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https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/01/kaplan-spahnmarichalToday I was motivated by reading an article on ESPN by Bradford Doolittle - hitting the reset on pitcher wins http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/21439977/hitting-reset-button-starting-pitcher-wins-baseball
 
As a baseball fan who started out rooting for Warren Spahn, Lew Burdette, Hank Aaron, and Eddie Mathews of the Milwaukee Braves and then moving over to the new Twins as an usher for their first season my views are tainted by history and, while I like many new stats, I am bothered by the tendency to throw out the old stats with the recycling.
 
Over and over I hear that wins don't count, then we drool over our greater win totals. True it is a team game and the wins by an individual pitcher have to be looked at under a new lens since the idea of a complete game where the pitcher really does control the outcome has changed and now we have shifted to the bullpen as masters of the mound, but the true aces rise above this.
 
Sale and Kluber, Kershaw and Scherzer are not just great starters, they actually win games, even though they do not pitch very many complete games. To understand my love of the complete game and the true aces you should read about the Spahn/Marichal game in 1963 - https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/01/kaplan-spahnmarichal
How nostalgic this game is for me.
 
Now admittedly in this era it is a thrill to see two starters go 7 innings against each other, but that does not diminish the win and loss records. It is true that the scorer never invokes his right to award the win to the most deserving so a relief pitcher can come in throw one ball and then get the win, but that is not all that common. The starter gets his record because he pitches long enough, often enough to get to the position to win.
​And I understand fielding and hitting are essential I remember when Ryan won the ERA title in 1987 came with an 8 - 16 record, hardly a great pct. Yet he overcame the poor teams he pitched for to surpass 300 wins just as Blyleven won 287 games pitching with some mediocre teams. I give him credit for this win total in addition to the new stats that pushed him in the Hall of Fame.
 
I do not want to negate the new approach. In fact the bullpen era will create some interesting statistical aberrations that challenge our ability to compare pitchers from one era to another, but take nothing away from those winners of yesteryear.
 
It is common place to always state today's athletes are the best ever. Kershaw is being anointed by ESPN weekly and he deserves his recognition, but necessarily his ranking. Give the same diet, training and opportunities, the greats of the past would be the greats of today and the greats of today put in another era would still rise to stardom.
 
So how do we judge players? Old stats, new stats, the eye test? Maybe all of them. If real baseball was just a statistical exercise we could dispense with the field and just play strato-matic, but the human element is what gives it greatness and is the reason we still talk about players like Cy Young and Honus Wagner even though they are simply grainy photographs and statistical lines in our life times.

https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/01/kaplan-spahnmarichalToday I was motivated by reading an article on ESPN by Bradford Doolittle - hitting the reset on pitcher wins http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/21439977/hitting-reset-button-starting-pitcher-wins-baseball
 
As a baseball fan who started out rooting for Warren Spahn, Lew Burdette, Hank Aaron, and Eddie Mathews of the Milwaukee Braves and then moving over to the new Twins as an usher for their first season my views are tainted by history and, while I like many new stats, I am bothered by the tendency to throw out the old stats with the recycling.
 
Over and over I hear that wins don't count, then we drool over our greater win totals. True it is a team game and the wins by an individual pitcher have to be looked at under a new lens since the idea of a complete game where the pitcher really does control the outcome has changed and now we have shifted to the bullpen as masters of the mound, but the true aces rise above this.
 
Sale and Kluber, Kershaw and Scherzer are not just great starters, they actually win games, even though they do not pitch very many complete games. To understand my love of the complete game and the true aces you should read about the Spahn/Marichal game in 1963 - https://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/07/01/kaplan-spahnmarichal
How nostalgic this game is for me.
 
Now admittedly in this era it is a thrill to see two starters go 7 innings against each other, but that does not diminish the win and loss records. It is true that the scorer never invokes his right to award the win to the most deserving so a relief pitcher can come in throw one ball and then get the win, but that is not all that common. The starter gets his record because he pitches long enough, often enough to get to the position to win.
​And I understand fielding and hitting are essential I remember when Ryan won the ERA title in 1987 came with an 8 - 16 record, hardly a great pct. Yet he overcame the poor teams he pitched for to surpass 300 wins just as Blyleven won 287 games pitching with some mediocre teams. I give him credit for this win total in addition to the new stats that pushed him in the Hall of Fame.
 
I do not want to negate the new approach. In fact the bullpen era will create some interesting statistical aberrations that challenge our ability to compare pitchers from one era to another, but take nothing away from those winners of yesteryear.
 
It is common place to always state today's athletes are the best ever. Kershaw is being anointed by ESPN weekly and he deserves his recognition, but necessarily his ranking. Give the same diet, training and opportunities, the greats of the past would be the greats of today and the greats of today put in another era would still rise to stardom.
 
So how do we judge players? Old stats, new stats, the eye test? Maybe all of them. If real baseball was just a statistical exercise we could dispense with the field and just play strato-matic, but the human element is what gives it greatness and is the reason we still talk about players like Cy Young and Honus Wagner even though they are simply grainy photographs and statistical lines in our life times.

The Twins medical staff is under fire again for yet another misbegotten medical decision, and according to sources, some of the doctors on staff are starting to question the team's long-running practice of relying on Yahoo! Answers for medical advice.
 
"We've long been believers in Yahoo! Answers, which has been our go-to repository of cutting-edge medical research," said a source, who's intimately involved with the team's medical staff. "Unlike traditional journals, which can be months, even years behind the time, we've found Yahoo! Answers to be constantly updated and responsive to changing the medical needs of our age. That said, when reviewing outcomes from our decisions, we've yet to see an improvement, and so we're beginning to wonder whether the research is truly up to snuff."
 
The Twins have long relied on the medical advice of researcher "xxx_legday_xxx", whose groundbreaking theories about using weight training to cure both partially and fully torn arm ligaments have long been among the top Google results for the search "how to heal elbow without surgery." After Twins outfield prospect Alex Kirilloff became the latest Twin for whom the research failed, though, several members of the Twins staff started checking into his background.
 
According to the source, the team found that the cutting-edge researcher had also advocated long-disproved medical theories like bloodletting and trepanning, as well as offering a wealth of ill-considered advice about sexual health and making thousands of dollars per month by working two hours a week from home.
 
Despite the team's long-held assumption, investigation was unable to unearth any documentation of what the team assumed was Yahoo! Answers' strict peer-review process, or any sort of vetting process of any kind to ensure that answers were indeed provided by experts.
 
"We're just starting to wonder about this whole thing," said the unnamed medical staffer. "But why would they even put it on the internet if it wasn't true? Who has that kind of time?"
 
At press time, the source was investigating another online journal called "WebMD," but had gotten sidetracked by the looming possibility that his occasional headaches were in fact a sign of brain cancer.

Last season, the Minnesota Twins jettisoned Ricky Nolasco to the Los Angeles Angeles. The move was widely applauded as it purged Nolasco's contract from Minnesota and got him out of the rotation. What was overlooked however, was that former top prospect Alex Meyer was thrown in, and Hector Santiago was coming back to the Twins.
 
There's no kind way to put it, Nolasco was a disaster in Minnesota. Terry Ryan over-extended himself by spending on starting pitching that had almost no chance of paying off. In trading Nolasco to the Angels though, Minnesota simply took on a similar pitcher. Hector Santiago was awarded $8 million through arbitration, and the club is still paying the Angels $4 million of Nolasco's salary this season. Essentially they gave up Alex Meyer simply to get a team to take Nolasco off their hands.
 
Santiago came over to Minnesota in the midst of a hot streak, and there was some thought he could pitch right around the high water level he'd established. What ended up taking place however, was 11 starts to the tune of a 5.58 ERA and a 5.82 FIP. His strikeout numbers plummeted and he gave up 13 homers in those starts.
 
Although Santiago was an All Star in 2015, his recent career has always had reason for concern. In his All Star campaign, he gave up a league leading 29 homers, and then backed that up with 33 in 2016. He also surrendered a league leading (and career worst) 79 walks last season. For a guy that's never thrown over 182 innings, and owns a 4.84 FIP since 2014, he's got very few things going in his favor.
 
Since his 2011 debut with the White Sox, Santiago's velocity has fallen off as well. Topping out at a 93.8 mph fastball then, he's fallen to hovering right around 90 mph last season, and routinely sitting there is a stretch. His contact rate checked in at 81.8% last season, which was it's highest since 2014. If there's a level of consistency, it's found in Santiago's swing and miss stuff, which has routinely generated an 8% mark throughout his career.
 
The reality though, when looking at the sum of all parts, is that the Twins are going to be asking a lot from a guy they already have cemented into their rotation. There's real reason to believe that Santiago could be among the Twins worst pitchers this season. He serves up dingers at an alarming rate, his velocity has dipped, and his command has waned. He could be helped out by the boost that Jason Castro will serve over Kurt Suzuki, but he's going to need a significant jump.
 
If Santiago wasn't the Twins return for Nolasco, or frankly if he had a different name on the back of his jersey, you'd be able to make a real argument he'd struggle to make this club. Considering top prospect Jose Berrios has little to prove in the minors at this point, running him out there more consistently would provide more long term benefit.
 
As things stand. Paul Molitor and the Twins are going to be forced to choose between Trevor May, Berrios, Adalberto Mejia, Justin Haley, Ryan Vogelsong, and Nick Tepesch for one spot. There's absolutely some guys in that group that will be filtered out, but on numbers alone, there isn't a reason to suggest Santiago is better than the bulk of the group. Having to settle for him no matter what ties the hands of the Twins rotation a bit, and it was already not in a good place.
 
Maybe everything gets turned on its head, and Santiago's first full year in Minnesota allows him to acclimate and things go incredibly well. Looking at the numbers he's put up, and the way things have trended for him though, that's a pretty big ask. Hector Santiago is going to be in the Twins rotation, but he may just be another form of Ricky Nolasco.
 
For more from Off The Baggy, click here. Follow @tlschwerz

Jose Berrios made his major league debut on April 27, 2016. He now has made nine starts for the Twins, the latest of which came today against the Detroit Tigers. As has been the case more often than not, he wasn't good. This time though, it resulted in Jose Berrios being demoted to Triple-A Rochester.
 
This is the second time Berrios has been demoted by the Twins this season. The latest occurrence though highlights a culture of ineptitude at the big league level. Everyone from Paul Molitor on down seems absolutely clueless when it comes to not only Berrios, but the majority of the young prospects supposedly tasked with revitalizing the organization.
 
On the season, Berrios owns a 9.24 ERA and is 2-4 across his nine big league starts. He owns a poor 35/23 K/BB ratio, and his pitches have been all over the strike zone. In hoping to fix that, Minnesota has recently gone with a committee approach. Molitor, pitching coach Neil Allen, pen coach Eddie Guardado, starter Ervin Santana, and even Hall of Famer Bert Blyleven have taken to observing the young Puerto Rican. The collective brain trust has failed, and done so miserably.
 
The issue I have with how things went down following Berrios' latest poor start is that the Twins come out looking clueless in the whole mess. A young 22 year old top pitching prospect just got shelled. It's not the first time, and his struggles haven't been consistently getting better either. Instead of letting him continue to work through it under the best coaches the organization should have, the big league club (and staff) simply washes their hands of him.
 
While with the Twins in his latest stint, Berrios was given direction by seemingly everyone with a mouth and the ability to walk to the Target Field pen. No doubt reeling with the amount of information and tweaks he was trying to make to his game, the process was absolutely experiencing more negativity than anything else. Rather than realize that this club is destined for 100 losses though, and Berrios continuing to work through things against the only competition he hasn't mastered, Minnesota gave up.
 
Earlier this season, Jorge Polanco was sent back and forth between Triple-A and the big leagues despite no reason for Minnesota to do so. Paul Molitor was clueless when it came to intitially utilizing Max Kepler. Heck, Byron Buxton is so wrecked that prominent national analyst Keith Law has suggested Buxton stay at Triple-A until he's traded to an organization that "knows how to develop him as a hitter" or Molitor and his staff is gone. The collective coaching staff at the highest level for the Twins is arguably a larger laughing stock than that of the clubs 48-79 record.
 
Don't worry though, Jim Pohlad has suggested that Paul Molitor will be the first thing inherited by his newly hired General Manager.
 
At this point, you can't help but to feel for the likes of Jose Berrios and Byron Buxton before him. Berrios doesn't have a good outing or two to spare him. Thankfully Kepler has 15 home runs, and Polanco has a solid average, otherwise the likelihood of Molitor continuing to mismanage them would remain high as well.
 
Going into 2017, there's nothing more important than Jose Berrios and Byron Buxton getting right at the major league level. The problem is, the Minnesota Twins don't have organization pieces in place to allow that to happen. Unfortunately, we got to see that on full display yet again.
 
For more from Off The Baggy, click here. Follow @tlschwerz

It has already been an interesting year in terms of how the Twins have deployed their players defensively. From Miguel Sano moving all over the place, to Jorge Polanco going from no reps a shortstop in the minors to the everyday guy there on the big club, there have been some decisions that have been worthy of questioning.
 
Well, the questioning seems to be never ending during a down season, and I'd like to pile on and add Mitch Garver's usage on to the list of head scratchers in the organization. If the Twins believe Garver can be a starting catcher, they sure have a funny way of showing it.
 
While in Chatanooga, fellow 2013 draftee Stuart Turner held a slight advantage over Garver in terms of reps behind the plate. Since his promotion, Garver holds a slight playing time advantage over John Ryan Murphy, but it's only eight starts vs. seven. Overall, Garver has played 107 games this year but has caught in just 54 of those contests.
 
This is nothing new. In 2014, on his way to being named Twins Daily Minor League Hitter of the Year, Garver caught 63 of his 120 games. Last year, the split was less extreme at 77 games caught and 127 total games. With just 12 games left in the Red Wings' season, when it's all said and done Garver will have caught right around 200 games over the past three seasons. Sounds like a decent amount until you compare him to other backstops.
 
A few of the most recent catchers to establish themselves as big league regulars are Philadelphia's Cameron Rupp, Miami's J.T. Realmuto and Cincinnati's Tucker Barnhart. Over their final three full years in the minors, each of them totaled over 280 games caught. Even prized Yankee prospect Gary Sanchez, who has always been more highly regarded for his bat, eclipsed 90 games caught in three separate MiLB seasons.
 
It seems these days you can't have a discussion about catching without also talking about concussions, especially in concern to the Twins. It's worth noting Garver has been placed on the DL twice for concussions, once in June of '14 and again this May. There is no such thing as a concussion that isn't a serious injury, but in both cases Garver was able to get back in the gear in a matter of weeks, so those injuries can't account for the lost reps behind the plate.
 
Garver has kept his bat in the lineup by playing first base or DH, but his skills at the plate have never been questioned as much as his ability play behind it (but we'll get to more on that later). With that being the case, you'd think the team would go out of its way to have Garver catching as much as possible.
 
Not buying the playing time being an issue? Okay, then let's go into the "Free Mitch Garver" portion of the discussion. Garver was called up to Rochester on Aug. 9, but what took so long? There's a valid argument to be made that Garver should already be on the big league club.
 
I understand that Turner was drafted ahead of Garver and started his career a level ahead. It's also valid to point out that the team invested resources into Murphy, who is on the 40-man roster, and they want to give him every opportunity to play his way out of his season-long slump. But why has Garver remained so low on the catching totem pole when his performance has been stellar and he's actually older than both Murphy and Turner?
 
At 25-years-old, I'm not sure if Garver can really even be called a prospect anymore. It's time to see what he can do, no matter what that means to Murphy, Turner, or even Kurt Suzuki or Juan Centeno.
 
Garver had a down year in 2015, but followed it up with an impressive showing in the Arizona Fall League. He had posted an above average OPS for the Southern League each month this season, ending his time in Chattanooga with a .257/.334/.417 slash line. Combine that with an excellent start in Rochester (.364/.404/.455) and you have a guy who has trended up for around 12 months now, and the glove work is catching up with his offense.
 
On Sunday's pregame radio broadcast, interim GM Rob Antony went out of his way to compliment the strides Garver has made with the mitt, and the numbers back it up. The University of New Mexico product has also thrown out an impressive 50% of base stealers this season and has received positive reviews on his pitch framing ability.
 
So ... if the bat was never in question and the numbers show he's been a phenomenal defensive catcher this season, then what gives? I suppose it's entirely possible the front offices does not, in fact, view Garver as an everyday catcher. The way he's been used over his career certainly makes you wonder.

Through 82 games, the Twins are on pace to blitz by a franchise worst amount of losses, and finish the season as the worst team in history. Suggesting the first half of the season has been anything but a disaster would be putting it nicely. That all being said, there's plenty left to play for in 2016.
 
Considering that the bulk of Minnesota's schedule to close out the year comes against AL Central foes, Paul Molitor's club will see a lot of their divisional rivals and can begin to prepare for the year ahead. While it's going to be important to try and slow the pace of the losing, it's equally as important to set up for success in the year ahead.
 
Looking at how the Twins have positioned themselves, what will be available on the market, and where the roster stands, many of the answers for the future are going to need to come from within. Starting to figure those out sooner rather than later remains in the best interests of the club.
 
If you're going to place a heightened focus on certain places the rest of the way, here's exactly where I'd point you:
 
1. Jose Berrios
 
First and foremost, Jose Berrios needs to get back up to the big leagues and settle in. Across his last four Triple-A starts he's owned a 0.60 ERA and allowed opposing hitters to bat just .104/.171/.156 against him. He's allowed just one home run in his last 30 innings and he's walked batters at just a 2.1 BB/9 rate over that time.
 
There's no denying he scuffled in his big league debut. As Keith Law of ESPN warned, command and a flat fastball were his biggest deterrents. He'll need to keep the ball in the yard, and he can't issue so many free passes. What remains a constant though is that the Twins need Berrios more than he needs to be here. Minnesota doesn't have an ace, and hasn't for a while. The rotation is full of mediocre options performing below their typical high water marks. Berrios may not be among the best pitchers in the major leagues, but he needs to settle in the rest of the way and be viewed as the Twins go to starter to open 2017.
 
2. Who is your number two?
 
If Jose Berrios can finish the year in the big leagues, and do it while pitching well, you have to find out what you have behind him. Right now, the Twins need to be looking everywhere to see if they can move Ricky Nolasco or Ervin Santana. The latter seems like he'll have suitors, while the former's market remains up in the air.
 
Tommy Milone may not be offered arbitration again, and that leaves just Kyle Gibson and Phil Hughes. Gibson was expected to take a step forward this season, but despite not being healthy, has struggled to do so. He turned in a nice effort last time out, but owns a 4.82 ERA through 9 starts and has walked a career worst 3.4 per nine. Hughes is facing an uphill battle in coming back from Thoracic Outlet surgery, and there'll be plenty of question marks there. Someone needs to pitch behind Berrios, and it can't be a group of mediocrity. Minnesota will need a legitimate one-two-punch, but who makes it up is yet to be seen.
 
3. Is there an actual closer?
 
As of right now, the Twins should be operating under the belief that the days of Glen Perkins closing baseball games for them is done. His velocity has declined severely, and he'll now be entering 2017 after a shoulder surgery that required his labrum be reattached to his bone. He has a 3.51 ERA over the past two years and has saved 32 games. Without a stellar pre-All Star 2015 bolstering those numbers though, things are much worse.
 
Brandon Kintzler is currently operating as the Twins closer, but like Kevin Jepsen before him, that's a role he's not really cast for. Paul Molitor needs to see if Trevor May or Ryan Pressly could be a better option for the here and now. Nick Burdi hasn't pitched hardly at all in 2016 due to injury concerns of his own, and the Twins have given a whopping two outs of major league work to J.T. Chargois. Those are the names I'd start with for closers in 2017, you can't go into the year with a question mark at the back end of a mediocre pen.
 
4. Settle the log jams
 
Really, the only areas that the Twins need to be concerned in regards to players piling up are at second and third base. Both Brian Dozier and Jorge Polanco should be at the major league level, but there's currently only room for one. Trevor Plouffe and Miguel Sano play the same position, and when both are healthy, that's been an area of concern as well.
 
It's pretty obvious that the Twins should've traded Plouffe some time ago. His value has probably never been lower than it is now, and a move at this point would be beneficial if only for opening up the roster spot. In regards to Dozier and Polanco, the return for the Twins All Star second basemen should be hefty. Despite entering his 30's, Dozier is a late bloomer and has been one of the most offensively productive two-baggers in the big leagues. I'm really good with trading either, but the return has to be right for both. At the end of 2016 however, only two of these four should realistically be options going forward for Minnesota.
 
5. Allow Buxton to struggle
 
I was really happy to see the Twins make the right move in their latest roster shuffles by adding guys back without sending Byron Buxton out. Sure, he's scuffled at the plate, but his defense is already Gold Glove caliber. He's shown the club he can rake at Triple-A, and there's nothing new he's going to learn by heading back there.
 
Run Buxton out nearly every day and let him struggle through it. He's got a good head on his shoulders, and confidence doesn't appear to be an issue he struggles with. He's hit a better (but still not good) .222/.248/.374 since rejoining the Twins, and his 37% strikeout rate is a far cry from the 53% output he had prior to his demotion. There's going to be a lot more lumps for Buxton to take the rest of the way, but if he can figure things out and take them now, it sets him up to hit the ground running in 2017. Minnesota needs to let that process play out.
 
When you have played as bad as the Twins have, there's not many positives to draw from the first half of what has been an unfortunate year. That being said, the rest of the way invites an opportunity to position things for a better start in 2017, as opposed to packing it in and slogging through the rest of the schedule. If Minnesota can get a few things to click down the stretch, the team they have a year from now will be significantly better for it.
 
For more from Off The Baggy, click here. Follow @tlschwerz

More than 100 years ago Minnesota was home to one of the best baseball teams in the country. The St. Paul Colored Gophers, who in 1909 beat the Chicago-based Leland Giants for the title of “Blackball World Champions,” are just one of the teams highlighted in the new book “They Played for the Love of the Game: Untold Stories of Black Baseball in Minnesota” by Frank White.
 
A thoroughly researched addition to our state’s history, this title is also visually appealing with the inclusion of approximately 100 photos, including one of Prince Honeycutt, Minnesota’s presumed first black baseball player who helped form the Fergus Falls North Stars baseball club in 1873, and scorecards from the Uptown Sanitary Shop, a baseball club formed by a dry cleaning business in St. Paul in 1922.
 
The Negro National League, which ultimately included some of the most famous names in baseball history including Satchel Paige and Josh Gibson, was started by Chicagoan Rube Foster in 1920. When reading White’s book, one question comes to mind: with Minnesota’s prominence in the world of black baseball why weren’t they awarded a team when the league started? Perhaps it was because of an issue that still confronts us today – travel. “It was probably just too financially difficult to have a team in Minnesota,” Frank White told me recently.
“Minnesota was considered far away from the other teams.”
 
In today’s over stimulated world of endless varieties of entertainment, another theme of the book is the rise of baseball as America’s game – one picture from 1925 shows a girls team from the Phyllis Wheatley Settlement House in north Minneapolis. What was it about baseball that captivated a nation no matter who you were? “It allowed you to walk away from everyday challenges,” said White. “For those who played the game, there was nothing quite as satisfying as the feeling of hitting the ball flush with a wooden bat.”
 
White also includes a personal connection to this slice of state history – his father, Louis White, played with the Twin City Colored Giants in the 1950’s and Buck O'Neil (who gained fame after eloquently sharing his remembrances of the Negro Leagues for the PBS miniseries "Baseball") once tried to recruit him to join the Kansas City Monarchs. The annals of baseball lore run deep and the stories are seemingly endless for those who played for the love of the game.
Frank White will be doing a talk at the Hosmer Library in Minneapolis on Monday, June 27 from 6:30 - 8 pm. For more information or for future events, you can visit his website at http://www.minnesotablackbaseball.com

Following his first and only start in a Major League Baseball uniform, the Twins couldn't even wait through the night to option prospect Alex Meyer back to Triple-A Rochester. Getting a chance with Ervin Santana and Kyle Gibson on the shelf, the Twins had deemed they had seen enough after just 2.2 innings pitched from Meyer. Really though, it seems there's a much large issue at play here.
 
This morning on Twitter I was thinking back to the guys I can remember the Twins using in an extremely poor fashion. The list is probably longer than I was able to recall, but here's what I came up with:
 
2015 Michael Tonkin
2015 Kennys Vargas
2016 Max Kepler
2016 Jorge Polanco
2016 Alex Meyer
Plan for these guys has been horrible #MNTwins
The reality of the situation is that every single one of the names mentioned has been done a disservice by either Paul Molitor, Terry Ryan, or a collection of the two. I touched on odd roster moves when writing up Ryan a while back, but I think it's probably fair to look a little deeper.
 
I won't spend much time on Tonkin or Vargas as I've talked about the poor usage they had to endure previously. Tonkin was jerked back and forth between the big leagues and Triple-A in 2015. Despite being a good piece for Minnesota this season, it's something they should have previously been aware of. You can read that piece here.
 
Vargas is a guy that's never been someone I have regarded as in the higher level of prospects. It was nice that he made a showing at the 2014 Future's Game, but that may go down to be the highlight of his career. Regardless of my feelings that he may be a bench bat, Minnesota sent him packing at such a poor time, and it's essentially ruined him. Read more of my thoughts on that here.
 
That brings us to the guys that Ryan and Molitor have hurt this season. The list starts with Max Kepler. He was up with the Twins for roughly 20 games in 2016 to start the year, and in that time, drew just two starts. Kepler was employed almost solely as a defensive replacement, and was given just 14 plate appearances. For a guy that's regarded pretty highly across MLB in the prospect realm, his development was being stunted, while his ability at the highest level was not at all being understood.
 
Kepler could have been drawing regular, rotating starts among the Twins outfield. A guy that can play all three positions, he should have been in the lineup at least two times per week. Instead, he was sent back to Triple-A after having been able to show nothing. He's now hitting below the Mendoza Line at Rochester, and is trying to get things going after having the first bit of his season be rendered completely useless.
 
Of the group, Polanco has probably been the least damaged, despite being a victim previously. He has been called up and sent back now by the Twins twice in 2016. The latest time, April 26, saw him get a single at bat (on April 29) before being sent back to Triple-A. Minnesota has promoted Polanco multiple times over the past three seasons, and yet he's been given a whopping 29 at bats. He's going to be out of options at the end of 2016, and despite being touted to have a big league ready bat, Minnesota really hasn't allowed him an opportunity to showcase it.
 
I've contended for quite some time that Polanco's greatest asset to the Twins is in his trade value. He can't play short or third efficiently enough, and Minnesota has Brian Dozier at second for the immediate future. The way in which Polanco has been showcased isn't going to drive up his trade value, and it's becoming closer to the time that the Twins lose him for next to nothing.
 
Now for the most recent example, and maybe the most frustrating one, Alex Meyer. Meyer was acquired for Denard Span from the Washington Nationals prior to the 2013 season. Now 26 years old, Meyer has both started and relieved in the Twins system. Having been a part of the organization for multiple years, it's somewhat sad the club hasn't decided on which is the best route for him to succeed.
 
In being called up to the big leagues this time, Meyer was given a deck stacked against him, and then was immediately jettisoned to the farm in favor of a reliever with an ERA north of 10.00. Here's the timeline the Twins gave Meyer in 2016:
 
Alex Meyer timeline:
Apr 20- Recent AAA start
Apr 25- Promoted to MLB
Apr 29- Relief app
May 3- MLB start
May 3- Option to AAA#MNTwins
Instead of scrapping the starting idea, and allowing him to see if he can stick in the pen for a team that's 8-19, Minnesota abandoned him altogether. Meyer goes back to Rochester where he'll likely start. Sure, he probably gets another crack at the big league level in 2016 in some fashion, but he's 26 and the organization still has no idea what the future holds for him.
 
At some point, the Twins need to understand that if you're going to build from within, you're going to be employing youth. With youth comes inexperience, and therefore you'll have some bumps in the road to work through. For a team that's 8-19, there's little reason to keep acting like you need the quick fix that is going to get you to the playoffs, it's not happening.
 
Looking to the future, this organization still has plenty of pieces to build a contended from within, and remain that way for a while. What I'm not sure they have is the right people at the top (Ryan and Molitor) to get them to that point.
 
For more from Off The Baggy, click here. Follow @tlschwerz

This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, crossposting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post.
 
[This one is from Mark]
 
Had Branch Rickey retired from baseball in 1942, before he ran the Dodgers, before he signed Jackie Robinson, his record as a general manager would still be enough to warrant consideration as the greatest GM in the game’s history. By that time he had already built one of history’s best organizations, winning six pennants and four World Series while completely revising baseball player development and instruction and inventing the farm system model that is still in place nine decades later. When you add in his Brooklyn years, both the building of one of baseball’s best and most iconic teams and his historic and courageous act to integrate the game, it is a relatively easy call. Summarizing Branch Rickey as a general manager is like summarizing Isaac Newton as scientist. Where do you begin?
 
By the age of thirty, Rickey had retired from his brief playing career and had received a law degree from the University of Michigan. The practice of law did not take, and by 1913 he was back in baseball, where he remained for the next five decades. He managed the Browns for two years, then was “kicked upstairs” when a new ownership group came on, becoming something like a general manager in 1916. A year later he moved cross-town, becoming president of the Cardinals and de facto GM, though the position did not yet formally exist. In 1919 he appointed himself the field manager and filled both jobs for six years.
 
Most of history’s best GMs have been blessed with excellent ownership that has provided the necessary resources with limited interference. Sam Breadon took control of the Cardinals in 1920, and proved to be the best thing that ever happened to Rickey. After a few years of non-contention, in 1925 Breadon relieved Rickey of his uniform and told him to concentrate on the front office part of his job, player development and scouting. Rickey was not happy, but history proved it to be a brilliant decision.
 
Branch Rickey first envisioned an organized “farm system” as a solution to the high cost of buying minor league players. A team could instead sign amateur players (for much less money) and then assume the cost of developing the players on teams under its control. At first Rickey’s efforts were (at least) bending the rules, which limited the number of players a major league team could control in the minors. Rickey instead had handshake agreements with many minor league teams that occasionally got the baseball commissioner to take notice. In the early 1930s, after continual lobbying from Breadon and Yankee owner Jacob Ruppert, baseball significantly relaxed their rules on teams’ owning or controlling farm teams, and the Cardinals and Yankees soon had huge farm systems. And, not coincidentally, the two best teams in baseball.
 
Soon after Rickey created his system, he realized that he needed a cohesive philosophy of scouting, instruction, and coaching. The Cardinals were not signing ready-made players; they were signing boys who needed to be taught how to play. Every part of the game—bunting, sliding, run-down plays, and so on—Rickey wanted to be taught consistently throughout the organization. And Rickey wanted the scouting and player-development parts of the system to work hand in hand. As Kevin Kerrane wrote in his classic book on scouting, “Rickey applied scouting insights to teaching, and vice versa.” Rickey became a legendary talent evaluator, able to make decisions quickly on players. Among other things, he valued speed and youth. No sentimentalist, he tried to trade players before they started to decline rather than after. With his huge farm system, he believed he could fill the holes created when he traded his veterans away.
 
From 1926 to 1946 the Cardinals won nine pennants and six World Series. Rickey did not have complete control of the club — Breadon hired and fired the managers, for example — and the relationship between the two men had become a bit strained by the early 1940s. When the Dodgers offered an ownership stake and more authority in October 1942, Rickey moved to Brooklyn.
 
The Dodger team Rickey inherited had just won 104 games. But make no mistake, this was not Rickey’s sort of team. Previous executive Larry MacPhail ran his clubs like a man in a hurry, like he needed to win today because he might not be around tomorrow. As good as the 1942 Dodgers were, only a few good players—notably Pee Wee Reese and Pete Reiser—were in their twenties. But MacPhail had overseen such a dramatic improvement in the Dodgers’ financial position that Rickey had the resources to build the organization that he wanted. He wasted no time getting to work.
 
Rickey could not do much with the war going on — all his players were in the service — but he worked on building his farm system to be ready. In 1943 alone the Dodgers signed Rex Barney, Duke Snider, Gil Hodges, and Ralph Branca. Over the next couple of years Brooklyn added Carl Erskine and Clem Labine, two other mainstays of Dodger teams to come.
 
The most important event of Rickey’s career, of course, was the signing of Jackie Robinson in October 1945, the first step on the road to ending the Major Leagues’ decades-long prohibition on dark-skinned players. Rickey has been justifiably praised for this courageous and ethical act and his related decisions to sign other black players in the coming years. But more than that, Rickey dramatically improved his team, and in a short time had dramatically improved the quality of play in the major leagues. When Robinson was signed it effectively opened up a huge new source of talent, the biggest new pool in history. As baseball soon discovered, there were dozens of good players, some of them among the greatest players ever, ready to sign cheaply with the first team that asked them. By the end of the 1940s eleven black players had made their debuts in the Major Leagues, eight of whom ended up playing at least five full Major League seasons. Among them were three Dodgers—Jackie Robinson, Roy Campanella, and Don Newcombe—whose extraordinary play helped define an era and one of history’s most beloved teams.
 
The integration of the Dodgers went relatively smoothly, thanks both to the tremendous care taken by Rickey and his staff, and the ability and character of these three players. Rickey traded away several southern players during and after the 1947 season, but most of these deals were classic Rickey moves that helped the ball club. In December he dealt Dixie Walker, one of the team’s best and most popular players, to the Pirates, a deal many have interpreted as an indication that Rickey wanted Walker off the team. In fact, it was a great baseball trade: Rickey acquired infielder Billy Cox and pitcher Preacher Roe, who played huge roles on the coming teams. Eddie Stanky was dealt the following March, allowing Robinson to move to second base and Gil Hodges to play first, another very solid baseball move.
 
After losing a pennant playoff in 1946, the Dodgers won NL pennants in 1947 and 1949 and then lost in 1950 on the season’s final weekend. Unlike the prewar teams, by 1950 the Dodgers had several good players in their twenties and more on the way. In late 1950 Rickey began to sense that his position had weakened with his partners and decided to cash in his stake and take a job running the Pittsburgh Pirates. Walter O’Malley bought Rickey’s share and gained control of the club. The core of talent Rickey left behind won four more pennants and the 1955 World Series. The acolytes he left, including Buzzie Bavasi and Al Campanis, built on Rickey’s foundation to create and maintain baseball’s model organization for another four decades.
 
Rickey was 69 years old and taking over a team that needed a slow, patient overhaul. The Pirates signed a few bonus babies that did not bear fruit, but he slowly began to improve the organization one player at a time. When owner John Galbreath finally let Rickey go, after five years, the team’s assets included youngsters Roberto Clemente, Bill Mazeroski, Dick Groat, Bob Friend and Vernon Law. It would take another five years for the Pirates to win a pennant, but Rickey certainly did his part.
 
Rickey never really stopped working. He played a leading role in trying to form the Continental League, a third major league that did not quite get off the ground. In 1962 the 81-year-old took a job as a senior adviser to Cardinal owner Gussie Busch, which proved awkward for GM Bing Devine and everyone else. Rickey left after the 1964 championship.
 
He died a year later, leaving behind an unmatched resume in the game. As a general manager he dramatically changed how teams find and develop players, and what players are allowed to play the game. His place as the greatest GM in baseball history is secure.

To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store.

This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, crossposting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post.
 
John Schuerholz spent 26 seasons as a big league GM, winning 16 division titles, six pennants and two World Series. In Kansas City he oversaw that franchise’s only World Series. After moving to Atlanta he took over a team that had lost more than 90 games for four consecutive years and won the next 14 division titles (excepting the truncated 1994 strike season) and five pennants. Schuerholz displayed an uncanny knack for retooling his team, knowing which holes could be filled by integrating prospects and which needed outside solutions.
 
A Baltimore native, Schuerholz left his junior high school teaching position to join the Orioles front office in 1966. Two years later he became an administrative assistant with the expansion Royals and worked his way up to farm director in 1975, and Vice President of Player Personnel in 1979. Finally, in October 1981 the Royals named him GM, promoting incumbent Joe Burke to president.
 
The Kansas City team he inherited had won the AL pennant in 1980, but slipped below .500 in the strike-shortened 1981 season. In one of his first moves he hoped to fill a couple of needs for his mostly veteran team by swapping several young players for Vida Blue and outfielder Jerry Martin. The team rebounded to 90 wins in 1982, but Blue and Martin proved a distraction in 1983, as a cocaine investigation dogged them and other players. After the season those two, along with stars Willie Wilson and Willie Mays Aikens, pleaded guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison.
 
Rather than try to rebuild his aging rotation with veterans, in 1984 Schuerholz introduced a trio of young starters: Bret Saberhagen (20), Mark Gubicza (21), and Danny Jackson (22). For 1985 he acquired veteran catcher Jim Sundberg to help his young staff acclimate, and in conjunction with offensive mainstays George Brett, Frank White, Willie Wilson, Steve Balboni and Lonnie Smith (the last two great trade acquisitions by Schuerholz), Kansas City won the franchise’s first and so far only World Series.
 
Over the remainder of the 1980s, the Royals remained at the margin of the division race but could not capture another title. The team made some astute draft picks, such as Bo Jackson, but Schuerholz also made what he considered his worst deal, swapping David Cone for Ed Hearn, and some suspect free agent signings towards the end of the decade. By this time the Royals executive suite was becoming a little unwieldy; the two owners were not in complete agreement, and Burke remained tangentially involved as well.
 
In October 1990 Schuerholz joined the Atlanta Braves as GM with full authority over baseball operations. He inherited a franchise coming off a last place finish that had not been relevant for some time. Nevertheless, the team had a solid core of young pitchers: John Smoltz, Tom Glavine, and Steve Avery, plus outfielders Ron Gant and David Justice. As he had back in Kansas City, Schuerholz went to work to support his young hurlers, acquiring four solid defensive players: Sid Bream, Rafael Belliard, Terry Pendleton, and Otis Nixon. Pendleton had a great hitting season and won the league MVP, and the Braves won their first pennant since 1958 before losing in the World Series. With pretty much the same line up the team captured the flag the next year but again fell short in the World Series.
 
Schuerholz was not typically a participant in the big name free agent auctions, but prior to the 1993 season, the Braves rocked the baseball world by signing free-agent Greg Maddux, the 26-year-old ace of the Chicago Cubs, to bolster a pitching staff that was already the envy of the league. Maddux responded with the second of his four straight Cy Young awards.
 
The Braves could not have maintained their success for a decade without a continual influx of talent. The team that won the World Series in 1995 was much different than the one that had lost four years earlier: five of the eight position players, two starting pitchers, most of the bench and all of the bullpen had turned over. When the Braves lost the World Series in 1999, five of the eight position players, two starters, and all of the bench and bullpen were different from the champions of 1995.
 
Schuerholz made several impressive trades to keep his team competitive, but more importantly he continually addressed aging and ineffective players with internal solutions (if available) as opposed trading his prospects for aging veterans. Good teams are often reluctant to give significant roles to untested players. The Braves of the early 1990s had several veteran journeymen that needed replacing within a few years. What set the Braves apart from other great teams of the past generation is their willingness to give regular roles to the jewels of their farm system. When Terry Pendleton or Ron Gant needed replacing, Schuerholz did not trade his young talent for veteran solutions. In 1994 the Braves gave starting positions to Javy Lopez and Ryan Klesko, and within two years both Chipper Jones and Andruw Jones were key players. Later still, Rafael Furcal, Marcus Giles and Adam LaRoche claimed jobs.
 
Schuerholz often liked to note that the Braves on average turned over ten players on their roster every year. “One of the key responsibilities we have as general managers is managing change effectively,” he said. “I think it’s true in any business. We exist in an environment where change occurs in a bizarre fashion at a bizarre pace. We have to keep our antennas up and keep our minds open. We have to understand that change in inevitable, especially in our business, where we rely on human beings to perform physically, and we have to be able to manage the changes that are required in an effective manner.”
 
A comparison to the Cleveland Indians of the 1990s under general manager John Hart (now Schuerholz’s GM in Atlanta) is instructive. Hart built a great team in Cleveland that blossomed in 1994-96, but as holes emerged he seemed reluctant to fill them from within the organization. Over the next few years he dealt such players as Sean Casey, Danny Graves, Jeromy Burnitz, Albie Lopez, Brian Giles, and Richie Sexon, often acquiring a veteran player who proved less productive than a possible internal solution.
 
One of the reasons the Braves magnificent run eventually ended is because the farm system could not continue to produce stars the way it had in the mid-1990s, putting additional pressure on Schuerholz’s trades and free agent signings. Nevertheless, even in 2002 and 2003, twelve years after Schuerholz’s first division title the team was still winning 101 games a year.
 
After the 2007 season Schuerholz was named team president, and he promoted Frank Wren to GM. After a few mediocre years, the Braves returned to the postseason in 2010, making it again in 2012 and 2013. After missing the playoffs in 2014 Schuerholz dismissed Wren and made Hart the GM.
 
The Atlanta Braves from 1991 to 2005 enjoyed one of the most impressive runs of success by a franchise in baseball history. The team has been underrated because they navigated through the post-season unscathed only once, but Schuerholz’s maneuvering that kept this team at the top for fourteen years is truly remarkable. When added to his legacy in Kansas City, Schuerholz clearly merits a ranking among the best ten general managers ever.
 
To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store.

This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, crossposting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post.
 
After the 1996 season Florida Marlins owner Wayne Huizinga—angling for a new publicly financed stadium–asked general manager Dave Dombrowski what it would take to produce a winner the following season. Dombrowski didn’t prevaricate. He told his boss that he would deliver if allowed to take the payroll from around $31 million (in the lower third of the league) to roughly $44.5 million (near the top). Huizinga told him to go for it, and Dombrowski went to work, pulling the levers masterfully. In the end he overspent his projection by a couple of million but brought South Florida a World Series champion in only their fifth season of major league baseball. Once in a while you really can deliver on demand.
 
When he first took over the Expos in mid-1988, the 31-year-old Dombrowski was the youngest GM in baseball. Three years later he moved on to Florida where he assembled the World Series champion before salvaging a respectable return when forced to dismantle it. Finally, in Detroit, his third and current GM job, he rebuilt a struggling franchise, delivering two pennants and a recent string of division titles. Overall, Dombrowski’s won-loss record as a GM is less than stellar because he spent much of his time building up from the bottom. But at his two stops of any length, Dombrowski turned hapless franchises into winners with staying power—though only in Detroit was he allowed to execute on his longer term plans.
 
When Dombrowski told his eighth grade teacher as part of a student survey that he wanted to be a big league GM, she told him, “I can’t put that down. Nobody wants to do that.” But Dombrowski was persistent. His college thesis at Western Michigan was titled “The General Manager: The Man in the Middle.” After graduation, White Sox GM Roland Hemond appreciated Dombrowski’s passion and brains and gave him a job. A decade later he was in charge of the Expos.
 
Immediately after taking over in July 1988 Dombrowski pulled the trigger on a couple of trades, showing that he would be aggressive despite, or possibly because of, his youth. The next year Charles Bronfman, the original Expos owner, was thinking of selling, but wanted one more crack at a championship. Accordingly, with the team in contention at mid-season, Dombrowski made a couple deals for veteran pitchers, one of which turned out regrettably when he included a young Randy Johnson in a deal for ace pitcher Mark Langston. The Expos finished 81- 81 for the third consecutive year and many of their best players, such as Langston, Hubie Brooks, Pascual Perez, and Bryn Smith, left as free agents. They also failed to sign their first round draft pick, catcher Charles Johnson.
 
Bolstered by three rookies in 1990—Marquis Grissom, Larry Walker, and Delino DeShields—Montreal overcame its free agent losses and jumped to 85 wins. Rule 5 pickup Bill Sampen led the team in victories; free agent pick up Oil Can Boyd started 31 games with a 2.93 ERA; and Dombrowski acquired Moises Alou in a midseason trade. For his efforts Dombrowski was named UPI baseball executive of the year. Unfortunately, the team dropped back to 71 wins in 1991, despite a similar lineup (though Dombrowski had swapped Tim Raines—past his dominant prime–for Ivan Calderon and Barry Jones before the season).
 
As the 1991 season dragged on, Dombrowski grew more frustrated with his financial constraints. In September he joined the expansion Florida Marlins to build an organization and team for the inaugural 1993 season. The Expos organization he left behind contained many of the players that would contribute on the 1994 squad that would have the best record in baseball. Drafted and signed amateurs during his three plus years at the helm included Rondell White, Ugueth Urbina, Chris Haney, Cliff Floyd, Mark Grudzielanek, Matt Stairs, and Kirk Rueter.
 
In Florida, Dombrowski set about building the club’s system, bringing in a bevy of veteran scouts from Montreal and elsewhere. With his first pick in the 1992 amateur draft Dombrowski again nabbed Charles Johnson, whom he drafted and lost in Montreal. At the expansion draft Dombrowski picked up a number of useful veterans to either play or trade: Brian Harvey, Trevor Hoffman, Carl Everett, Jeff Conine, Greg Hibbard, and Danny Jackson. Dombrowski also made a huge trade that first season, landing 24-year-old Gary Sheffield and also dealt for future closer Rob Nen.
 
By 1995 Dombrowski realized that the team’s pitching was not as far along as its hitting, so in December he signed two quality undervalued hurlers: Kevin Brown and Al Leiter. For 1996, he also introduced 19-year-old Columbian signee Edgar Renteria. Their fourth season was the Marlins most successful in team history (every year they had won more games than the year before). But Huizenga wanted to accelerate the process.
 
To put the Marlins over the top, Dombrowski bolstered his squad with three of the top free agents on the market, Alex Fernandez, Bobby Bonilla, and Moises Alou, and several key role players. He also hired manager Jim Leyland, who had recently resigned from the Pirates. The team qualified for the postseason as the NL wildcard and went on to win the World Series.
 
But Huizenga did not get the stadium he wanted, claimed to be losing money, and wanted out of baseball. He gave Dombrowski the opposite directive of the one he had given twelve months earlier: drastically reduce payroll to make the team more saleable. If the rise of the Marlins was steady and unrelenting, the fall was startlingly swift. By Thanksgiving, Dombrowski had traded Alou, Nen, Conine, and Devon White. By New Year’s Day, Brown, Dennis Cook, and Kurt Abbott were also ex-Marlins. The 1998 team, the defending World Champions, finished 54-108, one of the worst records of the expansion era.
 
After the team’s sale, Dombrowski began to rebuild the team’s talent level under new owner John Henry, though the team maintained one of baseball’s lowest payrolls. At the conclusion of the 2001 season, with the team’s future in doubt, Dombrowski moved on to the Detroit Tigers as team president. He left behind a nucleus that would become (or used as trade chips to build) the 2003 world championship club.
 
In 2001 the Tigers had finished below .500 for the eighth consecutive year, and owner Mike Ilitch wanted a strong hand in charge. In April 2002 Dombrowski assumed the GM mantle as well. He quickly realized that his rebuilding task was even more daunting than it appeared on the surface. The Tigers were burdened with a number of bad contracts with injured or non-productive players. At an ill-advised “private” venting in front of some season ticket holders, Dombrowski named Craig Paquette, Dean Palmer, Damion Easley, Matt Anderson, Danny Patterson, Bobby Higginson, and Steve Sparks. Basically untradeable, these seven players, under contract for roughly $40 million, accounted for a huge portion of the payroll. The 2002 team finished 55 – 106, with little payroll flexibility. Dombrowski had his work cut out for him.
 
The next season was even worse. The 2003 Tigers started 3-25 en route to 119 losses, one shy of the 1962 Mets all-time record. Once again, however, Dombrowski was slowly rebuilding his team at a steady pace, using many sources. And as in his early days in Florida, his owner would pay up for scouts and front office executives. Dombrowski also brought in Jim Leyland, his World Series manager in Florida, after the 2005 season. His rebuilding culminated in the 2006 pennant.
 
Nearly all the key 2006 players were acquired under Dombrowski’s reign. Fireballing hurlers John Verlander and Joel Zumaya and center fielder Curtis Granderson came from the draft; infielders Placido Polanco and Carlos Guillen were trade acquisitions; Ivan Rodriguez was signed as free agent in February 2004, as much to make a statement as for his abilities, and Magglio Ordonez was signed a year later, overpriced but useful nonetheless; Todd Jones was signed as a free agent for 2005, and Kenny Rogers for 2006; Chris Shelton was a Rule 5 draftee; and Nate Robertson and Jeremy Bonderman were both acquired as youngsters early in Dombrowski’s tenure as part of veteran for prospects deals.
 
When several players suffered injuries in 2007 the team fell back, and Dombrowski realized he needed to again retool his squad. In December he made a huge trade, sending top prospects to Florida for Miguel Cabrera and Dontrelle Willis. The latter was coming off of a Cy Young runner up season, but was never healthy or effective in Detroit. Cabrera, however, became one of the best players in the game. Dombrowski’s trade record for the next few years was uncanny—he always seemed to know when to trade prospects for veterans or vice-versa. Moreover, he once again needed to maneuver around large contracts with players who no longer justified them, such as Willis and Ordonez.
 
In late 2009 in a three-way swap he surrendered Curtis Granderson, but received Austin Jackson and Max Scherzer. Going back the other way, at mid-season in 2010 and 2011 he landed first Jhonny Peralta and then Doug Fister for prospects. In another great trade at mid-season in 2012 he landed Omar Infante and Anibal Sanchez for several more farm hands. Enough of the prospects Dombrowski didn’t trade, such as Alex Avila and Rick Porcello, developed into quality major leaguers, injecting some youth into the team.
 
Dombrowski also showed a knack for finding undervalued free agents and signing them for reasonable contracts, including Jose Valverde (before 2011), Victor Martinez (2011), Brad Penny (2011), and Torii Hunter (2013). After appearing to overpay for Prince Fielder, Dombrowski swapped him for Ian Kinsler to regain some payroll flexibility.
 
Dombrowski’s astute roster manipulation led to four consecutive division titles and one pennant from 2011 to 2014. Several recent more suspect trades, free agent losses, and an apparently thin farm system give some pause as to how much longer the string can continue. But Dombrowski has demonstrated an uncanny knack for both rebuilding teams and keeping them competitive. With Dombrowski in charge Detroit should remain a relevant and competitive franchise.
 
To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store.

#25 — Andy MacPhail
 
This post is part of a series in which Mark Armour and I count down the 25 best GMs in history, crossposting from our blog. For an explanation, please see this post.
 
Andy MacPhail had big shoes to fill. Both his father Lee and his grandfather Larry are in the Hall of Fame as baseball executives. When the Minnesota Twins promoted the 33-year-old MacPhail to run the club, they surely took his pedigree into account. He lived up to his surname, and his surprisingly quick success cemented a wave of extremely young GMs, a couple with similar front office bloodlines.
 
Coming out of college in 1976 MacPhail knew he wanted a career in a baseball front office and thought he had lined up a position with the Montreal Expos. Unfortunately, when the American League awarded an expansion franchise to Toronto that spring, creating a second major league team in Canada, the Expos were so dismayed with American League president Lee MacPhail that they rescinded the employment offer to Lee’s son. Andy quickly rebounded, taking a positon with the Cubs in park operations and player development. In early 1982, just 28, he joined Houston as assistant to general manager Al Rosen.
 
New Minnesota Twins owner Carl Pohlad brought in MacPhail as vice president of player personnel in 1985 and one year later made him general manager, at 33 the youngest GM in baseball. The Twins had been mired in mediocrity or worse for the previous decade and a half; nevertheless the squad MacPhail took over had a number of talented young homegrown players, including Kirby Puckett, Kent Hrbek, Gary Gaetti, and Frank Viola.
 
MacPhail made several moves to bolster his nucleus with veteran talent, trading for left fielder Dan Gladden and closer Jeff Reardon and signing reliever Juan Berenguer. The 1987 Twins crept up to 85 wins, but it was enough to win a weak AL West and beat the Tigers in the ALCS. When the Twins defeated the Cardinals in the 1987 World Series, everyone associated with the team became a regional hero, perhaps because other than the Minneapolis Lakers in the late 1940s and early 1950s (before the NBA was popularly established as a national league), no Minnesota professional team had won a championship in any of the four major sports. MacPhail was hailed as “Boy Wonder.”
 
Despite his quick success, MacPhail recognized that lower revenue teams could only compete cyclically and that a team needed a solid crop of low-salaried youngsters and under-appreciated veterans who could ripen concurrently, leaving some payroll available to plug holes with free agents. Sensing the team was not ready to compete for a title, in 1989 MacPhail traded Viola, the previous year’s Cy Young Award Winner, for several players, most notably pitchers Rick Aguilera and Kevin Tapani. The Twins fell to last place in 1990, but MacPhail felt his restructured team had enough talent and some payroll flexibility.
 
Before the 1991 season he signed free agents Mike Pagliarulo, Jack Morris, and Chili Davis, while farm products Chuck Knoblauch and Scott Erickson came through with star-quality seasons. The team won 95 games, going from last to first in their division, and again prevailed in a seven game World Series. More than two decades later, these two Twins World Series victories remain Minnesota’s only substantive men’s professional sports championships. During his stint in Minnesota MacPhail was brilliant at managing his payroll, recognizing when he had a team close to contention, and using his payroll capacity to acquire in the right veterans.
 
MacPhail’s success helped usher in a new era of very young GMs. Oakland had hired Sandy Alderson in 1983, and Texas had brought in Tom Grieve a year later—both just 35—but after MacPhail the minimum age fell even further. Dave Dombrowski and Jim Bowden were only 31 and Randy Smith just 29 when hired. Smith and Bill Bavasi, just 36 when he became a GM, were like MacPhail scions of successful front office executives. Somewhat surprisingly, other than by Alderson, the analytic revolution that was slowly seeping into baseball before Moneyball was not really embraced by this generation of young GMs.
 
The Twins remained competitive in 1992, but fell off quickly thereafter as several players left as free agents, the pitching deteriorated, and several younger players performed below expectations. With rapidly increasing salaries throughout baseball after an arbitrator ruled the owners had been colluding to keep salaries down, MacPhail was becoming increasingly pessimistic on the future of small market clubs. “I can’t make it work anymore,” MacPhail said regarding even his successful cyclic approach to building a competitive team.
 
After a players strike shut down the final phase of the 1994 baseball season, the Tribune Company hired MacPhail to be president and CEO of the Cubs, one of baseball’s most venerable but long-suffering teams. As his title implied, MacPhail was responsible for the entire franchise and named Ed Lynch his general manager. MacPhail intended to build a “development-based” organization while at the same time bringing in veterans to keep Chicago competitive in a weak division.
 
In mid-2000, after just one playoff appearance in five years, MacPhail jettisoned Lynch and assumed the GM duties himself. He got the club up to 88 wins in 2001, but the next July MacPhail named Jim Hendry the GM. In 2003 the Cubs won 88 games and qualified for the playoffs, where the team advanced to the NLCS, before losing a heartbreaking seven game series to the Marlins. The Cubs would not make the post season again under MacPhail’s reign, and he resigned after a disappointing 66-96 record in 2006. Certainly the Cubs suffered some bad luck—phenom pitchers Kerry Wood and Mark Prior pitched 200 or more innings only three times between them due to injuries–but the farm system did not deliver as expected and several prospects were traded away with little substantive return. In contrast, MacPhail was highly successful in the off-field part of his job, as attendance and revenues surged during his 12 years at the helm.
 
MacPhail was not unemployed for long; in mid-2007 Orioles owner Peter Angelos brought him aboard as president of baseball operations, acting as a general manager with considerable authority. Baltimore had fallen on hard times since consecutive ALCS trips in the late 1990s, winning fewer than 80 games every year from 1998 to 2007, but MacPhail again hoped to create a “top echelon scouting and development franchise.” When the farm system appeared to be more efficient at developing pitching, MacPhail’s strategy evolved to “buy the bats and grow the arms.”
 
Unfortunately, many of the young hurlers never progressed as hoped, and the Orioles lost over 90 games every season through 2011, after which MacPhail resigned. The next year Baltimore was baseball’s surprise team; they won 93 games and made the playoffs, mostly with a team built by MacPhail. Although he wasn’t around to enjoy it, MacPhail’s farm system and savvy trades for the likes of Adam Jones, Mark Reynolds, J.J. Hardy, and Chris Davis left the Orioles with a solid talent base.
 
To read more about the history of baseball operations and the GM, please buy our new book In Pursuit of Pennants–Baseball Operations from Deadball to Moneyball via the publisher or at your favorite on-line store.