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drivlikejehu

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Everything posted by drivlikejehu

  1. drivlikejehu
    His swinging strike rate is well above his career norms - 10.5% instead of 8-8.5% (it dipped below that in 2014 but then came back up). On a related note, hitters so far have chased outside the zone much more often than has been the case in the past against Santiago. So, arguably his xFIP is misleading, regardless of whether he has the true ability to outperform it, because his strikeout rate is lower than would be expected based on his swinging strike %. But . . . it's 18 innings. Pitch data seems to indicate that his stuff and command are basically in line with the past. He certainly could have a decent year but there's no reason to think he's stepped up his overall game.
  2. drivlikejehu
    It does kind of worry me that high schoolers manage to put the ball in play against Greene a decent percentage of the time, relatively speaking. However, his elite overall athleticism is a big factor in his favor . . . even if he is physically mature for his age, I like his chances to dramatically improve on his consistency and command with added reps. I don't think he's a real exciting 1-1 option, ideally you get an elite HS position player there, but there's no denying the upside.
  3. drivlikejehu
    Pitchers do have the ability to influence quality of contact; those that are easy to square up tend not to make the Majors. The problem for Stewart, at the MLB level anyway, is that pitchers need to get some strikeouts too, otherwise even weak contact will add up to a lot of baserunners as a simple function of arithmetic. Plus, strikeouts are positively correlated with weak contact. In other words, pitchers that are harder to square up also tend to get more swings and misses. What this means for Stewart is that he has enough ability to get weak contact from minor leaguers, but a complete lack of MLB projection against higher-quality hitters. Either his stuff and/or command improves, or he doesn't succeed in MLB.
  4. drivlikejehu
    My only thought is that they are waiting for Vargas to get healthy, and that the 25th man was a placeholder regardless of position. Having Park up but sending him right back down would arguably be pointless. So this appears to be some kind of extended bullpen tryout. I'm more OK with the 13 pitchers, bizarre as it is, than I am with the roster more generally.
  5. drivlikejehu
    There's way more to being a successful GM than that. It's nice that he realized it's imperative to sign international free agents, but it doesn't mean that he was somehow a success when so many other things went poorly.
  6. drivlikejehu
    Sure, college picks are risky too, or teams would never take high schoolers. The 2006 draft is a good example, it went (position added for potentially unfamiliar names): Luke Hochevar Greg Reynolds (college RHP) Evan Longoria Brad Lincoln Brandon Morrow Andrew Miller Clayton Kershaw Drew Stubbs Billy Rowell (HS 3B) Tim Lincecum Max Scherzer So, not only was the best pitcher taken 7th overall out of high school, but the college picks didn't exactly pan out in the order selected, either. So really it comes down to some combination of performing the right scouting/analysis and getting lucky. My point is just that, if Greene offers a little extra potential but one of the college guys is right there with him, plus 2-3 years closer to MLB, I want the guy that's closer and has thrown more innings in a season without breaking down. I definitely do not want Brad Lincoln. But if there's a college guy with power stuff + command . . .
  7. drivlikejehu
    There have been plenty of flame-throwing prep right-handers before. If there's a college starter that projects as a near-term, top of the rotation guy, I take him over Greene without hesitation.
  8. drivlikejehu
    All of this stuff is incremental. It's not like Cleveland can magically get sure things in the 5th round or anything like that. But it's important to give every player the best chance to succeed . . . if an improved organizational philosophy helps even 1-2 pitchers a year, it's a huge deal. Given that the Twins have been particularly poor in developing pitchers, I think improvement could very well happen in the near-term, but regardless it's a difficult thing to assess.
  9. drivlikejehu
    But when did anyone say that "upper 70 wins" makes the Twins "good"? Or are you saying that? Sorry, I'm struggling to understand the "context" wherein projecting a team under .500 is saying that they are "good" and means that management should "leave things largely the same."
  10. drivlikejehu
    I did, but I don't see anyone "patting the new FO on the back for their keen insight in how good the team was . . . " This is a sentiment that exists only in your imagination. In context, it appears to be another form of your critique regarding the FO's inaction, which this time you expressed through a straw-man. Literally zero people on TD have expressed a position even similar to what you are claiming. You either didn't read the posts you allegedly are responding to, or alternatively, chose to mis-characterize them rather than address the points made.
  11. drivlikejehu
    Are you seriously claiming that Falvey and Levine's decision-making is based on the idea that the Twins are already a good team? If you believe that, you have an incredibly high pain threshold to continue following the Twins. If that's true the Twins will be lucky to lose less than 1,000 games over the next decade.
  12. drivlikejehu
    So, what exactly should the Twins have done differently - that we know was under their control (e.g., not trading Dozier for a fair return)? What I've read so far is that they should have signed a reliever with possible trade deadline value. OK, I don't necessarily disagree, but last year only a quarter of players signed to such deals were traded, and none for a legit prospect. That is not enough of a variance to justify the complaints. There needs to be more - a lot more - that the Twins clearly <a> could have and <b> should have done. What are those things?
  13. drivlikejehu
    Do you really think that's the case though? That even if they wanted to make some other minor moves, they are incapable of doing so? I don't think that's very plausible . . . I suppose it's theoretically possible that Falvey & Levine could be the most inept management in baseball history, but it strikes me as not the most likely explanation.
  14. drivlikejehu
    They inherited a roster with few trade pieces. The market for Dozier was limited at best and trading Santana was arguably counter-productive given the pitching situation. I understand wanting significant roster change in the abstract, but in reality it's clear that there were significant constraints. They also inherited an organization in need of rebuilding top-to-bottom, not just from a player personnel standpoint. Those things are less visible but very important. In effect though, Falvey & Levine are being blamed for the mess Ryan left them. Lots of roster change happens during the MLB season, making it very premature to pass judgment.
  15. drivlikejehu
    I think it's strange how much more hostility there is to the new leadership, in comparison to what it was with the old leadership that ran the organization into the ground. The old leadership was defended vigorously after each incompetent, incomprehensible move . . . the new leadership is criticized for non-moves that are either fictional or marginal in relevance. I find the dichotomy puzzling.
  16. drivlikejehu
    There are paths, just not necessarily probable ones. Example - Berrios finds his command and becomes a #2, May moves back to the rotation and stays healthy, two out of Romero/Gonsalves/Jay turn into solid starters, Mejia eats up innings as 5th starter. That would be above average, despite the lack of a clear #1 guy. In reality, guys get hurt, prospects fail quite frequently, etc., but it's not hard to see the everything-goes-well path of relative success.
  17. drivlikejehu
    My practice group does that all the time, in a manner of speaking - we take a "loss" (by internal firm metric standards, not actual economic reality) on phase I of an engagement so that we can make a ton on phase II. The difference is that the newspapers aren't talking about how the firm is struggling, incompetent, etc. during the phase I stage. So in that sense, it's actually harder to sacrifice in the short-term as a sports franchise, because success or failure is very public. But they still have to do it, because the only thing worse than failing in the short-term is failing in the long-term. I agree in theory with your original point though, and a limited amount of front loading naturally occurs with early extensions, because players almost always get a bump in control years x through 6 compared to what they would have received otherwise. The tricky part is if and when to pull the trigger on a deal like that.
  18. drivlikejehu
    The numbers are unusual at the individual player-employee level, but the overall labor expense is not that unusual because teams follow annual budgets . . . there is variation year over year, but that's true in other businesses as well. The players are paid to provide services. The costs are not like a materials expense - that would be associated with a product-oriented business that deducts inputs as cost of goods sold. Nor is it true that labor is synonymous with product in sports; at least in MLB, guaranteed contracts mean that players are sometimes paid when they aren't even on the team anymore. Compare a baseball team to a law firm (with multiple attorneys). In both cases, the biggest expense is compensation, whether in the form of salary or partnership distributions. The law firm provides legal services through the employment of some number of individuals, who each provide part of that overall service. Baseball teams provide entertainment, and each of the employees provide some part of that entertainment, directly or indirectly. Dramatic variances in compensation, role, etc. exist in both circumstances.
  19. drivlikejehu
    Yeah the distribution was off there, I didn't think about it too hard. But the total is probably ballpark in today's dollars if Buxton doesn't really turn into a great hitter. Businesses have prepaid or advance salary expenses all the time, just not as far out. I don't see it as a different type of cost.
  20. drivlikejehu
    Keep in mind that arbitration calcs are not based on advanced metrics, so defense tends to be underrated. Buxton in particular is likely to be undervalued in arbitration, while Sano for instance might be overvalued. The value concept for an early extension is complicated because there are so many variables. I'm not sure off the top of my head what I'd consider reasonable for any of the Twins young position players. A lot depends on the individual players' appetite for risk. Early extensions are the only real form of front-loading you see in MLB contracts - technically the player's salary rises over the years, but in reality the increase compared to automatic renewal/arbitration in early years is effectively being transferred from the later years. So from the Twins side, I like the idea of considering early deals, I just don't know how practical it is given the level of uncertainty.
  21. drivlikejehu
    The problem is risk. Holding out exposes players to a lot of it. Arbitration isn't a great deal, either: http://www.thepointofpittsburgh.com/calculating-mlb-arbitration-percentages/ For Buxton, just spitballing- Salary by year (est.) 2017: 550k 2018: 575k 2019: 8m 2020: 10m 2021: 14m Let's say he values his first two years of free agency at $50 million. Offering him $85 million would pretty much be fair market value, with the only downside being that as a 2022 free agent he would command a lot of additional years and guaranteed dollars. But this way, his risk level plummets and he still hits free agency in his prime.
  22. drivlikejehu
    Everyone likes young talent. That's why you can't just snap your fingers and have more of it. Is your concern that Falvey and Levine aren't worried about the Twins pitching?
  23. drivlikejehu
    Well, if the position players don't pan out, then adding a pitching prospect or two is pretty much irrelevant . . . the club will be bad no matter what. Any realistic notion of contending relies on Sano, Buxton, Kepler, etc. being a successful nucleus. Without that it will be a long, long rebuild. Your first point is a good one though because a lot of people seem to take the position player side for granted while saying the pitching is hopeless, but I think the difference is a lot smaller than that. It's certainly plausible in theory that by next year, a rotation of Santana, Berrios, May, Mejia, and Gonsalves could be decent. Not really likely of course, but it's possible. How much more likely is it that all the position players pan out?
  24. drivlikejehu
    Are you saying that group will definitely perform equal or worse than in 2016?
  25. drivlikejehu
    You don't know that for sure. But fine, Friedman texts and says,'final offer - De Leon + Player X.' Who is the least-heralded Player X that you say yes to? You seem to be saying there's a line somewhere. Where is it?
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