power continue? Like the adaptations that Chris Colabello and Trevor Plouffe made to their swings, the real test comes with how they respond once pitchers change their approach. As has been the case with Colabello and Plouffe, pitchers have worked them away more often and that has sent them into prolonged funks. It is possible that Parmelee’s newfound aggression could be used against him -- like fewer fastballs and more off-the-plate pitches. Because the Twins won yesterday, you can get a half price large or extra-large pizza today (Friday) from PapaJohns.com when you use the promo code TWINSWIN.
  9. Parker Hageman
    The Indians’ David Murphy should send the Minnesota Twins’ front office and coaching staff a bottle of champagne. After all, the struggling left-handed outfielder hast just six doubles this season but two of those came courtesy of the Twins when they have infielders positioned in the outfield. While the 2014 Twins infield numbers have flourished, the outfield has languished. The Twins’ outfield was a defensive liability last year. In 2013, they posted an unsightly -35.3 UZR as an outfield unit. Of course, if you solely relied on the broadcast of the games, you would have likely heard that the Twins outfield had a .991 fielding percentage, 4th best in the game. In short, last year’s outfield was very good...if the ball was hit directly at them. But overall they converted a lowly 84.4% of all outfield flies into outs -- a rate that was 29 out of 30 MLB teams. With the knowledge that the team had issues in this department, the Twins front office did little to address that particular need in the offseason. Naturally, starting pitching took a precedence. Yet little preparations were made to provide any safety nets. In fact, the only outfield addition this past year, Jason Kubel, provided questionable defense in corner outfield spots at his best. There was a method to this madness. The Twins had Josh Willingham locked in. They had to find out if Aaron Hicks could manage center field and if Oswaldo Arcia could claim right field. Beyond that, heading into camp, there was some depth (some depth in the same way there is some water in the desert). Kubel could take over for either Willingham or Arcia if necessary. Alex Presley had played a decent center field and Darin Mastroianni was certainly capable as well. But what is clear now -- as much as it seemed obvious even then -- is that there was a razor thin margin for error. Would Willingham, a much maligned player coming off knee surgery, survive an entire year? Hicks had little track record to suggest he was going to capture the position, which could be the same thing about Arcia. At the very least, in the case with Hicks and Arcia, the Twins deserve credit for wanting to see the kids play. The problem is that they purchased a very ****ty insurance policy. When it came time to make the final roster decisions, the leadership including the manager decided that Jason Bartlett would be a super utility-type -- a move that was necessitated just as much by the lack of confidence in Pedro Florimon as anything -- which came at the expense of Presley, an actual outfielder, who would be claimed by the Houston Astros. In terms of that final roster spot, Twins assistant GM Rob Antony had stated that the decision was influenced by the manager. “When you get down to the tail-end of your roster, I think the manager sort of has to determine how he’s using different guys and it doesn’t make much sense to fill out a roster any other way than how he’s going to use them,” said Antony shortly after the final roster was announced in spring training. As camp wound down, Bartlett saw more time in different outfield positions. After one afternoon in right field, manager Ron Gardenhire levied his thoughts on Bartlett’s performance. “He hasn’t played much out there, he’s just an athlete,” Gardenhire said in March when asked what his thoughts were on Bartlett in the outfield. “He actually ran the ball down great today -- the one ball in the corner, he just got too close to the wall. He’s had no practice in right field and balls in the corner. None whatsoever. He’s just taken balls off the bat. He got some great jumps on a few balls out there. Right field is the toughest out here. You can’t hardly see the ball out there -- everybody will tell you the same thing. I thought he did pretty damn good out there. To tell you the truth I was pleasantly surprised.” Gardenhire went on to say that Bartlett would be receiving plenty of outfield practice, alongside Chris Colabello and Eduardo Escobar, once the season began. The notion, however, that Bartlett would be needed almost immediately in the outfield did not seem to cross his mind. Additionally, the front office said that Bartlett would be available in emergency situations to fill in for Hicks but that Mastroianni would be a phone call away in Rochester. The emergency situations arose in Cleveland just six games into the season when left fielder Josh Willingham was destroyed by a Justin Masterson fastball. With Jason Kubel in right field and Oswaldo Arcia out because of an injury, Bartlett was pressed into left field duty. In the sixth inning, the Indians began to pick on Barlett. First it was Lonnie Chisenhall getting a bonus base because of Bartlett’s play, then Jason Kipnis landing a single in short left field and finally, David Murphy’s first gift double: http://i.imgur.com/7Ahbebc.gif In both instances, the likelihood of actually making the play was remote. According to Inside Edge’s fielding data available at Fangraphs, the IE video scouts suggested that the initial double allowed to Chisenhall had a 40-60% chance of being converted into an out. Murphy’s bloop, on the other hand, received a near 0% chance of being caught. The issue came in Bartlett’s approach -- the attempted dive rather than play it safe and get behind the play and limit Murphy to a one-base hit rather than move into scoring position. His hustle was admirable but his inexperience was on display. Source: FanGraphs This outing resulted in Bartlett’s eventual retirement after he sprained his ankle and opted not to continue through the rehab process. When the Twins returned to Cleveland, they were once again left with a short bench thanks to a pair of concussions to Aaron Hicks and Sam Fuld. With depth being a significant issue, Gardenhire decided to use Escobar in left field. Despite the vote of confidence from his manager after the game, it became apparent during the game that his inexperience -- like not knowing exactly how to read a warning track -- came into play. In that case, Inside Edge’s video scouts said Asdrubal Cabrera’s double was a play that should have been made 90-100% of the time. It essentially cost the Twins that game. Source: FanGraphs The next afternoon, still short of outfielders, Gardenhire promoted Escobar to center field action. This is where David Murphy received his second double from the Twins: http://i.imgur.com/FIZHJXw.gif Undoubtedly a tough read. Line drives that are smoked straight at an outfielder have the tendency of being difficult to read. As of posting, Inside Edge’s data from that game has not been uploaded to Fangraphs.com so there’s not baseline as to what professional video scouts feel about that particular play. That said, a player like Hicks or Fuld who has a history of seeing those types of plays would be able to get a better jump and route than Escobar did. Through Monday night, the Twins have had infielders in the outfield for 45.2 innings (or 4.6% of the total innings). Of those innings, the players involved have a combined 64 innings of professional outfield experience between them (Danny Santana did have 15 games in center in 2011 with Beloit). While a small sampling, that still is too large. Clearly health-related issues have forced several of these decisions but those were born from the inability to properly build -- or in the case of losing Presley and Mastroianni, manage -- outfield depth in the system. It was the offseason gamble, not the final decision to keep Bartlett on the 25-man roster, that caused so many issues are that resonating today. You are welcome, David Murphy.
  10. Parker Hageman
    The Indians’ David Murphy should send the Minnesota Twins’ front office and coaching staff a bottle of champagne. After all, the struggling left-handed outfielder hast just six doubles this season but two of those came courtesy of the Twins when they have infielders positioned in the outfield. While the 2014 Twins infield numbers have flourished, the outfield has languished. The Twins’ outfield was a defensive liability last year. In 2013, they posted an unsightly -35.3 UZR as an outfield unit. Of course, if you solely relied on the broadcasts of the games, you would have likely heard that the Twins outfield had a .991 fielding percentage, 4th best in the game. In short, last year’s outfield was very good...if the ball was hit directly at them. But overall they converted a lowly 84.4% of all outfield flies into outs -- a rate that was 29 out of 30 MLB teams. With the knowledge that the team had issues in this department, the Twins front office did little to address that particular need in the offseason. Naturally, starting pitching took precedence. Yet little preparation was made to provide any safety net, or improvement. In fact, the only outfield addition this past year, Jason Kubel, provided questionable defense in corner outfield spots at his best. There was a method to this madness. The Twins had Josh Willingham locked in. They had to find out if Aaron Hicks could manage center field and if Oswaldo Arcia could claim right field. Beyond that, heading into camp, there was some depth (some depth in the same way there is some water in the desert). Kubel could take over for either Willingham or Arcia if necessary. Alex Presley had played a decent center field and Darin Mastroianni was certainly capable as well. But what is clear now -- as much as it seemed obvious even then -- is that there was a razor thin margin for error. Would Willingham, a much maligned player coming off knee surgery, survive an entire year? Hicks had little track record to suggest he was going to capture the position, which could be the same thing said about Arcia. At the very least, in the case with Hicks and Arcia, the Twins deserve credit for wanting to see the kids play. The problem is that they purchased a very ****ty insurance policy. When it came time to make the final roster decisions, the leadership, including the manager, decided that Jason Bartlett would be a super utility-type -- a move that was necessitated just as much by the lack of confidence in Pedro Florimon as anything -- which came at the expense of Presley, an actual outfielder, who would be claimed by the Houston Astros. In terms of that final roster spot, Twins assistant GM Rob Antony had stated that the decision was influenced by the manager. “When you get down to the tail-end of your roster, I think the manager sort of has to determine how he’s using different guys and it doesn’t make much sense to fill out a roster any other way than how he’s going to use them,” said Antony shortly after the final roster was announced in spring training. As camp wound down, Bartlett saw more time in different outfield positions. After one afternoon in right field, manager Ron Gardenhire weighed in with his thoughts on Bartlett’s performance. “He hasn’t played much out there, he’s just an athlete,” Gardenhire said in March when asked what his thoughts were on Bartlett in the outfield. “He actually ran the ball down great today -- the one ball in the corner, he just got too close to the wall. He’s had no practice in right field and balls in the corner. None whatsoever. He’s just taken balls off the bat. He got some great jumps on a few balls out there. Right field is the toughest out here. You can’t hardly see the ball out there -- everybody will tell you the same thing. I thought he did pretty damn good out there. To tell you the truth I was pleasantly surprised.” Gardenhire went on to say that Bartlett would be receiving plenty of outfield practice, alongside Chris Colabello and Eduardo Escobar, once the season began. The notion, however, that Bartlett would be needed almost immediately in the outfield did not seem to cross his mind. Additionally, the front office said that Bartlett would be available in emergency situations to fill in for Hicks but that Mastroianni would be a phone call away in Rochester. The emergency situations arose in Cleveland just six games into the season when left fielder Josh Willingham was destroyed by a Justin Masterson fastball. With Jason Kubel in right field and Oswaldo Arcia out because of an injury, Bartlett was pressed into left field duty. In the sixth inning, the Indians began to pick on Barlett. First it was Lonnie Chisenhall getting a bonus base because of Bartlett’s play, then Jason Kipnis landing a single in short left field and finally, David Murphy’s first gift double: http://i.imgur.com/7Ahbebc.gif In both instances, the likelihood of actually making the play was remote. According to Inside Edge’s fielding data available at Fangraphs, the IE video scouts suggested that the initial double allowed to Chisenhall had a 40-60% chance of being converted into an out. Murphy’s bloop, on the other hand, received a near 0% chance of being caught. The issue came in Bartlett’s approach -- the attempted dive rather than play it safe and get behind the play and limit Murphy to a one-base hit rather than move into scoring position. His hustle was admirable but his inexperience was on display. Source: FanGraphs This outing resulted in Bartlett’s eventual retirement after he sprained his ankle and opted not to continue through the rehab process. When the Twins returned to Cleveland, they were once again left with a short bench thanks to a pair of concussions to Aaron Hicks and Sam Fuld. With depth being a significant issue, Gardenhire decided to use Escobar in left field. Despite the vote of confidence from his manager after the game, it became apparent during the game that his inexperience -- like not knowing exactly how to read a warning track -- came into play. In that case, Inside Edge’s video scouts said Asdrubal Cabrera’s double was a play that should have been made 90-100% of the time. It essentially cost the Twins that game. Source: FanGraphs The next afternoon, still short of outfielders, Gardenhire promoted Escobar to center field action. This is where David Murphy received his second double from the Twins: http://i.imgur.com/FIZHJXw.gif Undoubtedly a tough read. Line drives that are smoked straight at an outfielder have the tendency to be difficult to read. As of this posting, Inside Edge’s data from that game has not been uploaded to Fangraphs.com so there’s not baseline as to what professional video scouts feel about that particular play. That said, a player like Hicks or Fuld who has a history of seeing those types of plays would be able to get a better jump and route than Escobar did. Through Monday night, the Twins have had infielders in the outfield for 45.2 innings (or 4.6% of the total innings). Of those innings, the players involved have a combined 64 innings of professional outfield experience between them (Danny Santana did have 15 games in center in 2011 with Beloit). While a small sampling, that still is too large. Clearly health-related issues have forced several of these decisions but those were born from the inability to properly build -- or in the case of losing Presley and Mastroianni, manage -- outfield depth in the system. It was the offseason gamble, not the final decision to keep Bartlett on the 25-man roster, that caused so many issues that are resonating today. You are welcome, David Murphy.
  11. Parker Hageman
    Submitted for your listening pleasure, this week’s No Juice Podcast, Parker Hageman and Dan Anderson discuss a variety of topics, including: The Joy of Twitter Infielders in the Outfield Multilingual Colabello Joe Mauer and injuries Things you shouldn’t say out loud if you are Tommy Lasorda Walking through Uptown fountains The NFL Draft The No Juice Podcast is now available on Stitcher and can be followed on iTunes as well. Be sure to follow the No Juice Podcast on Twitter (@NoJuicePodcast) for all updates.
  12. Parker Hageman
    Trevor Plouffe was essentially an afterthought this winter viewed as a third base placeholder until Miguel Sano takes the position from him. By the grace of the inelasticity of an elbow ligament, Plouffe's job security increased considerably. Sano's misfortune would be Plouffe's godsend. And, to his credit, the 27-year-old has made the most of this opportunity. After several seasons of mishandling the hot corner and minimal offensive contributions, Plouffe's game took giant leaps forward in 2014. Defensively he has looked improved and the magical defensive metrics reflect it. Offensively, there have been signs that he has matured as a player like using the entire field and laying off pitches out of the zone. Of course, Twins fans have gotten excited once before for the big breakout. In 2012, Plouffe gained attention by hitting roughly 750 home runs (estimate) in June and July. At that time, I documented his mechanical changes since his rookie year that allowed him to pull the ball with such might. By quieting his bat movement and aggressively deploying his hips, he fired red-seamed rockets into the outfield bleachers. Part of what made that stretch so successful for Plouffe was his ability to let it fly early in the count. According to ESPN/TruMedia, he was 14-for-26 and banged 7 of his 14 home runs in that situation. Of course, the baseball bombardment would not last as teams adjusted to his new approach and Plouffe could not reciprocate in kind. Following what felt like a lost year in 2013, Plouffe overhauled his strategy at the plate and refined his mechanics in order to become a more complete hitter. The first change was improving his base. Prior to this season, Plouffe demonstrated a wider stance with his weight distribution on his back leg. This season, the stance has been shortened and his distribution is more balanced. http://cdn.makeagif.com/media/5-07-2014/HlyjAq.gif In his swing, or more specifically his leg lift, we see a muted version of the front leg lift. Over the previous two seasons, Plouffe used a higher lift and shifted more of his weight onto his back leg before shifting forward. Not only that but he also This creates a situation with plenty power but also overcommitting to fastballs and the selling out on the pull-side. Now, with his balanced approach, he is able to allow the ball to travel deeper while staying back. This gives him the ability to drive the ball hard to all fields with impressive results -- he is hitting a robust .333 when driving the ball to right field and .357 up-the-middle. http://i.imgur.com/lkBGD89.gif2012http://i.imgur.com/sWmO59U.gif2013 http://i.imgur.com/dbacd8u.gif2014 Plouffe explained this change in his approach to 1500ESPN.com’s Derek Wetmore at the end of April by saying: Will this approach be sustainable? Plouffe has thrived this year by smacking pitches that have remained up in the zone for hits. In fact, his .340 average on pitches in the upper-half is 100 points better than the average. It is clear that this trend has been spotted by opposing teams when you consider how Plouffe has been pitched as of late and his performance in that time (.132/.175/.211 since May 1). Now, as you can see from the ESPN heat map, teams are throwing him down-and-away. Over his career he’s hit just .128 on pitches in that area and is a miserable 0-for-17 this year when putting those balls into play. Perhaps as a result of this new attack, Plouffe has also started to stray from his newfound approach of swinging at just pitches in the zone. Prior to May, Plouffe chased after 15.5% of pitches out of the zone, says ESPN/TruMedia. This month he’s expanded this region and offered at 26.7% of all out-of-zone pitches. Unless Plouffe can adjust to that plan of attack -- or capitalize on mistakes -- he is almost certain to see his numbers fall. That being said, Plouffe’s maturity and willingness to make these changes bodes well for his ability respond.
  13. Parker Hageman
  14. Parker Hageman
    The Minnesota Twins’ starting pitching shortage of strikeouts has continued into 2014. That’s not anything new but it makes you wonder if the fumes from the garbage burner are causing pitchers to simply lob the ball into the strike zone. As of Tuesday, the Twins were owners of the bottom three strikeout rates in the American League. While Kevin Correia and Kyle Gibson are thought of as contact-oriented pitchers, it is Ricky Nolasco’s inclusion on the list which is a bit surprising. After all, Nolasco held a 19% strikeout rate over his career. Though a drop in the strikeout rate is expected during the switch in leagues and pitchers have to face a designated hitter instead of a car antenna-swinging pitcher, the drop from 20% in 2013 to 11% so far in 2014 has been curious. Nolasco has been able to get to a two-strike count regularly, however, he has failed to put hitters away at an expected pace. According to ESPN/TruMedia, Nolasco leads all qualified starters with a .295 batting average in two-strike situations (he also owns a .333 average in 0-2 counts this year!!!)(!!!!!!). What is happening? The most notable difference between last year and this year is his reliance on the fastball instead of either of his breaking balls. After throwing 35%/65% fastball/secondary split in two-strike counts in 2013, he’s throwing at a 44%/56% split this year – and his fastball has been hammered. When he throws the fastball in two-strike situations, opponents are hitting .429 (9-for-21 with 3 doubles). Another interesting aspect to this strikeout drop-off is his curveball usage. More than the usage, it is the effectiveness which is more cause for concern. Last year he posted a 25% swing-and-miss rate, that’s down to 7% this year. Who knows where this change is coming from – coaching staff, catcher or Nolasco himself. As he mentioned in spring training, Nolasco knows he has the final say to what is thrown in what situation. As of now, he has not been effective in what should be put-away situations. At the very least, it probably is time to reconsider what he is tossing in two-strike counts. ~~~ Twins beat the Indians on Monday so on Tuesday you can treat your family to a half price Papa John's L or XL pizza by using the promocode 'twinswin' at PapaJohns.com . ~~~
  15. Parker Hageman
  16. Parker Hageman
    The No Juice Podcast returns for the fourth installment where Dan and Parker highlight the Minnesota Twins discussion with thoughts on the performance and contract of Mike Pelfrey. In the non-Twins world, they also talk about: Dan's theory that drinking bottled beer decreases your odds of getting a hangover while drinking tapped beer increases them. The Snowflake Nelson fiasco. How girlie a bedroom can be decorate before it is considered creepy. Overrated rock songs and bands. And they answer Twitter questions from various sources. Podcast is fueled by a growler of No. 9 Bock from the Freehouse in Minneapolis. You can listen below, at the NoJuicePodcast website or on iTunes: Be sure to follow The No Juice Podcast on Twitter!
  17. Parker Hageman
    Since it has been raining for 40 days and 40 nights, this week’s No Juice midweek shortcast tackles the timely question: Should the Twins have put a damn roof over Target Field? Since neither of us was alive to keep the Metrodome from being built, joining Dan and I to discuss this heated topic is my Dad, Old Blue. You can listen at our website or catch us on iTunes. Be sure to follow @NoJuicePodcast on Twitter.
  18. Parker Hageman
    In a collaborative effort from TwinsDaily.com’s Parker Hageman and nowhere special’s Dan Anderson, the pair bring you the second installment of the No Juice Podcast. Fueled by refreshments from Steel Toe Brewing in St. Louis Park, Dan and Parker discuss the latest from the Minnesota Twins, assign blame for stupid things, contemplate wedding music and answer questions from Twitter. Listen here, or find us on iTunes: Be sure to follow @NoJuicePodcast on Twitter.
  19. Parker Hageman
  20. Parker Hageman
    When the Minnesota Twins signed Kurt Suzuki this past offseason the focus was on his defensive capabilities and his offensive abilities were basically an afterthought. “We wanted to add some leadership to help the pitching staff,” Twins assistant general manager Rob Antonysaid in March. “We went out and got some starting pitching, but we also wanted somebody to help them on defense. With Joe [Mauer] moving to first, we were willing to sacrifice some offense for defense.” So far this year, the leadership with the staff has not manifested into success in the rotation but, more surprising, is the fact that Suzuki has outhit the catcher emeritus. Coming into the season Suzuki had a .253/.309/.375 (average/on-base/slugging) career line. While the 74 plate appearances this season are nothing to base any accurate assessment on, it should be noted that he is hitting an unexpectedly robust .305/.397/.407 and his performance has been largely overshadowed by the production of players like Chris Colabello, Trevor Plouffe, Jason Kubel and Josmil Pinto. But with nearly a month in the books, this is starting to deserve attention. Under most circumstances this sort of spike would scream small sample size success ripe for regression -- after all, Suzuki’s career rates do not point to sustainability at this level. While there is likely regression in the future, Suzuki has made some adjustments at the plate that may stave off the decline. Below are two clips of Suzuki’s mechanics from 2013 with the Washington Nationals and this year with the Twins: http://i.imgur.com/4jUFOUc.gifhttp://i.imgur.com/avvL4Bu.gif The thing that should jump out is the stride and front-foot landing. With the Nationals Suzuki’s front foot would land almost straight at the pitcher. This year’s version has Suzuki landing with a closed front-side, having his front side aiming towards the second baseman and his foot strike closer to the plate. Suzuki changed to this style at some point following his late season trade from Washington to Oakland. Since the trade, he has been hitting .304/.380/.457 with a 9-to-12 strikeout-to-walk rate in 109 plate appearances. For Suzuki, an already above-average contact machine with good strike zone comprehension, this approach has greatly improved his coverage. According to ESPN/TruMedia’s data, from the beginning of 2012 until his trade to Oakland, Suzuki hit just .220/.270/.270 with a 17% swing-and-miss rate when being pitched away. Since then, he has posted a solid .308/.373/.423 with a 10% swing-and-miss rate on those same type of pitches. He also jumped from an 18% line drive rate to 27% line drive rate suggesting that the contact was superior as well. In addition to the success when being pitched away, Suzuki is seeing strong production on pitches up in the zone, another area he has struggled with in the past. Again, from 2012 until his trade to the Athletics, he hit .153/.279/.193 with a 16% swing-and-miss rate. Post-A’s trade, Suzuki has been hitting .414/.500/.483 with a 4% swing-and-miss rate on pitches up in the zone. These are both positive signs that Suzuki’s adjustment has been the source of his unexpected offensive numbers and not just a small sample size fluke. That being said, it is a small sample size and that fact cannot be ignored. Whatever the Twins can get out of Suzuki offensively that goes above and beyond the previous expectations is gravy. Now about that leadership for the starting rotation...
  21. Parker Hageman
    The narrative for Joe Mauer this offseason was that the transition to first base was going to heal his legs, provide him with superhuman power, and maybe help him find the missing Malaysian plane in his spare time. So far, none of that has happened. To Twins fans, the most relevant is the power. Through 19 games this year, he has just three extra base hits in his back pocket - two doubles and a home run. Beyond that, Mauer has accumulated 24 strikeouts in 90 plate appearances, an extremely high rate by his standards. While the conversation revolving around his lack of dingers and ribbies is mindbogglingly shortsighted, there are some elements to his early season numbers that may help confirm some of what the “eye-testers” are seeing. Here are a few things to consider. Mauer is having issues against non-fastballs Curves, sliders, changeups and everything in between, if it ain’t straight heat, Mauer has not been Mauer this season. From 2009 to the end of last season Mauer compiled a .262 batting average on pitches that were not fastballs. That rate is not otherworldly -- Miguel Cabrera leads baseball with a .301 average in that time -- but Mauer’s figure was still well above the league’s average. His ability to allow the ball to travel deep into the zone before executing his patent inside-out swing, combined with a doctorate in zone comprehension, made it a difficult proposition for pitchers to break off a bender. This year has been a different story. Pitchers have mixed in more of these types of pitches to improved results. Following Tuesday’s game against the Rays, the curve that he laced off the cup of pitcher David Price notwithstanding, Mauer is hitting just .182 against non-fastballs. The most significant difference appears to be his ability to put the ball in play. According to ESPN/TruMedia’s database, Mauer has put the ball in play on just 33% of his swings compared to the 49% he has in the previous years. What’s more, the balls Mauer is putting in play have not been exactly scorched, says his well-hit average. From 2009 to 2013, Mauer held a .213 well-hit average on secondary pitches. So far in 2014, that number is at .093. (While it is almost certain that the video scouts would include the fourth-inning liner off of Price’s manhood as “well-hit”, that hit failed to even knock the big lefty out of the game in spite of catching the pitcher square between the legs.) Two-strike situations have been un-Mauer-like Over the previous five seasons, Mauer has been one of the best two-strike hitters in the game. With the best batting average (.257) and seventh-highest on-base percentage (.312) in that time, the Twins’ best compensated player was the hardest for pitchers to retire despite the two-strike advantage. This year, with a direct correlation to the aforementioned secondary struggles, Mauer has been decisively different. Putting the ball in play with success has been difficult, and as his current .167 average would suggest, pitchers are finding it much easier to put him away with a strikeout. In two-strike situations, Mauer’s vaunted contact abilities have taken a leave of absence so far this year. Whereas from 2009 to 2013 he had a 14.8% swing-and-miss rate, that has skyrocketed to 27.7% this year. For the visual learners, Mauer’s contact rate heat map shows a Swiss cheese-like pattern on his two-strike swings (below) in comparison to last year (above): Mauer’s swing zone has changed One of the explanations behind his increased strikeout rate and his lack of power may have to do with his swing location selection. Mauer has had a very concise swing zone over the past five years, focusing mainly on offerings that come in on the upper inner-half of the plate. These pitches he has been able to drive to left field with some authority as he lets the ball travel deeper into the zone. So far this year he has expanded this area, bleeding over to the other hemisphere of the plate. In the past, Mauer has done well with pitches on the outer half -- particularly when going the other way. For instance, last year he hit .536 (37-for-69) with 14 doubles and four home runs when he drove the ball to left on the outside portion of the zone. This year he’s just 3-for-13 with no extra base hits when going the other way on pitches away. Repeat of last year? So, for those who feel that this Joe Mauer is different than previous versions of Joe Mauer, you are not wrong. One big reason not to panic is because of the overall sample size. After missing substantial amount of time at the end of 2012, Mauer came into 2013 cold as well. A little over 100 plate appearances (109 to be exact), he was hitting .283/.349/.394. This prompted a similar write-up to this one in response to the mass hysteria regarding his lack of production. Per usual, Mauer responded and rebounded by hitting an absurd .335/.415/.500 from then until his untimely concussion in August. This season’s slow start, like that of last year, may just be residue of rust hanging on from his extended time away from the game or simply a slow start. Settle down, everyone.
  22. Parker Hageman
  23. Parker Hageman
  24. Parker Hageman
    Over his career, Phil Hughes has seemingly been one solid secondary pitch away from taking over the world. Since his prospect days, his curveball was considered this dangerous weapon. For Hughes, unfortunately, the pitch never manifested as that killer pitch as projected. Eventually, the pitch was unceremoniously dropped from his arsenal in 2012. When asked why the deuce took the backseat to other pitches in his repertoire, Hughes cited his inability to execute as one of the main reasons. “It was one of those things where basically it became a first-pitch strike pitch and that’s all I was using it for, and that’s not what I want it to be,” Hughes said in the clubhouse this spring. “But it was out of necessity because I was kind of looping it up there. It wasn’t a good thing.” In his final year with the Yankees, Hughes certainly favored the pitch to start an at-bat off. While he threw the pitch just 11% of the time overall, he spun it up to the plate a nearly quarter of the time on the first pitch to a hitter. Opponents, trained to seek-and-destroy fastballs on the opening pitch, often allowed the big bend to sail past only to find themselves down in the count no balls and one strike. As the at-bat would progress, Hughes had the tendency to then lean on his impressive fastball. Much like former Twin Scott Baker, Hughes would target the top of the zone with a 92+ heater and would register a high percentage of swing-and-misses with an equally insane number of foul balls. With two strikes, and fear that the looping curve would be tipped out of his hand, Hughes stuck to the fastball and slider -- demonstrating a near fifty-fifty split in usage between the two. The results left something to be desired as his .253 opponent batting average against in two-strike situations, the second highest in the game last year, suggested that the current plan was not working. On top of that, his 44% foul ball rate with two-strikes meant he handed out a lot of souvenirs to the ticket holders in the gated community areas of the stadium and also that his pitch count increased quickly. This translated to premature clubhouse showers. So with all that in mind, but without all the numbers to back it up and just ball guy intuitive stuff, Hughes focused on redeveloping the curve to be a legitimate weapon in those types of circumstances. “Coming into spring it was a conscious effort to make sure I was finishing that pitch and keeping my hand out in front so you don’t pick up any spin or have it pop out of my hand,” Hughes explained. Camouflaging your secondary pitches is one of the biggest keys in pitching and, to Hughes’ concern of keeping the curve from “popping” out of his hand, is a big one for that particular pitch. The looping curve, as he described it, is one that has the tendency to come out of the pitcher’s hand a bit higher than a fastball. “A lot of times with curveballs, more than any other pitch, it will go above the fastball plane,” major league pitching instructor Tom House told the Washington Post in 2012. “And if it goes above the fastball plane, then the hitter knows it’s not a fastball.” Which means they sit and let it pass. Or they swing out of their cleats at it. Either way, it becomes a less effective pitch. Through three starts in 2014, it is hard to tell if the tinkering has worked. He has thrown more curveballs throughout each plate appearance but the percentage of times hitters have swung at it has decreased. Plus, no one is chasing after the pitch out of the zone, which means it is not getting buried for strike three. While his strikeout rate has climbed so far this season and may not be directly due to his curveball (12 of his 17 K’s have come on fastballs) it is possible that just occasionally flashing the curve keeps hitters off his fastball. “It’s altering sequences,” Hughes said this spring, “I’ve gotten into some predictable sequences for the most part, so once I get my changeup and cutter going I can kind of alter those a little bit, you know, flipping a few first-pitch curveballs, always keeping it different, that will be good.” In terms of his curve -- his large, looping pitch thrown around 74.1 mph on average -- hitters will see it mainly early in the count (16 of the 44 were thrown on first-pitch) or occasionally with two-strikes (another 18 were thrown in two-strike situations). In both instances, hitters refrained from swinging. Of the 44 thrown, just 14 (31.8%) have been offered at. That’s quite a low total for a curveball overall. Does predictable sequencing explain why Hughes’ curveball has been roundly ignored by opponents? Or is the big loop helping hitters differentiate his curve from other pitches? Some attribute the modern hitters’ ability to lay off these slower breaking pitches to improved analytics and scouting reports. In Boston, a Providence Journal article noted that the Red Sox staff was tightening up their pitch types, moving to cutters and splitters instead of sliders and curves, because the late break of the former would confuse hitters better than the looping curve or long tilt of the slider. “There’s more knowledge in a game now of bat paths and technologies and studies and charts and hot zones, so you can get a picture of somebody’s bat path and where they like to hit the ball,” Red Sox catcher David Ross told the Providence Journal’s Brian Macpherson. “Guys try to stay off that as much as they can off the fastball with a cut or a sink or sharp breaking stuff. The big breaking ball is pretty much obsolete.” While Ross may consider the big breaking ball obsolete, Hughes still breaks his out, just not at the same rate as he did a few years ago while coming up with the Yankees when it was considered a plus-pitch for him. It was last year when Hughes started to feel that hitters were not reacting to the pitch the same and shelved it in favor of the late-break cutter. This season, while he’s thrown his curve more frequently than last year, it is still the cutter that is thrown with greater frequency. Unlike his curve, the cutter is (1) swung at, (2) swung at out of the zone and (3) missed at a higher rate. So maybe the curveball is the savior of a pitch for Phil Hughes that it was made out to be in spring training. He still is doing many things right at this juncture, such as leading the staff in strikeouts and avoiding home runs. If, however, he can find some help in reducing his unsightly batting average on balls in play or the number of foul balls that has blown up his pitch count so frequently, he might be able to stay on the mound beyond the typical five innings of work.
  25. Parker Hageman
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